EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

National Pride and the Meanings of 'Europe': A Comparative Study of Britain and Spain

by

Pablo Jáuregui

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view
to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the
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Florence
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B/C →

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Prof. Christian Joppke (EUI – supervisor)
Prof. Stephen Mennell (University College Dublin)
Prof. Gianfranco Poggi (EUI – co-supervisor)

Florence
September 2001

Para Kira

Acknowledgements

I have never been a rock-climber in the literal sense, but my experience of writing a doctoral dissertation has often reminded me of this daring, high-risk form of athletic endurance. You start at the bottom of a jagged, intimidating mountain, carrying only a vague and confusing map with which to orientate yourself, and feeling considerable uncertainty about whether in the end, the highest peak will actually be reached. On your way up, there are wonderfully gratifying moments of pride and self-confidence, when you can really feel that substantial progress is being made. However, there are also terrifying moments of total panic when it seems like all your efforts are utterly futile, and the most prudent option is surely to throw in the towel, before the consequences of a potential fall become too dangerous for your physical and psychological health. Then, when you least expect it, the worst moment suddenly hits you. This is when the summit finally becomes visible, but it seems as if you simply do not have the necessary energy and stamina to get there. At that point, defeatism easily sets in, and the temptation to give up can become excruciatingly strong. Yet if you pull yourself together, and ultimately manage to conquer those last painful meters, the view from the top really is as beautiful and spectacular as everyone who got there before you had promised that it would be.

I would firstly like to thank the European University Institute, and particularly its Department of Political and Social Sciences, for depositing its trust in me, and thereby granting me the privilege of carrying out this research project at the Badia Fiesolana. For the same reason, I must also thank the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and specifically its Salvador de Madariaga programme of grants for doctoral research.

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To Árpad Szakolczai, I shall always be grateful for literally putting Norbert Elias's *What is Sociology?* in my hands the very first time I went to see him in his office, and for providing me with a great deal of theoretical orientation, as well as warm encouragement (including his insistence, during my third year, that the time had come for me to publish something), during the period when his presence at the EUI coincided with mine.

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Throughout the past four years, I have also had the good fortune of receiving much crucial feed-back and support from several external professors, to whom I am also greatly indebted. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Joaquín Abellán, for his kind encouragement from the moment I met him, through a fortuitous *carambola de la vida*, and above all for offering me the opportunity of participating in his research project on the idea of Europe in Spanish political discourse, within the EU's PRESTIGE TMR network; Stephen Mennell, for the warm enthusiasm with which he responded to my ideas since the day he came to deliver an illuminating lecture on Norbert Elias, within the framework of Gianfranco Poggi's seminar on Comparative Historical Sociology; Dennis Smith, for inviting me to contribute a paper within the framework of his *Whose Europe?* volume; Luis Moreno, for his constructive criticisms, as well as his kind support, both during his time as a Jean Monnet fellow at the EUI, as well as in our meetings in Madrid, especially during the unforgettable *paella* meal which we shared in January 2001; Jack Barbalet, Cris Shore, and Montserrat Guibernau, for providing critical comments, as well as encouraging remarks, on my work in progress; Sophie Chevalier, Eric Dunning, Johann Goudsblom, Hermann Korte, and Artur Bogner, for the kindness and enthusiasm with which they responded to the paper I presented at the 'International Congress on Norbert Elias and Social Anthropology' in Metz; and finally, Wilfried Spohn, Anna Triandafyllidou, Paloma Aguilar and José Ignacio Torreblanca, for offering me the chance to participate in EURONAT, a new research project which has allowed me to finish my thesis with bright academic prospects for the future.

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The EUI is a place where a great deal of anthropologically fascinating 'interaction ritual' takes place every day between people of many different cultural backgrounds, in which national groupings occasionally huddle together to ridicule 'the others' behind their backs. Much more importantly, however, it is also a place where, in spite of the national stereotypes which we all inevitably carry around in our heads, and the symbolic boundaries we tend to construct, genuine friendships are gradually built amongst the people who work there, irrespective of all such mental barriers. This has certainly been my experience, and so for all the many things we have shared, I would especially like to thank Dani, Craig, Javier, Jean-Pierre, Carsten, Juanma, María José, Teresa, Amalia, Oscar, Marc, Susana, Elia, Antonio, Nadia, Jackie, Giampiero, Lia, Tatiana and Makis, Sigfrido and Nathalie, Helder and Annabela, Marta and Cosimo, Graciela and Fred, Mariano, Yael, and Malena, Anja and Yasmine, Caroline and Asher, Maarten, Marta, and Cristina, Paolo, Olivia, and Carlotta, Ana Rosa, Paolo, and Ariadna, Alison, Karen, Klaus, Jens, and Maria Paola.

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Last, but evidently not least, I thank Kira, to whom this thesis is dedicated, *por supuesto*, for coming with me to Florence, for staying with me, and for always standing by me.

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Abstract

This thesis has two fundamental objectives. On the one hand, at the level of theoretical generalization, it aims to make a contribution to the study of collective identities, and more specifically, of national identities within the context of European integration. On the other, at the level of empirical investigation, it aims to compare how the collective ideals, memories, and sentiments of two national communities, Britain and Spain, have conditioned the diverse symbolic representations of 'Europe' which have emerged over the course of time in the public spheres of these two particular case-studies.

The thesis is divided into four parts. In my initial introductory section, I outline a theoretical and methodological approach to the study of national identity, which fundamentally stresses the *affective* dimension of this phenomenon. Following the insights of Norbert Elias – as well as of earlier sociological thinkers such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and also of contemporary authors such as Thomas Scheff and Pierre Bourdieu –, I argue that national identities should be understood as the historically developed (and developing) *we-images* and *we-feelings* which human beings collectively share about themselves as members of national communities. In particular, I focus on the collective emotions of relative superiority and inferiority, or pride and shame, which nationalized individuals experience in response to their nation's triumphs and defeats in different fields of international status-competition, such as those of political strength, economic prosperity, cultural prestige, moral respectability, and so on. At the same time, I emphasize that such national ideals and emotions should be analyzed as historically conditioned, politically contested symbols and sentiments which are constantly invoked in the discursive struggles for power and legitimacy which take place in contemporary nation-state societies.

In the next two sections, I empirically apply this theoretical and methodological approach, by carrying out a comparative and historical analysis of the different collective representations and symbolic meanings of 'Europe' which have gradually emerged in the particular national contexts of Britain and Spain, since the end of the Second World War. In particular, I focus on the dominant political and media discourses on the EEC/EU which arose in these two countries at three critical junctures of their relations with the process of European integration: their initial failed attempts to 'enter Europe'; their eventual successful accesions 'into Europe'; and their diverse responses to the birth of the 'European Union', which was officially established by the Treaty of Maastricht. My fundamental argument throughout this analysis is that while in Britain, the idea of 'Europe' became widely associated with a decline of national status after the loss of 'world power', in Spain, on the contrary, this concept symbolized a crucial enhancement of national prestige following the collapse of a 'backward dictatorship'.

Finally, in my concluding section, I suggest that this sharp symbolic and emotional contrast between the cases of Britain and Spain demonstrates that the development of the European Union has not eroded or eliminated the collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood. On the contrary, national we-images and we-feelings should rather be seen as the fundamental factors which have conditioned, and are continuing to condition, the degrees of collective enthusiasm or hostility which are generally felt towards the project of European integration in the different member states of the EU.

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I. Introduction

"The question is not whether one thinks national pride is a good or bad thing. The fact is that it exists. If one looks around disinterestedly, it is evident all people in all states of the world have to come to terms with the problem of national pride."

Norbert Elias

1. Central Questions, Objectives, and Arguments

"Nations are not something eternal. They began, so they will come to an end. A European confederation will probably replace them."
Ernest Renan[1]

More than a century has passed since Renan made this prophetic statement in his celebrated lecture *What is a nation?*, delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882. To what extent can one say that this prophetic vision has come true? How far would it be accurate to claim that over the course of time, a supranational confederation has begun to replace the nations of Europe, and their respective nationalisms? Has the emergence of a European identity diminished the significance of Europe's separate national identities? It is certainly undeniable that since Renan's day, great progress has been made towards the goal of European unification. A new territorial unit has gradually emerged which today encompasses fifteen nation-states and is symbolically represented by a common name, the 'European Union', a number of 'European' political and legal institutions, a 'European' flag, a 'European' anthem, the 'Euro' currency, ritualized commemorations such as 'Europe Day', and so on.[2] In many ways, Renan seems to have hit the nail on the head, and Europe does appear to be moving towards an increasingly 'post-national era' (Touraine 1994).

Nevertheless, one has only to consider the euphoric passions ignited by athletic contests such as the World Cup or the Olympic Games in order to realize that the ideals and sentiments of nationhood have hardly disappeared within the context of the European Union.[3] There is nothing on the European level which remotely resembles the collective enthusiasm that is generated by

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[1] From *What is a Nation?*, reprinted in Woolf (ed., 1996: 59).

[2] The symbolic strategies which the officials of the European Commission have adopted to construct a 'European consciousness' and to build up a 'European patriotism' amongst the nation-states of the EU has been comprehensively explored in several articles by the anthropologist Cris Shore (1993, 1995), as well as in his recent book *Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (2000). See also Shore's collaborative ethnographic studies with Annabel Black (1992, 1994).

[3] As Michael Mann has put it, 'watching the Olympic Games or other events transformed into displays of emotional nationalist pageantry, it is difficult to believe that the nation-state is finished' (1993:118). The igniting of national sentiments in modern sports competitions was highlighted and fruitfully investigated by Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning in *Quest for Excitement* (1986).

the sporting events in which millions of people indulge in the excitement of watching the national representatives compete against each other on football pitches, athletic tracks, and s on. Indeed, a quick look at any newspaper can reveal what Michael Billig (1995) has called th 'banal nationalism' of the contemporary world: the taken-for-granted, routine ways in whic every nation's achievements are constantly promoted or 'flagged' in the daily language of th mass media, highlighting national triumphs not just in athletic arenas, but in political, economi cultural, and many other spheres of international competition. Within each of the EU's membe states, governmental decisions and policies concerning 'Europe' are in fact typically legitimate by invoking the defence of 'national interests' (Ruane 1994). Hence, as soon one takes int account this continuing resilience of national ideals and sentiments, it becomes clear tha Renan's vision of Europe hardly fits the facts at this stage, and that the conclusion reached b Raymond Aron more than thirty years ago still sounds like a much more accurate description c reality: 'I believe that consciousness of the nation remains infinitely stronger than a sense c Europe... The old nations still live in the hearts of men, and love of the European nation is nc yet born, assuming that it ever will be' (1964: 60-61).

However, is it always right to assume that people's emotional attachments to 'the ol nations' are necessarily incompatible with 'a love for the European nation'? Are nationa sentiments insurmountable obstacles which can only stand in the way of European unification Should 'nationalism' and 'Europeanism' be seen as irreconcilable enemies or polar opposite that cannot co-exist with one another? This certainly seems to be a widespread belief. On historian of the 'European idea', for instance, has written that 'national consciousness... is mos inimical to unity of any sort' (Albrecht-Carrié 1965: 79). Another writer has suggested tha 'national identity... is the biggest stumbling block on the road towards a united Europe (Odermatt 1991: 220). Indeed, the project of European integration is often depicted as a heroi struggle *against* 'nationalism'. Like in Renan's prophecy, many supporters of 'Europeanism' hope that loyalty to a new supranational confederation will ultimately transcend, erode, and

replace the traditional sentiments attached to nation-states, which are seen as selfish and dangerous emotions.[4]

As numerous authors have pointed out, the project of European integration was fundamentally launched 'in opposition to the nationalist, the atavistic instincts' (Gladwyn 1967: 58) and 'the welter of ultra-nationalistic attitudes' (Davies 1996: 42) which were held to be responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. In the years that followed this devastating conflict, 'the reaction against nationalism went naturally together with the notion of European solidarity' (Seton-Watson 1985: 12), and hence 'committed "Europeans" saw European union as *replacing* the failed nation-states out of which it would be built' (Wallace 1990: 63-4). In this way, as Swedberg (1994: 383-384) has written, the ideal of a 'United Europe' became a sacred 'totem' for many European politicians and intellectuals, which was symbolically constructed 'in opposition to the Nazis' glorification of the national state'. Not surprisingly, therefore, when Winston Churchill famously called for the creation of 'a kind of United States of Europe' in the influential speech he delivered at Zurich in September 1946, he fervently condemned the 'frightful nationalistic quarrels, originated by the Teutonic nations, which we have seen even in this twentieth century and in our lifetime, wreck the peace and mar the prospects of all mankind' (1994 [1946]: 6). In order to prevent such a tragedy from falling upon the peoples of Europe in the future, the British leader proposed the following remedy, in his characteristically eloquent, impassioned rhetoric:

> Why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent, and why should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings in shaping the destinies of men?... If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past.(1994 [1946]: 7).

[4] This 'Europeanist' opposition to 'nationalism' has a very long and venerable intellectual history. As Alan Bance (1992: 3) has shown, during the Enlightenment figures such as Erasmus and Montaigne rejected national pride as 'petty self-love', and proposed to replace it with a utopian project of continental 'peace and concord'. Derek Heater (1992) and Joseph Weiler (1998) have also explored the symbolic value of 'Europe' as a pacifist ideal.

From a 'Europeanist' standpoint, some contemporary writers have therefore lamented the fa that today, 'a European feeling' does not yet exist, due to 'the predominant emotional fixation (our nation-states' (Papcke 1992: 66), and that the 'nationalism of the peoples' still remains o1 of the 'major problems besetting the idea of a European supernation-state' (Llobera 1994: 207).

In this thesis, I shall take a closer look at the relation between national sentiments and tl process of European integration, by analyzing how 'Europe' has been collectively perceived an symbolically represented in two current member states of the EU: Britain and Spain.[5] M objective will be to show that it can be highly misleading to make a rigid distinction betwee national and European affiliations, as if these two spheres of collective identification wer necessarily opposed to each other or mutually incompatible.

Anthony Smith, one of the leading scholars in the field of nations and nationalism, ha rightly pointed out that 'although there have been many studies of the economic organization and political institutions of the European Community, relatively little attention has been devote to the cultural and psychological issues associated with European unification -- to questions o meaning, values, and symbolism' (1992: 57). At the same time, the proponents of a nove 'anthropology of Europe' have recently promoted the study of 'what Europe means to differen groups and individuals, and the many ways in which they conceptualize and talk about Europe ir relation to their own identity' (Goddard, Llobera, and Shore 1994: 30). My thesis aims to make a contribution to this field of sociological and anthropological inquiry, by analyzing how the meaning of 'Europe' has been influenced in two countries by different national memories, aspirations, and sentiments.[6]

Throughout this study, I shall particularly focus on the rather neglected *affective* dimension of national identity. On the whole, social scientists have not paid much attention to emotional phenomena (at least not explicitly), although in recent years there has been a growing interest in

[5] Although in both of these countries there are strong sub-state nationalist movements, in this thesis I have focused on the national ideals and sentiments represented by the central state, i.e. the concepts of British and Spanish nationhood, and their relationship to the process of European integration.

[6] Other authors who have promoted this line of research in recent works are Macdonald (ed., 1993), Wilterdink (1993), Wilson (ed., 1993), García (ed., 1994), Zetterholm (ed., 1994), Jenkins and Sofos (eds., 1996), Kapteyn (1996), Wintle (1996), Hedetoft (1994, 1997,1998), and Smith and Wright (eds., 1999).

the role that feelings and sentiments play in human societies.[7] Randall Collins (1990: 27-8), for instance, has suggested that many of the central concepts of classic sociological theory such as 'solidarity', 'values', 'conflict', 'legitimacy', and 'status' implicitly refer to emotional processes, and hence that a more direct focus on the emotions would undoubtedly improve our understanding of the social world. Similarly, in his recent book *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure* (1998), the British sociologist Jack Barbalet has cogently argued that emotions such as shame, fear, vengefulness, and resentment are crucial to understand many social processes, and therefore that emotion concepts can fruitfully be applied to the development of sociological explanation and theory building.

It is noteworthy that the so-called 'founding fathers' of sociology devoted considerable attention to the emotions, although this aspect of the 'classical' legacy seems to have been largely forgotten and abandoned. For instance, when Emile Durkheim originally defined the nature of 'social facts' in his *Rules of Sociological Method*, he spoke not only of 'ways of acting and thinking', but also of 'ways of *feeling*' which are 'invested with a coercive power' by virtue of which they 'exercise control' over the behaviour of individuals (1982 [1895]: 52, my italics). Furthermore, in his writings on education, Durkheim explicitly stated that 'we are not purely rational beings; we are also *emotional creatures*' (1961 [1925]: 112, my italics]), and he argued that people's 'moral actions' were fundamentally grounded on their 'emotional attachments' to particular social groups.[8] Max Weber, as well, was convinced that the nascent science of sociology necessarily had to focus on human emotions in order to understand the motives of what he called 'social action'. This is clearly reflected by the fact that when Weber defined the central concept of his sociological approach, the 'interpretation of meaning', he suggested that

[7] See, for instance, the recent volumes on the 'sociology of emotions' edited by Kemper (1990) and Bendelow and Williams (1998). My own interest in the relationship between emotions and society has been significantly inspired by the study of the human being as not only an *homo rationalis*, but also as an *homo emotionalis*, which has recently been proposed by the Spanish anthropologist José Antonio Jáuregui in his book *The Emotional Computer* (1995).

[8] By 'moral actions', Durkheim meant those actions that are motivated not by an individual's egoistic pursuit of his personal self-interests, but rather for the collective good of a society to which he belongs. On this aspect of Durkheimian sociology, see Robert T. Hall's study *Emile Durkheim: Ethics and the Sociology of Morals* (1987).

one effective methodological strategy which could be adopted to carry out this scientific was what he called 'emotional empathy':

> Emotional or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through sympathetic particip we can adequately grasp *the emotional context* in which the action took place.(1978 [1 20], my italics).

Weber's interest in the emotions was also particularly evident in his insightful analyse political conflict and status competition. For instance, in his lecture on *Politics as a Vocatio* pointed out that individuals often strive for positions of high ranking not to enrich themse economically, but rather for 'the prestige feeling that power gives' (1946a [1919]: 78-80 fact, both Durkheim and Weber have been key sources of inspiration for this thesis, since shall show later in this introductory section, they both emphasised the emotional dimensio national identity in their brief writings on this topic.

The importance of the emotions in human life was also repeatedly stressed by another figure in the history of sociology, Norbert Elias, whose insightful writings – after a very l period of almost total neglect – are finally gaining the attention which they undoubt deserve.[9] In the final, concluding synopsis of his magnum opus, *The Civilizing Process*, E wrote:

> Every investigation which considers only the consciousness of men, their 'reason' 'ideas', while disregarding the structure of drives, the direction of human affects passions, can be from the outset only of limited value. Much that is indispensable fo understanding of men escapes this approach.(1994a [1939]: 486)

In particular, Elias emphasized that what he called the 'emotional make-up' or 'habitus' human beings is never exclusively determined by an innate biological programming automatic instinct-mechanisms, but is always fundamentally conditioned and moulded by lo

[9] This is illustrated by the fact that three introductory studies have been published in English during the course the past decade on the work of Elias: Mennell (1992), Van Krieken (1998), and Smith (2001). My o understanding of Elias has been crucially guided by these three excellent books.

term sociohistorical processes. In this way, he demonstrated that people's emotional experiences clearly constitute a very important object of sociological investigation:

> To be sure, the possibility of feeling fear, just like that of feeling joy, is an unalterable part of human nature. But the strength, kind, and structure of the fears and anxieties that smoulder or flare in the individual never depend solely on his own 'nature' nor, at least in more complex societies, on the 'nature' in the midst of which he lives. They are always determined, finally, by the history and the actual structure of his relations to other people, by the structure of society; and they change together with it.(1994a [1939]: 520)

More recently, the American scholar Thomas Scheff – whose work has been significantly inspired by Elias[10] – has also cogently argued that sociology, and the social sciences in general, would undoubtedly be enriched by focusing much more attention on the emotional aspects of human life. In his latest book, *Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality*, Scheff has suggested that any analysis of social interaction which merely considers the cognitive aspects of people's discourse and their behaviour will always be necessarily incomplete, like the sounds made by 'a pianist playing only the left hand' (1997: 10-11). This is fundamentally because, as Scheff has explained in one of his illuminating studies on the affective dimensions of collective identity, 'the emotions are the psychological sides of social relationships, just as relationships are the social aspects of the emotions' (1994a: 298).

It is above all Elias's 'process-sociology', as well as the insightful writings of Scheff, which have inspired the theoretical and methodological approach I have adopted in this thesis. Both of these authors are undoubtedly major figures in what is today being called 'the sociology of emotions'. The seminal value of their ideas, however, has largely gone unnoticed, and has hardly become a part of the sociological mainstream. At a more general theoretical level, therefore, the comparative empirical research I have carried out on my two case-studies also aims to illustrate how the study of collective pride and shame which Elias and Scheff have pioneered can improve

[10] Scheff discovered Elias's work rather late in his career, but since then he has begun to employ and further develop several of Elias's concepts, such as the 'I-we balance' (1994b). Furthermore, he has called Elias 'a pioneer in the sociology of emotion' (1997), and has also written an essay entitled 'Rationality and Emotion' (1992) that explores the concept of shame in *The Civilizing Process*, and the subtitle of which is 'A Homage to Norbert Elias'.

our understanding of national identity – and, more specifically, of national identities in the context of European integration.

Following the insights of these innovative authors, as well as of other leading sociological and anthropological thinkers, this thesis shall compare the way in which sentiments of national pride, generated by shifting self-images of power and status, have conditioned the diverse meanings of 'Europe' which have emerged over the course of time in Britain and Spain. In particular, borrowing Barbalet's terminology (1999: 632), I shall focus on the *affective meanings* of 'Europe'[11] that have characterised the dominant discourses in the public spheres of my two case-studies – in other words, the diverse emotional charges which have been attached to this concept in these two countries. 'Europe' will therefore be studied as a contested, *multivocal* symbol, which has been differently represented in these two countries, depending on its perceived impact on national self-esteem.[12]

I have selected these two case-studies not only because they are the two European countries with which I am most familiar, both linguistically and culturally, but also because they offer a sharp symbolic and emotional contrast which can illustrate very clearly the varying effects which the collective sentiments of national pride may have in different sociohistorical contexts on the emergence of both positive and negative outlooks towards the EC/EU. As I shall argue throughout this thesis, while in Britain the idea of 'entering Europe' became widely associated with a decline of national status after the loss of 'world power', in Spain, on the contrary, this event represented a great enhancement of national prestige following the collapse of a 'backward dictatorship' and the successful transition to 'modernity' and 'democracy'. Hence, EC/EU

[11] 'Meaning, understood in terms of the ordering of references, can relate to both intelligibility and involvement. Formal meaning explicates relationships within a whole, thus making something intelligible, whereas what might be called *affective meaning* relates to what involvement a person has with an object or event, that is, how it matters to them' (Barbalet 1999: 632, my italics). Hence, what this thesis aims to explore is how 'Europe' has mattered emotionally to people in Britain and Spain, the kind of affective involvement they have had with the notion of being or becoming 'European'.

[12] The concept of symbolic 'multivocality' was coined by the anthropologist Victor Turner, who employed it to describe symbols which are 'susceptible of many meanings' (1974: 55). Turner's ideas have been further developed more recently by Anthony P. Cohen in *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (1989).

membership became a potent source of national pride for Spaniards, in a way which could hardly have been possible in Britain.

On the basis of this comparison, I shall propose that instead of making a sharp distinction between sociologically imprecise, value-laden terms such as 'nationalism' and 'Europeanism', one should rather consider the way in which national sentiments have provoked different degrees of enthusiasm or hostility towards the concept of 'becoming European' in each member state of the EU. From this perspective, the emotionally charged, collective self-images of nationhood, far from being suppressed or eroded by the process of European integration, can in fact be seen as the key factors which have determined the emergence of both favourable and unfavourable perceptions of the EU.

In the remainder of this introductory section, I shall outline the theoretical understanding of national identity which has guided my research, as well as the methodological approach I have employed.

2. We-images, we-feelings, and power struggles: a theoretical approach to the study of national identity

National identity can be conceptualized as one component of modern selfhood. By the term 'selfhood', I am simply referring to the uniquely human experience of self-consciousness: the symbolic conceptions and emotional sensations of a creature which, as George Herbert Mead (1934: 136) famously put it, can become 'an object to itself' through a process of social interaction with 'significant others'. In the contemporary world, most human beings think of themselves (among many other things) as members of collectivities they refer to as 'nations'. Hence, an individual may routinely state, in relation to himself: 'I am Spanish' or 'I am British'. Furthermore, as the athletic status-contest of the Olympic Games vividly illustrates, these same human beings often display an acute emotional sensitivity towards the shifting prestige-rank of their own particular nations. These symbolic and emotional components of national identity can be defined, following Norbert Elias (1991a), as 'we-images' and 'we-feelings': the ideas and sentiments which people acquire not in relation to who they are as unique individuals, but in relation to the human communities within which they symbolically classify themselves and to which they feel emotionally affiliated. The extent to which the national component of selfhood is valued may vary from individual to individual, but it seems undeniable that for many people, nationhood remains an important component of their self-understanding, as well as their self-esteem. At the same time, national identity clearly has a crucial political dimension, which has gradually developed over the course of a long-term, sociohistorical process: all modern states legitimate their authority more or less successfully, by claiming to represent a particular 'nation' within a particular territory. For this reason, those who are involved in the discursive struggles to acquire or maintain positions of power within each state constantly appeal to the collective we-images and we-feelings of their respective national communities in order to gain popular support.

I shall now explore these theoretical propositions in detail, firstly by delineating the symbolic and emotional dimensions of selfhood which can be experienced by individuals in any human society, and secondly by characterising the particularities of national identity as a

historically developed, symbolically constructed, emotionally charged, and politically contested component of selfhood in modern times.

2.1 The anthropological constants of selfhood: images of superiority or inferiority and feelings of pride or shame at both individual 'I' as well as collective 'we' levels

In order to come to grips with any cultural or sociohistorical variation of 'identity', such as the modern phenomenon of national we-images and we-feelings, one must firstly acquire some understanding of self-consciousness as a universal human experience.[1] Otherwise, it becomes rather difficult to comprehend which variable aspect of human society is actually being investigated in the first place. Nowadays, many social scientists frequently employ the term 'identity' without giving any precise indication of what they actually mean by this vague term.[2] In my view, this theoretical imprecision can only be overcome by attempting to delineate – albeit in a tentative and incomplete manner – what one could perhaps call the *anthropological constants of selfhood*. As Elias pointed out in *What is Sociology?*, an anthropological characterization of the universal 'constants' which exist in all human societies is indispensable to carry out effective analyses of any particular social reality: 'An empirically based conception of the similarities between all possible societies is essential to provide a frame of reference within which particular investigations may be carried out' (1978: 107).[3] More recently, Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 198), whose work has been significantly inspired by Elias,[4] has also

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[1] It is interesting to note that Marcel Mauss, who was an early pioneer in the study of selfhood as an evolving, sociohistorical phenomenon, asserted in the opening paragraphs of his classic essay on 'the category of the person', that 'there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical' (1985 [1938]: 3). In other words, before presenting his vision of how the notion of the 'self' had developed over the centuries, he attempted to define, however briefly and vaguely, an anthropological starting point: the universal nature of human self-consciousness.

[2] As Brubaker and Cooper have rightly complained, the concept of 'identity' tends to mean 'too much', 'too little', or 'nothing at all', due to its 'sheer ambiguity' (2000: 1).

[3] This is one of the things which I have found particularly illuminating in the writings of Elias: his attempt to characterize *both* the universal biological characteristics of the human species, as well as the changing development of human societies over the course of a long-term sociohistorical process. Underlying the 'process-sociology' of Elias, I would argue that there is an insightful anthropological vision, an attempt to define the uniquely malleable nature of humankind.

[4] In a tribute which was held to honour Elias at the University of Amsterdam, on the occasion of his 90th birthday in 1987, Bourdieu publically stated that Elias was 'one of his own intellectual forebears' (Mennell 1994: 1). Indeed, it

emphasised that in order to gain a clear grasp of what he calls 'the social game' in any given cultural or historical context, sociological research needs to be anthropologically grounded on a clear theoretical understanding of 'the universal characteristics of bodily existence.'[5]

Following some of the central ideas which have been proposed in the work of Elias and Scheff, as well as of other leading sociological and anthropological thinkers, I shall argue here that human selfhood can be understood as both a biological and cultural, symbolic and emotional, individual and collective phenomenon: an ongoing process of symbolic self-understanding, as well as a varying emotional state of greater or lesser self-esteem (pride or shame), which develops during the course of an individual's or a group's relations with other individuals or groups.

One can begin by pointing out that all healthy human beings are uniquely equipped with the biological capacity to orientate themselves in the world and communicate with others through the acquisition of symbols (Elias 1991b). As the great German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1944: 25-6) argued, man is fundamentally an *animal symbolicum* who lives in a 'symbolic universe' of his own creation.[6] From the beginning of their lives, all newborn human babies not only can but must undergo a socio-psychological process of symbol-learning within a particular linguistic community, and this crucially includes the internalization of symbols about themselves, or self-symbols. Although it has become fashionable to define the notion of 'identity' as a purely social, historical, or cultural 'construction' which is in no way 'natural',[7]

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is noteworthy that many of the key terms in Bourdieu's conceptual vocabulary, such as 'field', 'habitus', and 'distinction' can all be found in *The Civilizing Process.*

[5] 'Although it has, in order to constitute itself, to reject all the forms of that biologism which always tends to naturalize social differences by reducing them to anthropological invariants, sociology can understand the social game in its most essential aspects only if it takes into account certain of the universal characteristics of bodily existence, such as the fact of existing as a separate biological individual, or of being confined to a place and a moment, or even the fact of being and knowing oneself destined for death.'(Bourdieu 1990:198)

[6] 'No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe... Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as a *animal rationale*, we should define him as an *animal symbolicum*. By doing so we can designate his specific difference' (Cassirer 1944: 25-6). According to Van Krieken (1998: 12-13), Elias was in fact significantly inspired by Cassirer's 'philosophy of symbolic forms'.

[7] In relation to national identities, for instance, Hobsbawm (1994: 35) has written that they are 'historically novel arrangements' and that 'there is nothing "natural" about them.'

one should rather conceptualize people's self-consciousness as the outcome of an ongoing interrelation between the psycho-biological potentials of the human brain and the social learning process through which the symbolic tools of language are acquired.

It seems evident that many social scientists continue to fall into the same conceptual trap which the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset plunged into when he wrote that 'man has no "nature"; he only has history' (1946: 148).[8] In response to this misleading statement, one should rather say that if human beings have history, it is because they have a uniquely changeful or malleable nature. As Elias argued, human nature and history, or human biology and culture, should not be conceptualized as if they were separate, mutually exclusive substances, but rather as interrelated, interdependent processes.[9] Hence, the fact that a person's 'identity' or self-understanding has been historically or culturally 'constructed' does not mean that it is not also 'biologically conditioned', since humans are, by nature, symbol-using animals who are 'constitutionally equipped with organs which enable them to learn constantly' (Elias 1978: 107). Every healthy human child is born with a physiological potential for acquiring a stock of sound-symbols from other people, and these symbols can refer not only to objects, processes, and other living beings in the world, but also to the individual himself. This unique symbol-learning capacity can be seen as one fundamental component of what Axel Honneth and Hans Joas have called the 'unchanging preconditions of human changeableness' (1988: 7).[10] Hence, the first thing one should make clear is that people's 'identity' or self-understanding is simply one component of the biologically grounded, socially acquired symbolic universe in which all human

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[8] This misleading polar dichotomy between 'nature' and 'culture' is evident, for instance, in a recent introductory textbook to social anthropology: 'The truly human in us, as anthropology sees it, is primarily created through our engagement with the social and cultural world; it is not individual and natural' (Eriksen 1995: 30).

[9] Arguing against those who continue to think of 'nature' and 'culture' in terms of mutually exclusive substances, rather than as interdependent processes, Elias wrote: 'Nature is equated with immutability and innateness, and thus conceptually isolated from what is changeable and learned. And what is changeable and learned is classified as culture, society, or other representations of what is regarded as not natural. Yet how could human beings learn anything, if they were not by nature, that is biologically, equipped for it?' (1987a: 346). The very same point was also made in a similar fashion by the American anthropologist David Bidney, in an insightful article entitled 'Human Nature and the Cultural Process' (1946).

[10] Honneth and Joas are two authors which have also cogently defended the need for social scientists to ground their empirical analyses on firm anthropological grounding in their insightful book, *Human Nature and Social Action* (1988), which in one of its chapters discusses what they call the 'historical anthropology' of Elias.

beings live – a symbolic universe which has developed, and is continuously developing, over the course of a long-term historical process.

Selfhood, however, is not only a symbolic but also an emotional phenomenon. It is not merely a question of cognitively defining and categorising who we are, but also of experiencing feelings about ourselves with regard to such classifications and judgements – particularly when this involves a hierarchic evaluation of our relatively superior or inferior status in comparison to others. In his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Immanuel Kant argued that human beings have a natural propensity to 'self-conceit', by which he referred to people's desire to have, and to be recognized as having, 'a greater self-worth than their fellows' (1952 [1788]: 321-22, cited in Wood 1998: 68). Furthermore, in his *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, Kant defined this general tendency as the 'enviously competitive vanity' of humankind, and suggested that man's 'desire for honour, property, and power' drives him 'to seek status among his fellows' (1971 [1784]: 45]). The cross-cultural, anthropological evidence which has accumulated since Kant wrote these words suggests that indeed, human beings do generally display a keen emotional sensitivity to what Max Weber called 'status honour' (1946b [1918-20]: 191), and a traditional idiom of Spanish folk culture defines as *el qué dirán* (literally, 'the what-will-they-say-about-me'). Indeed, it is noteworthy that ethnographers have often discovered public shaming ceremonies and punishments of ostracism, which function as the main mechanisms of social control in 'tribal' societies with no centralized state authorities or modern legal systems backed up by written normative codes, police forces, and courts.[11] In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Sigmund Freud also referred to this universal human sensitivity, when he pointed out that people generally experience feelings of 'social anxiety' when they fear a loss of love and appreciation from individuals whom they respect (1975 [1930]: 62).

[11] This was explored by Bronislaw Malinowski in his classic, insightful study *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (1989 [1926)]. More recently, the anthropologist George De Vos has described this universal human sensitivity to social status as follows: 'The social world in any culture is marked by various forms of interpersonal evaluation and sanctioning. In humans, there gradually evolves interpersonal sensitivity to groups forms of approval and disapproval growing out of early dyadic parental approbation or recognition, and the inner enhancement that marks receiving social regard. Humans become governed by a potential to experience shame.'(1990: 45)

Elias, who of course was very familiar with the writings of Kant, Weber and Freud,[12] made the same anthropological point when he observed that one of the particularities which distinguish humans from other animal species is that they not only have survival-interests related to the physical nourishment and protection of their bodies, but also status-preoccupations related to the way in which they are perceived by their fellow human beings (1994b: xxxiii).[13] In another essay, he referred to this socio-psychological phenomenon of affective interdependence as the human 'need to love and be loved' (1991a: 201), 'the desire for security and constancy in the emotive affirmation of one's person by others' (1991a: 204). He observed that feelings of shame are experienced by an individual when he fears 'social degradation', i.e. 'loss of the love or respect of others, to which he attaches or has attached value' (1994a [1939]: 492). Hence, when people find themselves in degrading positions of social exclusion, Elias suggested that the principal deprivation they suffer is not so much a deprivation of food, but rather a deprivation of 'value', 'meaning', and 'self-respect' (1994b: xxxiv). Furthermore, he also argued that 'a compulsive desire for social prestige', rather than 'the simple necessity of economic subsistence', is the primary impulse which motivates people to work, when their material well-being places them 'appreciably over the hunger threshold' (1994a [1939]: 473).

More recently, Bourdieu has also focused much of his sociological attention on what he calls 'the game of honour' (1990: 22) – in other words, the ongoing status competitions which take place in all social contexts for the emotionally gratifying trophy of 'distinction', 'recognition', or 'symbolic capital':

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[12] Elias initially studied philosophy, and he specifically included Kant in his own personal canon of three 'great men' of German *Kultur*, the other two being Goethe and Schiller (Smith 2001: 30). Nevertheless, he ultimately turned against the major strands of Kantian thought, and this provoked a serious disagreement, as well as a painful conflict, with the supervisor of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Breslau, Richard Hönigswald (Elias 1994c: 88-9, 91-2). On the influence of Weber and Freud in Elias's writings, see Van Krieken (1998, ch. 2).

[13] The Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda has defined human emotions as mechanisms which are triggered by the brain to ensure the maintenance of a person's 'preference states', or what he calls 'concern satisfaction'. 'Emotions... result from monitoring whether events promise, or threaten to interfere with concern satisfaction' (1986: 472). In Frijda's terms, Elias's point was that humans are not only concerned with the satisfaction of purely physiological concerns (the ingestion of food, the maintenance of bodily health, etc.), but also with the satisfaction of *status concerns* (the acquisition of respect from other people).

> Struggles for social recognition are a fundamental dimension of social life... what is at stake in them is the accumulation of a particular form of capital, honour in the sense of reputation and prestige... there is, therefore, a specific logic behind the accumulation of symbolic capital, as capital found on cognition [connaissance] and recognition [reconnaissance]... (1990: 22).

Indeed, Bourdieu has related people's pursuit of social recognition to one of the anthropological invariants which he refers to as 'universal characteristics of bodily existence': the conscious awareness of our mortality, and hence the need to find meaningful reasons and justifications for living. In one of his *Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Bourdieu eloquently explains this human predicament as follows:

> Doomed to death, that end which cannot be taken as an end, man is a being without a reason for being. It is society, and society alone, which dispenses, to different degrees, the justifications and reasons for existing; it is society which, by producing the affairs or positions that are said to be 'important', produces the acts and agents that are judged to be 'important', for themselves and for the others – characters objectively and subjectively assured of their value and thus liberated from indifference and insignificance... Pascal spoke of the 'misery of man without God'. One might rather posit the 'misery of man without mission or social consecration'. Indeed, without going as far as to say, with Durkheim, 'Society is God', I would say: God is never anything other than society. What is expected of God is only ever obtained from society, which alone has the power to justify you, to liberate you from facticity, contingency, and absurdity: but – and this is doubtless the fundamental antinomy – only in a differential, distinctive, way... and the competition for a social life that will be known and recognized, which will free you from insignificance, is *a struggle to the death for symbolic life and death*... The judgement of others is the last judgement; and social exclusion is the concrete form of hell and damnation. It is also because man is a God unto man that man is a wolf unto man.(1990: 196, my italics)

One could therefore say, following Bourdieu, that human beings are *prestige-seeking animals* who are emotionally sensitive to the degrees of esteem they receive from other members of their own species, and hence are engaged in an ongoing competitive struggle for *social distinction*. As this leading European thinker has emphasised, the respect people receive from others is one of the crucial gratifications they need to make their lives meaningful. Indeed, in relatively secularized societies where, echoing Nietzche, 'God has died' (or at least is a widely contested idea), the only 'significant others' from which one can expect an emotionally gratifying recognition, and therefore a meaningful justification for living, are other human beings of flesh and blood.

In his book *The Loneliness of the Dying*, Elias also explored the way in which death is 'a problem of the living', given that humans are symbol-using animals which, unlike all the other creatures of the earth who also die, *know* that this is their destiny (1985: 3-4). And, like Bourdieu, he similarly linked the human consciousness of mortality to the quest for a 'meaningful' life – in other words, a life that will *mean* something to others:

> Today it is still somewhat difficult to convey the depth of the dependence of people on each other. That the meaning of everything a person does lies in what he or she means to others, not only those now alive but also to coming generations, that she or he is therefore dependent on the continuation of human society through generations, is certainly one of the most fundamental of human dependences, those of future on past, of past on future generations.(1985: 64)

Hence, Elias stressed that although the Western notion of the 'autonomous' and 'self-sufficient' individual tended to hide the reality of people's emotional interdependence on each other, the loneliness of dying people in modern times – whether of sick or elderly people in aseptic clinics, of prisoners in dark jail cells, of homeless vagrants in urban street corners, or of innocent men, women and children being led naked into Nazi gas-chambers – could serve to 'remind us how fundamental and how incomparable is the meaning of people for people' (1985: 66).[14]

In the American sociological tradition, this emotional dimension of human selfhood was originally explored in a very illuminating matter by Charles Cooley, a largely forgotten, though highly original thinker. In his book *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1922), Cooley developed the conception of the 'my-feeling' or the 'self-feeling', which he defined as the 'desire for some sort of appreciation' from others (1922: 178). In particular, he proposed the idea that the self should be seen as a sort of mirror or 'looking glass' in which feelings are determined by the beliefs which the individual has about how others perceive him:

> As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of

[14] Elias's own mother was executed at Auschwitz, and this loss tormented him throughout his life. As he told two Dutch sociologists who interviewed him shortly before he died, 'I simply cannot get over the picture of my mother in a gas chamber. I cannot get over it' (1994b: 79).

> our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it. A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification... The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. (1922: 184).

Cooley's point, therefore, was that human beings typically experience feelings of pride and shame in relation to what they think that others think about them.[15] If they do not particularly value the person who denigrates or humiliates them, then this negative opinion may hardly affect their self-esteem; but if the person who looks down on them is someone whose opinion they do respect, then the feelings of shame may be intense: 'the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling' (1922: 184). Most of the time people may not be consciously aware of their sensitivity in relation to how others perceive them, for 'we do not think much of it [self-feeling] so long as it is moderately gratified' (1922: 209). However, Cooley noted that:

> if failure or disgrace arrives, if one suddenly finds that the faces of men show coldness or contempt instead of the kindliness and deference that he is used to, he will perceive from the shock, the fear, the sense of being outcast and helpless, that he was living in the minds of others without knowing it, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up. (1922: 209)

Erving Goffman's analysis of 'face-work' and 'impression management' (1967) similarly implies that people are constantly monitoring their self-image in their encounters with others, and are emotionally sensitive to the amount of deference they receive or believe to be receiving:

> A person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him... If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to 'feel good'; if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will 'feel bad' or 'feel hurt' (1967: 6).

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[15] It is interesting to note that exactly the same point was made by Charles Darwin in *The Expression of Emotions in Men and Animals*, when in the last chapter he discussed blushing and its relation to shame: 'It is not the simple act of reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinking what others think of us, which excites a blush' (Darwin 1872: 325, cited in Scheff 1990b: 281).

In Goffman's detailed empirical studies of people's 'interaction rituals' in everyday life, one can observe that selfhood is a risky business in which an individual's reputation is always potentially endangered by his own behaviour, and the extent to which he plays by the rules of the social game. A person's face, as he puts it, is always 'only on loan to him from society', and hence 'it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it' (1967: 10). If the individual does not live up to the standards which are expected of him, his self-image on the public stage may be discredited, 'causing him shame and embarrassment' (1967: 106). Following this Goffmanian theory, it has recently been argued that the key to understanding what human beings find 'funny' or 'amusing' in other people, and hence why they ridicule and laugh at them, is the discrediting of the 'face' or self-image which a given individual or group tries to portray on the social stage of everyday life (E.S. Jáuregui 1998). Goffman's concept of 'face', therefore, also draws our sociological attention to people's emotional sensitivity in relation to their status-ranking as members of social groups, i.e. to the degrees of respect or disrespect they receive from significant others.

More recently, following the insightful theoretical footsteps of Cooley and Goffman, Thomas Scheff has demonstrated how human behaviour cannot be properly understood without considering what he calls the 'master emotions' of pride and shame. His approach begins by referring to Durkheim's classic conception of 'solidarity', and his emphasis on the 'external', 'coercive' character of 'social facts' (1982 [1895]). The problem, Scheff notes, is that Durkheim never clearly spelled out the causal sequence implied in his model: 'What are the steps involved, such that individuals experience social control as exterior and constraining?' (1990a: 73). Ultimately, the notion of solidarity (the 'cement' of social bonds) has remained a black box in which no explanatory wiring diagram has been drawn. In order to remedy this lack of clarity, Scheff argues that it is necessary to elaborate Durkheim's views through what he calls the 'deference-emotion system' (1990a: 71). Essentially, his argument is that people constantly monitor the amount of respect or disrespect they are receiving from others, and that this self-awareness triggers an automatic, psychological mechanism of varying degrees of pride or

shame. Scheff has therefore suggested that such emotions 'arise out of the innately social character of human nature' (1994b: 43).

The experience of selfhood, according to this sociological thinker, is an ongoing process in which the individual checks the attitudes, opinions, and judgments of others towards him. This, in turn, inevitably affects him emotionally: 'The degree and type of deference, and the attendant emotions of pride and shame, make up a subtle system of social sanctions, a system that leads to experiencing social influence as constraining' (1990a: 74). Scheff has therefore fruitfully elaborated a number of key concepts of classic sociological theory by illustrating how 'Durkheim's analysis of social influence implies a deference-emotion system in which conformity to exterior norms is rewarded by deference and the feeling of pride, and nonconformity is punished by lack of deference and feelings of shame' (1990a: 95).[16] An individual's self-esteem, he therefore concludes, is always a sort of 'balance between pride and shame', which is related to the amount of respect or disrespect that he receives, or in any case believes to be receiving, from others.[17] In short, following the insights of Scheff, pride can be defined as the emotion of *high social status, inclusion, and admiration*, while shame can be defined as the emotion of *low social status, exclusion and denigration*. We experience pride in moments of achievement, success, and acceptance, and shame in moments of error, failure, and rejection.

For the purposes of this thesis, however, what has particularly interested me in the work of both Elias and Scheff are the innovative and stimulating contributions which these sociologists

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[16] It is noteworthy that in his *Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim himself noted at one point that 'if in my mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty' (1982 [1895]: 51). In referring to 'the laughter I provoke' and 'the social distance at which I am kept', Durkheim was implicitly referring to the embarrassment or shame which individuals may experience if they do not abide by social norms, and are therefore ridiculed or denigrated. Similarly, in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim implicitly referred to the emotional gratification of pride which is experienced by individuals when their morally upright behaviour is rewarded by praise and deference from others: 'The man who has done his duty finds, in the manifestations of every sort expressing the sympathy, esteem, or affection which his fellows have for him, a feeling of comfort, of which he does not ordinarily take account, but which sustains him, none the less. The sentiments which society has for him raise the sentiments which he has for himself' (1976 [1912]: 211).

[17] 'Self-esteem would be a summary measure, representing the balance between pride and shame states in a person's life, taking into account not only duration but also intensity' (Scheff 1990b: 284).

have made to the study of pride and shame as the emotions of *collective prestige and humiliation*, or *group superiority and inferiority*.

The human self, as Elias argued, should be seen as both an I-self and a we-self (1987b: xii). People learn to say 'I' within communities of which they say 'we'.[18] Their self-images are therefore composed not only of symbolic conceptualizations of themselves as distinct individuals in relation to other individuals, but also as members of groups in relation to other groups: 'An individual does not only have an ego-image and an ego-ideal, but also a we-image and we-ideal' (Elias 1996: 152); 'A person's we-image and we-ideal form as much part of a person's self-image and self-ideal as the image and ideal of him or herself as the unique person to which he or she refers as "I"' (Elias 1994b: xlii). As Elias put it in his introduction to *Involvement and Detachment* (1987b: xi-xii), people have a 'remarkable propensity' to attach a part of their self-love to the groups with which they identify. Hence, they may feel flattered or humiliated, respected or insulted, admired or despised, not only in relation to their status as distinctive individuals, but also with regard to the prestige of the human collectivities within which they symbolically classify themselves, and of which they say 'we'. In *The Established and the Outsiders*, an ethnographic study of a British suburban neighbourhood, Elias and Scotson (1994) empirically illustrated this point by showing how an individual's sense of self-worth can be intensely affected by the 'group charisma' or 'group disgrace' of a community to which he or she belongs.[19] With these terms, Elias was referring to what he saw as 'a universal human theme': the tendency of groups which are, in terms of power and status, *stronger* than

[18] This is one of the fundamental themes in Elias's sociology: the need to stop thinking in terms of what he called the *homo clausus* or 'we-less I', the image of the human being as a solitary, isolated thinker which has characterized the Western philosophical tradition. In opposition to the misleading Cartesian notion of *cogito ergo sum*, 'I think, therefore, I am', Elias repeatedly emphasised that only because people live in a society in which they have learned a communal language can they think of themselves as individuals who are different from other people: 'the individual is only able to say "I" if and because he can at the same time say "we". The thought "I am", more still "I think", presupposes the existence of other people and a communal life with them – in short a group or society. Each "I" is irrevocably embedded in a "we"... Only because people live in society with other people can they perceive themselves as individuals different from other people' (1991a: 62, 195).

[19] The concept of 'group charisma' was inspired by Weber's notion of *Gentilcharisma* ('clan charisma'). This was explicitly acknowledged by Elias (1998) in a lecture he delivered at the 1964 congress of the German Sociological Association, which in that year commmemorated the first centenary of Weber's birth by holding this annual conference in his honour .

other interdependent groups, to think of themselves in human terms as *better* than the others (1994b: xvi). He therefore suggested that human associations – particularly those in established positions of high rank – typically develop a 'self-praising vocabulary' through which their members derive 'an immense narcissistic gratification', in contrast to the denigrating terms of abuse they generally employ to stigmatise relatively powerless outsiders.[20] In his view, people's tendency to derive pleasure from 'the feeling that one of the groups to which they belong is superior to other groups' was a 'rather neglected of the dangers which human groups constitute for each other' (1987b: xi-xii).

In his own writings, Scheff has suggested that his concept of the *deference-emotion system* and its fundamental component, the *pride-shame balance* of greater or lesser self-esteem, is applicable not only to the micro-level of interaction between particular individuals, but also to the macro-level of relations between large-scale collectivities. It is noteworthy that Cooley, who Scheff has repeatedly acknowledged as one of his key sources of inspiration, explicitly pointed out that his concept of the 'looking glass self' could also be applied to a 'group self' or 'we', which should be seen as 'simply an "I" which includes other persons' (1922: 209). Similarly, Goffman – who was one of Scheff's teachers at the University of Chicago – also pointed out in some sections of his work that in many relationships, the members of a group could come to 'share a face' (1967: 42), so that improper behaviour on the part of any of them could become a source of collective shame and embarrassment. Scheff has developed these ideas further, by emphasising that Cooley's theory of 'social self-feelings', as well as Goffman's analysis of 'face-work' and 'impression management' in the everyday interaction of individuals, can have 'considerable relevance' at the societal level of large-scale, group relations (1994b: 179-80).

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[20] It is noteworthy that Freud, one of Elias's fundamental sources of inspiration, similarly pointed out in his essay *On Narcissism* that ego-ideals have both a personal and a collective dimension: 'The ego-ideal is of great importance for the understanding of group psychology. Besides its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class, or a nation' (1952 [1914]: 410). In *The Future of an Illusion*, he also suggested that members of 'cultural units' such as nations can derive satisfaction of a 'narcissistic nature' by believing that their collective ideals are infinitely superior to those of others (1961 [1927]: 16). This emotional or 'libidinal' aspect in the constitution of human groups was also explored by Freud in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1959 [1921]).

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, the great Scottish thinker David Hume – who devoted much of his philosophical attention to describing and classifying emotions – observed that 'according as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we... are elated by pride or dejected with humility' (1978 [1739]: 277). However, since our 'idea of ourself' clearly includes both individual and collective dimensions, or 'I' and 'we' layers, we may be 'elated with pride' or 'dejected with humility' not only in relation to our shifting fortunes as individuals, but also as members of groups. More recently, Gabriele Taylor, a philosopher inspired by the writings of Hume, has defined 'pride, humiliation, shame, and guilt' as the 'emotions of self-assessment':

> In experiencing any one of these emotions the person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in the world. The self is the 'object' of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an assessment of that self.(1985: 1)

However, what the work of Elias and Scheff has demonstrated, and what has most inspired the theoretical approach I have adopted in my research, is that human beings continuously assess themselves and their sense of self-worth not only as distinct individuals *vis-à-vis* other individuals, but also as members of societies *vis-à-vis* other societies. Hence, on both the personal as well as the collective level, '*individuals and groups seek to increase their pride-shame balance, their moment-by-moment social status*' (Scheff 1994a: 286, italics in original).

2.2 National identity as a historically developed, symbolically constructed, emotionally charged, and politically contested component of modern selfhood

During the course of a long-term sociohistorical process, membership to collectivities known as 'nations' has become one component of people's self-images, as well as of their self-respect. This phenomenon, therefore, can be seen as a modern variant of human selfhood at the we-level of collective identification: a biologically grounded, socially acquired, symbolic self-conception of group-membership ('I am a Spaniard'), and an emotional state of greater or lesser self-esteem in relation to this idea (a sense of varying pride or shame in accordance with the relative prestige-ranking of Spain *vis-à-vis* other nations). One could say that part of the 'face' or the self-love of individuals becomes attached to the power and status of their respective national

collectivities. Hence, national triumphs and defeats can conceivably affect their pride-shame balances, their feelings of relative superiority or inferiority, in the same way as their own personal successes and failures. On the basis of numerous criteria, the world's nation-states are all tacitly ranked on a competitive ladder of prestige-ranking. Nationalized individuals therefore typically view their own country's classification on this hierarchic pyramid of international status as an aspect of their own self-importance in the world.

One of the first thinkers who emphasised this affective aspect of national identity was John Stuart Mill, who suggested in his classic essay *On Nationality* that a sense of 'collective pride and humiliation' was one of the fundamental characteristics of this phenomenon (1996 [1861]: 40). The very same observation was also made a few decades later by the most important figures in the early years of sociology. Emile Durkheim, for instance, defined patriotism as 'the ideas *and feelings* as a whole which bind the individual to a certain State' (1992 [1950]: 73, my italics). In particular, he argued that members of nations were bonded by powerful collective emotions of 'national *amour propre*', and that such sentiments 'frequently succeed in stifling the accents of human solidarity' (1986 [1899]: 211). Similarly, Durkheim's nephew and disciple, Marcel Mauss, observed that national communities had a dangerous tendency to construct ridicuously inflated, self-flattering images of their collective importance in the world:

> A nation believes in *its* civilization, in customs, its industry and its fine arts. It fetishizes its own literature, its sculpture, its science, its techniques, its morals, its tradition; in a word, its character. It is almost always prey to the illusion of being the world's pre-eminent nation. It teaches its literature as if it were the only literature, science as if it alone had contributed to it; its techniques as if it had invented them, and its morals as if they were the best and the most beautiful... Not even the smallest nations avoid this. Each nation is like the villages of our antiquity and our folklore: convinced of their superiority over the neighbouring village, their folk fight with the 'madmen' opposite... They are heirs to the prejudices of ancient clans, ancient tribes, parishes and provinces, because they have become the corresponding social unities, and are individualities that have a collective character.(1996 [1920-1]: 91-2)

In his insightful discussion of 'The Nation', published posthumously in *Economy and Society*, Max Weber also emphasised this affective aspect of national identification. He argued that the members of nations were bonded by collective emotions of 'solidarity', and hence that their patriotic actions were often motivated not by purely economic concerns, but rather by what he called 'sentiments of prestige' (1978 [1918-20]: 921-22). In fact, Weber viewed the pursuit of

'power prestige' as the 'irrational element in all political foreign relations' (1978 [1918-20]: 911), and he suggested that a nation 'forgives if its interests have been damaged', but never 'if its honour has been offended' (1946a [1919]: 118). Elias, for his part, pointed out that 'powerful nations' were the main contemporary exemplars of 'group charismatic beliefs' in a unique, collectively shared 'virtue and grace' (1994b: xli), and he therefore suggested that nationalism, 'whatever else it may be... is also a form of self-love' (1996: 152).

More recently, the emotional sensitivity members of nations typically feel with regard to the relative superiority or inferiority of their countries on the world stage has also been stressed by a number of important contemporary authors. Anthony Smith, for instance, has defined the idea of 'the nation' as 'a cultural and political bond which unites in a *community of prestige* all those who share the same myths, memories, symbols, and traditions' (1992: 62, my italics). Similarly, following the insights of Weber on status groups, Murray Milner has observed that the concept of 'the nation' implies 'a sense of common identity and morality – and, in at least certain important respects, a common social status' (1994: 28). Thomas Scheff, whose sociological theory of pride and shame I have already discussed extensively, has fruitfully applied his ideas on the human 'deference-emotion system' to the collective level of national identification. In his book *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War* (1994b), he has illustrated the empirical validity of this approach through a detailed analysis of Adolf Hitler's speeches after the Treaty of Versailles. As Scheff demonstrates, in many of these impassioned public addresses, the Nazi leader repeatedly promised the German people that he would wipe out their nation's shame and recover the honour and dignity of their homeland once again in the eyes of the world. Finally, it is also worth referring here to Maurizio Viroli's *For Love of Country*, a recent essay in which this Italian political philosopher has suggested that 'the most distinctive feeling of patriotic love is shame' (1995: 166).

It is crucial to note, however, that there can be a national 'pride-shame balance' in relation to various different spheres of prestige-ranking or status-stratification. Borrowing Bourdieu's language, one could say that there are several competitive 'fields' in which this international 'game of honour' is continuously played. The two most obvious ones are undoubtedly *political power* and *material wealth*. In these particular arenas, what is at stake is the degree of

'influence' (including, of course, the 'influence' of the nation's military capacities), and the 'prosperity' with which a given nation is supposedly blessed (always defined in contrast with that supposedly enjoyed by other nations). It is to such emotionally charged criteria of status-ranking that politicians typically refer in their frequent discursive appeals to the so-called 'national interest'. Another obvious arena in which national self-love may be flattered or humiliated is that of *athletic excellence*. As Bourdieu (1998a: 79) himself has pointed out, the Olympic Games can be seen as a 'patriotic ritual' in which national television networks overhwhelmingly focus their attention on the events most likely to provide narcissistic gratification to the national population in question: 'The sports given prominence and the individual games or meets shown must be carefully selected to showcase the national teams most likely to win events and thereby gratify national pride.' Other important criteria of international prestige-ranking which are observable in people's everyday usage of a nationalized 'we' are undoubtedly *scientific excellence* ('How many Nobel Prize winners have *we* won in the past?'), *technological advancement* ('Are *we* keeping up to date with the Internet revolution?'), or *artistic creativity* ('What great poets, novelists, playwrights and film-makers have *we* given to the world?').

At the same time, although this is rarely noted, another crucial competitive sphere in which the national 'face' may be flattered or denigrated is that of *moral respectability*. As Freud pointed out, an individual who upholds the ethical ideals which are valued in his society typically feels emotionally gratified by 'the narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think oneself better than others' (1975: 80). It is evident that this Freudian observation can also apply to collective levels of self-understanding, such as nationhood. This was in fact explicitly pointed out by Durkheim, in his insightful lectures on the 'civic morals' of patriotism:

> As long as there are states, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing the best moral constitution (1992 [1950]: 75). [21]

[21] These Durkheimian lectures, which in the original manuscript were entitled *The Nature of Morals and Rights*, were originally delivered at the Sorbonne between 1890 and 1900, and later repeated at the same university, first in

Hence, a nation's presumed moral worthiness can also become a crucial mark of 'distinction' or 'disgrace' in the hierarchic global ladder of international prestige.

In the contemporary world, there are many other layers of we-images and we-feelings aside from the national one: less inclusive groupings such as the family, the city, the region, and so on, and more inclusive ones such as supranational associations, religious communities, and ultimately the 'global village' of humanity as a whole (Elias 1991a: 202). To some extent, it is clear that as webs of human contact and interdependence have spread throughout the world, the 'circles of collective identification' have gradually expanded (De Swaan 1995). Elias illustrated this point through a comparison with the gruesomely violent forms of recreation which prevailed in the days of Ancient Rome:

> No doubt the scope of identification is wider than in earlier times. We no longer regard it as a Sunday entertainment to see people hanged, quartered, broken on the wheel. We watch football, not gladiatorial contests. As compared with antiquity, our identification with other people, our sharing in their suffering and death, has increased. To watch hungry lions devouring living people piece by piece, or gladiators trying by ruse and deceit to wound and murder each other, is scarcely a diversion that we would anticipate with the same relish as the Roman senators decked in purple, or the Roman people. No feeling of identity, it seems, united those spectators with these other people who, below in the bloody arena, were fighting for their lives.(1994: 2-3)

At the same time, however, Elias emphasised that the 'emotional tinge of we-identity' had a tendency to grow fainter and fainter, as the circles of identification got wider and wider, from the family, to the nation-state, to supranational units such as the European Union, and finally to the all-encompassing notion of humankind (1991a: 203). Indeed, he observed that in many contemporary nation-states, a contradictory code of moral norms appeared to have arisen, in which nationalist and humanist values uneasily co-existed with each other. The use of violence against all human beings was generally forbidden, but in the context of war this ethical taboo could conceivably be broken for the good of 'the nation':

> In contemporary nation-states the supreme code of one and the same society may impress

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1904, and then in 1912. They were first published in French as *Leçons de Sociologie*, in 1950, and later on in English, with the title *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, in 1957.

> upon its members that the single human being, the individual, is the supreme value, and at the same time that the sovereign collectivity, the nation-state, is the supreme value to which all individual aims and interests – even the physical survival of individuals – are to be subordinated.(Elias 1996: 160)

Several decades earlier, in the same lectures on the 'civic morals' of patriotism which I cited earlier, Emile Durkheim had similarly noted that 'one of the gravest conflicts' of his times was the tension which had arisen between the ideal of loyalty to the national state, and that of moral respect for humankind in general – between what he called 'patriotism' and 'world patriotism' (1992 [1950]: 72). Today, although it is undeniable that in many countries the defense of 'human rights' has become a sacred moral principle, the national we-layer of collective identification has simultaneously remained an important component of people's emotional make-up or 'habitus'.[22] Hence, a curious situation has arisen whereby we-feelings of national pride may conceivably be derived in the sphere of moral respectability by the belief that one's nation is supposedly 'not nationalistic', but is rather a leading defender of revered ideals such as 'peace', 'freedom', and 'democracy'.

Following Elias's terminology (1994a [1939]), one could say that a sociogenetic process of nation-building has led to a psychogenetic process of identity-formation: the self-awareness of people as members of rival, competitive nations, and the related feelings of pride or shame in relation to their particular nation's successes and failures on the world stage. The human population has always been divided into 'survival units': relatively self-sufficient collectivities that have been emotionally bonded by we-images and we-feelings of collective self-love, and which have organized themselves to provide security for their members from all external threats (Elias 1978: 137-39, Mennell 1994a). What has always existed among such collectivities is the phenomenon of social identification, which the Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan has concisely defined as:

> a process in which people come to feel that other human beings are much 'the same' as they are and still others are more 'unlike' them. It occurs in the course of group formation, as part of the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion from which groups emerge in dynamic competition. It is both a cognitive and an emotional phenomenon: perceived similarities

[22] On the national 'we-layer' of people's habitus, see Elias (1991a: 182-3).

and differences provide a basis for affective involvement and detachment, and the other way around.(1995: 25)

These survival units have typically exercised comparatively strict control over the use of physical violence in the relations between their members, while simultaneously allowing and often encouraging their members to use physical violence against non-members.[23] For this reason, Elias also referred to them as 'attack-and-defence units', and he pointed out that 'amongst the greatest dangers to humans are humans. In the name of protecting themselves from destruction, groups of people again and again threaten other groups with destruction' (Elias 1985: 4). Indeed, from the earliest times, he suggested that societies formed by human beings have therefore been 'Janus-faced', since they have been characterized by 'inward pacification' and 'outward threat' (Elias 1985: 4). Over the course of history, however, it is clear that there has been a long-term trend towards the development of increasingly larger survival units, and the expansion of emotional identification throughout wider territorial spaces: 'From small bands of twenty-five to fifty members, perhaps living in caves, humans coalesced into tribes of several hundred or several thousand, and nowadays more and more into states of millions of people' (Elias 1987c: 225). Nation-states, therefore, can be seen as modern variants of earlier human survival units.[24] They are inwardly pacified and outwardly defensive associations, which have developed their own particular brand of collective we-images and we-feelings.[25]

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[23] It is noteworthy that in his classic ethnographic study of the Nuer, the British anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard observed that amongst these 'stateless' people of Sudan, who had no centralized system of authority, individuals of the same village felt morally obliged to settle disputes among themselves, and men could in principle only fight each other with wooden clubs. However, this respect for others became much weaker between distant villages or tribes, and in such cases it was much more common, and often strongly encouraged, for men to fight to the death with spears if a conflict arose.(1940: 162-72)

[24] The idea that modern nation-states should be viewed as the contemporary versions of small-scale, ancient tribal communities has also been proposed and explored by two social anthropologists: Harold Isaacs in his book *The Idols of the Tribe* (1975) and José Antonio Jáuregui in his *Las Reglas del Juego: Las Tribus* (*The Rules of the Game: The Tribes*, 1977).

[25] Given the dichotomy of inward pacification and outward threat which characterizes the modern, national variant of human survival units, Elias suggested that 'a curious split runs through our civilization – our civilization understood now as being that of humanity as a whole. In intra-state affairs, violence between people is tabooed, and when possible, punished; in inter-state affairs another code holds good. Every large state is in constant preparation for violence with other states, and when it comes to such violence, those who perpetrate it are extremely highly valued, and in many cases praised and rewarded.' For this reason, the author of *The Civilizing Process* suggested in *The Germans* that 'we are basically still living exactly as our forefathers did in the period of their so-called barbarism.'(1996: 176-7)

As Durkheim originally argued in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, every human society develops 'collective ideals' and 'collective sentiments' about itself, which are regularly reaffirmed through the celebration of ritual gatherings. This, according to Durkheim, was the perennial aspect of 'religion', understood as a form of collective self-worship in which all gods are nothing but symbolic representations of the groups which adore them. In his view, therefore, the collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood, as well as the patriotic ceremonies in which national communities are regularly venerated, should be viewed as modern variations of a common human theme:

> Thus there is something in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successfully enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideals which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the result which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt, or the promulation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life? (1976 [1915]: 427).

Independently of whether or not one accepts this argument as a valid sociological explanation of religion, it seems to me that in the *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim accurately pointed to the symbolic and emotional dimensions of collective identification as a universal phenomenon of human societies. Nationalism, with its paraphernalia of flags, anthems, and so on, can clearly be seen as a modern variant of what Durkheim called 'totemism': an emotionally charged, symbolic representation of a collectivity which regularly venerates itself in ritualized ceremonies.[26] The question one must then ask is: what are the particular features which distinguish national we-images and we-feelings from earlier collective totems, ideals and sentiments?

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[26] Indeed, as Ruth Wallace (1973) has shown in an illuminating article entitled 'The Secular Ethic and the Spirit of Patriotism', Durkheim himself actually saw national ideals and sentiments as the secular substitutes which could provide modern individuals with a sacred object of moral devotion and collective sacrifice, in the same way that religious totems and belief-systems had done in the past. It is also noteworthy that Ernest Gellner (1983: 56) referred to Durkeim's theory of religion in his celebrated study of nationalism: 'Durkheim taught that in religious worship, society adores its own camouflaged image. In a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage.'

In an insightful, though little known essay entitled 'Processes of state-formation and nation building', Elias (1970) explained the specificity of national self-consciousness by referring to 'an overall change in the distribution of power chances in society': a long-term process which transformed dynastic states, where 'the resources of power are very unevenly distributed between ruling elites and the mass of the population', into modern nation-states, where these power-differences certainly did not disappear, but became less unequal. At the socio-structural level of institutions, this was reflected in the emergence of 'nation-wide parties and party governments' which adopted 'ideologies designed to convince the mass of the population that they regard the improvement of their conditions, the advance of the welfare of the nation, as their central task' (1970: 282-3). At the symbolic level of we-images, it was reflected in the change from people's conceptions of themselves as the 'subjects' of a King, to their self-understanding as 'citizens' of a nation.

More recently, Benedict Anderson has similarly argued that the concept of the modern sovereign nation 'was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm' (1991: 7). Hence, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may continue to prevail in contemporary nation-states, 'the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship' (1991: 7). In Anderson's view, it is this sense of 'fraternal love' amongst compatriots which has made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people 'not so much to kill as willingly to die' for their nations (1991: 7). At the same time, following this author, modern nations can be understood as 'imagined communities' in the sense that for the most part, the members of these large-scale collectivities do not personally know each other or interact in face-to-face relationships, but they typically conceive of themselves as one fraternal community of solidarity, with a shared historical past and a common future destiny: 'The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (1991: 6). The spread of texts in vernacular languages through the growth of capitalist printing industries, and later on of other media technologies such as newspapers and broadcasting, have played (and continue to play) a fundamental role in the dissemination of a national self-consciousness across wide stretches of

geographical space. Hence, the members of any modern nation-state become aware of themselves, and constantly reproduce their emotive affiliation with each other, largely through the symbols and rituals disseminated by mass media institutions (Thompson 1995), such as the daily news broadcasts in which the nation's political, economic, moral, and cultural health is monitored, the televised sports competitions in which 'our nation' may triumph or fail in athletic arenas, and so on.

From Ernest Gellner's (1983) work, one can also define the specificity of national self-images and sentiments by referring to the long-term sociohistorical process which transformed the world of 'agrarian' or 'food producing' societies into 'industrial' ones. In the former, political and cultural boundaries were seldom congruent, since the dominant minority of land-owning elites, who shared a literate 'high culture', had no interest in promoting linguistic homogeneity amongst their subordinate peasants, who were divided into various different groups of illiterate 'low cultures':

> In the characteristic agro-polity, the ruling class forms a small minority of the population, rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultural producers, or peasants... The whole system favours horizontal lines of cultural cleavage... The state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining the peace, and not much else, and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.(1983: 10)

However, the gradual development of a new economic division of labour, that of industrialism, required the spread of a common mass culture and sentiment within sharply delineated territorial boundaries. Hence, in order to create a mobile population with a shared linguistic code of communication and a common sense of identification, nationalist movements did not so much 'awaken' ancient nations to self-consciousness, but largely 'invented' them where they did not previously exist. This, as Gellner has argued, was performed primarily by the imposition of compulsory national systems of education, which spread a homogenous, literate 'high culture' throughout a state's territory (even if this was typically obscured by nationalist ideologies which claimed to be defending an old, traditional folk culture):

> It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them selectively, and it most often transforms them radically... The basic deception and self-deception of nationalism is this: nationalism is essentially the

> general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority... But this is the opposite of what nationalism affirms and what nationalists fervently believe. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants.(1983: 57)

Hence, although it may be true that modern nation-states have largely grown out of dominant medieval languages and cultures, such as those of England in Britain and Castille in Spain (Llobera 1994), it is clear that many other potential 'nations' were suppressed or completely obliterated in the process of nation-building.[27] As Eric Hobsbawm has similarly argued, following Gellner's insights, there is clearly an 'element of artifact, invention and social engineering which enters into the making of nations', and hence one should say that 'nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way around' (1990: 10). Of course, the effectiveness of the central state's identity-construction as the legitimate representative of a particular 'nation' has been more successful in some territories than in others, as the contemporary struggles in areas such as Catalonia, Euskadi, Scotland, and Wales illustrate.

In short, national we-images and we-feelings should be seen as the historically contingent, sociopsychological outcome of long-term processes involving the development of modern industrial states, which have legitimated their authority more or less successfully by claiming to represent a particular 'nation' within a particular territory. This has been achieved partly through the sheer military potency of dominant cultural groups, but furthermore by providing physical security, material benefits, and psychological rewards of collective self-love to populations: the internal pacification of state territories through effective monopolies of violence and taxation (Elias 1994a [1939]), the distribution of welfare throughout the national citizenry (De Swaan 1988), and the narcissistic gratification of belonging to a 'great nation', as narrated by official national systems of education. As Elias (1991a: 210) put it, in all nation-states 'the institutions of public education are dedicated to an extreme degree to deepening and consolidating a we-feeling

[27] In this sense, I completely agree with Montserrat Guibernau (1996: 51), when she states that: 'I consider the fact that some nations survived and created their own state as a matter of historical accident, as it is also an accident that some of the nations became divided or absorbed into alien states.'

based exclusively on the national tradition'.[28] Using Durkheimian terms once again, one could say that the profane, bureaucratic apparatus of the modern state has been typically legitimated by the claim that it serves the sacred national community and its future generations. Hence, because the authority of a state is always based on the idea that it represents 'the nation' within a particular territory, those who are involved in the political struggle to acquire or maintain positions of power typically appeal to the collective we-feelings of this community in order to gain popular support.

The defense of 'the nation', the 'national interest', or 'national pride' is therefore one of the fundamental symbolic strategies of political legitimation in contemporary state societies.[29] One can observe that 'the good of the nation' constantly becomes an object of discursive dispute among those who are competing to represent the population in question. Hence, the political arena of each nation-state (which people collectively view, listen, or read about across wide territories, through the vehicles of the mass media) can largely be seen as a constant struggle between rival leaders who claim to best represent, defend, and maintain the security, prosperity, and prestige of 'the nation' in question. As William Bloom has cogently argued, in modern nation-states there is an ongoing competition among political elites to appropriate what he calls the 'national identity dynamic':

> The political attractiveness of the national identity dynamic, of the mobilisation of mass national sentiment, is that it is the widest possible mobilisation that is available within a state... If a politician, therefore, can symbolically associate her/himself with national identity and mobilise it, s/he will then possess a virtual monopoly of popular support (1990: 81).

The concept of 'the nation' can therefore be seen as an emotionally charged, political symbol which is constantly invoked and manipulated by aspiring or established leaders, in their daily

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[28] In relation to the 'nationalisation' of people's habitus through education, Elias (1987a: x) further noted that 'the history books of nations, particularly those destined for children, are full of battles won and enemies defeated'. For this reason, he suggested that national war victories 'gained in the course of mutual woundings and killings' had become 'a source of collective pride and rejoicing' with 'a firmly entrenched tradition.'

[29] In this sense, nationalism can clearly be defined as an *ideology*, following the neat definition of this term which has been proposed by John B. Thompson: 'meaning in the service of power' (1990).

struggles to acquire popular support within particular territories.[30] One could say that there is an ongoing political contest to flatter the narcissistic sentiments of national self-love among the mass public by offering to populations what one could call *conflicting paradigms of national greatness*[31] in the various competitive spheres of international status-ranking: political power, economic prosperity, moral respectability and so on. One has only to read the press or watch the evening news on any particular day in order to observe the way in which contemporary politicians typically present themselves and their programmes as the most effective guardians of the national 'face', and its related we-feelings of collective pride and shame.[32] As Elias put it, 'people in power can usually count on a warm response of approval and often of affection or love from their compatriots they praise or add to the glory of the social unit they all form with each other' (1987a: xii).

The British anthropologist Abner Cohen has suggested that in all societies, authority is typically legitimated and loyalty is often invoked by the manipulation of collective symbols which are emotively charged due to their relation to people's conceptions of themselves and their existential condition in the world. For this reason, 'the totality of the self is thus subject to the most intensive competition between various types of power groups' (1974: 60). Humans everywhere face what Cohen refers to as 'the perennial problems of existence': evil, misfortune, illness, decay, and death. However, in modern as well as in pre-modern societies, individuals are not totally helpless in the face of such difficulties, because collective solutions and remedies are always on offer from competing political groups:

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[30] As the anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1993: 39) has argued, the concept of 'the nation' must be seen as a politically contested symbol which can have 'multiple meanings offered as alternatives' and may be 'competed over by different groups manoeuvering to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimating effects.' Bourdieu (1991: 105) has also referred to 'nations' as one example of what he calls the symbolic 'struggle over classifications' which characterise the discursive power contests in which competing political factions aim to impose 'the definition of the social world that is best suited to their interests.'

[31] My use of this concept has been inspired by the anthropologist Victor Turner (1974: 17), who suggested that the political process of any society can be viewed as a conflictive 'arena' in which there is an ongoing 'social drama', a 'trial of strength between influential paradigm-bearers' who offer conflicting representations of 'the good life'. In my case, I have been interested in the way in which political leaders in modern nation-states put forward conflicting paradigms of how their respective nations can maintain their 'greatness' in the world.

[32] This discursive strategy evidently applies not only to 'the nation' which the official central state claims to represent, but also to the case of rival peripheral 'nations', whose representatives may aspire to establish their own political autonomy.

> We do not face these problems of human existence on our own. For most of us, the major groups, the great corporations to which we belong, take care of this side of our life... They teach us that we die, but continue to live within our lineage, motherland, nation, the party. We are made to identify with and project ourselves into a continuing, eternal force which is larger than ourselves, within which we should continue to live after our death. This is developed and inculcated in ceremonies of all sorts: state funerals, cenotaphs, memorial services.(1974: 62)

This is how one should understand the potency of 'the nation' as a politically contested component of modern selfhood: its emotive power resides in its relation to people's images of themselves as members of a 'historic' national community, which both stretches back into the past, and extends forward into the future. In what Weber famously called the 'disenchanted' world of modernity (1946c [1919]: 155), national self-images may therefore provide a secular substitute for religion, an emotional palliative which helps people to confront the problem of mortality and the meaning of life. Although many human beings may no longer believe in a heavenly afterlife of eternal bliss, they may find some solace in the idea that 'the nation' to which they devoted their lives will continue to exist after they die, and will honour them in the future for their services to the fatherland. As Elias pointed out, a national we-image 'grants the individual a chance of survival beyond actual physical existence: survival in the memory of the chain of generations' (1991a: 223-4). [33] In this sense, following the insights of Bourdieu on human mortality which I discussed earlier, the 'recognition' or 'distinction' which people receive not for what they accomplish as individuals, but for what they achieve collectively as members of nations, may also become a meaningful justification for living.

As Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 109-119) has cogently argued, the ideology of nationalism should indeed be seen as a form of 'collectivized' or 'group immortality', a way of alleviating the fear of mortal insignificance through the belief that 'we' as individuals will die, but 'our nation' will continue to survive after we disappear from the face of the earth. This is

[33] From this perspective, nationalism has recently been defined by the anthropologist Josep Llobera (1994) as 'the God of modernity'. The same point has also been made by Anderson (1991) and Smith (1991).

undoubtedly one of the fundamental reasons for nationalism's emotional potency as a political discourse of power-legitimation:

> The construction of group immortality can be interpreted as an attempt to harness the energy generated by death-anxiety in the service of specific group interests and, of course, the interests of the group's extant or aspiring elites.(1992: 123)

Furthermore, this pursuit of 'collectivized immortality' through the continuing survival of 'the nation' can itself become an issue of prestige-competition and status-stratification, since it may be publically proclaimed (and widely believed) that other weaker nations may sink into the 'dustbin of history', but 'ours' never will:

> Generally speaking, the strategy of group immortality consists in exempting one's own group from the condition of transience which extends to all other categories and collectivities of the human species. Other groups are temporalized; their presence in history is made into an episode. Those groups make a brief entry onto the historical stage which is bound to be promptly followed by an exit.(1992: 119)

Hence, it is certainly not infrequent to hear political leaders making emotionally charged claims about how *their* programmes and *their* policies are the ones which will ensure the continuing prosperity, dignity, and happiness of *our nation's children*. As the political philosopher David Miller has written, national identity involves 'an essentially historical understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a tradition which they then pass on to their successors' (1995: 175). In this sense, the collective emotions of national pride or shame may also be derived by imagining the continuing triumphs, as well the potential humiliations, which 'our nation' may experience in the future, when *we* are no longer on *this* side of the grave.

In Abner Cohen's terms, 'the nation' can therefore be seen as a 'bivocal symbol' of modernity, in the sense that it can simultaneously fulfil both personal, existentialist functions of self-meaning, as well as political functions of power-legitimation.[34] A national self-image may not only provide individuals with an emotionally appealing answer to the question 'Who am I?',

[34] 'The most dominant symbols are essentially bivocal, being rooted, on the one hand, in the human condition, in what may be called "selfhood", and on the other in the relations of power' (1979: 87); 'the more potent the symbol, the more total the involvement of the self' (1977: 123).

but for this very reason it may also determine their response to the question: 'Who should I support with my obedience, my consent, my vote, my money, or perhaps even my life?' In other words, a person's self-awareness of himself as a national citizen, and his emotional sensitivity in relation to the well-being and prestige of his country, both today and in the future, may crucially determine his political affiliations to those leaders who are perceived as its most effective sentinels. For all of these reasons, the emotively charged we-image of 'the nation' is always an extremely contested object of political dispute in the media-transmitted political struggles of each modern state society. The 'pride-shame balance' of the national 'face' is monitored on a daily basis in the press and in television news broadcasts, and leaders are constantly judged according to their capacity or inadequacy to maintain the nation's reputation in the world, in the different competitive fields of international prestige-ranking.

In this thesis, therefore, national identity will be understood as a symbolically constructed, emotionally charged, and politically contested component of modern selfhood that has developed, and is developing, over the course of a long-term sociohistorical process. To identify with a nation involves: (1) a symbolic understanding or *we-image* of oneself as a member of a nation which is (subjectively) classified on a hierarchic ladder of global prestige, in various arenas or fields of international status-competition (e.g. political power, economic prosperity, moral respectability, athletic excellence, etc.); and (2) a shifting emotional state or *we-feeling* of greater or lesser self-esteem, pride or shame, in relation to what is perceived to be the particular ranking of one's nation in these different 'games of international honour'. Such we-images and we-feelings, however, evidently do not emerge out of the blue, in some sort of sociocultural vacuum. On the contrary, these collective ideals and sentiments must necessarily be analyzed as (3) *historically conditioned, politically contested symbols and sentiments* which are constantly invoked in the ongoing, discursive struggles for power and legitimacy that take place in contemporary nation-state societies.

3. Methodological considerations: The study of 'Europe' as a historically conditioned, emotionally charged, and politically contested symbol

In the opening chapter of this introductory section, I stated that the approach I have adopted for the study of national identity has been inspired above all by Norbert Elias's 'process-sociology'. I shall now explain more clearly what I mean by this, in order to justify the particular methodological strategy I have employed in my research. The whole of Elias's *oeuvre* can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate the interrelations between long-term sociohistorical processes and the psychological make-up or emotional 'habitus' of individuals. His most famous application of this approach is of course *The Civilizing Process* (1994a [1939]), which essentially tries to illustrate the connections between the 'sociogenesis' of the modern state and the 'psychogenesis' of *relatively* 'pacified' and 'self-controlled' individuals (in contrast to the *relatively* 'unrestrained' and violent habitus which prevailed in earlier times). Leaving aside the numerous controversies which this ambitious argument has provoked, and irrespective of the extent to which it is empirically accurate or 'reality-congruent',[1] what in my view seems undeniable is that in *The Civilizing Process*, Elias inaugurated a new, highly innovative research programme which broke down the disciplinary boundaries between history, sociology, and psychology: a novel synthesis which aimed to discover the sociohistorical processes which have moulded the malleable psyche of human beings over the course of time. Indeed, in the final concluding synopsis of this book, Elias himself described the investigations he had carried out as those of 'a science that does not yet exist', a new project for which he proposed two possible names: 'historical psychology' and 'historical social psychology' (1994 [1939]: 484).[2]

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[1] The concept of 'reality-congruence' was employed by Elias (1987b) himself to refer to the degrees of empirical validity or 'object-adequacy' which a particular symbolic depiction of the world may have. The conclusions he proposed in the final chapter of *The Civilizing Process* have been attacked with particular vigour by social anthropologists, many of whom have viewed this book as a misguided, ethnocentric glorification of a supposedly superior, less violent, Western 'civilization'. For a review of these criticisms, which in my view are based on a complete misreading of Elias's original text, see Mennell (1992) and Van Krieken (1998).

[2] Recently, however, Árpad Szakolczai (2000) has proposed that Elias's work should be placed within the larger framework of what he calls 'reflexive historical sociology' – an approach which, according to this Hungarian scholar, characterized the later writings of Max Weber, and whose later protagonists include Michel Foucault, Franz Borkenau, Eric Voegelin, and Lewis Mumford.

For the methodological purposes of this thesis, however, the most relevant of Elias's works is undoubtedly *The Germans* (1996), a much less known collection of essays in which he attempted to apply his unique sociological outlook to the study of national sentiments. In this book, Elias proposed what one could perhaps call a *sociohistorical psychology of national pride*. His fundamental methodological point was that in order to understand the collective emotions of a national community, the sociologist above all has to delve into its past, in order to analyze the particular historical trajectory of its vicissitudes on the world stage. In this way, one can focus on the we-images of relative inferiority or superiority, and the we-feelings of pride and shame, which have emerged during the course of a particular nation's history, in its competitive struggles for power and status with other national collectivities. Elias actually compared the sociologist's task in this field of study to the objectives which his great intellectual mentor, the founder of psychoanalysis, had set himself when he began to explore the anxieties and insecurities of his mental patients:

> The central question is how the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members. Sociologists face a task here which distantly recalls the task which Freud tackled. He attempted to show the connection between the outcome of the conflict-ridden channelling of drives in a person's development and his or her resulting habitus. But there are also analogous connections between a people's long-term fortunes and experiences and their social habitus at any subsequent time. At this layer of the personality structure – let us for the time being call it the 'we layer' – there are often complex symptoms of disturbance at work which are scarcely less in strength and in capacity to cause suffering than the individual neuroses.(1996: 19)

In particular, Elias stressed the importance of focusing on the collective we-feelings of national pride, a sensitive topic which was generally avoided due its morally repugnant associations with the horrors of the Third Reich, but which in his view the sociologist had a scientific duty to dissect and explore:

> The problem of national pride remains undiscussed. The memory of the distorted form of national pride prevalent under the National Socialist regime has made this topic unmentionable. I think one should not hesitate to grasp the nettle. There are indeed forms of national pride which are dangerous and insulting. But the question is not whether one thinks national pride is a good or bad thing. The fact is that it exists. If one looks around disinterestedly, it is evident that all people in all states in the world have to come to terms with the problem of national pride... Even in the most powerful countries, national pride is and remains a sore spot in the personality structure of the people concerned. This is particularly true of countries which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the pyramid of states.(1996: 17)

These eloquent passages from *The Germans* have been key sources of inspiration for the comparative-historical research which I have carried out in this thesis.

Following Elias, my first methodological task has therefore been to delve into the British and Spanish past, in order to trace the particular trajectories of these two nation-states in the global 'pyramid of states'. My fundamental objective has been to understand the relationship between collective we-feelings of national pride and the affective meanings of 'Europe' which have emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century in my two case-studies. Hence, I have particularly focused on what EC/EU membership came to represent in these two countries as a result of their particular positions on the world stage at the time the process of European integration was initiated, in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the British case, this has essentially involved coming to grips with the predicament of an established 'world power', resisting the necessity of 'entering Europe' until it was clear there was 'no other alternative'. In the Spanish case, it has fundamentally involved analyzing the humiliating situation of a denigrated outsider, aspiring to be 'accepted by Europe' in order to overcome the shameful stigma of Francoist 'backwardness'. Hence, my first methodological task has involved a thorough examination of the secondary sources which are available for these two countries on this particular historical period. For this purpose, I have primarily relied on works written by historians, but in some cases also by political scientists, international relations scholars, intellectuals, and journalists.

At the same time, however, I have also combined this 'Eliasian' investigation into the historical and socio-psychological roots of national we-feelings in Britain and Spain, with a second, equally important methodological endeavour: an analysis of the dominant political and media discourses[3] on 'Europe' which have emerged in the public spheres of these two case-

[3] I have purposely avoided employing the term 'discourse analysis', since this is associated primarily with the techniques which have been developed by the sociolinguist Teun Van Dijk (1988) and his school. In my view, this methodological strategy is seriously flawed from a sociological perspective, because it involves a largely de-contextualized, ahistorical study of linguistic utterances and grammatical constructions. At the same time, it focuses almost exclusively on the *cognitive* aspects of language, and pays little or no attention to the *emotional* dimensions of discourse which have been the central concern of my own research.

studies.[4] In order to do so, I have attempted to bring together a Durkheimian focus on collectiv symbols and sentiments with a Weberian analysis of political conflict, by studying what on could call the *politics of national symbolism* and the *politics of national sentiment.* Durkheim, a I have already suggested, was undoubtedly a sociological pioneer in the study of how emotiona solidarity is generated in human societies through the medium of collective symbols and rituals The problem with his approach, however, is that it overwhelmingly stresses the function o symbols and rituals in the maintenance of a homogenous, unified, consensual 'society', withou considering the way in which symbols and rituals may be employed as strategic weapons in th ongoing conflicts which take place in all societies between rival political factions.[5] It is for thi reason that in my view, Durkheim's teachings on the construction of emotional solidarity through symbolism and ritual need to be combined with Weber's insights on the politica struggle for power and authority: the passionate, discursive war in which words 'are no plowshares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought', but rather 'swords against the enemies' that are employed by politicians as 'a means of canvassing votes and winning over others' (1946c [1919]: 145). From this perspective, one can analyze how competing political groups manipulate emotionally charged, collective symbols and employ rituals strategically to defend or attain power vis-à-vis other groups (Lukes 1975: 302). As Randall Collins has cogently argued, if Durkheim's insights on symbolism and ritual are combined with the Weberian tradition of 'conflict sociology', one can analyze how rival political leaders attempt to monopolize what he calls 'the means of emotional production', in order to generate collective enthusiasm for their programmes:

> Ritual is a weapon usable by some groups to dominate others, by manipulating emotional solidarity as well as the lines of group identification to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. Politics may thus be described as a struggle by, with, and over 'the means of emotional production' (1987: 117).

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[4] In my use of the term 'public sphere', I am following the classic definition proposed by Jürgen Habermas: 'By "public sphere" we mean first of all a domain of social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed... Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion... When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence... newspapers... radio and television are the media of the public sphere' (1991: 398).

[5] As Stephen Lukes (1982: 23) has put it, 'power... is the great blind spot of Durkheimian sociology', which is characterised by 'a systematic neglect of politics.'

In spite of the remarkable progress which the project of European integration has made this century, every member state of the EU has clearly maintained its own nationally bounded arena of political conflict, its own symbolic battlefield of discursive struggles. National we-images and we-feelings have therefore functioned and continue to function as highly contested objects of political dispute in each country. In my research, therefore, I have attempted to analyze how the collective ideals and sentiments of nationhood have been invoked in the respective public spheres of my two case-studies, in order to build up legitimacy and popular support for different positions towards 'Europe'.

This particular methodological focus has been promoted in recent times by a number of authors from different disciplines who have been working in the field of study which one could broadly classify under the heading of 'political symbolism and ritual'. For instance, in an illuminating book entitled *Two-Dimensional Man*, Abner Cohen has argued that power and symbolism are the two major variables that pervade human social life, in modern as much as in pre-modern contexts: 'Everyhwere political man is also symbolist man' (1974: 137). Hence, according to this anthropologist, a proper understanding of any society necessarily requires an analysis of the interrelations between symbolism and politics. Cohen defines symbols as 'objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions, and impel men to action', while politics refers to 'the processes involved in the distribution, maintenance, exercise and struggle for power' (1974: xi). Although symbols exist in their own right and may be analyzed for their own intrinsic values, 'they are nearly always manipulated, consciously or unconsciously, in the struggle for, and maintenance of, power between individuals and groups' (1974: 11). Hence, Cohen has suggested that the political process can be analyzed as an ongoing discursive contest in which competing factions invoke emotionally charged symbols in their attempts to acquire or maintain power and legitimacy.

Another anthropologist, David Kertzer, has also argued that 'politics is expressed through symbolism', and therefore that to understand the political process in any society, it is necessary to analyze 'how political actors consciously and unconsciously manipulate symbols' (1988: 2).

Kertzer has particularly emphasized the importance of rituals as powerful tools of politic action in which leaders attempt to guide cognition and channel emotion so that their authori may be legitimated and their policies may gain enthusiastic support. In his view, the power (rituals resides in the fact that they are 'able to unite a particular image of the universe with strong emotional attachment to that image' (1988: 40). He also stresses that the political use (symbolism and ritual is not necessarily a conservative force to maintain a particular power orde On the contrary, he rightly argues that the manipulation of symbols and rituals is equall important in the process of political contestation and change. The point is that people' allegiance and enthusiasm for any political cause, whether for the defense of the *status quo* o for the overthrow of a government, is always drummed up through the utilisation of symbolisn and ritual: 'Symbolism is necessary to prop up the governing political order, but it is alsc essential in overthrowing it and replacing it with a different political system' (1988: 147).

For the most part, anthropologists have generally carried out studies of symbolism and ritual in small-scale ethnographic investigations of 'tribal' communities.[6] In his own work, however, Kertzer has emphasised that the study of political symbols and ceremonies can be particularly important and fruitful in our own contemporary, industrialized societies. This is because the modern nation-state is not like the traditional village in which all members of the community know each other and interact in face-to-face relationships, but instead has no palpable existence outside the symbolism through which it is envisioned: 'Living in a society that extends well beyond our observation, we can relate to the larger political entity only through abstract symbolic means. We are, indeed, ruled by power holders whom we never encounter except in highly symbolic representations' (1988: 8). As Michael Walzer has similarly put it, 'the state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived' (1967: 194).

[6] As one practitioner in this field has put it: 'Social anthropologists have consistently neglected the study of ritual, especially political ritual, in modern Western society. Until very recently most have preferred to continue their traditional interest in the exotic, whether in distant lands or among peasant groups closer to home. Though ritual plays an important role in modern European politics, only a few pioneers have been prepared to study the topic' (MacClancy 1993: 119).

Within the field of political science, the figure who has done the most to promote a methodological focus on political symbolism and ritual is undoubtedly Murray Edelman. More than three decades ago, in his insightful writings on 'the symbolic uses of politics' and 'politics as a spectator sport' (1964: 5), this author suggested that:

> For most men most of the time, politics is a series of pictures in the mind, placed there by television news, newspapers, magazines, and discussions. The pictures create a moving panorama whic take place in a world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its members come to fear or cheer, often with passion and sometimes with action... Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent... The parade of 'news' about political acts reported to us by the mass media and drunk up by the public as drama is the raw material of such symbolization.(1964: 5)

From Edelman's perspective, the political process can therefore be analyzed as an ongoing discursive contest in which leaders invoke emotive symbols of *threat* or *reassurance* in their attempts to acquire power and legitimacy:

> The point is that every political institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular response in its audiences... So government not only confers benefits; its forms also placate or arouse spectators... For the spectators of the political scene every act contributes to a pattern of ongoing events that spells *threat* or *reassurance*. This is the basic dichotomy for the mass public.(1964: 12-13, my italics).

Hence, Edelman suggests that if the conventional study of politics concentrates on 'how people get the things they want through government', his approach focuses on 'the mechanisms through which politics influences what they want, what they fear, what they regard as possible, and even who they are', by analyzing 'the *meanings* for large publics of the acts and gestures of leaders' (1964: 20).

For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant aspect of Edelman's work is of course his emphasis on the *national* dimension of contemporary political symbolism and ritual. For instance, this author has drawn attention to the 'patriotic ceremonies affirming the greatness, heroism, and nobility of the nation' as key vehicles in the symbolic legitimation of modern states. At the same time, in his book on 'politics as symbolic action', Edelman has focused on the constant invocations which are made in contemporary political discourses with regard to the defense of the so-called 'national interest' – i.e. the attempts which politicians typically make to

wrap themselves up in the national flag, in order to 'mobilize mass publics behind particular concrete interest groupings' (1971: 12). The effectiveness of this tactic is that 'it conveys the message that these interests are the "national interests": that the whole nation is involved in them and must patriotically support them' (1971: 157).

Following these and other authors in the growing field of political symbolism and situal,[7] in my research I have analyzed how the collective we-images and we-feelings of nationhood have been invoked in Britain and Spain to rally support for both positive and negative outlooks towards 'Europe'. More specifically, I have tried to focus on how sentiments of national pride (and shame) have been manipulated to defend different postures towards the EC/EU in conflicting political discourses and rituals of legitimation or de-legitimation. In this way, as Gerard Delanty has suggested, my aim has been to study the concept of 'Europe' as a sociocultural construction 'which means different things to different people in different contexts' (1995:3), and to analyze the discursive struggles over the definition of this idea as a kind of symbolic football match: 'the ball is Europe, the players the identity projects, and the pitch the geo-political reality on which the game, in this instance the discourse, is played' (1995: 4). The very same point has been stressed by the proponents of an 'anthropology of Europe':

> We should recognize the plurality and diversity of the many different Europes that exist, and have existed, and the ways in which these different meanings might be deployed to different effect. The way to see these different 'Europes' is as cultural conceptions advanced by diverse groups competing for hegemony in the political arena.(Goddard, Llobera, and Shore 1994: 30)

From this perspective, I have attempted to analyze what Alan Milward has recently called 'the symbolic role of "Europe" in political rhetoric' (1997: 15), through an exploration of how this concept has been employed by rival political leaders, in their discursive attempts to build up popular support for themselves in each of my case-studies.

Given the objectives of my research, I have also been particularly inspired by Weber's classic essay *Politics as a Vocation*, in which he pointed out that political leaders often try to

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[7] See also Geertz (1973), Alexander (ed., 1987), Thompson (1990), Abeles and Rossade (eds., 1993), Pérez-Díaz (1993), Desfor-Edles (1998).

build up popular support for themselves not only by offering material rewards to their potential followers, but also by enticing their egos with what he called 'premiums of vanity' (1946a [1919]: 81).[8] Throughout this thesis, I shall illustrate how in both Britain and Spain, political leaders have attempted to promote EC/EU membership by offering to their respective publics what one could call, following Weber, *premiums of national vanity* – in other words, self-flattering we-images of their nation's status-position in the world. More specifically, I shall focus on the three key spheres of international prestige-ranking which have been particularly relevant in the debates over 'Europe' that have taken place in both case-studies: *political power*, *economic prosperity*, and *moral respectability*. The difference, as I shall argue, is that given the different historical trajectories of these two countries, in the British case it was rather difficult to combine the idea of 'belonging to Europe' with collective we-feelings of national self-love, while in the Spanish case 'Europe' could more smoothly be transformed into an emotionally appealing source of national pride.

With regard to this aspect of my research, the fundamental source of data has been the national press of my two case-studies, in which I have analyzed both the rhetoric on 'Europe' that has been employed in ritualized political speeches, as well as in the headlines, articles, editorials, and cartoons of the leading newspapers.[9] The reason I have opted for this methodological strategy is that, as I pointed out in the previous section of this introductory chapter, it is fundamentally through the mass media that national populations are routinely informed about their country's successes and failures in the different fields of international power rivalry and status competition. As Anderson has argued, one of the fundamental ways in which the citizens of modern nation-states 'imagine' themselves as fraternal communities of

[8] Weber defined 'vanity' in another section of this same essay as 'the need to personally to stand in the foreground as clearly as possible' (1946a [1919]: 116).

[9] With regard to the selection of newspapers, in order to be as comprehensive as possible, I have carried out an exhaustive analysis of all the leading national dailies in both of my case-studies. Hence, for my analysis of Britain, I have looked at both the main broadsheets, *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, and *The Independent* (as well as their respective Sunday editions), and the leading tabloid papers: *The Daily Mirror*, *The Daily Express*, *The Sun*, and the *Daily Mail*. In the Spanish case, for the Franco period I have looked at *Arriba*, *ABC*, and *Ya*, and for the democratic period I have analyzed *El País*, *ABC*, and *Diario-16*.

fellow countrymen is through the daily 'mass ceremony' in which the national press is read every morning by millions of people who do not personally know each other:

> The significance of this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.(1991: 35)

In this way, the readers of national newspapers are 'symbolically integrated into a public whose common concerns are shown by the narrative of the world represented' (Chaney 1993: 117). Alexis de Tocqueville made this very same point in his classic study *Democracy in America*:

> Only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before a thousand readers... Newspapers do not multiply simply because they are cheap, but according to the more or less frequent need felt by a great number of people to communicate with one another and act together... A newspaper can only survive if it gives publicity to feelings or principles common to a large number of men.(1994 [1835]: 517-19)

As the social psychologist Michael Billig has illustrated, the language of the national press reproduces the symbolic categorizations which classify 'us' every day as members of particular 'nations' ('Home News'/'National events'), in relation to 'others' ('Foreign News'/ 'International events'):

> All broadsheets, whatever their politics, maintain a principle of news 'apartheid' - keeping 'home' news and 'foreign' news paginally separate... Without conscious awareness, we find our way around the familiar territory of our newspaper. As we do so, we are habitually at home in a textual structure which uses the homeland's national boundaries, dividing the world into 'homeland' and 'foreign'.(Billig 1995: 118)

The discourse of every newspaper is filled with underlying assumptions about 'the nation' in which 'we' live. There are, for instance, constant references to '*the* Prime Minister', '*the* economy', '*the* country', '*the* weather'. No further specification is necessary: it is taken for granted that '*the* Prime Minister' or '*the* economy' is 'our' Prime Minister and 'our' economy. Editorials, in particular, employ the national 'we', 'us', and 'our' in speaking to and for 'the nation'. They morally judge political figures according to their capacities to maintain national security, prosperity, and prestige. Such language, as Billig argues, indicates 'the nation' at the

center of the reader's and the writer's shared symbolic universe. It unconsciously reminds 'us' everyday of who 'we' are and where 'we' stand in the global hierarchy of international prestige, in the competitive fields of politics, economics, ethics, science, art, sports, and so on.

The methodological approach of my thesis has therefore combined two fundamental tasks. Firstly, I have attempted to acquire an accurate sociohistorical understanding of the national pride-shame balance in my two case studies, and its relationship to the process of European integration. In particular, following the insights of Elias, as well as Scheff, I have focused on the dominant national self-images and collective emotional sensitivities of these two nation-states, and how they developed in relation to the post-war project of European unification. Secondly, against the background of this historical and socio-psychological contextualization, I have analyzed the dominant political and media discourses on 'Europe' which emerged in my two case studies during three critical time-periods in the history of Britain's and Spain's relations with the EEC/EU: their initial failed attempts to enter 'the Common Market', their ultimately successful entries into the 'European Economic Community', and the 1991 summit meeting at which the Maastricht Treaty was agreed and hence the 'European Union' was officially born. I have chosen these three episodes because they all clearly represent critical junctures in which 'Europe' became an important issue for debate in the public spheres of my two case-studies. Hence, they offer three ideal historical contexts in which one can compare the influence of national we-images and we-feelings on the emergence of different contested outlooks towards 'Europe'.

Following the insights of the authors I have mentioned earlier in the field of political symbolism and ritual, throughout my research I have paid particular attention to the political ceremonies or 'media performances' (Elliot 1980) in which the relationship of 'the nation' to 'Europe' was defined in emotionally charged discourses – such as the televised 'messages to the nation' in which the decisions to enter the EEC were officially announced by British and Spanish leaders, the signature rituals in which their respective entries into 'Europe' were formalized with much ceremonial pomp, and the press conferences in which the outcome of the

'historic' Maastricht negotiations were publicly announced. Throughout my analysis of these key episodes, my central focus has therefore been the 'political spectacle'[10] in which aspiring o established leaders have put forward their rival visions of 'Europe' during ritualized ceremonie transmitted by the mass media, and the leading national newspapers have voiced their agreemen or disagreement with regard to such viewpoints in their editorials, cartoons, and so on.

Many previous studies which have explored the relation between national identities and collective attitudes to Europe have done so primarily through quantitative analyses of 'Eurobarometer' surveys (e.g. Hewstone 1986, Reif 1993). However, although these investigations may certainly provide some indication of general trends in public sentiment at a particular moment in time (and indeed throughout this thesis I have occasionally cited the results of such studies amongst the British and Spanish populations), there is clearly no way one can carry out a historically contextualized, interpretative exploration of what 'Europe' *means* in different national contexts, and what *affective charge* this symbol carries, merely through an analysis of opinion polls. In this sense, I completely agree with Anthony Smith, who in his seminal article 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', pointed out that 'in few areas is the attitude questionnaire of such doubtful utility as in the domain of cultural values and meanings' (1992: 57). Smith therefore suggested that what was clearly lacking in this field of research was a series of case-studies which would analyze collective perceptions of Europe *over time* in different nation-states, 'as recorded in political traditions and symbolism, in national mythologies and historical memories, and as relayed in... the mass media'. Following these methodological suggestions, in this thesis I have aimed to capture the dominant collective perceptions and affective meanings of 'Europe' in my two case studies, through an analysis of the emotionally charged statements of political leaders trying to sell themselves to the public, as well as the discourse of mass-circulation newspapers, who also attempt to reach an audience as wide as possible. As I pointed out earlier in this introductory chapter, such symbolic

[10] I am borrowing this concept from Murray Edelman, who has argued in one of his books that the political news transmitted by the media 'comprise a spectacle' and 'serve as a meaning machine: a generator of points of view and therefore of perceptions, anxieties aspirations, and strategies... generators of meanings that shape political quiescence, arousal, support or opposition to causes' (1988: 10).

representations evidently do not fall from the sky, in some sort of sociocultural vacuum, but are clearly constrained by the particular historical trajectories and collective memories of a given national community. Hence, my objective has been to study the public sphere in each of my case-studies as a competitive discursive arena or 'symbolic market' (Bourdieu 1991) in which the invocation of national we-images and we-feelings in political and media discourses has been conditioned by each particular country's past fortunes on the world stage.

Since my argument is built up chronologically in my two case-studies, and involves the narration of a continuous historical trajectory for each of these two countries, I have divided the thesis into an initial section on Britain, in which the three mentioned episodes are analyzed in one block of three chapters, and another section on Spain in which the same three time-periods are studied in another three chapters. In this way, the reader is first immersed into the history of the British pride-shame balance and its relationship to 'Europe', which is illustrated in these three critical junctures, and afterwards is led into the contrasting historical experience of Spain and its relation to 'Europe' during these same key time-periods. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I sum up the fundamental arguments of the thesis, by comparing and contrasting each of the three episodes which I have analyzed in my two case-studies, as well as drawing out the theoretical and methodological implications of these empirical findings.

II. Britain: 'Europe' as a symbol of national decline

"We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. We belong to no single continent, but to all. We have our own dream and our own task."

Winston Churchill

4. Attempts to 'enter Europe': A painful adaptation to the nation's loss of 'world power'

When the project of European integration began to take shape in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Kingdom was still hierarchically ranked as a 'world power' with global aspirations and responsibilities. After its heroic war victory, Britain enjoyed a place amongst the so-called 'Big Three', with a secure place at the 'Top Table' of international diplomacy. This was a time when British children were still being taught geography with school maps in which a very substantial portion of the globe had been shaded in red, the colour-symbol of 'the Empire'.[1] As two writers from this country have recalled, 'it was still a time when there seemed nothing comic or incongruous about the prefix "Great" for Britain' (N. Beloff 1973: 15), or when a popular saying asserted that 'to be born an Englishman was to have drawn the top card in life' (Haseler 1996: ix). Hence, from such a standpoint of global power and prestige, the very idea of Britain's submersion in a European federation was simply inconceivable amongst the vast majority of its political elites, since the United Kingdom was considered to be much more than '*just* another European country.'[2] At that time, the dominant paradigm of British national greatness was still that of a nation which could allow itself much greater aspirations on the world stage, through its special ties with the United States, as well as the leadership of its Empire-cum-Commonwealth: 'Yes, Britain was in Europe but not only in Europe... To think of Britain as just a western European nation would have been to belittle her national and international status' (Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 6).

Hence, when the war came to an end there was 'a profound difference in outlook and psychology on the two sides of the Channel' (Kitzinger 1973: 21). While most of the continental countries had suffered extremely harsh blows to their national self-confidence through the

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[1] As the Labour politician Giles Radice (1992: 4) has recalled: 'When I was a child in India during the last days of the British Raj, I used to gaze at a map of the world, a quarter of which was coloured in red.'

[2] This claim was made by Ernest Bevin, Britain's foreign secretary in the post-war Labour administration headed by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Cited in Haseler (1996: 125).

humiliating experience of defeat and foreign occupation, British pride was enormously enhanced by its prestigious role in the Allied victory: 'The war had been different for the British and it had left them not with a sense of national failure and a feeling of national inadequacy, but with a sense of national achievement and an illusion of power' (Camps 1964: 3). If Europe's post-war unification was fundamentally driven by the need to achieve the economic, political, and moral 'rescue' of its devastated nation-states through a collective pooling of strength (Milward 1992), it seems evident that this necessity was felt much more acutely on 'the Continent' than in Britain. On the whole, the British people still maintained a much more inflated and ambitious self-image of their place in the world's hierarchic ladder of power and status:

> After the Second World War most states in Western Europe were concerned primarily with their own economic recovery, and with rediscovering a sense of national identity of a war that had resulted in defeat and national humiliation for the Germans, and that had involved the division of almost all the other nations of Western Europe between fascists and anti-fascists, collaborators and resistance fighters. While these states were formulating their foreign policies in line with such objectives, Britain continued to formulate its foreign policy in global terms.(George 1990: 13)

The Europeanist call to 'unite or perish' therefore made relatively little sense in the British context of post-war self-confidence, for the situation did not appear to be so desperate. On the contrary, the British people could easily derive considerable collective pride from the relatively strong and prestigious status which they still enjoyed after their courageous war effort, in comparison to the ravaged continental countries. At the same time, they had very little reason to doubt what they generally perceived as the uparalleled excellence, fairness, efficiency and stability of their nation's political institutions. On the contrary, the war victory had renewed many British people's self-gratifying faith in the supposedly unrivalled moral superiority of their country's democratic traditions and its sovereign Parliament. In short, as David Marquand (1995: 184) has written, 'in 1945 [Britain] was the proudest state in Western Europe, with the most to be proud of.' There seemed absolutely no reason to risk Britain's global prestige, economic self-interest, and political autonomy with supranational 'European' experiments, for the traditional framework of the nation-state had served the British people very well.

Hence, at least initially, Britain's governing elites generally maintained a rather distant and paternalistic stance towards the supranational project of European integration which began to take shape in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Instead of actively participating in this process, they preferred to pursue a foreign policy that remained fully consistent with the distinctive status of a proudly independent global giant. From their perspective, the notion of pooling sovereignty in a European federation may have been entirely appropriate for 'them', the utterly devastated, unstable continental countries, but not for 'us', the British people, a nation which could still undoubtedly afford the luxury of higher ambitions, as well as the honourable burden of greater, world-wide responsibilities: 'In the heady postwar years, Britain would have considered a stridently European posture far too parochial. Europe began at Calais; if Britain had a consistent stance at all, it was as a warm but detached supporter' (Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 6-7).

By the early 1960's, however, this collectively shared sense of lofty national self-confidence had begun to dissolve, due to the gradual weakening of British status in a bipolar world now clearly dominated by the two undisputed 'superpowers', the United States and the Soviet Union. During that year, the Conservative government led by Harold Macmillan ultimately decided to put foward an application to join the European Communities, the only option which remained in order to find a new source of national strength. At that point, the economic success of the EEC, in contrast to the declining situation of the UK,[3] caused British leaders to fear the dangers of being excluded from such a prosperous club, as well as of losing political influence on the world stage. As one author has put it, when Britain turned to Europe, this occured 'more by a process of elimination than one of choice' (Allen 1988: 169), only when the attempt to maintain a distinctive 'world power' status had completely failed, and there seemed to be no other alternative if further status-decline was to be avoided. In Britain, the application to 'join Europe' was thus hardly an easy policy to promote and sell to the public, for it inevitably appeared to

[3] Throughout the 1950's, the average growth rate within ECSC/EEC countries was 4 per cent, compared with a figure of 2.3 per cent for Britain (figures cited in Sanders 1990: 144).

symbolize the definitive collapse of much greater aspirations, the end of a 'global vocation', and therefore a humiliating lowering of British rank in the hierarchic global ladder of international prestige. Hence, from the beginning, one can observe that the decision to 'become European' inevitably provoked a passionate outbreak of discursive controversies in the British public sphere. To make matters worse, the road to the EEC proved to be a rather long and embarrassingly difficult one, since both this initial attempt, as well as a second try under the premiership of Harold Wilson in 1967, were blocked by Charles de Gaulle. In both cases, the French leader proclaimed that Britain lacked sufficiently 'European' credentials to enter the exclusive, 'members only' club in which Monsieur le President had clearly become the self-appointed pontifex maximus, in his efforts to reconstruct la grandeur de la France, after the collective humiliations this nation suffered during World War II. In this chapter, therefore, I shall illustrate how in the British case, the approximation towards 'Europe' represented a painful adaptation to the loss of a widely cherished 'world power' status, and hence could not easily be transformed into an uncontested, potent source of national pride.

4.1 The decline of British power and status: from self-confident 'national greatness' to self-doubting collective anxiety

One of the best ways to illustrate the proud we-image which characterized the emotionally charged discourse of British leaders after the war victory is by considering the eloquent rhetoric of Sir Winston Churchill. Indeed, this self-confident grandeur was displayed quite clearly by Churchill during his influential Zurich speech of 1946, which I cited earlier, in which he famously called for the creation of 'a sort of United States of Europe'.[4] This public address can be seen as one of the most significant political rituals which got the ball of European integration rolling after the war, and it earned Churchill a rightful place among the so-called 'founding

[4] *The Times*, 20 September 1946. The rest of the quotations cited from Churchill's speech are also taken from this newspaper's reports.

fathers' or 'patron saints' of European unity (Milward 1992). Nevertheless, the discourse which he employed made it totally plain that in Churchill's mind, Britain would in no way be a part of this continental association. Rather, along with the world's other 'great powers', the United Kingdom would warmly encourage the construction of European unity from the sidelines:

> Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and, I trust, Soviet Russia – for then, indeed, all would be well – must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live.

Churchill's grand, idealistic proposal, therefore, did not envision Britain within the future 'United States of Europe', since this would be completely incongruent with the 'distinction' or 'status honmour' it enjoyed as one of the world's giants. Of course, the ex-Prime Minister assured that Britain would certainly support this honourable project from its powerful position of global strength and influence (and in this way it could derive some extra amounts of self-gratifying national pride in the sphere of moral respectability). Hence, from this perspective, while 'they, the Europeans' needed to unite in order to survive, 'we, the British' were not seen as a part of this continental grouping, because this was a national 'we' which could allow itself greater, much more prestigious aspirations. As Ralf Dahrendorf (1982: 136) has summed up this condescending, collective British attitude: 'Europe, that was the others'.

Indeed, it is worth considering Churchillian discourse in some detail, given the historic influence of this cherished war leader, and his symbolic role as one of the most popular totemic emblems of modern British nationhood (as is illustrated, for instance, by the prominent place reserved to artistic representations of his famous portly figure, with a cigar in one hand and the sign of Victory held up with the other, in key places of the national homeland such as London's Trafalgar Square). Such an analysis demonstrates that the paradigm of British national greatness which Churchill clearly believed in and publicly promoted was one of Anglo-American world leadership. In the preface to the first volume of his widely read *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, he wrote:

> For the second time in the present century the British Empire and the United States have

> stood together facing the perils of war on the largest scale known among men, and since the cannons ceased to fire and the bombs to burst we have become more conscious of our common duty to the human race... Vast numbers of people on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations have felt a sense of brotherhood.(1956: vii)

Churchill emphasized that there was absolutely no contradiction between this powerful partnership of 'the English-speaking peoples' and 'the erection of structures like the United States of Europe' (1956: vii). However, he made it clear that the national we-image which he stood for sought the maintenance of British national status and collective pride through an Atlantic union with the United States, rather than by merging with the continental Europeans. The power potential which Churchill foresaw in this transatlantic, Anglo-American bond was also made patent at a dinner in the White House after his election victory in 1951, during which he triumphantly proclaimed: 'Do you not feel, round this table, that there is a gathering of the governance of the world, not to dominate it, mind you, but to save it?'(cited in N. Beloff 1973: 80) Such words reflected a remarkably self-confident and narcissistically gratifying vision of global power which was to be exercised by 'the English-speaking peoples'. Furthermore, this Anglo-American project was simultaneously promoted as a collective victory in the international 'status game' of moral respectability, through the bold claim that all of humanity would supposedly be served by such an alliance.

It was Churchill, furthermore, who also laid out a highly influential vision of Britain's place in the world which located the United Kingdom at the intersection of three great circles: the Empire/Commonwealth, America, and Europe. Britain's links with 'the Continent' were thus perceived as merely one aspect of the nation's global importance, a relatively minor component of its we-image as an established 'world power'. In an essay written in 1930, Churchill proclaimed:

> We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. We belong to no single continent, but to all. We have our own dream and our own task.(Cited in Reynolds 1988: 225)

Twenty-three years later, when as Prime Minister he rejected Britain's participation in the project of the European Defence Community, Churchill reiterated this idea once again in a parliamentary speech:

> Where do we stand? We are not members of the EDC, not do we intend to be merged in a federal European system... We are with them, but not of them. We have our Commonwealth and Empire.[5]

Hence, although Churchill was undoubtedly a passionate promoter of European unity, it is also clear that he never abandoned 'the idea of Britain's extra-European status as head of a world-wide community and joint leader, with the United States, of the English-speaking world' (N. Beloff 1963: 47). From this perspective, which was widely shared, both Britain's imperial links and responsibilities, as well as the 'special relationship' with America, were viewed as much greater sources of national pride than the highly unattractive, rather demeaning concept of losing sovereignty by joining a supranational European federation. As George (1990: 39) has put it, 'the Churchillian doctrine of the three spheres of influence was the prevalent view: Britain was a global power, and only incidentally a European power.'

Although the war had seriously weakened Britain economically, the discourse of its leaders largely continued to display the resilience of this proud, self-confident we-image. In spite of the relative inferiority of its military might and its material strength in comparison to the USA and the USSR, Britain was nevertheless portrayed as a nation with an unparalleled moral prestige which still had a unique influence and a special, distinctive role to play on the world stage (Blackwell 1993: 98-100). As the Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee put it in an emotive speech delivered in 1946:

> It is for us to show that the British way of life, with its freedom and democracy, with its kindliness, and with its acceptance of the moral values on which alone true civilization can be founded, can in peace as in war be an example to the whole world.(Cited in Blackwell 1993: 99)

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[5] *The Times*, 12 May 1953.

In the discourse of Attlee's post-war government, the idea of Britain's moral world leadership was linked both to the progressive development of the Commonwealth countries, as well as to the construction of the welfare state at home. This project demanded firm control of the national economy, and hence the leading figures of the Labour government feared that its success could be put in danger by transferring sovereignty to a supranational European authority. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, declared in 1950:

> We are determined not to put these gains in peril through allowing vital decisions on great issues of national economic policy to be transferred from the British Parliament at Westminster to some supra-national European assembly... We intend to hold what we have gained here in this island.(Cited in Northedge 1974: 145-6)

The achievement of better living standards and welfare services in Britain was itself promoted as an important source of national pride in the moral sphere, an example of social improvement that should be imitated by other countries in Europe and throughout the world.

Monarchic figures also played a very important role in the maintenance of Britain's proud national we-image. For instance, the discourse employed by King George VI after the war victory similarly emphasized the idea of Britain's ethical preeminence, and the way in which its respected voice could still have a major impact on the destiny of humanity:

> In the supreme councils of the world, she [Britain] speaks not merely with an authority based on physical force and war potential, but also with a moral authority, and with an unrivaled experience in the handling of men and human affairs.(Cited in Blackwell 1993: 100)

Indeed, as David Cannadine (1983: 150-54) has shown, spectacular royal rituals such as the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953 continued to celebrate 'the continuity of Britain as a great power'. Hence, the new Queen's dress displayed embroidered emblems of all the dominions, numerous regiments of Commonwealth and colonial troops marched in solemn procession, and at one point the archbishop of Canterbury even proclaimed euphorically that the British nation had approached the Kingdom of Heaven on that very special day. Indeed, the discourse

employed by the monarch in her address continued to reflect the British desire to maintain its old grandeur in the world, even if this was becoming increasingly difficult:

> I am sure that this, my coronation, is not a symbol of power and splendour that are gone, but a declaration of our hopes in the future.(Cited in Cannadine 1983: 150)

According to Marquand (1995), for many years after the war a 'whig imperialist vision' of nationhood dominated the mentality of Britain's entire political class:

> Young or old, the myths and symbols that embodied the whig imperialist vision conveyed a simple message. The British state was a uniquely imperial state, and the British a uniquely imperial people, constituted as a people by their decision to pursue an oceanic rather than a European destiny... Almost certainly, it cut across the boundaries of class as well as of ideology... For, on the central questons of identity and nationhood – fundamental to any state – the whig imperialist vision enjoyed a kind of hegemony.(1995: 187)

Similarly, Hugo Young (1998: 14) has pointed out that during this initial post-war period, 'hardly anywhere, on the left and the right, in the journalistic or literary or political milieus, was the concept of Britain's solitary greatness, uniquely positioned at the hub of several global groupings, subjected to serious reassessment.' The belief that Britain remained a great power was 'a given of national politics', and the consensus was that 'the island nation belonged not to the continent, but to the world' (H. Young 1998: 25, 43-4).

Hence, one could say that during this period, the dominant national we-image continued to place Britain on a much higher plane of status and prestige, in comparison to the lower ranking which was ascribed to the continental European countries: 'The British felt themselves to occupy significantly higher ground in all their dealings with "the Europeans"' (Robbins 1998: 308). Although the greatest days of imperial glory may have been over, it was widely believed that the United Kingdom could still play a distinctive global role, playing the part of wise 'Greeks' who enjoyed a privileged position in America's 'Roman Empire' (Hartley 1963: 60). Hence, even if it may have admitted that Britain was no longer the dominant power in the world, its position was seen as being 'at the right hand of the new dominant power, the US, acting as a sort of first lieutenant' (George 1990: 39). As Alan Milward has put it in his detailed study of this period,

British foreign policy-making throughout the early post-war decades was based on the belief that Britain 'was still in some sense a great power whose foreign policy should reflect that position', a view that 'drove it towards rhetoric and away from realistic policies' (1992: 395).

For the most part, the British governing elite therefore maintained a stance of relative indifference and aloofness towards the major steps which were initially taken in the process of supranational European unification, the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It had been widely assumed that the Commonwealth, as well as the 'special relationship' with the Americans, would be sufficient to maintain national prosperity and prestige, without having to resort to a humiliating submersion in the pooling of national sovereignties which the EEC represented. The customs union agreed in the Treaty of Rome was seen as a first step towards supranationalism, an unpalatable concept for all those who still believed in Britain's distinctive, independent importance on the world stage. Furthermore, it also implied a common external tariff which appeared to be incompatible with Britain's traditionally wider patterns of trading in the world's 'open seas' (Porter 1987: 124-125). In particular, the EEC represented a threat to Britain's system of trade preferences with the Commonwealth countries, and hence to what had traditionally been an important source of cheap food and raw materials.

The Commonwealth factor, moreover, was not merely an economic issue, but also one which was emotionally and morally charged. In the first place, to some extent it continued to provide the British we-image with a 'fake illusion of global power' (N. Beloff 1963: 90). Furthermore, many British people had relatives in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa. Therefore, the possibility of constructing a tariff wall around Britain on Commonwealth products, which could potentially be imposed by 'foreign' European authorities, was seen as a totally immoral, unacceptable policy – a ruthless betrayal or turning of one's back on these beloved members of the British 'family of nations'. As the Tory politician Lord Selbourne put it: 'The continental nations may be charming neighbours and good friends, but

they are not to be preferred to our own kith and kin who owe allegiance to the Queen' (Jowell and Hoinville 1976: 9-10).

The EEC therefore clashed not only with Britain's self-perceptions of its proud role in the world as joint leader of the Western world, along with the United States, but also with what were perceived to be its national economic interests and ties of loyalty with the Commonwealth. Hence, to some extent, British leaders attempted to frustrate the objectives of 'the Six' by promoting the alternative of a wider, looser trading unit: the European Free Trade Association, or EFTA (Greenwood 1992: 68-73). The appeal of this rival project was that it would lower tariffs amongst its members, while allowing each of them to set its own duties on external trade from outside the group. It would thus give Britain the advantages of free trade with European countries, without losing its Commonwealth preferences or giving up any aspects of its national sovereignty.

However, in the end this British aspiration to maintain an 'independent global role' failed miserably. Instead, as two authors from this country have candidly recognized, Britain suffered a painful downfall 'from primacy back to mere ordinariness' (Hill 1988: 34), or 'from palmy greatness to anxious mediocrity' (Holmes 1994: vii). One early indication of British weakness was the Suez crisis in 1956, which Hugo Young (1998: 99, 108) has eloquently defined as 'the terminal calamity of Empire' and 'the death-blow for Britain's fading belief in her imperial reach'. The humiliating failure of this military operation in Egypt, as a result of America's staunch opposition, was clearly a 'psychological shock' (Sanders 1990: 89) which made evident the reduction of British power, and stimulated the growth of anti-imperialist nationalism throughout much of the Commonwealth.

Suez, furthermore, was only one symptom of a more widespread national infirmity. In 1960, the cancellation of the Blue Streak nuclear missile programme, as well as Harold Macmillan's failed attempt to act as a peace-maker between the USA and the USSR at a 'superpower' summit in Paris, further revealed that Britain could no longer be considered a truly significant player in the 'world power' league. By this stage, Britain had lost much of its old imperial prestige, it had

become entirely dependent on the United States for its defensive nuclear capacity, and in fact it was now even beginning to slip in the economic league tables in comparison to the members of the European Common Market (Sanders 1990: 143-44). In 1959, the EFTA agreement had joined Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland together in a free trade partnership of non-EEC nations, but it quickly became very evident that these 'Outer Seven' seemed to be no match for 'the Six'. At this point, 'the post-war view that the British economy was fundamentally stronger than any other in Western Europe had to be abandoned in the face of the evidence' (George 1990: 41).

The fear of isolation and decline thus grew, and politicians such as the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting began to voice this concern in 'pro-European' publications which defended the need for Britain to join the EEC before it was too late:

> Is there a way of extricating ourselves from the predicament in which we are now placed? Can we avoid being excluded from Europe and priced out of the Common Market or shall we be confined to the role of impotent spectators of a continental comunity growing and expanding in wealth and power at our expense? (1960: 113)

Indeed, the Americans themselves now increasingly saw Britain as '*just* another country in Europe', and began to put pressure on their supposedly 'special' British friends to give up their global aspirations and take part in the EEC as a way of fortifying Western unity against the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the United States, Britain's economic integration in Europe was simply seen as 'the natural corollary' to Britain's military role in NATO (Sanders 1990: 146). Indeed, the Kennedy administration proposed a new 'Grand Design' in the Western world's struggle against Communism based on two fundamental pillars: one in America and the other in Western Europe. Within this framework, Britain was now considered as simply one part of the wider EEC pillar. As one analyst of British foreign policy has put it:

> The picture which more and more Americans tended to form of Britain in the second half of the 1950s was of an ageing, self-satisfied prima donna who insisted on holding the limelight though the glory of her youth were long passed, while her friends were forming successful business partnerships after their retirement from the political theater.(Northedge 1974: 171)

Indeed, it was an American ex-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who famously ridiculed Britain's delusions of grandeur in a public address delivered during these years:

> Great Britain has lost an Empire and not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role – that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role based on being the head of a 'Commonwealth' which has no political structure, or unity, or strength... this role is about to be played out.[6]

Even 'the English-speaking peoples' across the ocean, therefore, seemed to be telling the British that they should swallow their pride and face the facts. Policy-makers in Britain therefore began to fear that if their country did not join 'the Six', the United States would soon begin to consider the emergent EEC, rather than a weak, isolated UK, as its most important and powerful partner in the West (J. W. Young 1993: 71).

Hence, however difficult it may have been to admit it, Britain's old national we-image of global preeminence increasingly began to lose its plausibility, and the decision to 'join Europe' was in fact a key aspect of this country's painful adaptation to the new reality of reduced power and status. When other, more ambitious and prestigious alternatives had failed, British leaders ultimately turned to the EEC as the only option which remained to avoid the possibility of becoming 'an insignificant has-been, living with its memories' (Northedge 1974: 228). In the British case, one could therefore say that 'Europe' was a sort of last straw rather than a widely desired aspiration.

4.2 The First Attempt: Macmillan's struggle to promote 'Europe' amidst passionate cries of 'Shame!'

Given this particular context of national we-images and we-feelings, it is perhaps not very surprising that when Prime Minister Macmillan timidly announced the decision of his government to open negotiations with the European Common Market on 31 July 1961, he was

[6] Cited in *The Times*, 6 December 1962.

immediately interrupted by an emotive cry which was yelled from both sides of the Parliament floor: 'Shame!'[7] The Conservative leader's tone was extremely cautious, and he assured his audience that Britain would only join the EEC if it gained terms of entry which fully guaranteed the country's economic interests, as well as those of its Commonwealth. The shyness with which Macmillan made this controversial announcement was ingeniously captured by a cartoon that was published on the following day by *The Guardian* [reproduced on the following page]. It showed the Prime Minister coyly dipping his toe into the English Channel, as he looked out towards the territory of the 'COMMON MARKET' in the distance, while the ankle of his other foot remained tied down to British soil by the weight of a heavy anchor. Nevertheless, in spite Macmillan's evident reticence with regard to this difficult decision, his prudently uttered words were enough to enrage a member of his own party, Mr Anthony Fell, who interrupted the Prime Minister and called him a 'national disaster' for 'his decision to gamble with British sovereignty'.

During the parliamentary debates which followed Macmillan's announcement, another Tory, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, proclaimed that he found 'something humiliating' in the belief that his country's economic strength could only be preserved by joining the EEC, since it was 'on Britain's special and separate position that its greatness had rested.'[8] At the same time, the leader of the Labour Party at that time, Hugh Gaitskell, also warned Macmillan that British opinion was 'simply not ripe' for the idea of a Federal Europe. He pointed out that 'the very idea of switching preferences which have been in favour of the Commonwealth into preferences against them is difficult to stomach'. In his view, this was 'not purely an economic issue', but also a question of 'moral obligations' to 'our great multirracial Commonwealth - of whose development we are all so proud.' Another member of the Labour Party, Miss Jennie Lee, similarly intervened in a

[7] On this event, see *The Times* and *The Guardian*, 1 August 1961.
[8] *The Guardian*, 3 August 1961. All the other interventions cited from the parliamentary debates on the EEC application are also taken from the reports in this newspaper.



The Guardian, 1 August 1961

hostile manner to warn the Prime Minister that the British people had 'too much pride, as well sense' to think they could solve their own problems by 'looking for a bunkhole' in Europe.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Macmillan's announcement was also greeted wi loud cheers which warmly supported the move towards 'Europe' as a new hope for Britain future. In fact, what was essentially inaugurated on that day was a symbolic and emotional batt concerning the fate of 'the nation' and its relationship to the European Community, which to considerable extent is still going on today. It was a passionate conflict between two rival vision: the older we-image which saw British national pride as fundamentally linked to the leadership c its Commonwealth and its distinctive global preeminence through the 'special relationship' witl the United States, in opposition to a new we-image which aimed to find a new source of powe and status through collaboration in the project of European unity.

In the discourse with which Macmillan cautiously attempted to legitimate the decision tc begin negotiations with the EEC,[9] he emphasized that the best hope for security and prosperity, both for Britain as well as for its Commonwealth, could now only be found through the opportunities offered by the Common Market. Otherwise, if the British people did not accept that the glory days of the past were over, the future could be a gloomy one:

> In a changing world, if we are not to be left behind and drop out of the main stream of world life we must be prepared to adapt our methods.

In a context of Cold War fears and tensions, the Prime Minister warned that Britain could no longer seek in isolation 'a security which our geographical position no longer gives us'. Taking part in the project of European integration was therefore presented as a new, morally respectable national project: a way to put Britain 'in the vanguard of the movement towards a greater unity of the Free World'.

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[9]All quotations from *The Guardian* and *The Times*, 1 and 3 August 1961.

Macmillan, in any case, attempted to reassure those who were concerned about the supranational aspects of the Common Market by claiming that the EEC was 'an economic community, not a defence alliance or a foreign policy community or a cultural community.' He asserted that the ideal of a federal Europe which would follow the model of the United States was a 'false analogy', and that

> the only practicable concept would be a confederation or Commonwealth which would retain the great traditions of and pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interests.

Membership of the EEC was therefore presented not only as the best guarantee for British security and prosperity, but also as an option which in no way threatened the nation's 'great traditions' or its 'pride'. At that time, the concept of a *Europe des patries* favoured by the French President Charles de Gaulle had indeed watered down the supranationalist aspect of the EEC, and hence made it more acceptable to many British minds.

As Britain's negotiations with the EEC proceeded, the Prime Minister delivered a televised address to the country in which he continued to promote the virtues and advantages of the European option.[10] During this media-transmitted political ritual on 'the state of the nation', Macmillan essentially asked the public to give up the old ideals of the past and wake up to a new reality in which Europe was now the right way forward for Britain:

> Now it's no good pretending. Some people naturally feel like this, that we can go back to the old world, before the war. A lot of people do look backward, but the real test you must bring to this question is are you going to look forward?

This policy shift was also justified once again in the competitive status-sphere of morality: membership of the EEC was depicted as a potential source of ethical pride for Britain because it represented 'the end of Europe's quarrels' and therefore a 'work of peace and progress'. At this point in national history, Macmillan assured his countrymen that the best way to maintain a

[10]All quotations from *The Times*, 21 September 1962.

dignified, respectable position in the world was through the European solution: he claimed that the 'great historic reason' why his government had applied to enter the EEC was 'to preserve the power and strength of Britain in the world'. It was thus a direct appeal to the British people's collectively shared pride-shame balance. 'Europe' was now undoubtedly the right way forward, the most realistic alternative to retain as much national strength as possible, given that the old global 'greatness' of the past had been lost for good:

> if we were not in Europe our influence would begin to decline, and with the decline of our influence in Europe we should lose our influence in the world outside.

The Prime Minister was thus essentially arguing that 'Europe' was now the best Britain could do to preserve as much influence and status as possible, even if admittedly it was not all that its people might have desired.

However, the traditional British we-image could hardly have died down so easily, and in fact was kept fully alive by the harsh, discursive counter-attack which was soon delivered by Gaitskell. On the day after Macmillan's address, the leader of the Labour Party seized his own opportunity to speak to 'the nation' through a television broadcast, and proclaimed that the Common Market was certainly not the only way for Britain to be 'strong and prosperous' in the world.[11] Indeed, he warned that membership in a European federation would be a devastating blow to everything that Britain had represented since its very foundation:

> Let us be clear what it means. We become no more than Texas and California in the United States of Europe. It means the end of a thousand years of history. It means the end of the Commonwealth, for the Commonwealth cannot be just a province of Europe.

Gaitskell proclaimed that the British people felt much stronger emotional ties to countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, with 'our institutions and language', than with the countries of Europe. Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, the Labour leader totally rejected

[11]All quotations from *The Times*, 22 September 1962.

the idea that the EEC represented the right choice for global 'peace and progress'. In his view, the British Commonwealth represented the greatest hope for humanity's welfare as a whole, given its world-wide character, and so it was presented as a much more appropriate and honourable source of national pride in the sphere of morality:

> The Commonwealth is a tremendous force for peace because it embraces so many races and so many continents. Do not think the British people, given the chance to decide as they should be, will in a moment of folly throw away a tremendous heritage of history.

The two main British leaders therefore put forward two radically opposed views: 'Europe' as the best, most realistic hope for the maintenance of Britain's influence on the world stage, versus 'Europe' as an unacceptable, humiliating reduction of Britain's historic role. Nevertheless, it should be noted that they both proclaimed 'the good of the nation' as their fundamental concern, even if this 'good' was defined in diametrically opposed terms: either 'in Europe' or 'outside Europe'.

This passionate discursive battle also flared up in the annual conferences of the two leading parties, held in October 1962.[12] At the Labour conference in Brighton, Gaitskell once again reiterated that 'going into Europe' would ultimately imply 'the end of Britain as an independent nation-state', 'the end of a thousand years of history', and 'the end of the Commonwealth':

> How can one seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre of the Commonwealth, is a province of Europe, which is what federation means, it could continue to exist as the mother country of a series of independent nations? It is sheer nonsense.

Somewhat ironically, this allowed Conservatives such as R.A. Butler to claim during their own party conference in Llandudno that they were the ones who stood for modern, forward-looking, 'European' progress, and to accuse their Labour rivals of archaic backwardness:

> The socialists have decided to look backward and to leave the future to us. For them a thousand years of history books. For us the future.

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[12]All quotations from *The Times*, 4 and 12 October 1962.

However, like Macmillan, this same 'pro-European' Tory also assured that this in no way implied a threat to national character, traditions, or sovereignty:

> British policy is opposed to any extinction of national identity. We shall agree to nothing which undermines the essential powers of Parliament or the domestic authority of our law courts in criminal and civil cases.

Edward Heath, the chief negotiator in the British government's talks with the EEC, guaranteed in his own intervention that 'we are not being asked to go into a federation', but rather to take part in a cooperative grouping of European states that could eventually match the strength of the world's two great superpowers:

> The voice of Europe has not been heard very much in recent years. We want that voice, with all its old traditions and civilisations, speaking loudly, clearly and unitedly, and from strength in the modern world.

The discourse of Britain's leading politicians therefore revealed an ongoing clash between 'Europe' as a dangerous threat to the nation's 'status honour' and dignity, versus 'Europe' as an effective strategy which could resurrect national power and status in the aftermath of imperial decline. One way or the other, the maintenance of British 'group charisma' was clearly the fundamental issue in the debate.

This same symbolic battle could also be perceived in the discourse of the editorials which were published in the country's leading newspapers after Macmillan announced Britain's application to join the EEC. On one extreme, dailies such as *The Guardian* illustrated a clear conversion to the idea that at this stage of its history, Britain now had no choice but to take part in the European project in order to grow economically and maintain as much strength as possible in the world:

> The central argument for joining the Common Market, above and beyond the precise computation of economic gains and losses at this moment, is that the European Community is a going concern, that it is dynamic and expansionist in its economic behaviour; and that Britain can hope for more influence in Europe and in the world if she joins than if she stays outside.[13]

Like the Prime Minister, this newspaper recognized the inevitable emotional resistance that EEC membership provoked amongst the British public, since it appeared to imply the recognition of a national defeat, the end of 'world power', and hence a lowering of rank in the global 'pyramid of states'. Nevertheless, its editorial insisted that there was truly no alternative other than 'entering Europe', even if admittedly, for many British people this was rather like swallowing a bitter pill in order to cure the symptoms of a devastating illness:

> It is, of course, painful for a people with a long and proud tradition of independence to admit that their country's voice is growing feebler. Nevertheless, it is a fact; and it must have taken some courage for a Conservative Prime Minister to admit it.

Other newspapers, such as the *Daily Mirror*, similarly agreed that on the vital question of whether 'Britain can have more world influence as a Common Market member or as an outsider', the answer was clear: 'Britain must take a full part in the economic AND political growth of a united Western Europe.'[14] Hence, from this perspective, 'Europe' may have been a rather bitter-tasting medicine, but it was undoubtedly a necessary cure to save a declining Britain.

Not all newspapers, however, were willing to accept the argument that Europe was now the only 'realistic' and 'rational' choice to defend Britain's prosperity and prestige in the world. *The Times*, for instance, while not rejecting the principle of EEC membership, maintained a much more cautious, wait-and-see attitude:

> The truth is that this is not one of those ultimately simple issues that, once stripped of inessentials, resolve themselves into a plain Yes or No. It is not a moral issue. It is a matter

[13] *The Guardian*, 3 August 1961.
[14] *Daily Mirror*, 1 August 1961.

> of making up a complex account of advantages and disadvantages. Some items in it cannot yet be filled in.[15]

At the same time, one could also find a stubborn, passionate defence of Britain's imperial we-image, and hence a completely hostile reaction to the European idea, in the discourse employed by the *Daily Express*. The editorial published by this mass-circulation newspaper[16] on the day after Macmillan announced his decision to begin negotiations with the EEC was entitled 'THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DECEIVED', and it made the following claims:

> Nobody reading the Prime Minister's statement about the approach to the Common Market can doubt for one moment that he is embarking on a decisive reversal in the nation's way of life... If Britain enters the Common Market she takes the first long step towards inclusion in a European confederation. The Parliament of Westminster must, in the end, become a subordinate assembly. The sovereignty of Britain will be obliterated in an over-riding European supremacy... How can a Britain which has lost her sovereignty remain a member, still less the leader, of the British Commonwealth of Nations? It is utterly impossible... No party will ever win the people with the cry 'Britain, part of Europe.'[17]

The discursive clash of the politicians was therefore also reflected in newspaper editorials such as these. For some, 'Europe' was now a new potential source of prosperity and prestige in a declining Britain that had lost its old strength. For others, nothing could be more humiliating than the defeatist claim that the glory days of the past were over, and that at this point Britain had no choice but to commit national suicide by becoming 'a province in the United States of Europe.' It was thus the perfect example of a symbolic struggle to manipulate national sentiments of collective pride and shame, either to support or to contest the idea of joining the EEC.

In the end, however, this first attempt to enter the Common Market was vetoed by President de Gaulle, who feared that British entry would reduce France's preeminent position within the

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[15]*The Times*, 31 July 1961.
[16]According to figures cited in Seymour-Ure (1991:28-9), throughout the 1960's the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Mirror* were the the two British newspapers with the highest circulation, with the latter selling an average of 5,016,000 copies a day in 1965, and the former reaching a figure of 3,987,000 daily copies sold. By contrast, *The Times* sold 260,000 copies a day, while *The Guardian* was selling an average of 212,000 daily copies.
[17]*Daily Mirror*, 1 August 1961.

EEC and subordinate it to the dictates of the 'Anglo-Saxon' partnership formed by London and Washington. As De Gaulle himself put it in the press conference during which he announced his veto on 14 January 1963, if Britain entered the EEC 'in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership, which would swallow up the European Community' (cited in Greenwood 1992: 85). From De Gaulle's perspective, Europe was to be guided by a strong France which would be armed by its own nuclear capacity and hence not subordinated to American dominance within the NATO system of defence. The key incident which confirmed his suspicions of Britain's close bilateral links with the United States, or in any case provided him with an ideal justification for his veto, was a meeting at Nassau in December 1962, in which Macmillan and President Kennedy agreed that America would provide the British with Polaris nuclear missiles, without consulting de Gaulle. For the French president, this demonstrated that Britain's potential entry into the EEC represented a 'Trojan horse' which America wanted to employ to exert its dominance in Europe. Ironically, the man who had made the EEC more palatable to many British minds by rejecting its supranationalist dimension and promoting the notion of a 'Europe of independent states', ultimately excluded the UK because of its ties of friendship with the United States. This predicament was perfectlt illustrated by a cartoon which was published on the day after De Gaulle's veto was announced on the front page of the Daily Express, which depicted the French President as a massive *gendarme* which blocked Macmillan and Kennedy's attempt to sneak into the territory of the Common Market, reserved only for 'real Europeans' [reproduced on the following page].

Hence, after promoting the idea that the membership of the Common Market now represented the best conceivable option to maintain Britain's influence and prosperity in the world, the Macmillan government ultimately failed to achieve what was in any case a highly contested objective. Indeed, the varying responses in the press to De Gaulle's veto illustrated the continuing divisions in Britain concerning 'Europe' and its relationship to 'the good of the nation'. The day after the veto, some newspapers, such as *The Guardian*, *The Times*, or the *Daily*

No. 19,479 TUESDAY JANUARY 15 1963

—ON BRITAIN'S BID TO JOIN THE COMMON MARKET . . .

ON KENNEDY'S NASSAU OFFER OF THE POLARIS . . .

NON!

From
RENE MacCOLL
Paris, Monday

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE tonight brusquely denied Britain's entry into the Common Market—unless Britain is prepared to jettison all the major reservations she has had so far about the terms of membership. De Gaulle also turned down President Kennedy's offer of the Polaris missile to France.

Talks chaos

By DOUGLAS CLARK

IT looks as if Britain's negotiations with the Common Market Six are dead.

But—in a final gamble—Mr. Macmillan intends to keep the talks going for a few weeks in case France's five partners can produce a last-minute formula to enable Britain to enter Europe without humiliation.

There is little real hope of this in Whitehall. And the Government is looking ahead to the steps it will take if deadlock results.

Likely timetable:—

A decisive Commons debate in late February on the Six's final terms—with the probability that Mr. Macmillan will advise they are unacceptable.

A fresh conference of commonwealth Prime Ministers in the spring to devise closer economic ties.

Before these moves one last throw is not ruled out—a Macmillan visit to all the six.

Assuming that fails and a spring Commonwealth meeting achieves useful results Mr. Macmillan may risk a General Election in May on the slogan "We put the Commonwealth first."

At the talks Heath gets on the phone at once to the Premier

Sorrowfully, he said: "France intends to have her own national defence."

And he proclaimed passionately that France must at all costs retain her own nuclear deterrent and not rely on those of "foreigners" — meaning the Americans.

[illegible] the 72-year-old President [illegible] spoke in [illegible] terms to Britain. He suggested what amounts to [illegible] surrender if Britain wants to join the Six.

Britain can expect no special terms except for the own agriculture of the Commonwealth nations.

Either Britain comes in on [illegible] or does not come in at all.

His terms

[illegible] speaking to a [illegible] conference of [illegible] ministers at the [illegible] Palace, asked if Britain is ready to accept these conditions for entry into the Common Market:

1. [illegible] Britain prepared to [illegible] Market [illegible] [illegible] agricultural [illegible]
2. [illegible] prepared to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] at present [illegible]
3. [illegible] prepared [illegible] [illegible] arrangements [illegible] the Sterling Area [illegible] [illegible] Sterling [illegible] [illegible]
4. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Mirror lamented this outcome and accused the French President of having a narrow-minded, utterly selfish and chauvinistic conception of Europe, as well as an absurd anti-Americanism:

> For Britain to join the kind of Europe which President de Gaulle wants would be unthinkable. In the last resort Britain is an Atlantic power before she is a European one, and her ties to the United States matter at least as much to her as her ties with Continental Europe.[18]
>
> The pure Gaullist doctrine could prove as disruptive to Europe as any impurities that might have found their way inside through the admission of Britain... [De Gaulle's] constant bogey has been a revived Anglo-Saxon dominance... To defeat that he clings to his own form of insularity – the independent French nuclear arm...[19]
>
> [De Gaulle's] desire is that France, regardless of the harsh manner in which the Twentieth Century has reduced her significance and stature, shall dominate the remnants of European power. Never has pride been based upon such folly. His fear is that British participation will open the floodgate of American influence in Europe and diminish his own. As if the West could conceivably thrive without American sympathy and strength.[20]

At the same time, however, the Europhobic *Daily Express* characteristically called De Gaulle's decision 'a blessing'. On the day the negotiations with the EEC officially ended, it published a front-page editorial entitled 'GLORY, GLORY HALLELUJAH!' which celebrated Britain's liberation from the European trap [reproduced on the following page]:

> At last the miserable, misguided and long drawn-out negotiations in Bruseels on the Common Market have come to an end... It is over, and it should never have begun... Many may be mourning the failure of Britain. They are foolish. This is not a day of misery at all. It is a day of rejoicing, a day when Britain has failed to cut her throat!... A deplorable and dangerous chapter is closed. An era of hope and opportunity opens up.[21]

A cartoon published in this same newspaper reiterated this point, by portraying De Gaulle as the *madame* of a boutique which had tried to force Macmillan into an extremely tight and suffocating 'European' corset, and sarcastically suggested: '*Voilà Madame! My Style Continentale! – created for you! It suits you? Oui? Non!*' [reproduced on the following page].

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[18] *The Guardian*, 15 January 1963.
[19] *The Times*, 15 January 1963.
[20] *Daily Mirror*, 15 January 1963.
[21] *Daily Express*, 15 January 1963.

DAILY EXPRESS

No. 19,492 WEDNESDAY JANUARY 30 1963

Glory, glory Hallelujah!

It's all over

Britain's Europe bid is dead

NOW—FORWARD

AT last the miserable, misguided and long-drawn-out negotiations in Brussels on the Common Market have come to an end.

They have ended in failure.

"The conference is over," says a spokesman.

It is over, and it should never have begun.

WELENSKY BACKS DEMAND FOR EMPIRE TALKS

By DOUGLAS CLARK

STONE cold dead in the Market—and news of the collapse of the Brussels talks was followed last night by moves for Commonwealth leaders to meet and work out plans with Britain for a new "family" trade expansion.

Daily Express, January 15 1963



Daily Express, January 15, 1963

According to the historian K. O. Morgan, in spite of the Macmillan government's symbolic efforts to sell the European idea throughout the negotiations, British public opinion had largely remained 'insular and unconvinced of the virtues of getting closer to unreliable European foreigners', and when De Gaulle announced his veto, many people felt 'sanguine, almost relieved' (1990: 220). Another analyst of this period has similarly noted that 'the British people clearly had their doubts about "joining Europe", and one of the dominant reactions to the failure of the negotiations was relief at not having to get mixed up in "all that"' (Camps 1964: 505-6). This popular sentiment was perfectly illustrated by another cartoon published in the *Daily Express*, which pictured the classic English 'bobby' in a British village, who pointed to the graffiti 'VIVE DE GAULLE!' which someone had painted on a wall, and asked a group of smiling, self-satisfied onlookers: 'All right – which one was it?' [reproduced on the following page]. Indeed, opinion polls which were carried out during this period show a considerable lack of enthusiasm for the EEC amongst the British public between 1961 and 1963, with support for membership remaining broadly within the 40% to 50% range (Spence 1976: 19-22). Hence, Britain's entry into "Europe" had ultimately been blocked by the French President, but given the widespread division of opinions on this matter, it was rather unclear whether this was a cause for national mourning or celebration.

4.3 The Second Attempt: Wilson depicts EEC membership as 'the beginning of a new greatness for Britain'

It was not until 1967 that Britain, this time under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, once again knocked on the European door to find a solution to its declining economic situation, as well as a new source of political influence. At the time of the first attempt, Wilson had voiced his opposition to the idea of EEC entry, as a result of 'Britain's position in the world, due to our special relation with the Commonwealth' (cited in Kitzinger 1968: 11). Indeed, after his election victory in 1964, he was still proudly maintaining the traditional British we-image with proclamations such as 'we are a world power and a world influence or we are nothing' (cited in



"All right—which one was it?"

Daily Express, January 31 1963

Robbins 1994: 272). Nevertheless, only a few years later, his own government also came to the conclusion that Britain had become too weak to 'go it alone' in a world of powerful economic giants, and that there was after all 'no alternative to Europe'. Therefore, on 2 May 1967, Wilson announced his decision to re-open negotiations with the EEC in the House of Commons. At this point, British economic growth was significantly lower than any member of 'the Six' (Sanders 1990: 145), and there was much concern about the country's capacity to compete in an advanced industrial world and keep up with modern technological progress, unless it joined forces with the countries of the EEC. The Commonwealth was no longer seen as a viable alternative for the maintenance of national prosperity and influence, and it was feared that 'economic stagnation would inevitably lead to political isolation, with Britain not at the intersection of three circles but in no circle at all' (Greenwood 1992: 92). Furthermore, the Americans continued to pressure the British to abandon their lingering, unrealistic attachment to a 'world power' status, and hence to take part in the project of European unity, as a way of strengthening the NATO alliance against their common 'threatening Other', the Soviet Union. Hence, as in the previous attempt to join the Common Market, the dominant belief was that even if 'Europe' may not have been the ideal aspiration that people may have wished for, there was now no choice for a weakened Britain but to accept its reduced stature and maintain as much strength as possible by joining the EEC (J.W. Young 1993: 93-5).

Indeed, Wilson's discursive efforts to legitimate this second application to the EEC clearly revealed a conversion to the idea that given Britain's undeniably diminished position, entry into the Common Market now represented the only available option to ensure the maintenance of national pride in the economic, political, and moral spheres of global status-ranking. As he put it in the parliamentary address in which attempted to discursively legitimate his decision to re-apply for EEC membership:

> We believe in the need to make effective our enormous potential industrial strength by giving that strength a chance to operate on a European and not a national scale or series of national scales. It is only if we can do this that we can exercise everything which comes from industrial strength and independence in terms of European influence on world affairs. A stronger and more united Europe would enable all the countries of the community to

> play a still greater part in the vitally important north-south war against world hunger, poverty, and disease...[22]

Like Macmillan before him, Wilson also appeared on television to justify his government's decision, and once again a direct appeal was made to national we-feelings. The Prime Minister made it clear that above all, 'Europe' represented a novel source of British power and status: 'It is the beginning of a new greatness for Britain. I believe this is a great historical turning point.'[23]

With Edward Heath now in the position of leader of the Tory opposition, Wilson's decision was 'warmly welcomed' and 'wholeheatedly supported' by the other leading British party,[24] and hence in this case there was consensus amongst the country's main leaders on the question of EEC membership. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe the way in which these politicians struggled between each other to guarantee that they could best defend national interests and uphold national pride in this new approximation towards 'Europe'. In an earlier speech delivered in March 1966, after Heath praised the French government for suggesting that they would favour a new British application, Wilson ridiculed the Conservative leader for shamefully behaving like a submissive puppy in relation to the EEC:

> Now one encouraging gesture from the French Government, which I welcome, and the Conservative leader rolls on his back like a spaniel. I don't want you to misunderstand me. Please, no letters from angry dog lovers. Some of my best friends are spaniels, but I wouldn't put them in charge of negotiations into the Common Market... Given a fair wind, we will negotiate our way into the Common Market, head held high, not crawl in...(Cited in Kitzinger 1968: 109-110)

Heath logically responded by denouncing Wilson's accusation as a 'nauseating, filthy insinuation' which in no way represented his wholehearted commitment to the honourable defense of Britain's interests and her prestige. Hence, a widespread agreement amongst Britain's leading politicians may have now existed on the importance of EEC membership, but of course

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[22]*The Times*, 5 May 1967
[23]*Daily Mirror*, 9 May 1967.
[24]Cited in *The Times*, 3 May 1967

each party leader attempted to present himself as the most effective guardian of the national 'face' within this new context.

At the time of this second application, the discourse of most newspapers also reflected a general acceptance of the idea that the old we-image of global power and grandeur was becoming increasingly outdated, and hence that membership of the EEC was now the most realistic, rational, and dignified option to defend 'the good of the nation'. For instance, in an editorial significantly entitled 'POST-IMPERIAL BUT PRE-EUROPEAN', *The Times* argued that:

> No realistic alternative to joining Europe exists; we are not doing well enough to go on as we are; isolation is a miserable expedient; Americanism is a subordination to a greater power. Only as a European power can Britain join in a power group comparable to the great continental powers and do so on a footing of equality.[25]

The Guardian put forward an almost identical argument:

> The world now knows how Britain sees its role. We no longer pretend that we can stand alone among the Great Powers. We have and can retain wider links – through the Commonwealth and through the Atlantic Alliance. But if Britain is to play the larger part in world affairs which it thinks it ought to, it can do so only by acting in concert with its European neighbours.[26]

Even tabloids such as *The Sun* and the *Daily Mirror* humbly accepted that there was no choice but to face the facts and accept the reality of a reduced 'European' position – one which, nonetheless, offered a new horizon of hopeful prospects for Britain:

> Britain is no longer a great power presiding over an empire on which the sun never sets. Everybody knows this but the effort of mental re-adjustment has not been easy. It is not completed yet... The choice for Britain is either to fall behind and be engulfed by American capital or to join with others in a larger economic unit... Britain in Europe could be the start of another 1,000 years of history. Very different years. But very exciting and rewarding years.[27]

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[25]*The Times*, 1 May 1967.
[26]*The Guardian*, 3 May 1967.
[27]*The Sun*, 3 May 1967.

> The issue sadly remains the same, with a choice for the people of Britain: Are we to endure a lingering demise in genteel poverty in a lagoon of history with Prince Philip on a horse outside Buck Palace seeling Royal Family postcards at a dollar a time to American tourists and the rest of us playing bingo? Or are we to stop the world because we want to get on?[28]

Hence, from this perspective, what was now seen as shameful or embarrassing was the absurd, unrealistic fantasies of those who still believed that they were living in the age of an Imperial Britannia that ruled the waves. In opposition to this, 'Europe' was presented as the option of calculating rationality and wisdom – perhaps a little difficult to accept, but nevertheless the only realistic alternative which remained in order to keep the national ship afloat, and ultimately to find a new source of political strength, economic prosperity and moral respectability in the future. As the diplomat Lord Gladwyn Jebb put it in a strongly pro-European book which was published at the time of this second application:

> In his little backwater, the Englishman might soon get accustomed to his Victory Gin. But it would be sad indeed if it were towards such a future that our young people were marching... So lest worse befall let us examine together the European Idea, the glorious conception of the United States of Europe – a new type of unity, an example to the rest of the world, a great hope for peace. (1967: 11)

For those who shared this conversion to the EEC cause, the traditional vision of British imperial power was completely rejected because it no longer represented an ethically appropriate source of national pride, and 'Europe' was now viewed as the most appropriate substitute to renovate collective self-esteem.

The old national we-image, however, was not completely dead. The *Daily Express*, in particular, continued to uphold the claim that membership of the EEC would be an absolute catastrophe for the British nation and everything it stood for. On the day after Wilson's announcement, its editorial proclaimed:

> What a melancholy spectacle was presented yesterday in the House of Commons! The three party leaders, like the three witches in Macbeth, joining hands over a policy of disaster! To the applause of his fellow chieftains, the Prime Minister makes the

[28] *Daily Mirror*, 3 May 1967.

> announcement everybody knew he was going to make. He will apply for membership of the Common Market... The MPs who cheered him yesterday should realise that acceptance of the Rome Treaty means a vast lessening of their own powers.[29]

At the same time, anti-EEC organizations such as the Keep Britain Out Campaign voiced their opposition to the government's decision by organizing a mock funeral next to the Houses of Parliament, round a coffin draped with the following slogan: 'Common Market – Death to British Democracy' (Kitzinger 1973: 247). Hence, one can observe that there was hardly complete unanimity over whether 'Europe' could really represent a proper source of national prestige for Britain. One could say that the collective pride-shame balance remained unstable in relation to this issue. The British national self-image was in a process of contested redefinition, and inevitably there was a continuing emotional resistance to the claim that the only possible destiny for the country was 'European'.

Once again, however, the whole debate turned out to be a somewhat futile exercise, since this second attempt to join the EEC was also blocked on 27 November 1967 by the recalcitrant De Gaulle. On this occasion, the French President humiliated the British by arguing that they were not economically fit to join the Common Market, due to a forced devaluation of the Pound which had recently taken place (J.W. Young 1993: 101). The French President, furthermore, continued his role as the self-appointed guardian of 'Europeanness', by insisting that Britain still remained 'a state which through its politics, its economy, its currency, is not at present a part of Europe'.[30] On issues such as nuclear weapons and NATO policy, Britain remained too closely tied to the USA for De Gaulle's taste. Hence, although the French leader's hostility to supranationalism and his defence of state sovereignty had again made the EEC more attractive to the British, his dislike of American control made the UK's entry impossible. For the second time, the fate of the British people was therefore decided by the whim of the French leader, and this event was once

[29] *Daily Express*, 3 May 1967.
[30] Cited in *The Times*, 28 November 1967.

again a painful illustration of national weakness which inevitably stung the national ego. As Morgan has put it:

> The whole episode left a continuing impression of Britain still searching for a role in international affairs. One role was dissolving in the heat and dust of Africa; a successor had not yet arisen. Britain's prestige was further dented in consequence. (1990: 273)

This sense of national weakness and impotence was perfectly encapsulated by another ingenious cartoon published on the front page of the *Daily Express*. Under the headline 'DE GAULLE SLAPS DOWN WILSON'S BID FOR EUROPE', it depicted a towering de Gaulle who, with a mere puff of his potent breath, effortlessly blew away a minuscule Harold Wilson, the second Prime Minister who had dared to climb the ladder of the Common Market but who, like Macmillan before him, had failed miserably before he reached the top [reproduced on the following page].

As with the previous veto, much of the British press defended the nation's 'status honour' by mocking De Gaulle's stubborn hostility to 'Anglo-Saxons', and defending the idea that Britain should continue to pursue its European goal in spite of the French leader's stubborn opposition. *The Times*, for instance, called De Gaulle 'the voice of doom' and described him as a 'Don Quixote' whose inflated, fantastical image of his country's power had led him to knock down windmills such as Britain's European aspirations:

> Unfortunately for the General, the vanquished windmills have a habit of getting up again... and the French government must be certain that Britain really won't take 'no' for an answer, and that the moment the General leaves the Elysee the British Government, be it Labour or Conservative, will have ready its renewed application to join the Common Market...[31]

[31] *The Times*, 28 November 1967.

THE FINAL NO!

De Gaulle slaps down Wilson's bid for Europe

Now—talk about North Atlantic 'Market'

Express Political Correspondent

NEW ZEALAND'S deputy Prime Minister, Mr. John Marshall, spoke warmly yesterday of the idea for a North Atlantic free trade area as an alternative to the Common Market.

His words will encourage those M.Ps of all parties now rallying behind this idea following President de Gaulle's virtual veto of Britain's latest attempt to join the Market.

The North Atlantic free trade area would include the EFTA nations, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Japan.

Mr. Marshall, speaking in London today, said from New Zealand's point of view: "It is a very attractive proposal."

But he stressed that it was not yet in the field of practical politics.

He said: "I think it is too early to forecast what is going to be the outcome of Britain's application—and until that is disposed of one way or the other I don't think the idea of a NAFTA will be considered in this country at an official level."

Silent

BOTH Government and Opposition are withholding a public reaction to the de Gaulle veto until all six Common Market members have spoken. This may not come from the Ministerial meeting of the six in Brussels on December 18.

But no one believes that the meeting will make any practical difference, for the alternative to accepting the French veto would be the break-up of the Market itself. To wait for the Six, therefore, is little more than a courtesy to those of the Five who have backed Britain's application.

The Government has, however, is still that even if this application has failed, in the long run Britain will be inside the Community some time.

But it was admitted yesterday that there will be no negotiations this side of 1970.

TORY leader Edward Heath is likely to fall in with the view of many of his backbenchers that the present British application to join the Market should be abandoned.

Import dues cut

A five per cent cut in duty on a number of the import surcharges introduced by Chancellor Roy Jenkins last November was announced yesterday by the Treasury.

Australia's loss

SYDNEY, Monday.—Devaluation by Britain and other countries last week cost Australia £A10,500,000 (£8,400,000), the Australian reserve bank says.



From JOHN ELLISON: Paris, Monday

IN 15 minutes today President de Gaulle hit Britain's move to join the Common Market with a veto so final and crushing that even his staunch supporters gasped.

The scene, the candlelit state hall of the Elysee Palace, was the same as in 1963 when Mr. Macmillan was turned down flat. [illegible] for Mr. Wilson were [illegible]

1 [illegible]

2 [illegible]

Daily Express, November 28 1967

Others, such as the *Daily Mirror*, denounced the French leader as 'obstinate and arrogant', but urged the government to 'get its own house in order for De Gaulle's funeral', so that Britain could 'get into Europe' as soon as possible.[32]

At the same time, however, the Euro-phobic *Daily Express* battled on with its passionate defence of Britain's 'true destiny' in the world, arguing that De Gaulle's veto should finally convince the country's leaders that nothing good could ever come out of European entanglements:

> This new and – surely – final 'No' from De Gaulle should unite all sections of British political opinion in seeking out a more natural and glorious role for Britain - and in making the effort and sacrifices needed to achieve it. For seven years, under two parties, Britain has been pursuing a phantom in Europe... The only pity is that, in spite of the known preference of the majority of the British people, it has required the decision of a Frenchman to call Britain back to her true destiny. That destiny lies first of all with the Commonwealth and the Anglo-Saxon nations.[33]

The same discursive conflicts thus went on in the British public sphere, with the United Kingdom still out of the EEC after two failed attempts. In some minds, British national pride could only be regenerated at this point in the nation's history by being accepted into the European club, while for others, nothing could be more demeaning and humiliating.

4.4 Conclusion: 'Europe' as a contested source of potential British pride

In a book entitled *A State of England*, published at the time of Britain's first application to enter the EEC, the historian Anthony Hartley wrote:

> We are a country that has known greatness and will never get the smell of it out of our nostrils until it is replaced by the bitterness of death... I have no wish to see our moment of ultimate lethargy, the twitching of wasted limbs and blinking of myopic eyes that marks the patient's lapse into a final coma.(1963: 126)

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[32] *Daily Mirror*, 28 November 1967.
[33] *Daily Express*, 28 November 1967.

This intellectual warned his fellow countrymen that Britain was beginning to suffer severely from 'the creeping paralysis which afflicts empires in their decline' (1963: 126), and he suggested that the only way to avoid further decadence or 'the descent into limbo' (1963: 226) would be to join the European Community. By taking part in this larger whole, he argued, Britain could compensate for its current weaknesses and discover a new stimulus for economic growth, as well as a new, morally worthwhile collective purpose. Europe, in short, was the only possible remedy which could overcome the frustrations arising from the collapse of British power:

> The idea of European unity has taken on just enough substance to save us from the worst of the nostalgia and bitterness that follow the end of empires. We have been presented with a ready-made substitute for that self-indulgent contemplation of diminished greatness, to which we seemed ready to abandon ourselves.(1963: 238)

Nevertheless, Hartley acknowledged that the mental and emotional adjustment which 'going into Europe' required would not be easy:

> No doubt, we shall not enter Europe without passing through a phase of political and psychological crisis. If our entry into the Community is the cure which will rid us of the neuroses engendered by loss of power and constriction of opportunity, then the process of debate and negotiation preceding it can be compared only to the moments during which these subconscious motivations are brought up on to the level of consciousness, producing screams and hysteria.(1963: 237)

I have cited extensively from the work of this author, for I think it accurately and eloquently sums up the complex British predicament which has been traced in this chapter. At the same time, it illustrates a British intellectual's acute patriotic concerns at this time of national decline, and his belief that participation in the project of European unity was the only way to recover collective strength and dignity. Britain's approximation to the EEC was indeed a difficult process that produced its fair share of 'screams and hysteria', because it essentially involved having to recognize a loss of international status-ranking, and hence to accept a new position of relative weakness and inferiority. As I have attempted to illustrate, British participation in the European project of supranational integration was initially avoided because it was widely felt

that this was something which Britain could surely do without, even if it was entirely appropriate for other, less fortunate countries. A we-image of distinctive global power and prestige was thus maintained for many years, based on the idea of Anglo-American world leadership, until it became increasingly evident that this no longer coincided with the reality of Britain's diminished stature.

In his fascinating analyses of the 'interaction rituals' which take place between individuals in their everyday encounters with each other, Erving Goffman (1967) described the losses of 'face' which can occur whenever the self-image that an actor tries to represent on the public stage is suddenly discredited, provoking uncomfortable feelings of embarrassment, as well as the fear that such behaviour will provoke the laughter and ridicule of others (E.S. Jáuregui 1998). As I suggested earlier in chapter 2, if one applies this insight to the level of national we-images, one could say that for many people, Britain's decision to apply for EEC membership implied a loss of *collective* face, for it signified a collapse of this country's initially greater pretensions of power and prestige on the world stage – a recognition that a self-flattering we-image of global status-ranking no longer coincided with reality. To some extent, as one author has put it, it made the British look rather like 'impoverished supplicants' or 'decayed aristocrats, obliged by adverse circumstances to eat in a soup kitchen for the needy' (Barzini 1983: 55, 60-61). It is interesting to observe how, as this chapter has shown, leaders such as Macmillan and Wilson did their utmost to symbolically depict the EEC option in the most favourable terms possible for the national pride-shame balance, by suggesting that the British people should not lose their faith in themselves, since they would be able to achieve a new form of 'national greatness' through participation in the noble, morally worthy project of European integration. Nevertheless, the discursive controversies which this decision provoked illustrate that in many British minds, 'Europe' inevitably provoked an unpalatable sense of shrunk status and national defeatism. Even if EEC membership may have become recognized by many people as a pragmatic necessity, it was rather difficult to make it sound like a patriotic triumph that one should get excited about. In other words, there was a sort of widespread resignation about the inevitability of 'becoming

European', but 'there was little real enthusiasm' (Camps 1964: 506). Hence, although discursive efforts were certainly made by the country's leaders to present the European Community as a new potential source of national pride, this was hardly an uncontested claim. The next chapter will illustrate how this same symbolic and emotional battle continued in this country's public sphere, as Britain ultimately succeeded in its third attempt to 'go into Europe'.

5. 'Going into Europe': A resigned acceptance of diminished status

It was ultimately under the leadership of a Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, that Britain officially 'entered Europe' on 1 January 1973. Heath's personal commitment to the project of European integration went back to his earliest days in politics. In 1950, he delivered his maiden speech in Parliament on the need for European unity, and even at this early stage of widespread British aloofness, he supported his country's participation in the Schuman plan. Heath was also a member of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States for Europe, and led the British government's negotiations with the EEC during Macmillan's application for membership. Nevertheless, such ardent 'Europeanism' in no way implied an abandonment of national pride or a rejection of patriotic values. On the contrary, from Heath's perspective, the European Community clearly represented the greatest hope for the recovery of British power, prosperity, and prestige. He firmly believed in what one could call the 'European' paradigm of British national greatness: the idea that a declining United Kingdom could only be resurrected and newly strengthened at this point of its history through membership of the EEC. Indeed, according to one of his ministers, he actually saw Britain's entry into Europe as 'the way back to being a Great Power' (cited in J.W. Young 1993: 107). This was a vision which, as the previous chapter showed, had already begun to arise during Macmillan's and Wilson's applications to the EEC, and it reached a culmination in the emotive, patriotic discourse which Heath employed in order to legitimate and promote his own government's successful attempt to join the European Community.

Nevertheless, the Conservative leader's determined symbolic efforts to equate European membership with a resurgence of British national pride inevitably continued to meet much resistance. For one thing, Harold Wilson, now as leader of the opposition, fervently opposed the agreement which Heath's negotiating team reached with the EEC, because he proclaimed that it completely failed to protect vital 'national interests' and was forcing the British people to accept shameful conditions of entry into the Common Market. Although he could hardly reject the principle of 'going into Europe', given that his own government had previously attempted to do

so, the Labour Party was bitterly divided on the whole question of EEC membership, and was unwilling to allow the Conservative Prime Minister an easy triumph on this matter. Hence, in spite of Heath's patrotic discursive appeals, the EEC issue still remained a hotly contested one, and as I shall illustrate, there was considerable public indifference and hostility to the Common Market as membership became official.

The debate over 'Europe' eventually reached an important climax on June 5 1975, when under the renewed leadership of Wilson, the British people were granted the opportunity to vote in favour or against the EEC in the first referendum of their country's history. During the campaigning that preceded this public consultation, the conflict of national paradigms erupted once again, with leaders on each side of the debate appealing to the collective pride-shame balance of the British people, either in favour or against membership of the Common Market. This chapter will therefore focus on the way in which the discursive political battle of British we-images and we-feelings flared up at the time of the country's 'entry into Europe', and how it was provisionally resolved during the referendum campaign in which a 'Yes to Europe' ultimately prevailed.

5.1 'A Greater Britain in a Greater Europe': Edward Heath's patriotic flag-waving in favour of EEC membership

Charles de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 eliminated the major obstacle which until that point had blocked British entry into the European Community. His successor, Georges Pompidou, was less hostile to the idea of 'Anglo-Saxon' entry into the Common Market, and this new situation opened the door to a renewal of Britain's negotiations with the EEC. Nevertheless, after the second veto in 1967, British public opinion had again turned against 'Europe', and the idea of initiating another attempt to enter the EEC was hardly a popular one. In April 1970, polls suggested that support for membership had fallen to 19 per cent (George 1990: 49), and the idea that the United Kingdom did not need 'Europe' in order to be strong and prosperous had been revived: 'At the emotional level, in the face of two European rebuffs, the British public had to

believe that Britain could go it alone, partly to restore self-confidence, partly to save face and partly as a defiant reaction to having been scorned' (Spence 1976: 27). Furthermore, at the purely pragmatic level of living costs, the EEC had become widely associated in British minds with the rise of food prices, and this fear had intensified people's hostility to the Common Market (Hedges 1976: 39).

In fact, the performance of the British economy had improved in recent times, and some analysts began to doubt the need to enter the EEC (J.W. Young 1992: 106). For instance, one 'anti-European' publication which appeared during this period resurrected the idea that the immense economic resources of Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as the 'special relationship' with the United States, could still allow Britain to recover its 'lost national greatness', instead of reducing the country's status 'to the role of a member of an association of Continental nations' (Einzig 1970: viii). The author of this publication, a fervent defender of Britain's global grandeur, was convinced that those who defended the idea of EEC membership were misguided defeatists:

> I simply fail to understand men and women whose ancestors have lived on this island for a great many generations who feel enthusiasm bordering on fanaticism over a solution that would mean the end of hopes of recovering British national greatness, all for the sake of being admitted into an utterly undependable alliance which is liable to disintegrate at any moment.(1970: ix)

This was therefore a time in which, as Hugo Young (1998: 223) has put it, 'popular feeling for the whole idea [of joining the European Community] was at rock bottom.'

Given this mood of renewed suspicion and hostility towards the EEC, it is not very surprising that during the election campaign in which Edward Heath ultimately emerged victorious on 18 June 1970, the EEC was 'an extremely muted issue' (Kitzinger 1973: 151) which was treated with great caution. According to a British journalist's account of this period (Spanier 1973: 20), 'if you went into a pub or attended a political rally in the election of that summer of 1970... you would have heard little but doubt and dislike if the subject of the Common Market came up.' At the most, the party leaders committed themselves to negotiating terms of entry which could

guarantee national prosperity within the EEC, but without displaying too much enthusiasm for what remained a largely unpopular policy.

Nevertheless, once in power, Heath's government displayed a keen determination to achieve Britain's entry 'into Europe', and negotiations were soon initiated with the Six. In spite of the considerable difficulties which still existed, particularly with regard to the traditionally privileged access of Commonwealth products into the British market, a meeting between Heath and Pompidou in May 1971 ensured that this time the French would not say *non*. The British Prime Minister's relative lack of interest in the 'special relationship' with the United States, as well as his enthusiasm for developing an independent European defence policy and even an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent, appears to have been the key factor which convinced President Pompidou that Britain could no longer be considered the 'trojan horse' of the Americans (H. Young 1998: 234-38). Hence, following this successful summit, arrangements were soon finalized for British membership of the EEC's institutions, and in July the government published a policy document or White Paper in which it put forward its fundamental reasons for taking the country along the European path.[1]

As in the case of the earlier failed attempts under Macmillan and Wilson, the Heath government's official legitimating discourse in favour of 'Europe' essentially followed the same predictable arguments: Britain was no longer an Empire or a 'world power', its international influence had weakened considerably, and therefore at this point the best conceivable guarantee for regaining economic and political strength could only be found in the EEC. The document acknowledged that preferential trade with the Commonwealth would be damaged to some extent, and that food prices would inevitably rise due to the Common Agricultural Policy. Indeed, the only special concession that the British negotiators had managed to achieve was a five-year transition period during which New Zealand dairy products would continue to have privileged

[1]The entire document was published by *The Times* on 8 July 1971. All the citations which follow are taken from this newspaper.

access to its traditional market. Afterwards, however, Britain would in principle have to respect the tariff rules of the EEC club in relation to products from outside the Common Market. Nevertheless, even if the agreement reached may not have been perfect, the White Paper argued that there was ultimately no realistic alternative to the EEC:

> The choice for Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Community and join in building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose to stand aside from this great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from the narrow - and narrowing - base we have known in recent years. As a full member of the Community we would have more opportunity and strength to influence events than we could possibly have on our own... There is no alternative grouping of countries with similar circumstances and interests which could offer us the same opportunities to safeguard our national security and prosperity.

The European Community was thus defined as a 'great enterprise' which could save the nation from its 'narrow - and narrowing' position as a weakened global giant. At the same time, a 'vocabulary of reassurance' (H. Young 1998: 248) was employed in this official document to portray the potential loss of national sovereignty within the EEC in the most favourable light possible: 'what is being proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest.' The Conservative government's White Paper therefore concluded that while Britain's past may have been 'imperial', its future could only be 'European':

> A decision not to join, when at last we have the power to do so, would be a rejection of an historic opportunity... In a single generation we should have renounced an imperial past and rejected a European future.

However, the most emotionally charged occasion for patriotic flag-waving in favour of 'Europe' was undoubtedly Heath's nationwide television broadcast on the following day, in which the Prime Minister explained to the 'imagined community' of Britain his government's fundamental reasons for taking the country 'into Europe'.[2] It is worth considering this ritualized

[2]The entire address was published by *The Times* on 9 July 1971. All the citations which follow are taken from this newspaper.

media performance in some detail, for it exemplifies particularly well how an impassioned appeal to national symbolism, memories, and sentiments was carried out by this leader in a determined discursive attempt to build up popular support for Britain's membership of the European Community. As in his government's official White Paper on EEC entry, the fundamental claim of Heath's televised address was that 'Europe' now represented the only path which could allow Britain to overcome its recent loss of power in the world, and to recuperate its 'proper place' in the global hierarchy of international status-ranking:

> Why should we go in? As Prime Minister, my answer is that we must go in if we want to remain Great Britain, and have the chance of becoming a Greater Britain. Not a guarantee but the chance, the opportunity, to take up once again our proper place in the world. Let's look at the facts. Today we don't occupy the place in the world we once did... The European Community provides us with our chance. It opens up one of the biggest markets in the world to us. It gives us the opportunity to grow again, to become a Greater Britain in a Greater Europe.

Heath's recommendation to 'the ordinary people' was therefore that 'the facts' about Britain's diminished stature had to be acknowledged, however difficult this may have been. As he put it, the painful reality, whether the national 'us' of Britain liked it or not, was that 'we don't occupy the place in the world we once did'. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister assured his countrymen that there was no reason to despair: the EEC offered a new chance of grandeur, a new source of 'national greatness', dignity, and collective pride.

To those who saw the EEC as a betrayal of the Commonwealth, Heath guaranteed that Britain's 'old friends' had not been 'let down' in the negotiations. Furthermore, he suggested that by gaining access to a market which was greater than those possessed by the American and Soviet 'superpowers', the 'sheer prosperity' which awaited the British people would ultimately be the best service to the country's future generations:

> This country belongs to us all, but the future of this country belongs to those who are young or still unborn. And in reaching our decision we must keep them in mind. What kind of world will they want to live in? Will they ever forgive us if we take the wrong decision, the short-sighted decision?

'Entering Europe' was thus the ideal way to feel self-confident and proud about the opportunities created for future members of 'the nation'. Thanks to this decision, the coming generations would not frown upon their ancestors for taking the wrong historical turn, but instead would honour them for acting with forward-looking wisdom. It was a claim which illustrated how, as I noted in my introductory section, nationhood can involve a collective sense of emotional identification with unborn members of the national collectivity, and how national pride (or shame) may be derived from imagining how future generations will judge one's performance in the present.

Heath also identified the European project of integration with the morally worthwhile task of world peace and the achievement of national security. The importance of this point was stressed by invoking painful collective memories of the war that many British citizens, including himself, had suffered:

> Many of you have fought in Europe, as I did, or have lost fathers, or brothers or husbands who fell fighting in Europe. I say to you now, with that experience in my memory, that joining the Community, working together with them for our joint security and prosperity, is the best guarantee we can give ourselves of a lasting peace in Europe.

He then went on to address the worries of those who saw 'Europe' as a threat to British ways of life, to the uniqueness or the cultural personality of 'the nation', and claimed that there was absolutely no need to worry about the loss of 'Britishness':

> When we talk about Europe, let's be very clear. We are talking about a whole group of different countries acting with one mind. But those different countries are no less different because they act together. The French are no less French, the Dutch no less Dutch for being members of the community for 20 years. Anyone who goes to any of the countries can see that for themselves. Nor shall we be any less British.

In fact, Heath specifically referred to totemic collective symbols of national distinctiveness such as the royal family, Parliament, and British law, and went on to remind his audience that all other members of the EEC retained such collectively cherished aspects of their national life. The Prime Minister therefore concluded in a reassuring tone of patriotic complicity: 'So shall we.' And as for 'our vital national interests', once again Heath guaranted that this was hardly a cause for

concern, since 'any decisions affecting our vital national interests have to be made with our agreement.' The idea that national sovereignty could conceivably be diminished or lost through EEC membership was thus flatly denied.

In short, Heath's address to his countrymen was a remarkable symbolic exercise of emotionally charged, patriotic chanting in favour of 'Europe'. The EEC promised 'the nation' an increase of political power, economic prosperity, physical security, as well as an opportunity to make a crucil contribution to the morally worthy project of world peace. It was thus presented as the best conceivable way to fulfil the duties owed to Britain's unborn, future generations. Heath therefore did his utmost to persuade his countrymen that there was absolutely nothing humiliating about 'Europe', no reason to feel ashamed. On the contrary, as the Prime Minister put it in his concluding words, there was in fact a hopeful promise of renewing Britain's collective self-esteem, by once again feeling proud of one's role in the endlessly flowing river of national and world history:

> I believe that history will recall that when we faced this great challenge we were not afraid. We were not afraid because for the first time in a long time we had the chance to go out and do something. A chance to shape the future. A chance to lead, not to follow. And don't you think it's about time? Can you honestly say that there haven't been times in recent years when you've had the feeling that this country was losing out, in all sorts of ways? We're worth more than that. We've given the world a lot and we've got a lot more still to give... For 25 years we've been looking for something to get us going again. Now here it is. We must recognize it for what it is. We have the chance of new greatness. Now we must take it.

Such a passionate patriotic address can be seen from a Durkheimian perspective as a political leader's attempt to transform 'Europe' into a new emotionally charged, totemic object of collective devotion, because of what it was claimed to represent for the sacred national collectivity and its future generations. At the same time, following Max Weber's terminology in *Politics as a Vocation*, one could further say that Prime Minister Heath was clearly offering the British people 'prestige-feelings of social honour', or 'premiums of national vanity', in order to promote the concept of EEC membership amongst the public. 'Europe', he declared, was promising Britain a chance to *lead* instead of following others, an opportunity to *win* rather than

to continue losing out, the possibility of *giving the world a lot more*, the chance of *new greatness*, and so on.[3]

However, as in the past, there was hardly a unanimous political consensus in the British public sphere on this symbolic identification of 'Europe' with national power, status, and pride. In fact, on the following day, Harold Wilson took advantage of his own opportunity to address 'the nation' on television, by launching a bitter discursive attack on the agreement Heath's negotiating team had reached with the EEC, and claiming that it shamefully failed to maintain the nation's honour and dignity in the world.[4] As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the Labour Party was extremely divided on 'the Europe question' during this period. On the one hand, there was a convinced 'pro-European' faction of moderates led by Roy Jenkins, who viewed the EEC not only as the most effective strategy to strengthen the British economy, but also as a morally worthy project which could transcend the narrow defence of 'national interests' and further the Labour party's traditional commitment to the cause of global solidarity. At the same time, however, many Labour MPs, particularly on the extreme left of the party, saw the EEC 'as a capitalist, bureaucratic institution, supported only by elite groups in Britain but likely to harm working-class interests' (J.W. Young 1993: 114). The supranationalist dimension of the European project was essentially seen by these politicians as a threat to the British state's full control of the national economy, and hence to the aspiration of building 'a socialist Jerusalem on England's green and pleasant land' (King 1977: 37).

It is noteworthy, for instance, that popular trades union leaders such as Jack Jones delivered passionate anti-EEC speeches during this period, proclaiming that the only people who would benefit from the Common Market were those who had no genuine patriotic concerns for 'the British people': 'The only people who stand to gain are a tiny number of financial interests, the

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[3]Hugo Young (1998: 254), however, has pointed out that Heath's efforts to build up popular support for the EEC were seriously hampered by the fact that he was 'an entirely uninspiring orator', whose voice 'had the levitation of a lead balloon.'

[4]Wilson's television speech was published by *The Times* on 10 July 1971. All the citations which follow from this address are taken from this newspaper.

big money boys who have no loyalty to their country' (cited in Kitzinger 1973: 268). This left-wing 'anti-Europeanism' may seem bizarre, coming from an ideological tradition which usually identifies itself with the destruction of national frontiers and the brotherhood of all peoples. As Marx and Engels famously put it in *The Communist Manifesto*, 'the working men have no country'. However, like Hugh Gaitskell in the famous 'thousand years of history' speech I analyzed in the previous chapter, Labour's current 'anti-marketeers' believed that the most morally honourable and truly 'internationalist' role that Britain could play in the world remained its leadership of a multi-racial Commonwealth which represented the best hope for global solidarity, instead of tying itself to what was seen as a parochial, selfish, inward-looking club of rich, white 'European' nations. Moreover, they perceived the EEC as 'a sibling of NATO' which, far from contributing to the unity of the European continent, could only perpetuate the Cold War division between its Eastern and Western blocs (Lord 1993: 112).

Already at this stage, the leading figure of the party's left-wing, Tony Benn, began to demand that no matter what the government or Parliament decided, a national referendum would be necessary to settle the European question. Given the unpopularity of the EEC which opinion surveys seemed to suggest, anti-marketeers such as Benn were convinced that a popular vote would go their way. At the same time, an additional complication for Wilson was that James Callaghan, a rival aspirant to the Labour party leadership, also initiated a public campaign against EEC membership. In an emotionally charged speech delivered in May 1971, Callaghan made use of a fundamental national totem, the sacred tongue of the British tribe, in order to turn collective we-feelings against the European Community. The EEC, he proclaimed, had to be avoided, because it could endanger 'the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton'. Indeed, he went as far as saying that 'going into Europe' would represent a 'complete rupture of our identity', since it would replace Britain's traditional ties of friendship with the Commonwealth and the United States with what he called 'an aroma of continental claustrophobia' (cited in H. Young 1998: 273). Indeed, many Labour politicians were convinced that the European issue could be employed as a very useful symbolic weapon which would effectively erode the

popularity of Heath's Conservative government, since when the negotiations came to an end in the summer of 1971, polls suggested that only one in four Britons were in favour of EEC membership (J.W. Young 1993: 113).

Hence, although it would have been totally inconsistent for Wilson to oppose the principle of EEC membership, he was under great pressure from much of his own party to turn against the widely despised 'Common Market'. In the end, the Labour leader's strategy was therefore not to oppose the principle of joining the European Community, but rather to claim that the terms of entry achieved by Heath's Tory government were not only humiliating to the national 'face', but also represented a serious threat to its economic well-being. In his own television performance, he therefore maintained that, as in 1967, he was certainly in favour of joining the EEC if the terms agreed were truly beneficial to the country and worthy of the British people. However, for the time being, he proclaimed that 'the price of admission' was way too costly, as a result of the Heath government's utter incompetence. In opposition to the paradise of national power, prosperity, and prestige promised by the Prime Minister, Wilson suggested that Commonwealth exports had been put in jeopardy, that food prices would go up, and that unemployment was bound to rise in Britain as a result of EEC membership. Furthermore, he accused the Heath government of a putting forward a totally shameful and defeatist underestimation of national strength, as if Common Market membership was a matter of national life and death.'This White Paper by the Government appals me,' Wilson declared, 'by suggesting that Britain is finished if we do not go in.' The implication was therefore that the situation was not really so desperate, that 'Europe' was not some sort of life raft to which Britain necessarily had to cling out of sheer desperation, and that the people of this country could still freely decide their fate with much greater collective dignity and self-respect.

The majority of the Labour Party confirmed its opposition to EEC entry at its Conference in early October 1971, when it voted against the terms of accession achieved by the Conservative

government by a ratio of five to one.[5] During this event, numerous 'anti-European' addresses were delivered by leading figures of the party. James Callaghan, for instance, called the Prime Minister a 'Euro-fanatic' who wanted to sign the Treaty of Rome without the people's consent, and defended Britain's traditional we-image of global expansiveness in opposition to the comparatively minuscule and parochial Common Market:

> Will you turn away from the open seas and mould yourself to Europe? Mr Heath said 'yes'. The Labour Movement says no.

At the same time, Harold Wilson reiterated once again that the terms of entry achieved by the Conservatives were 'humiliating', and that they could only lead to 'crippling Britain's strength.' He called on all members of the Labour Party to unite against the Conservatives on this crucial matter, in order to advance towards the recovery of national self-confidence and to make possible the creation of 'a greater Britain than we have ever known.'

Nevertheless, during this same conference, Roy Jenkins reaffirmed his total commitment to Britain's entry into the EEC and warned that he would never allow 'the flame of Labour Europeanism to be put out'. In his own intervention, he argued that those who argued that 'Britain was different, that she was not Europe, that we won the war and "they" lost it, and that we were a great power on our own' had caused the country's influence in the world to decline for fifteen years. In his view, the EEC was undoubtedly the crucial 'spark' which the British economy needed to grow, and moreover, it was a morally praiseworthy enterprise from the perspective of socialist internationalism:

> By going in we can help to underpin world peace. By going in we can cooperate with the social democratic parties of Western Europe to make a reality of some of the socialist internationalism we have talked about for so long.

[5]See *The Times*, 4-6 October 1971. All citations which follow are from this newspaper.

For Jenkins and his supporters within the Labour Party, therefore, 'Europe' was clearly the most promising hope for the recovery of British national pride in the political, economic, and moral spheres of international status-ranking.

Meanwhile, within the Conservative Party itself, Heath also had to face a great deal of opposition from the far right, led by the sharp-tongued Enoch Powell, who saw the EEC as a shamefully humiliating, unacceptable threat to national sovereignty and independence (and therefore to the collective honour and self-respect of the British people). At the Party's own Conference a few days later,[6] Powell warned that a politically united European Community would completely eliminate Britain's proud, separate, distinctive voice in the world. Amid loud cheers, he refused to accept the arguments of all those who claimed that there was now 'no alternative' to such an utterly disgraceful situation:

> I do not believe this nation, which has maintained and defended its independence for a thousand years, will now submit to see it merged or lost; nor did I become a member of our sovereign parliament in order to consent to that sovereignty being abated or transferred. Come what may, I cannot and I will not.

However, the majority of the Tories rallied behind their 'Europeanist' leader enthusiastically, and voted by a ratio of eight to one in favour of EEC entry. In line with the discursive style of the Prime Minister, key speakers such as the Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, defined 'Europe' as a major boost to Britain's authority, influence and stature in the world, a chance 'to project herself on a stage wider than the British islands'. Another emotive high point of patriotic, 'pro-European' fervour was also reached by Norman St John-Stevas, the Tory MP for Chelmsford, who drew loud cheers from the crowd when he rejected the idea that the British monarchy could ever be threatened by a future 'European President':

> That is rubbish. The Queen of England is more than a match for any continental president. The only thing that is likely to happen is we go into the Common Market is that she might become the Empress of Europe.

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[6]See *The Times*, 14-16 October 1971. All citations which follow are from this newspaper.

Finally, on the last day of the Conference, the Prime Minister himself delivered an emotionally charged closing address in which the European Community was once again identified with the resurgence of British influence and prestige in the global pyramid of states: 'a real change in the standing of Britain among the nations of the world.'

The manipulation of British national symbolism and sentiment, whether in favour or against the concept of EEC membership, was also very evident in the propaganda of the different associations which emerged during this period in Britain to rally support for their respective causes. The 'pro-market' European Movement, for instance, published a monthly tabloid called the *British European*, which was distributed across the country by volunteers at holiday resorts, railway stations, football matches, and so on. It displayed the Union Jack with the headline 'It's time we carried our flag into Europe!', and in bold type proclaimed on the front page: 'It's time Britain woke up, stopped being a looker-on, and grabbed a share of the European gravy!'[7] Meanwhile, however, organizations such as the Keep Britain Out Campaign battled back with accusations of national betrayal, publishing advertisements which announced the government's decision to sell their own country:

> HM Government Ltd. auctioneers and valuers.
> FOR SALE BY ROME TREATY the Freehold of England and Scotland, Wales and the Northern Part of Ireland, together with the undisputed right to frame and impose laws upon the land and upon all of Her Majesty's subjects.
> Negotiations proceeding. Stop the greatest sell-out ever. Keep us out of The Six. Britain must not become no. 7.[8]

It is also interesting to observe how the two top-selling newspapers at that time, the *Daily Mirror* and the *Daily Express*,[9] represented the European issue during this period, igniting

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[7]Cited in Kitzinger (1973: 222).
[8]Cited in Kitzinger (1973: 247).
[9] According to figures cited in Seymour-Ure (1991: 29-30), in the early 1970's the average daily circulation of the *Daily Mirror* was 4,570,000, while the *Daily Express* was selling an average of 3,563,000 copies a day. In third place was *The Daily Mail* (1,890,000), followed by *The Sun* (1,615,000), *The Daily Telegraph* (1,409,000), *The Times* (388,000), and *The Guardian* (304,000).

national sentiments in order to build up support for both the 'pro' and the 'anti' cause. On one extreme, the *Mirror* fully accepted the argument that the only conceivable source of national strength and self-esteem, once the reality of Britain's loss of power was accepted, could be found in 'Europe'. When the Government's White Paper was published, this newspaper's editorial stated:

> Are a people who for centuries were the makers of history – and who can again help make history – to become mere lookers-on from an off-shore island of dwindling significance? Surely the answer is clear. The terms are known. The prizes are immense. The challenge must be accepted.[10]

On the opposite pole, however, the *Express* continued to label all such 'pro-Europeanism' as nothing short of national treason. It called the Government's agreement with the EEC 'The Great Betrayal', and asserted that its chief negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, had sold away Britain's distinctive cultural personality to the highest postor: 'It's not sugar that Rippon is selling short. It's your way of life.' According to this newspaper, the document presented by the nation's leaders to legitimate their decision to go 'into Europe' could not properly be called a White Paper, but a 'Black Paper' which essentially outlined the humiliating national defeat which Heath's government was responsible for – in other words, 'How Britain's Greatness will be Surrendered'.[11]

This same impassioned debate concerning 'Europe' was even observable on a spiritual and religious plane. On the whole, the official representatives of the main official churches manifested their full support of EEC membership and the benefits it would bring to the national soul. The General Synod of the Church of England, for instance, published a report in which it defined the enlargement of the EEC as 'an exhilarating and spirit-stretching experience for the Church of England as much as for England as a whole', and even proposed a prayer for the future of Europe which began as follows:

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[10] *Daily Mirror*, 8 July 1971 (Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 344).
[11] *Daily Express*, 14 May 1971 (Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 344).

> We offer up to thee the attempt to create a United Europe. We do not pray that Europe be strong or rich. We pray that her historic peoples may unite in peace after being so torn by wars.(Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 253-4)

Similarly, the Roman Catholic Institute of International Affairs issued an official statement which declared that:

> Christians who, by definition, believe in the breaking down of barriers between races cannot but welcome the opportunities for contact with the European peoples which the Common Market offers.(ibid.: 252)

Nevertheless, at least in some British minds, the EEC appeared to symbolize a frightening re-emergence of Papal domination. For instance, a pamphlet published by an organization known as the Protestant Alliance, entitled *The Queen and the Common Market*, made the following ominous warning:

> Unless faithful protestants stand up and be counted, Europe is about to realize the false anti-Scriptural ideal of One World One Church. The One World is Communist. The One Church is the Church of Rome. The Church of England and the apostate Churches will be swallowed up. This Common Market in Churches and States is a league with the World, the Flesh and the Devil.(ibid: 257)

A similar fear was also voiced by a very concerned British citizen, Mr Harold Eldred, who wrote an irate letter to *The Times* on 21 July 1971, in which he asserted:

> If Great Britain becomes a member of the EEC, she will be allied to countries one of which (at least) is dominated by the Roman Catholic Church from whose yoke we broke free at the Reformation. To bring us back under the rule of the Papacy would be the most retrograde step and the biggest disaster of all.(ibid: 258)

Hence, even at the level of spiritual beliefs and religious affiliations, there was some disagreement about whether 'Europe' could guide the British flock towards the path of heavenly salvation or infernal damnation.

At the political level, the issue of EEC membership was ultimately settled by a Parliamentary vote on October 28 1971, when a majority of 244 (356 versus 112) gave a 'Yes to Europe' on the

terms negotiated by the government.[12] The cross-party divisions on the matter were illustrated by the fact that 68 Labour MP's, led by the 'pro-European' Roy Jenkins, disobeyed their party's leadership and voted in favour of the government's proposal for entry, while 39 Conservative followers of Enoch Powell voted with the Opposition. Heath, in any case, characteristically attempted to turn the event into an occasion for patriotic rejoicing and collective national effervescence [see picture reproduced on the following page]. Standing outside the door of his residence at 10 Downing Street, a classic symbol of British political authority and leadership, the Prime Minister proclaimed:

> Parliament has now decided that Britain should, in principle, join the European Economic Communities on the basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated. Today's decision has been reached by a clear majority of the elected representatives of the people: men and women who, irrespective of party political differences, share the conviction that this decision is right for their country... Now we stand ready to take our first step into a new world full of new opportunities. Our historic decision has been made: the British people accept the challenge. Let us show ourselves to that new world as we would wish it to see us: confident, proud, and strong.[13]

Such words once again illustrated a concern and a sensitivity for the recovery of collective self-esteem, in this insecure period of British status-anxiety: a preoccupation with how 'we' would wish the world to see 'us' at this difficult time of change and transition. The Prime Minister was implicitly saying that no loss of national 'face; should be feared, and that no threat of collective shame or humiliation existed. On the contrary, he proclaimed that the British people could strut 'into Europe' with their head held high: 'confident, proud, and strong.'

A brief political ritual was also organized to celebrate the Commons vote in favour of 'Europe' at the cliffs of Dover, where the ex-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan lit a huge beacon that shone across the Channel [reproduced on the following page].[14] A few moments later, an answering beacon was lit on the French coast at Calais to symbolize a new union of fraternity

[12]See *The Times*, 29 October 1971.
[13]*The Times*, 29 October 1971.
[14]*The Times*, 29 October 1971. The citations which follow from this event are taken from this newspaper.

Friday October 29 1971
No 58,311 Price 5p

THE TIMES

Parliament gives a resounding Yes to Europe with MPs' majority of 112

Parliament last night voted for Britain to enter Europe with a majority of 112 in the Commons and 393 in the Lords.

Mr Roy Jenkins and 68 other Labour MPs voted with the Government, while 39 Conservative backbenchers voted with the Opposition.

Voting figures in the Commons were: 356 For, 244 Against: in the Lords: 451 For, 58 Against.

The voting figures by parties were:

	For	Against	Abst'd
Conservative	282	39	2
Labour	69	198	26
Liberal	5	1	—
Others	—	6	—

The figures exclude the Speaker, the chairman and deputy chairmen of Ways and Means, four tellers and one absent Conservative MP.



Mr Heath arriving back at Downing Street after the vote in Parliament.

Labour fears possible break-up of parliamentary party after vote

By David Wood
Political Editor

The Government last night [illegible] in the House of Commons by [illegible] to 244 [illegible] House of Lords by [illegible] to 58. [illegible] Conservatives. [illegible] majority of 112 votes in [illegible] [illegible] the time [illegible] [illegible] was equal to more [illegible] [illegible] the Government [illegible] overall majority in the Commons and three times [illegible] [illegible] over the Parliamentary Labour Party.

But in the important sense the [illegible] of the majority was enough [illegible] Labour members who voted [illegible] the principle of entry last night will not be able or willing to support the Government when [illegible] Common Market legislation [illegible] session. Everybody at Westminster knows that within a few months the Government [illegible] on which it will depend the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

THE TIMES FRIDAY OCTOBER 29 1971

Mr Harold Macmillan and bonfire at Dover.

A beacon shines out to Europe

From Geoffrey Wansell
Dover, Oct 29

Mr Harold Macmillan, who as Prime Minister first applied for British membership of the Common Market almost exactly a decade ago, tonight described the Commons vote for entry as "a great turning-point in Britain's history".

Speaking after lighting a huge beacon on the Dover cliffs in celebration of the Commons decision, Mr Macmillan said: "I am delighted and cheered in spirit. I feel the young people are seeing the possibilities of Europe". He went on: "Europe will not be a sofa for us, but it will be a springboard from which we can bring peace and prosperity to the world".

It was Mr Macmillan's first public statement on domestic politics since ill health forced him to resign as Prime Minister in 1963. He said the Commons majority for entry was "larger than I dared hope for".

He felt the vote was a vindication of the European movement which Sir Winston Churchill had helped to found in 1947. Mr Macmillan recalled that he had seen Europe tearing herself apart in two world wars and he was happy that now she seemed to be uniting. "This is something far bigger than internal politics alone", he said.

Mr Macmillan lit the beacon on the cliffs beside Dover Castle soon after 10.30 amid a crowd of more than 500 people. The beacon which had been erected by the European Movement shone out across the Channel. Far in the distance an answering beacon on the coast of France at Calais was lit by the town clerk and deputy mayor of Dover who had travelled to France for the occasion.

At Folkestone Mr John Jacques, the major, and Miss Folkestone, Miss Elizabeth Flynn, lit seven rockets to mark the occasion. An answering beacon was lit in Boulogne.

The Times, October 29 1971

between the Continent and Britain. Speaking in front of a crowd of more than 500 people, Macmillan defined 'Europe' as 'not a sofa for us', but a new, active, honourable role for the British people: 'a springboard from which we can bring peace and prosperity to the world'. He also proclaimed that the Parliamentary approval of Britain's EEC membership was 'a vindication of the European movement which Sir Winston Churchill had helped to found in 1947.' A revered national totem such as Churchill was therefore remoulded by Macmillan in order to fit the present circumstances of the country, as a way of legitimating its membership of the European Community. After all, as the previous chapter illustrated, Sir Winston himself had always defended the idea that Britain was a 'world power' which was merely 'with Europe, but not of it'.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the government's propagandistic efforts to channel national we-feelings in favour of 'Europe', this task of symbolic legitimation clearly remained a rather difficult one in the British context of collective memories and sentiments. As soon as the Parliamentary vote had taken place, the 'anti-European' Common Market Safeguards Campaign issued a public statement which suggested that all true British patriots should rebel against the Government's shameful, treacherous act:

> It is now therefore the duty of every patriotic citizen – everyone who wants to save the country from the national decline inevitable if we are driven into the EEC – to resist the Government's proposed legislation by all means in our power.(Cited in Kitzinger 1973: 239)

In fact, although the Heath government attempted to identify EEC membership with a renewal of British national pride, these discursive efforts 'failed to shake people out of their apathy' (N. Beloff 1973: 266). Some opinion polls actually suggested that although a majority of people had now resigned themselves to the uncomfortable fact that there was now 'no alternative to Europe', in order to protect 'the national interest', it was still the case that only a relatively small minority were in favour of going in (Lord 1993: 120). Even one of Heath's official spokesmen was forced to candidly confess: 'It's like going to the dentist: the country knows we've got to join, but it doesn't want to go' (Cited in Spanier 1972: 175). In the British national context, 'Europe'

therefore still remained a cause for which it was rather difficult to drum up patriotic enthusiasm, as the official date of membership approached.

5.2 'We're in – but without the fireworks': Political ceremonies of legitimation and counter-rituals of contestation during Britain's accession 'into Europe'

Britain's official entry into the EEC took place on 1 January 1973. However, almost a year before this date, on 22 January 1972, a formal ceremony took place at the *Palais d'Egmont*, in Brussels, to mark the signing of the Treaty of Accession which made Britain, along with Ireland, Norway, and Denmark, full members of the European Community.[15] It is worth considering this political ritual in some detail, for it can serve to further illustrate the symbolic strategies of legitimation which were carried out by the country's leaders in order to justify this event in the national life and transform it into a cause for patriotic joy.

The signing was attended by the EEC's main authorities at that time, as well as respected 'founding fathers' such as Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission. The entire ceremony was broadcast live on television and radio, so that the British people could all collectively participate in this 'historic occasion' from their homes, and every attempt was predictably made to present the signing of the treaty as a hugely important national triumph. In a newspaper article published on that day, Heath wrote:

> The British voice in the counsels of Europe gives us an opportunity to increase our influence in world affairs and thus our ability to protect our own interests... I have no doubt that today and all it stands for will come to be regarded as one of the major milestones in our history and in the peaceful and prosperous evolution of the peoples of Europe.[16]

[15]My account of this event is based on the reports in *The Sunday Times* and *The Observer*, 23 January 1972.
[16]*Daily Mail*, 22 January 1972.

During the course of the ceremony itself,[17] the Prime Minister delivered a speech in which he again attempted to harmonize people's emotional attachments to 'the nation' with the supranational project of European unity. Indeed, he emphasized that the national and European levels of collective identification did not necessarily have to clash:

> Clear thinking will be needed to recognise that each of us within the Community will remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the achievements of our national history and tradition. But, at the same time, as the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognise our common European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny. Imagination will be required to develop institutions which respect the traditions and the individuality of the member states, but at the same time have the strength to guide the future course of the enlarged Community.[18]

Hence, presumably because he was very conscious of the particularly strong clash between British national sentiments and the project of European integration, Heath stressed the importance of building a European Community which fully respected the 'traditions' and the 'individuality' of its respective member states.

At the same time, the British leader's speech was filled with emotive references to the morally worthwhile task of world peace and global solidarity which he proclaimed the European project should be committed to. Hence, a discursive attempt was made to bring together not only the national and the European, but also the universal, cosmopolitan level of collective emotional identification:

> Britain, with her Commonwealth links, has also much to contribute to the universal nature of Europe's responsibilities. The collective history of the countries represented here encompasses a large part of the history of the world itself. I am not thinking of the age of imperialism, now past; but of the lasting and creative effects of the spread of language and of culture, of commerce and of administration by people from Europe across land and sea to the other continents of the world. These are the essential ties which today bind Europe in frienship with the rest of mankind.

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[17]The pomp of the occasion was partly marred by the fact that the Prime Minister was splattered with black ink by a woman protester, although the reason for this bizarre attack apparently had nothing to do with the EEC. The incident, in any case, held up the signature ceremony for more than an hour, while Heath was cleaned up in the British Embassy and made to look respectable once again for this solemn gathering of international authorities.

[18]The entire address was published by *The Sunday Times*, 23 January 1972. All citations are taken from this newspaper.

The concept of 'imperialism' was thus now denigrated by this British leader as a morally shameful anachronism. In his view, the only respectable role for Europe's nations, within which Britain was now clearly included, would be to work together towards cooperation at a global level, and hence towards the unification of humanity as a whole. By linking 'Europe' with the ideal of a universal cosmopolitan solidarity, the EEC was thus presented as an honourable source of collective pride in the sphere of morality.

Heath's speech at the signature ritual undoubtedly struck an emotive chord in those British minds which had fully converted to the European cause. At the same time, however, the lack of consensus over the issue of EEC membership was once again very evident in the British public sphere. For one thing, the leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson, simbolically displayed his total lack of respect for the ceremony in Brussels by attending a football match of his favourite team in Highbury, instead of taking part in the government's official Euro-celebrations. At the same time, an 'anti-European' protest demonstration took place in London on the day of the Brussels ceremony. A crowd of approximately 150 people chanted 'Heath traitor!' and 'No to Europe!', in front of the building which housed the Common Market Commission's representative. During this 'anti-European' ritual of contestation, a delegation of MPs led by Labour's Douglas Jay delivered a letter of protest to this EEC institution, which stated that Parliament had not yet assented to the treaty of accession, and that the British people were firmly opposed to it. The Common Market Safeguards Campaign also organized a conference in which anti-marketeers from different parties voiced their rejection of the document which Heath had put his signature on. And two days later, the spokesman of the right, Enoch Powell, launched his own personal discursive counter-attack against the Brussels ceremony by delivering a speech in which he proclaimed that the British people would never tolerate such a disgraceful reduction of their self-governing powers, and hence their collective dignity as an 'historic independent nation':

> To propose to the British Parliament and people that they should be taxed, governed, judged, and legislated by an authority outside the realm is a perilous enterprise... The people of Britain will not suffer it.[19]

According to a British journalist's account of this period, in spite of the Government's efforts to whip up patriotic enthusiasm about EEC membership, many people's residual we-feelings of emotional allegiance to the Commonwealth countries continued to present a formidable obstacle which made it extremely difficult for them to accept the shift towards Europe, or in any case to view it as a national triumph:

> [There was] a nagging feeling in Britain that our real friends were not these foreign-language speaking aliens across the Channel, but the English-speaking, cricket playing kith and kin across the oceans. We were resigned to the liquidation of the Empire and increasingly aware that that the Commonwealth was too politically and materially diversified to provide an effective international entity. But these facts could not destroy the long traditions of friendship and the many family relationships which linked Britain with the white settlers in the one-time colonies.(N. Beloff 1973: 268-8).

Hence, the emotional climate in Britain at the time of the country's 'entry into Europe' was defined by this observer as 'not so much euphoria as resignation' (ibid.: 271). This general mood was in fact perfectly encapsulated in a cartoon published by *The Guardian* on the day before the signature ceremony in Brussels took place [reproduced on the following page].[20] It showed the Prime Minister dragging a reluctant Briton, who wore a jumper displaying the Union Jack, into the enclosed territory of the European Community. A sign welcomed the British newscomers with some enticing promises about the future that lay ahead for them in the EEC: 'FORGET THE PAST! JOIN THE FRENCH EURO LEGION! Make exciting new friends, Opportunities for Incentive, Good Cooking, Travel.' However, as Heath proudly signed the Treaty of Accesion, the unconvinced Briton turned his head nostalgically towards Europe's entrance gate, where a sombre-looking Britannia and her children had been left behind for good.

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[19]The Guardian, 25 January 1972.
[20]*The Guardian*, 22 January 1972.



The Guardian, 25 January 1972

In any case, irrespective of the considerable lack of public enthusiasm, the Treaty of Accession was officially ratified by Parliament in July 1972, and on the first day of the following year, Britain officially became a member of the European Economic Community. This occasion was symbolically marked with a new round of discursive media performances and political rituals which attempted to portray the event as a motive for collective patriotic rejoicing.[21] A nation-wide cultural festival, the so-called 'Fanfare for Europe', was organized by the Heath government to symbolically mark Britain's admission into the EEC, in which musicians, theatre groups, craftsmen, and other artists from all the member states participated [see advertisement reproduced on the following page. On the eve of the entry, a torchlight parade ceremony was organized by the European Movement in London, where approximately 300 people marched to celebrate the event and presented a silver tankard to George Thomson, one of the two new commissioners which would represent Britain in Brussels. Thomson declared:

> This is a unique new year. What dictators have failed to do by force, democracies are undertaking by peaceful consent. Twenty-five years from now, if we build the right foundations in 1973, our children will enjoy a richer quality of life than could have been conceivable had we remained separate.[22]

The other new British Commissioner, Sir Christopher Soames, defined the occasion as 'the beginning of a great adventure' for Britain, and proclaimed that 'we now set out to develop over the years a European Union which, with its own personality, strength, and sense of purpose, will have a major impact on world affairs.'[23]

The Prime Minister himself also continued his untiring discursive crusade to build up patriotic enthusiasm for the EEC amongst the British people. In a newspaper article published in *The Times* on the official entry date, Heath continued to insist on his vision of 'Europe' as the

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[21]My account of these events is based on the reports in *The Times* and *The Guardian*.
[22]*The Guardian*, 1 January 1973.
[23]*The Times*, 1 January 1973.

THE TIMES MONDAY JANUARY 1 1973

Fanfare for Europe

A nation-wide festival to mark the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community

This page describes in diary form some of the main cultural events taking place during this eleven-day festival, 3–13 January 1973. Special attention should perhaps be drawn to the opportunity it offers to hear four of Europe's greatest orchestras by the side of the ten leading orchestras of this country, and to the unparalleled variety of the exhibitions which have been arranged. In addition to the events individually described, the festival includes visits by E.E.C. civic leaders and elder statesmen, European policemen and military representatives, town twinnings, special links with European Youth fireworks displays, pageants, floodlighting of public buildings, special church services, tree-planting ceremonies, films shown, continental cooking in gas and electricity showrooms and in hotels, an essay competition for children of the community and a visit by the prizewinners, school's conferences, a touring international youth road show in Scotland, a children's cavalcade in Colchester, Internationa sports fixtures, major City into Europe exhibitions in Leeds, Plymouth and Reading, shopwindow exhibitions and Community products, post exhibitions, and special meetings of Chambers of Trade and Commerce, Rotary Clubs and Round Tables. There will also be special programmes on television A Beauty Contest (4 January) and a European slanted "Opportunity Knocks" programme

The Times, January 1 1973

only way to save Britain from further decline, and to find a new secure source of power, prosperity, and collective self-esteem:

> Since the last war we have been through a difficult time in our history... We have had to deal with a formidable succession of economic difficulties and we have seen other countries move ahead of us in prosperity and influence... Even more fundamentally, people in this country, faced with the difficulties which I have mentioned, were beginning to feel that our role as a country was to put up with the second best and to muddle through our difficulties as best we could. I believe that we can go back to associating ourselves with genuine achievement and success. We shall be able once again to help guide events rather than submit to them. That is the real significance of our entry into the European Community.

The Prime Minister therefore carried on with his determined symbolic appeals to the national pride-shame balance: if Britain wanted to avoid remaining 'second best' in the world's international hierarchy of status-ranking, the only way to do so at this stage was to pool its strength with the other members of the EEC.

On the day after membership became official, a special banquet ceremony was also held in London at the great hall of Hampton Court, as a further way of symbolically marking Britain's entry 'into Europe' and promoting its importance for the nation's future. During this official gathering, Heath made a particularly daring Europeanist speech, in which he stressed that the objectives of the EEC should not merely be limited to the sphere of economic self-interest:

> We have been accustomed during these years to hear the Community described as the Common Market. I hope that this is a habit which we can now abandon. Certainly the unified market is a fact of enormous significance. But it is only the first step in a journey which will carry us well beyond questions of tariffs and trade. For what we are building is a Community whose scope covers virtually the whole field of human endeavour.[24]

In an attempt to further legitimate this firm espousal of the Europeanist cause, Heath resorted to the same symbolic strategy which had been employed earlier by Harold Macmillan in a speech cited earlier in this chapter. Once again, the revered totemic figure of Winston Churchill was

[24] *The Times*, 3 January 1973.

invoked by the Prime Minister, as a way of channeling national we-feelings in favour of 'Europe':

> Twenty-five years ago, at the first gathering of the European Movement at The Hague, Sir Winston Churchill looked forward to the day when 'men and women of every country will think as much of being European as of belonging to their native land, and wherever they go in this wide domain they will feel truly, here I am at home.' Tonight, as we meet on the eve of the Fanfare for Europe festival to mark British entry into the Community, we are one step nearer to making Churchill's dream a reality.

In the emotive setting of this banquet ceremony, the historical facts about Churchill's preference for a world led by the 'English-speaking peoples' (rather than 'the Europeans'), were conveniently swept under the carpet by Heath to serve the purposes of his Conservative government. To cite Churchill's support for European unity was an effective way of saying that it was perfectly compatible to be both a 'good British patriot' and a 'good European'. After all, if Churchill, an exemplary national leader who had devoted himself to the survival and prosperity of Britain during the last war, had promoted the Europeanist cause, there would appear to be no patriotic reasons for opposing it. Implicitly, the Prime Minister was therefore claiming that to be in favour of European unification was in no way a patriotic sin. On the contrary, to do so was to respect the historic legacy of a statesman who was greatly revered for his service to the British people.

Nevertheless, as usual, the Heath Government's official ceremonies of legitimation were surrounded by a conflictive atmosphere of discursive contestation. In the first place, Harold Wilson continued to denounce the terms agreed with the EEC as 'utterly crippling'.[25] Hence, he boycotted the government's patriotic banquet ceremony in London because he said he did not feel like celebrating an event which was not 'in the best interests of the British people.'[26] Instead, the Leader of the Opposition promised that if he was re-elected, there would be a re-negotiation withS Brussels, and the British people would be given the chance to vote in favour or against the

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[25]*The Times*, 1 January 1973.
[26]*The Times*, 3 January 1973.

question of EEC membership. By that stage, Wilson's Shadow Cabinet had officially decided to entice the public by promising that under a future Labour government, 'the nation' would ultimately be granted the opportunity to give its own verdict on 'Europe' through either a referendum or a general election.

At the same time, on the eve of the entry 'into Europe', British 'anti-marketeers' organized another one of their classic protest demonstrations in Essex, by staging a mock funeral for the 'dead British nation' through the village of Hullbridge, with their heads bowed and wearing black armbands.[27] Furthermore, opinion polls published by the press on the day EEC membership became official suggested that only 38 per cent of people were happy with this prospect, while 39 per cent were unhappy, and 23 per cent were 'don't knows'.[28] On the day membership became official, *The Guardian* therefore summed up the national mood with the following front page headline: 'We're in - but without the fireworks'. The opening paragraph of this top story stated that:

> Britain passed peacefully into Europe at mignight last night without any special celebrations. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories are written, was taken by most people as a matter of course.[reproduced on the following page]

Indeed, it seems as if every time the Heath Government tried to organize a ceremony with the goal of turning the 'entry into Europe' into a cause for patriotic celebration, such symbolic efforts were typically confronted by counter-rituals of de-legitimation. This tendency was displayed once again on the night of January 3, when an attempt was made to give Britain's membership of the EEC a 'royal touch' of monarchic support. A special gala had been organized at the Royal Opera House in London's Covent Garden to launch the Fanfare for Europe festival, with the presence of Queen Elizabeth II. However, when the British monarch and the Duke of Edinburgh, dutifully escorted by the Prime Minister, arrived on the scene, they were greeted by a

[27] *The Times*, 1 January 1973.
[28] *The Times*, 1 January 1973.

THE GUARDIAN
Manchester Monday January 1 1973 5p

Eve of Triumph: Mr George Thomson (left), one of Britain's two European Commissioners, with Mr Duncan Sandys—who becomes a Companion of Honour in today's honours list—celebrating entry into Europe at a torchlight rally in London last night.

We're in—but without the fireworks

By DAVID McKIE and DENNIS BARKER

Britain passed peacefully into Europe at midnight last night without any special celebrations. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories of Britain are written, was taken by most people as a matter of course.

The principal party political figures maintained their familiar postures of hope and optimism or head-shaking despair. Mr Heath was starting back from Ottawa, where he had gone for the funeral of Mr Lester Pearson, at about the time that Britain, along with Denmark and Ireland, officially became members of the European Community.

In a spate of pre-recorded interviews, he expressed his own hope and satisfaction at the successful outcome of the long march towards Europe with which he had himself been so closely associated for so long.

Yesterday the latest opinion poll on the Market, by Opinion Research Centre for the BBC, suggested that 28 per cent were happy about embarking on what Mr Heath depicted as an exciting adventure, while 30 per cent would prefer to get off. Twenty-three per cent had no opinion

...speculation on your fears, you are paralysed by them. The only future lies in energetically seizing opportunity as it...

...the preponderant wish of the British people that Britain should not be a member on present terms is needed."

The TUC, long dubious about entry, said that the one particular omission from the celebrations was any real attempt to answer the serious questions raised about Britain's entry. Afterwards they had failed to find what had been obtained.

The official pessimism was not launched in time for the appointed hour of destiny. The

The Guardian, 1 January 1973

crowd of approximately 300 protesters, who booed and threw stink bombs at them [see report on the following page].[29] These 'anti-European' extremists displayed a gallows with an effigy of Heath hanging from it. The word 'TRAITOR' was written across its chest. The police had to intervene to control the situation, while the royal couple and the Prime Minister entered the opera house.

On the very next day, another demonstration of popular discontent took place when the Prime Minister was opening an art exhibition related to the Fanfare for Europe celebrations in London's West End. Suddenly, an angry middle-aged woman angrily swung her bag at Heath and accused him once again of being unloyal to his own country with the same harsh insult: 'Traitor!' The Prime Minister's security men quickly grabbed the bag-swiging protester and dragged her away. In itself, this incident could have remained a trivial anecdote of little consequence. However, what is interesting for the purposes of this thesis is that the Euro-phobic *Daily Express* seized upon the event and transformed it into its main front-page story on the following day. Under a massive headline in huge bold-face print which proclaimed 'EUROPE: Woman takes a swing at Heath – FED UP', this newspaper depicted the personal protest of this angry bag-swinger, Mrs. Beula Henry, as an incident which symbolized the collective sentiments of outrage which the 'ordinary people' of Britain felt against the treacherous Prime Minister who had forced them to 'go into Europe' against their will [reproduced on the following page].

Nevertheless, if one looks at the editorials of the main national newspapers on the official day of entry, it is clear that many of them fully adopted the same discursive tone of patriotic rejoicing employed by the Conservative government, and some even showed considerable enthusiasm for the ideal of a politically united Europe that went far beyond the concept of a 'Common Market':

> There is every reason to be delighted that this is the day Britain joins the European Community... It is through a successful economic and political contribution of the community that Britain will most certainly solve her own problems, and a successful

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[29] *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *Daily Express*, and *Daily Mirror*, 4 January 1973.

THE ROYAL FANFARE

The Queen and Mr Heath . . . smiles for a glittering night at the opera. Picture: TOM KING

. . but Queen faces demo

By JOHN JACKSON

THE QUEEN and Premier Edward Heath smile as they go into the Royal Opera House to watch a gala performance.

Their guard of honour at the Fanfare for Europe celebration—soldiers from the Common Market countries.

The glittering gala at Covent Garden was arranged to give Britain a sparkling send-off into the Common Market.

But outside the opera house, the atmosphere was less cordial.

Hundreds of anti-Common Market demonstrators were waiting as the Queen and Prince Philip arrived.

Waving

They booed and jeered. Stink bombs were thrown, but they fell well short of the royal couple.

The Queen was smiling and Prince Philip was waving when their car flanked by police outriders, approached the area.

When they saw the jeering mob the Queen stopped smiling. Prince Philip lowered his hand and raised his eyebrows.

The watching grim-faced as National Front parties waved a banner saying: "Prince Philip's crown belongs to us, the people."

Nearby was a gallows with an effigy of Premier Edward Heath swinging from it. The word "Traitor" was written across its chest.

Many visitors greeted TUC leader Vic Feather, Lord Goodman, Sir Christopher Soames, and many Cabinet Ministers.

Special cheers was reserved for the Prime Minister, who never stopped smiling.

Fanfare for Europe—See Page Six

Daily Mirror, January 4 1973

DAILY EXPRESS

THE VOICE OF BRITAIN

No. 22,563 FRIDAY JANUARY 5 1973 Weather: Dull and misty Price 3p

EUROPE: Woman takes a swing at Heath

FED UP

Britain gets a shock taste of soaring meat prices

By COLIN MACKENZIE, ROBERT MILLAR

MR. HEATH found the going tough in his Fanfare for Europe celebrations yesterday: A woman swung her bag at him as a personal protest, and the country's butchers pitched in with a warning that meat prices are soaring to Continental levels.

The Prime Minister looked startled as security men seized Mrs. Bettia Henry and her bag at an art exhibition in London's West End.

Mr. Heath watches as a security man grapples with Mrs. Henry at Christie's sale room yesterday

The Daily Express, January 5 1973

contribution will also be of benefit to the rest of the world. At last Britain has again a large area of fresh opportunity... Europe needs an idea, and it needs to have more appeal to human nature than mere geographical propinquity or economic interest provide. The people of Europe should be able to see themselves as a European nation with a particular character and aims.(*The Times*)

Today is the Day of the Great Happening. January the first, 1973, begins one of the significant New Years in the history of our nation. AT LAST, the British are members of the European Economic Community, so modestly called the Common Market. This is more than the most elaborate trading agreement in the history of states. It is more than the greatest trading bloc in the entire world. It is a community of nations who will grow ever closer as the years pass by. And one day, perhaps a long time from now, it will achieve the persistent dream of a United States of Europe. We should, every one of us, be brimful of rejoicing and hope.(*Daily Mirror*)

Happy New Europe!... From today, the Common Market means not THEM, but US... The Sun believes the changes that come in the long run will be mostly for the better. Britain will respond well to the opportunities and the pressures of being part of the greatest trading group the world has seen... A HAPPY NEW YEAR! AND A HAPPY (AND PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS) NEW EUROPE TO US ALL! (*The Sun*)

Other newspapers, however, while supporting the entry as a potentially great opportunity for the future of Britain, pointed to the lack of consensus on this issue and the difficulty of stirring up public enthusiasm for EEC membership:

'If the trumpet shall give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle?' Well, it's a pity that the Fanfare for Europe is not more harmonious, but in politics as in music dissonance has always been inevitable if the Second Fiddles play a different tune. In this case, it must be acknowledged that a large part of the country is not ecstatic about the score. The journey into Europe will be bumpy and discordant.(*The Guardian*)

Whether or not January 1, 1973 is regarded as a sunshine day for Britain still depends largely on how they react to the opportunities which now beckon. Enlargement of the Community from six to nine members could spell the final atrophy of a once great nation; or, more probably, it could mark a new and splendid chapter in our long history... Certainly this newspaper has for many years supported the cause of European unity, in the wake of two terrible world wars which almost destroyed European civilization. But it would be idle to pretend that public opinion shares that view. Enthusiasm, scepticism, and opposition, in perhaps roughly equal proportions, are apparent on the day of British entry.(*Daily Telegraph*)

There is bound to be some sadness and regret. No groom marries without a wistful glance back to his bachelor freedom. No fanfare for Europe, however cheery, can quite be made to harmonise with Rule Britannia. But ask yourselves how much hope and glory this land of ours would really enjoy if left on its own... Yes, there is much for us to do now. And everything to play for. We're in. And we're on our way. On this morning, as we put our first foot into Europe, we give you the toast: 'A happy New Year. And an exciting new era.' (*Daily Mail*)

Meanwhile, however, the *Daily Express* continued to voice its fervent opposition to the EEC in its own particular style. On the official date of entry 'into Europe', it showed the picture of a baby girl whose birth on the first day of the year had coincided with this 'historic' event in the national life. The headline was: 'Debby, the Euro-baby who couldn't care less' [reproduced on the following page]. The mother of the child was cited as looking on her first born as 'British', but the newspaper ominously warned that in twenty years' time things could be different, for babies born in Britain could be officially registered by 'foreign' authorities in Brussels as 'citizens of Europe'. At the same time, its front-page editorial argued that:

> For Britain to enter the Market is a mistake for at least three resons:
> It tends to separate her from her historic areas of development.
> It creates a set of circumstances in which Europeans may be treated preferentially to people of British stock.
> It does not carry the approval of the majority of the British people although it has been approved by Parliament.

At the most, the *Express* claimed that if there was now no choice but to resign oneself to this unhappy situation, then British leaders should simply ensure that the country attained the maximum possible benefits from its European entanglements:

> If our future is in Europe, in partnership with peoples so different from us, then Britain alone can ensure her own people's rightful share of influence and prosperity... Britain has a powerful role to play. Her traditions of political stability, her skills in finance and business are what Europe needs. They equip her to lead... So watch out Europe – Here we come!

From this newspaper's perspective, 'the Europeans' were therefore still very much an 'Other', distinct from and less important than 'people of British stock'. Hence, if EEC membership was now an inevitable reality, as a result of the undeniable decline of British power, the only acceptable goal would be to ensure national dominance within this new context. The discourse employed was therefore one that unashamedly displayed a narcissistic desire for national superiority over the European Other: 'So watch out Europe – Here we come!'

The emotional atmosphere in Britain at the time of entry therefore reflected much patriotic enthusiasm amongst those who had fully converted to the Europeanized we-image of national

DAILY EXPRESS

THE VOICE OF BRITAIN

No. 22,559 MONDAY JANUARY 1 1973 Weather: Cloudy, bright spells Price 3p



ALL' ERTA EUROPA ECCOCI QUA — DAILY EXPRESS

PASS AUF EUROPA WIR SIND DA — DAILY EXPRESS

WATCH OUT EUROPE HERE WE COME — DAILY EXPRESS

ATTENTION EUROPE NOUS VOICI — DAILY EXPRESS

KIJK UIT EUROPA HIER KOMEN WIJ — DAILY EXPRESS

PAS PAA EUROPA, HER KOMMER VI — DAILY EXPRESS

Whatever the language—Italian, German, French, Dutch or Danish—the New Year message is clear

WE'RE IN

The Daily Express and the Common Market

BRITAIN becomes a member of the Common Market by decision of Parliament and by the will of Prime Minister Edward Heath.

The British people are neither obsessed nor impressed by this fact. That is also the attitude of the *Daily Express*.

For Britain to enter the Market is a mistake for at least three reasons:—

IT TENDS to separate her from her historic areas of development.

IT CREATES a set of circumstances in which Europeans may be treated preferentially to men and women of British stock.

IT DOES NOT carry the approval of the majority of the British people although it has been approved by Parliament.

★

The Daily Express has for these reasons and others always opposed the entry of Britain into the Market.

But now that we are in, the Express believes it would be fatal for this country to look back, that there can be no purpose in pining for the past.

For our future is in Europe, in particular it is people so different from us, then Britain alone can restore her own people's special share of freedom and prosperity.

The romance would not have started on the side of the Six as we have seen in recent years the stumbling and hard negotiating to come to the terms of self-interest.

Britain has a powerful role to play. Her traditions of political stability, her skill in finance and business are what Europe needs. They could not be put.

★

The Daily Express will promote the cause of Britain in the European Community. A balancing task in foreign capitals and a stern reminder here at home to those in Parliament and Whitehall who fail to further our interests.

Let there be no doubt: If it becomes clear that there is no place for Britain in the developing European Community Parliament has a way out.

So watch out, Europe — Here we come!

Max Aitken

By WILFRID SENDALL

AS the chimes of midnight heralded 1973, Britain, Eire and Denmark joined the European Economic Community and the Six became Nine.

And that moment was marked by no official ceremony in London. And that's how it will be in Brussels, the Market headquarters, this morning —straightforward formality without fanfare.

Mr. Ewen Fergusson, deputy head of the British delegation in Brussels, will walk along echoing corridors of the headquarters to present Britain's "credentials."

He will hand over a letter from the British Government officially invoking entry.

Outside, the Daily Express flag will head the Union Jack along with the flags of the other two newcomers.

Officially will be flying the Tricolour, the Christiansborg Horsing and the Dannebrog.

Prime Minister Edward Heath isn't at home on a New Year's day.

Mr Heath is in Ottawa for the funeral of former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and that he feels, the occasion "very civil." It marks a corner of European life for which people have hoped for centuries," he said.

Mr Heath hoped people will be "interested by years."

CAMPAIGN

And even as Britons pretended, many Labour experts were...

Opposition leader Harold Wilson again urged the new Labour Government to decide a referendum on the issue of membership.

And said Marketeers agreed that they would have no time campaign, as pro Britain will...

One of Britain's leading seven leaders urged the TUC to join the Market committees and "plunge into Europe."

To be sure, even for a limited period, would be a mistake, said Mr. Alf Allen, leader of 320,000 shop workers.

At the same time, the TUC issued a statement accusing the Government of failing down the problems that membership will bring.

Customs duties were yesterday reduced. Britain's protective tariffs against Iron Market countries will be some. Food prices will fall next week.

From January 31 they start the first set of reductions in tariffs between the Nine.

But the "nations" could be pushed beyond the confines of ordinary commercial areas in Market relations and be an support of Chancellery duty-free shops.

TARGET

FEARS have been voiced about rapid producers set to expand the British economy in the fundamental industry of a European industrial structure by the end of 1973.

Some people believe that the move will by the more backward of the Market partners to see that to be realistic.

What targets does a NATO 1 and the attitude of M. Pompidou, Monetary Conservation Party-elected Mr. John Marchand to make a Community European partner.

On 31 conditions. By June 30, Foreign Ministers must draw up proposals for a common European external policy.

By July 1 a common European passport should be ready for all to cross and have unified with the rest of the world.

By July 31, a programme of actions encouraged, by a precise timetable to be with proposals of the environment.

By December 31, an agreement and road trade with newly developed countries in Africa, with Commonwealth countries and with countries of the Mediterranean basin.

The rules will apply into force in Brussels and Luxembourg.

A gong for Europe

HONOURS GET MARKET FLAVOUR

By DANIEL McGEACHIE

BRITAIN'S big step into Europe is marked by a special New Year Honours hand-out for our leading Common Market men.

Awards go to politicians, diplomats and business men who have helped forge new ties with the Community.

But the list marks a move away from the Old Commonwealth traditions, though former Australian Premier Willoe McMahon and the usual set of recommendations to London months are.

When new Labour Premier Joseph William Jones over, he decided Australia would no longer put up "candidates" for the Queen's Awards and Mr McMahon has was withdrawn before reaching Buckingham Palace for approval.

States

Meanwhile reinstatement by Mr McMon. Australian States have been expected as usual.

And the Old Commonwealth has also been represented with awards to New Zealanders. Their retiring Premier Mr. John Marshall is made a Companion of Honour and Sir Arthur Porritt, a give the Lay Preacher on the

Natural envoy for Common Market matters goes to Tory party statesman Duncan Sandys, a friend of the Supreme Commander, who is made a Companion of Honour.

There are Knighthoods for Michael Palliser, Britain's Ambassador to the EEC, and for MPs Douglas Dodds-Parker and John Foot who are in the Tory team in the European Parliament.

Knighthoods too for

PAGE TWO, COL. SEVEN

Debbie, the Euro-baby who couldn't care less

Debbie Bushby—a fully-fledged European at 7 lb. 8½ oz.

DEBBIE has hardly opened her eyes yet. But when she does she'll have to accept the fact that she's joined the exclusive ranks of Britain's first Euro-babies. Something to tell about?

Not judging from her parents' views. And you would surely say she's all dressed up for the occasion.

Mind you it was a close thing. For Debbie was born at Queen Charlotte's Hospital, London, at the weekend —when Britain was still officially outside the Common Market.

But she will be registered today. And that makes her "Euro-birth" a fully fledged member of the European Community.

DIFFERENT

Her mother, 18-year-old Sylvia Bushby, looks on her first-born as Britain. Which also would fit. Sylvia says:

"Things may be different for babies born in Britain to-morrow. They need be registered as citizens of Europe."

greatness espoused by Heath, but there was also a considerable degree of reluctance, resignation, and hostility towards 'Europe'. The idea that EEC membership could represent a new, honourable source of national pride still remained a hotly contested one. It seems as if the symbolic association of 'going into Europe' with the decline of British power and status, and hence with a discomforting sense of disgraceful national defeatism, continued to represent a major socio-psychological obstacle for those who wished to build up public support for the European cause. As the historian K.O. Morgan has put it:

> The mood when Britain joined was one of wary acceptance, since no obvious alternative could be found. It even appeared a kind of surrender, a recognition that the loss of Empire and the breakdown of an equal partnership with the Americans had left Britain as an enfeebled and divided offshore island with nowhere else to turn.(1990: 342)

To make things worse, the first year of official EEC membership was marked by high inflation, increasing unemployment, and widespread strikes in Britain, which caused the popularity of both Heath and 'Europe' to quickly sink simultaneously (J.W. Young 1990: 118-19; Spence 1976: 31). According to figures cited in Northedge (1974: 352), by July 1973 only 42 per cent of the British people approved the Common Market, as compared with 48 per cent who disapproved. In fact, the numerous surveys carried out on the issue of the EEC during the four years of Heath's Premiership suggest that 'at no time between 1970 and 1974 did public opinion register enthusiasm for the EC' (Lord 1993: 118).

5.3 The Referendum Debate of 1975: 'Europe' as national salvation versus 'Europe' as national disaster

In February 1974, the man who had successfully taken Britain 'into Europe' lost power in a general election, and Harold Wilson once again took over the reins of government. As I have shown, in spite of the patriotic triumphalism with which Prime Minister Heath had attempted to surround the official entry into the EEC, the Labour opposition always contested such Euro-enthusiasm by claiming that the Conservatives had completely failed to protect the 'national

interest' in their negotiations with Brussels. Hence, during the election campaign which brought Wilson back to 10 Downing Street, the Labour Party's manifesto promised to renegotiate the terms of entry with the EEC, in order to gain a better deal for the British people. It particularly stressed that under a new Labour government, the country's financial contribution to the Community budget would be reduced, its parliamentary powers over industrial, regional, and fiscal policies would be secured, and the Common Agricultural Policy would be reformed so that low-cost food producers from the Commonwealth countries could continue to have privileged access to the British market. Furthermore, the Labour Party guaranteed that there would ultimately be a popular vote on the question of EEC membership, in order to allow 'the nation' to choose freely whether or not it wanted to remain 'in Europe'.

The offer of a renegotiation with the EEC evidently had important electoral advantages for Wilson. In the first place, it allowed him to present his party as the supposedly more ardent defender of the 'national interest', and to depict Heath as a weak leader whose excessive and shameful submissiveness to European foreigners was seriously harming Britain. At the same time, the promise to hold a popular vote on the 'Europe question' made it possible for Labour to present itself as a party which was far more democratic than the Conservatives. Back in the 1970 electoral campaign, Heath himself had declared that it would be unacceptable to enter the European Community without 'the full-hearted consent of Parliament and people'. Opinion polls, however, continued to suggest that such a 'full-hearted consent' hardly existed at the popular level. Hence, the Labour Party capitalized on this situation, accusing Heath of contradicting his own words by forcibly taking the country 'into Europe' against its will, and in its manifesto, it proclaimed that 'the right to decide the final issue of British entry will be restored to the British people' (cited in Spence 1976: 33; my emphasis). The Conservative Premier was further harmed by the fact that in the closing days of the electoral campaign, Enoch Powell recommended that Tory opponents of the EEC should vote Labour in order to protect the independence of their country (J.W. Young 1993: 119). Heath's electoral defeat therefore

suggests that in the end, the Conservative leader's struggle to present the 'entry into Europe' as a great national victory had ultimately failed to convince much of the British public.[30]

At the same time, the decision to offer a popular vote on 'Europe' was not just a potentially advantageous electoral strategy, but also a useful mechanism to maintain the unity of the Labour Party, which remained extremely divided over the issue of EEC membership. By offering a process of renegotiation with Brussels, as well as placing the ultimate verdict on this question in the hands of the public, Wilson hoped to steer a pragmatic, mid-way course which would hopefully avoid an open fissure between Tony Benn's left-wing group of fervent anti-marketeers and the 'pro-European' sector of moderates led by Roy Jenkins. It has been suggested that in fact, the Labour leader's ultimate strategy was to outmaneuvre and weaken the party's leftists, by successfully achieving the public's approval of EEC membership (George 1994: 77). In any case, for the purposes of this thesis, what is crucially relevant about the referendum debate is that it offers a particularly vivid illustration of how national symbols and sentiments were mobilised by different British political figures in order to legitimate or de-legitimate the concept of EEC membership.

As Wilson had promised, this popular vote on 'Europe' was preceded by a process of renegotiation in which some significant concessions were granted to Britain by its Community partners. At a European Council meeting held at Dublin in March 1975, a number of British sore points were at least partly soothed: privileged access to the Common Market was achieved for New Zealand butter at least until 1980 (rather than 1977, as previously agreed under Heath), a special 'correcting mechanism' was agreed to reduce the UK's contribution to the EEC budget, and an official statement was made which safeguarded Britain's power to pursue its own regional and industrial policies. These new terms allowed Wilson and the man who had become

[30]I am not suggesting that Heath's defeat was due only or primarily to the EEC. There were other, more crucial factors which led to his downfall - in particular, the industrial strife which erupted in Britain during his Premiership. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the EEC also had a negative impact, especially as a result of Powell's support of Labour (H. Young 1998: 258).

his Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, to proclaim that under their leadership, the 'national interest' had now been firmly secured within the EEC. As George (1994: 86) has put it, the agreements allowed the Prime Minister to present himself 'as a "St George figure", who knew how to stand up to foreign dragons and would never sell his country short.' The deal on New Zealand dairy products, in particular, was depicted as a major national victory: a demonstration that even if Britain had 'entered Europe', she had not abandoned her 'kith and kin' in the Commonwealth. These renegotiated terms were approved by a majority of 16-7 in Wilson's cabinet, and so the Labour government officially adopted a 'pro' stance towards EEC membership when the promised referendum took place in June – although dissenting ministers, such as Tony Benn and Peter Shore, were allowed to freely voice their 'anti-European' views.

The celebration of this popular vote on the controversial 'Europe' question led to the creation of cross-party alliances on both the 'pro' and 'anti' platforms. Factional and ideological differences were provisionally dissolved within the 'Yes' and 'No' groupings, in order to campaign patriotically for the idea that 'staying in Europe' was either a wonderful opportunity or a terrible catastrophe for 'the nation'. The pro-marketeers united in an umbrella organization known as Britain in Europe, whose leading figures were the so-called 'Euro-pals', Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins, while the anti-marketeer groups merged together in an association known as the National Referendum Campaign, whose most visible protagonists were Enoch Powell and Tony Benn. Both sides received an identical amount of funding from the government, and were allowed equal time on television, as in any general election. However, the 'pros' were greatly aided by the fact that they received much more private financial support, demonstrating that they had the bulk of British business and industry on their side, as well as by the presence of relatively moderate, respected political leaders from the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal parties. The 'antis', on the contrary, received relatively little funding aside from the official governmental grant, and were handicapped by the fact that their cause brought together a rather bizarre alliance of extremists from both the right and the left. Aside from Powell and Benn, the 'no' campaign was supported not only by the British Communist Party and various Trotskyist

and Maoist groups, but also by the ultra-rightist National Front. Both the 'pros' and the 'antis', in any case, clearly did their utmost to channel collective we-feelings of national pride towards their respective causes.

The Britain in Europe organization, for instance, chose as its publicity logo a dove, the symbol of international peace, which was coloured with the design of the Union Jack, in order to prevent the antis from monopolising the symbolism of the national flag (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 93 [reproduced on the following page]). It also sent a pamphlet to all British households, entitled 'Why You Should Vote Yes', which identified EEC membership with the maintenance of national greatness in the three key spheres of economic might, political power, and moral respectability.[31] The European Community, it argued, made good sense for 'our jobs and prosperity', for 'world peace', and for 'our children's future.' By remaining in the Common Market, Britain was doing what all of its allies wished, including the United States and the Commonwealth countries, while if it pulled out, 'we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships.' In opposition to those who claimed that the EEC represented a loss of autonomy and independence, the pamphlet stated that in a globally interdependent world, the real test of sovereignty was 'how we can protect our own interests and exercise British influence in the world.' At this stage of the country's history, it was argued that the best way to do so would be 'to work with our friends and neighbours' by remaining in the European Community. What this actually involved in practice was not specified in any precise way, although the pamphlet attempted to reassure those who feared European supranationalism by claiming that 'all decisions of any importance must be agreed by every member.'

At the same time, much emphasis was laid on the idea that the nation's cultural traditions would in no way be threatened by the EEC:

> We can work together and still stay British. The Community does not mean dull uniformity. It hasn't made the French eat German food or the Dutch drink Italian beer. Nor

[31]The entire 'Yes' pamphlet was published in the appendix of Butler and Kitzinger (1976: 291-94). All citations are taken from this source.



Publicity Logo for the Britain in Europe Campaign of the 1975 Referendum

will it damage our British traditions and way of life. The position of the Queen is not affected.

Finally, after arguing that in the end there was no realistic alternative to the EEC in order to maintain Britain's safety and prosperity, the pamphlet ended with an emotively charged, moral appeal. To vote 'Yes', it suggested, was ultimately to 'believe in Britain' and to fulfil one's proper patriotic obligations to 'the nation' – an idea which was reinforced by a quotation taken from one of Heath's speeches during the campaign:

> So do our duty to the world and our hope for the new greatness of Britain. We believe in Britain - for Britain in Europe. For your own and your children's future it makes good sense to stay in.
> 'Are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?' Edward Heath, 5th April 1975

All of these ideas were of course reinforced during public rallies and media performances in which Heath and Jenkins became the most outspoken figures in the 'pro-European' campaign. The following excerpts from speeches and press articles can serve as an indication of the kind of passionate, patriotic discourse which was employed by these politicians, in order to link 'Europe' with the maintenance of national pride, dignity, and self-respect:

> One of the sadder aspects of the campaign is the way the anti-Marketeers are talking Britain down. They tell us that the British people are too weak to hold their own in the European Community... I reject totally that kind of defeatist talk. They may have lost faith but I have not.(Edward Heath, May 12 1975, cited in Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 183)

> The European Community presents us with the opportunity to channel our experience and skill towards great and constructive causes: the security of the western democracies, the renewal of prosperity for the benefit of all our people, and new sources of help for the developing nations of the world. These are noble objectives. They can only be achieved by Britain inside the European Community. It is this which gives us the opportunity in the modern world to fulfil ourselves as a nation.(Edward Heath in *The Times*, June 2 1975)

> For Britain to leave the Common Market would be like going into an old people's home for declining nations... I do not think it would be a very comfortable old people's home. (Roy Jenkins, June 2 1975, cited in King 1977: 116)

> There are people who genuinely believe, from good but mistaken motives, that we can best protect our security and independence by standing alone... I do not challenge the good faith of those who think we should return to the isolation of 35 years ago; but their ideas make as little sense as pulling the bedclothes over your head on a winter morning in the hope that time will stop and there will be no need to get up and go to work.(Roy Jenkins in the *Daily Express*, June 5 1975)

From this 'pro-European' perspective, withdrawing from the EEC was therefore presented as the option of a shameful national defeatism, as a sign of fear and weakness, and hence as a humiliating path that could only lead to further British decline. It was only through 'Europe', as Heath put it in his emotive legitimating discourse, that 'the nation' could find fulfilment.

The 'antis', of course, presented a diametrically opposed picture of the European Community. They depicted Common Market membership not merely as an economic disaster, but above all as a threat to the very continuity of Britain as an independent, self-governing nation. In its own pamphlet, entitled 'Why You Should Vote No', the National Referendum Capaign claimed that 'the fundamental question is whether or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own way.'[32] It ominously warned in its opening paragraphs that the Common Market 'sets out by stages to merge Britain with France, Germany, Italy, and other countries into a single nation', and hence would ultimately 'take away from us the right to rule ourselves which we have enjoyed for centuries.' From this perspective, it was the pro-marketeers who were seen as 'defeatists': *they* were the ones who had lost faith in Britain's national greatness and were shunning their patriotic duties towards the country's future generations:

> Those who want Britain in the Common Market are defeatists; they see no independent future for our country. Your vote will affect the future of your country for generations to come. We say: Let's rule ourselves, while trading and remaining friendly with other nations. We say: No rule from Brussels. We say: Vote no.

The pamphlet went on to list a catalogue of economic catastrophes which would supposedly be provoked by remaining in the Common Market: the massive rise of food prices and unemployment, the growth of a huge trade deficit, the increase of taxes to fund 'the Brussels budget', and the complete severing of Commonwealth links.

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[32]The entire 'No' pamphlet was also published in the appendix of Butler and Kitzinger (1976: 301-4). All citations are taken from this source.

The 'No' leaflet then drew attention once again to the danger of European supranational powers, and proclaimed that the 'real aim' of the Common Market was 'to become one single country in which Britain would be reduced to a mere province.' It suggested that the construction of a European Parliament with full legislative powers may have been a entirely logical, acceptable choice for Continental countries which in recent times had been 'ruled by dictators, defeated or occupied' and who were 'more used to abandoning their political institutions than we are.' However, it insisted to the voter that there was still time to avoid this calamity in Britain: 'Unless you want to be ruled more and more by a Continental Parliament in which Britain would be in a small minority, you should vote NO.'

In opposition to the claim that there was 'no alternative' to 'Europe', the anti-marketeers argued that membership in the European Free Trade Area would be more than sufficient to maintain national prosperity, 'without the burden of dear food or the loss of the British people's democratic rights.' At the same time, on the question of defense, they suggested that the Common Market had little to offer in terms of military security, and that in any case this would be amply guaranteed by the continued British membership of NATO. Furthermore, he 'antis' also rejected the moral accusation that they were narrow-minded, egoistic 'little Englanders', and they claimed, on the contrary, that the British people could still continue to cooperate with other countries 'as good internationalists, while preserving our own democratic rights.' Hence, their pamphlet concluded that Britain could remain economically prosperous, politically free, and ethically respectable without having to resort to the dictatorial EEC: 'If you want a rich and secure future for the British peoples, a free and democratic society, living in friendship with all nations – but governing ourselves: VOTE NO.'

As noted earlier, on the 'anti' side the two most vocal figures who constantly reiterated these 'No' arguments in speeches and media interventions were the odd tandem formed by Powell and Benn. The following excerpts from public addresses and press articles they published during the campaign can serve as illustrative examples of the kind of de-legitimating discourse with which they strove to contest the patriotic Euro-enthusiasm of Heath and Jenkins:

> Belonging to the Common Market may be the sign of hope and vitality for Italy or for Luxembourg. For the United Kingdom it spells living death.(Powell in Birmingham, cited in The Times, June 3 1975)
>
> The nation is being invited to confirm the surrender, and the permanent surrender, of its most precious possession: its political independence and parliamentary self-government, the right to live under laws and to pay taxes authorized only by Parliament and to be governed by policies for which the excecutive is fully accountable through Paliament to the electorate... The renunciation of nationhood through Community membership is fundamental, deliberate, and relatively imminent.(Powell in The Times, June 4 1975)
>
> Britain used to be the workshop of the world and can be again. Let's back the British people, not sack the British people. There's nothing wrong with Britain that British people cannot put right themselves... The Press, the Television, the big battalions, are telling you that beggars can't be choosers, that as a nation we are finished, that we can't be trusted to run our own affairs, and will be better off pushed around by a lot of Brussels bureaucrats... Because, make no mistake about it, if Britain stays in the Community it will be the end of us as a completely self-governing nation.(Benn in the Daily Mirror, June 4 1975)

One can therefore see the way in which the referendum debate became a passionate struggle to manipulate the national pride-shame balance, either in favour of against the question of EEC membership. While politicians such as Heath and Jenkins attempted to flatter the national we-image by identifying 'Europe' with British prosperity and prestige, others like Powell and Benn counter-attacked by equating the EEC with a humiliating surrender of national independence – indeed, with the very disappearance of nationhood itself. While the 'pros' claimed that to vote 'Yes' was to have faith and confidence in the continuing strength of the United Kingdom, the 'antis' declared that remaining in the EEC would imply that the British people had completely lost all their self-respect, that they had become a nation of shameless beggars or desperate losers, and hence that they were even prepared to accept orders from foreigners. As Peter Shore, another prominent figure in the 'No' campaign, put it in one of his campaign speeches:

> What the advocates of membership are saying, insistently and insidiously, is that we are finished as a country; that the long, famous story of the British nation and people has ended; that we are now so weak and powerless that we must accept terms and conditions, penalties and limitations, almost as though we had suffered defeat in war; that we have no option but to remain in the Common Market cage.(Cited in King 1977: 119)

However, as I noted earlier, the 'Yes' side not only had the support of the Britain in Europe campaigners, but also of Prime Minister Wilson and the majority of his cabinet. The Labour

government sent out its own propaganda in favour of EEC membership, and so in the end all British households actually received two 'pro' leaflets and only one 'anti'. The governmental pamphlet, entitled 'Britain's New Deal in Europe', focused primarily on the new terms of membership which had been negotiated with the Community, and hence on the pragmatic economic motives for remaining in the Common Market.[33] It opened with a letter from Wilson which stressed that 'big and significant improvements' had now been achieved which made continued membership in the EEC the right choice to safeguard British interests. The Common Market was described as 'one of the biggest concentrations of industrial and trading power in the world', and its aims were said to be the following:

> To bring together the peoples of Europe. To raise living standards and improve working conditions. To promote growth and boost world trade. To help the poorer regions of Europe and the rest of the world. To help maintain peace and freedom.

EEC membership was thus associated with the rather vague idea of 'bringing together the peoples of Europe', as well as with the maintenance of prosperity and peace, but it is noteworthy that absolutely no reference was made to the potential development of a political union. What the governmental pamphlet primarily stressed was that on the key economic issues, written in capital letters as 'FOOD and MONEY and JOBS', the new terms fully protected British interests. It then reiterated many of the same arguments of the leaflet sent by the Britain in Europe campaigners: that the Commonwealth countries wanted Britain to stay in the Community; that there was no reason to fear 'faceless bureaucrats' in Brussels or the possibility of being deprived of 'our national identity', since all important policy-making powers remained in British hands; that membership of the Common Market was in the end the best way 'to advance and protect our interests', which was after all 'the essence of sovereignty'; and that abandoning the EEC at this point would leave Britain economically and political isolated: 'Outside we are on our own.'

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[33]The entire governmental pamphlet was also published in the appendix of Butler and Kitzinger (1976: 295-300). All citations are taken from this source.

Throughout the campaign, Prime Minister Wilson maintained a relatively low-key profile, concentrating above all on the so-called 'bread-and-butter' issues of EEC membership – i.e. the economic benefits of the Common Market which the governmental pamphlet had outlined. His attitude was largely that of a cool-minded pragmatist, trying to build a consensus on 'Europe' within his divided party and the country at large, by referring to 'hard economic facts' which supposedly demonstrated that EEC membership was by far the best option for the future welfare of the British people. For instance, he made an important intervention for the 'Yes' cause when, three weeks before polling day, Tony Benn made a speech in which he claimed that EEC membership had already cost Britain the loss of half a million jobs, and that this trend would inevitably continue unless the country pulled out of the Common Market. Wilson immediately denied the charge, and declared: 'I believe that the opposite is the truth' (King 1977: 120-1)

Throughout the campaign, the Labour Prime Minister also made a point of denying that there was any real threat to Britain's status as a sovereign, independent nation-state. Three days before the referendum, he defined the idea that power would eventually be handed over from Westminster to Brussels as 'rubbish', and guaranteed that 'the power of Parliament will always be supreme so far as Britain is concerned.'[34] But this opposition to the supranational integration of 'Europe' at the political level in no way clashed with his full support for Britain's continued membership of the EEC. On the last day of the campaign, Wilson demonstrated his commitment to the 'pro-European' cause with a particularly emotive discursive performance. At a rally in Cardiff, the Labour leader also identified a 'Yes' vote with the patriotic duty of serving future members of the national collectivity:

> Tomorrow is the decisive day in the affairs of our people. When all the arguments have died down and this campaign comes to an end and when the dust is finally settled, tomorrow's decision will be seen not just as a vote, but as a vote about the future of our young people, our children and those who come after them.(Cited in Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 189).

[34] *Daily Mirror*, 3 June 1975.

Another important supporter of 'Europe' was Margaret Thatcher, the recently elected head of the Conservative Party, and hence leader of the opposition at that time. Although she maintained a relatively aloof stance in the referendum debate, in comparison to more passionate 'Europeanists' such as Heath and Jenkins, Thatcher clearly positioned herself on the 'pro' side. This inevitably seems somewhat ironic and inconsistent, given the notorious Euro-phobia she later displayed when she became Prime Minister. In fact, however, the seeds of her later hostility to the EEC were already visible. For the Thatcher of 1975, remaining in the Common Market was clearly a good thing for Britain because it made sense from an economic and a geopolitical perspective. In her view, the EEC was crucial to maintain the British people's standard of living, and to maintain peace and security throughout Western Europe.[35] However, she also emphasized quite clearly in her own discursive performances that she was totally against the development of a federalist 'United States of Europe'. What she desired was merely 'closer and closer cooperation between the countries of the Community.'

One can therefore see how in the referendum campaign, political figures such as Wilson and Thatcher positioned themselves on the 'pro-European' side, while simultaneously rejecting the ideal of a politically integrated Europe that would involve the loss of national decision-making powers. Their message to the voter was that no contradiction existed between supporting a 'Yes' in favour of Britain's membership of the EEC, while saying 'No' to the concept of a European supranational union and the loss of national independence.

Hence, although Thatcher made clear her anti-federalist stance, this did not stop her from demonstrating her allegiance to the 'pro-European' cause in a very overt manner. On the eve of the referendum, she appeared at the final pro-EEC rally in London with a colourful, propagandistic jumper that displayed all the flags of the European Community's member states, including, of course, the Union Jack [reproduced on the following page].[36] Standing next to a

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[35]See the report on Thatcher's campaign interventions in *The Guardian*, 3 June 1975. All further citations in this paragraph are taken from this source.

[36]*Daily Express*, 5 June 1975. All citations from this event are taken from this source.



Maggie . . . proving that it's Europe or bust for her

Picture by Peter Floyd

Mrs. Thatcher showing the flag last night

By Philip Belsham

MRS. THATCHER showed the flag for Britain In Europe last night.

She put on a bold front . . . of all the Common Market standards.

The Tory leader arrived at the statue of Sir Winston Churchill—where young pro-Marketeers were starting an all-night vigil—wearing a brightly coloured jumper.

It was a special gift from some mill workers and bore the national colours of each of the Nine.

Amid cheers from her young supporters, Mrs. Thatcher said: "Churchill was the first person to have the great vision of working together for peace in Europe.

"I hope within 48 hours we shall know the result and that it will be a splendid and decisive Yes for Britain in Europe."

She lit a torch at the statue, outside Westminster, which was to stay alight all night.

Secure

Earlier Mr. Harold Macmillan, the former Prime Minister, arrived at the statue where his 27-year-old grandson Mr. Adam Macmillan, helped organise the vigil.

Mr. Macmillan sen. said: "Sir Winston Churchill helped found the European movement 30 years ago.

"I trust our dear country will tomorrow prove worthy of his leadership and so secure our future and that of the Western civilised world."

Mr. Macmillan was presented with the European standard by a young Socialist, Mr. Julian Priestley.

And Mr. Adam Macmillan said: "We will certainly be here all night.

"This is our way of proving that the younger generation agree with the older generation that Britain should remain in Europe."

Daily Express, 5 June 1975

statue of Winston Churchill, the classic symbolic legitimator of Tory 'Europeanism', she declared: 'I hope within 48 hours we shall know the result and that it will be a splendid and decisive Yes to Europe.' She then lit a torch next to the statue, which would remain alight throughout the final night of the campaign. This last political ceremony of the Yes campaigners was also attended by the old veteran leader Harold Macmillan, the first Prime Minister who had attempted to get Britain 'into Europe' in 1961. His grandson, Adam Macmillan, delivered a speech in which the Churchill totem was typically employed once again to channel we-feelings of national duty in favour of 'Europe':

> Sir Winston Churchill helped found the European Movement 30 years ago. I trust our dear country will tomorrow prove worthy of his leadership and so secure our future and that of the Western civilized world.

However, in opposition to this manipulation of the Churchill symbol by the 'pro-Europeans', the 'antis' proclaimed in their own propaganda that on the contrary, the spirit of Sir Winston was on their side. To prove their point, throughout the campaign they often quoted a statement Churchill had made in 1944: 'Each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea.'[37] Furthermore, on the eve of the referendum the 'antis' attempted to steer national sentiments against EEC membership, by issuing a public statement which identified the obligations of 'true patriotism' with a 'No' vote:

> There is nothing wrong with Britain that the British people cannot put right. Make tomorrow Britain's Independence Day by voting 'No'.[38]

As for the press, it seems clear that every major national newspaper had by this stage fully converted to the idea that remaining 'in Europe' represented the only possible alternative which could realistically maintain British power, prosperity, and prestige. As the day of the referendum

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[37]*The Times*, 2 June 1975. It is interesting to note that Churchill's grandson, a Conservative MP, aided the 'pro' side in this emotive debate, by declaring that it was 'mischievous and misleading' to suggest that his grandfather had been an opponent of European unity, or of Britain's participation in this project.
[38]*The Times*, 5 June 1975.

approached, the editorials of the main 'serious' dailies all identified a 'Yes to Europe' with a 'Yes' to the the future happiness of the British people. *The Times*, for instance, laid much stress on 'Europe' as the option which offered the British people a new national vocation, a new collective sense of purpose, and a new moral ideal: the development of a wider European loyalty that would not obliterate national allegiances, but could ennoble them by making the country reach outwards to cooperate and work together with other nations. It therefore offered a potential source of ethical pride and self-esteem:

> European idealism... invites us to accept and to develop a loyalty to the Continent as well as to our island and invites us to see our self-interest as involving the collective interest of a group of nations working together for the purposes of European development... We accept the ideal of Europe because it involves an outgoing of will towards nations who belong to the same European family as the four nations of the United Kingdom. It is through Europe that Britain will gain most and serve best; in 1975 Britain is as much in need of an opportunity for service, for purpose, as for any opportunity of gain.[39]

The Guardian, on the other hand, emphasized above all the sense of security, strength and stability provided by membership in a wider European grouping of states, as opposed to the feeling of danger, weakness and isolation which pulling out of the EEC would imply:

> Do we... want to go into the twenty-first century as a small and separate nation or as part of a greater Western Europe? As yet nobody can forecast whether the spirit of Marx, Mao, 'Ein Volk Ein Reich', or Jean Monnet will be the dominant influence in Europe a generation hence. It is strongly probable, however, that Britain will be safer and more prosperous within a democratic Western Europe, and that with Britain as a full member Western Europe will be more securely democratic and less exposed to outside buffeting in a troubled world. Parliament took the right choice for Britain in 1972. The people should endorse it today.[40]

Finally, as in much of the 'pro-market' propaganda that has already been analyzed, the discourse employed by the *Telegraph* made every effort to equate voting 'for Europe' with voting 'for Britain', and hence with the proper fulfilment of one's patriotic obligations:

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[39]*The Times*, 5 June 1975.
[40]*The Guardian*, 5 June 1975.

> A vote against Europe would threaten us with a future of confusion and accelerating economic decline. Only a resounding Yes can put Britain positively on course towards better times. Those who vote Yes demonstrate their confidence in Britain's future. Those who say NO reveal their lack of faith. Membership of the Community does not offer the panacea for our ills; but it provides by far the best chance of securing the conditions in which Britain can by her own efforts, recover prosperity and stability. Thursday, therefore, will bring a choice of historic importance. The nation, it must be hoped, will show its sense of the occasion by a massive vote. If that vote is a reassertion of British will to play a proper part in Europe and the wider world, it will be a vote for Britain.[41]

The particular emphases of these different editorials may have varied slightly, but they all contained the same fundamental message: 'Europe' was essentially right for 'the nation' in the three key status-spheres of economic prosperity, political power, and moral respectability.

As for the more populist tabloid papers, they also promoted the cause of continued EEC membership in their own particular style, through passionate patriotic invocations about the need to do what was undoubtedly best for Britain and the future survival of its national greatness. For the *Daily Mirror*, voting 'Yes' was a question of abandoning the past of imperial nostalgia and embracing a future of modern European prosperity:

> Tomorrow the people of Britain decide their future. And the future of their children. A future INSIDE Europe. Or OUTSIDE...
> Tomorrow, June 5 1975, can be the day when Britain finally turns away from the past and says a confident YES to the future...
> YES to a future in which we play a leading and prosperous role as part of a Great Western Europe.[42]

The *Daily Mail* mocked all of those who still seriously believed in the possibility of 'going it alone' in the modern world, and warned that exiting the EEC could only make Britain a weak, humiliated has-been. Yet again, it was argued that only by remaining 'in Europe' could the great legacy of Sir Winston Churchill be respected, and that only a 'Yes' vote would be able to guarantee prosperity, peace, and security for the country's future generations:

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[41] *Sunday Telegraph*, 1 June 1975.
[42] *Daily Mirror*, 4 June 1975.

> The anti-marketeers make it sound as if going it alone was a romantic adventure like the days in 1940 when we stood alone because nobody else could or would join us in the defence of civilisation. But it will be nothing of the kind. For this time we shall be stepping outside of the arena and into the sidelines of history...
> Vote No tomorrow – and the work that Churchill started at Zurich all those years ago will be shattered in a single day. Vote Yes – and we shall at least have prospects of friends and partners, the prospect of power to direct and influence our own future – and the world's future – , the prospect of handing on to our children a Continent more securely rooted in the habits of peace than the Continent we ourselves inherited.[43]

The Sun stressed Britain's economic weakness at that time, and hence its absolute need to remain tied to the EEC in order to survive and prosper. It ridiculed the claims that Britain would lose either its sovereignty or its cultural personality in Europe, and emphasized the dangers of isolation which leaving the EEC would entail:

> When the world says that Britains hasn't a snowball in hell's chance of going it alone, is that the time to say NO?...
> You can vote YES – FOR A FUTURE TOGETHER.
> Or NO – TO A FUTURE ALONE...
> [All members of the EC] have gained in wealth. In jobs. In social benefits. In freedom.
> And what have they lost? Sovereignty?
> Rubbish!
> -Are the French a soupcon less French?
> -Are the Germans a sauerkraut less German?
> -Are the Italians a pizza less Italian?
> OF COURSE THEY ARE NOT!
> And neither would the British be any less British...
> No one runs Britain but the British. So why listen to the desperate men who want us to be afraid of the rest of Europe?...
> The Sun urges you to keep Britain in Europe.
> Because, baby, it's cold outside![44]

Finally, even the previously Euro-phobic *Daily Express* had by that stage conceded that Britain had no choice but to accept its diminished stature in the world, and hence to secure its future welfare by saying 'Yes' to EEC membership. This newspaper had ultimately accepted that, in the end, there was no realistic alternative to 'Europe'. All other options should be feared, for they could easily lead to further national isolation and decline:

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[43]*Daily Mail*, 4 June 1975.
[44]*The Sun*, 4 June 1975.

> Two tides have carried Britain to the Market. One is the tide of hope: that we will have a new role in the world through the Market, and that the Market itself will be more purposeful in the world because of it. These things are still true, but less true than they were... The other is the tide of fear: that we now have no other role to play, no other trading system to live in, no other credibility to keep us in funds as we try to put up our society and our economy in better shape. Unhappily, this is even truer than it used to be. The Pro-Marketeers have put this fear to good effect... They are right.[45]

Hence, all these popular newspapers also presented the same patriotic case in favour of EEC membership. 'Europe', they argued, should not be feared. It would not lead to a humiliating national disaster. It did not stand for the 'death of the nation'. On the contrary, at this stage it was undoubtedly the best hope for the survival of national prosperity and prestige. It was pulling out of 'Europe' that represented very serious dangers, for Britain could simply not 'go it alone' at this stage of its history.

One can therefore see that at the time of the referendum campaign, the 'pro' cause was overwhelmingly stronger in Britain. It had the official support of the Labour Prime Minister and his government, the Conservative leader of the opposition, moderate figures from the two main parties such as Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins, and the bulk of the mass media. Hence, as I have illustrated, a huge amount of emotionally charged, patriotic propaganda identified EEC membership with the maintenance of national well-being and self-esteem, while pulling out of 'Europe' was depicted as an extremely dangerous minefield. At the same time, the 'Yes' case was strengthened by the fact that the potential implications of European supranationalism and political integration were largely understated, denied, or explicitly rejected by the 'pros'. Indeed, it was perfectly possible, according to leaders such as Wilson and Thatcher, to be in favour of EEC membership, and to simultaneously defend the maintenance of all the traditional powers of the British nation-state. To use Murray Edelman's terms, a major discursive crusade was therefore fought by the 'Yes' campaigners to make the EEC *symbolically reassuring* to the British public, and to make all other alternatives *symbolically threatening*. Meanwhile, the 'antis' put forward a radically contrary view, stressing economic dangers of the Common Market such

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[45] *Daily Express*, 5 June 1975.

as the rise of unemployment and high food prices, as well as the shameful loss of national independence implied by EEC membership. While the 'pros' tended to minimize the supranational dimensions of 'Europe', the supporters of a 'No' exaggerated them to the extreme of identifying the EEC with the complete disappearance of nationhood itself.

The referendum campaign can thus be seen as a discursive battle in which rival, conflicting versions of 'British patriotism' were put forward. For the 'Yes' campaigners, the patriotic duties of service owed to the country's future generations could only be fufilled by keeping Britain 'in Europe', while for the 'No' men, exactly the opposite was true. In this way, both sides attempted to manipulate collective we-feelings of national pride towards their cause. In the end, however, the arguments of the 'pro-Europeans' clearly won the day, and the British people voted by a ratio of two to one in favour of continued EEC membership (67.2% to 32.8%).[46] 'Yes' majorities were obtained throughout the United Kingdom, in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Hence, the odd alliance on the 'No' side between extremist figures from the left and the right of the political spectrum was ultimately no match for the potent combination of relatively moderate, influential leaders who campaigned in favour of 'Europe' and their allies in the mass media.

This victory 'for Europe' was logically interpreted as a great historic triumph for 'the nation' by the 'Yes' campaigners. Hence, when the results were announced, they organized a final patriotic ritual to celebrate the referendum's outcome at the Waldorf Hotel in London.[47] The main discursive performances were of course delivered by Heath, who proclaimed that the British people had shown 'their true sense of vision and destiny', and by Jenkins, who described the result as 'a second D-Day for British resurgence in Europe, based not on sulky acquiescence but on enthusiastic cooperation.' Meanwhile, the humiliated leader of the leftist anti-marketeers, Tony Benn, meekly accepted the verdict, declaring to the media that he had read 'loud and clear'

[46]A detailed account of the results can be found in Butler and Kitzinger (1976) and King (1977).
[47]*Daily Express*, 7 June 1975. All citations from this event are taken from this source.

the British people's clear wish to remain in the EEC. 'Minorities,' he asserted, 'learn to accept majority decisions.'[48]

Nevertheless, Enoch Powell stubbornly refused to accept the legitimacy of the results. In a public statement to the media, he claimed that 'the vast majority of those voting had no notion that they were saying Yes or No to Britain continuing as a nation at all.' He predicted that over time, the British people would gradually realize that 'their Yes vote to Europe was No to Britain as a nation', and that they would ultimately rebel against this unnaceptable situation (Cited in King 1977: 134). The Prime Minister, however, triumphantly proclaimed that after over a decade of controversies, the 'Europe' question had finally been settled for good in Britain under his leadership. Speaking from the steps of 10 Downing Street, Wilson declared:

> It was a free vote, without constraint, following a free democratic campaign condicted constructively and without rancour. It means 14 years of national argument over. It means that all those who have had reservations about Britain's commitment should now join without stint, in the task of overcoming economic problems that assail us as a nation, and work wholeheartedly with our partners in Europe and our friends everywhere to meet the challenges confronting the whole nation.[49]

Today, these words sound extremely ironic, for it is evident that this referendum hardly put an end to the 'national argument' about 'Europe' in Britain.

In the end, as Butler and Kitzinger (1976: 280) concluded in their detailed study of the referendum, the British people's verdict 'was unequivocal, but it was also unenthusiastic.' They clearly accepted the recommendation that the EEC was the most 'rational' and 'sensible' strategy to protect Britain's economic future. At the same time, however, it was still difficult for 'Europe' to be perceived as an exciting national triumph or a great source of collective prestige. After over two year of Common Market membership, most people simply showed their resigned support for a situation which had come to be recognized as a necessary prop for the maintenance of as much

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[48]*The Times*, 7 June 1975. However, in spite of this assertion, Benn did not actually cease to be an 'anti-marketeer' after the referendum. In fact, he continued to voice his opposition to the EEC, after being demoted from the Department of Industry to the Department of Energy (George 1994: 96-7).
[49]*The Times*, 7 June 1975.

national strength as possible in this difficult period of British history. By then, 'Europe' had become accepted as the tolerated *status quo*, and it was feared that leaving it at that stage could provoke a dangerous disruption of the country's economic life.

What the referendum's results suggested was that the majority of the British people had ultimately accepted the fundamental argument which had been employed since Macmillan's day to discursively legitimate the idea of EEC membership: that Britain was no longer an Empire or the 'World Power' that it had been, that the 'special relationship' with America was no longer so special, that there was no way to 'go it alone', and hence that there was now 'no alternative' other than the EEC in order to maintain British influence in the world. After all, as I have shown, the 'pro' propaganda essentially stressed the renewed prosperity and influence which a post-imperial Britain could derive from the Common Market, while minimizing or flatly rejecting the potential for increasing supranational integration within the EEC. The 'Yes' was thus not primarily motivated by an eager conversion to the supranational ideals of European integration, but above all by the widespread fear that pulling out of the Common Market at that time would have undoubtedly been much more risky for the British people than staying in: 'To that extent, thought it may have been a marriage service, it had elements of a shotgun wedding' (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 280). As one voter put it, to justify his 'Yes' in favour of EEC membership: 'It was the only thing, wasn't it? If we didn't go in, we'd be finished' (cited in Hedges 1976: 75).

5.4 Conclusion: Britain's faint-hearted 'Yes to Europe'

In this chapter, I have illustrated how 'Europe' continued to be a highly contested issue in the British political arena, from the time of Heath's successful application to join the EEC until the passionate confrontations which surrounded the 1975 referendum campaign. I have shown how as Prime Minister, Heath clearly did his utmost to discursively legitimate EEC membership through the frequent invocation of national symbolism and the appeal to national sentiments, during numerous propagandistic media spectacles and political ceremonies. The Conservative

leader repeatedly attempted to equate 'Europe' with the revival of British 'national greatness', and to tranform the EEC into a source of collective pride, by proclaiming that it could contribute in a crucial manner to the maintenance of national pride in the three key spheres of economic prosperity, political power, and moral prestige. On some occasions, Heath even dared to state quite openly that the project of the European Community was not just a 'Common Market' limited to the sphere of economics, but that it also encompassed an ideal of political unity, and he remoulded the revered totemic figure of Winston Churchill in order to symbolically legitimate his Europeanism from a patriotic perspective.

The discursive efforts of the Prime Minister, however, were continuously resisted by the Labour leader of the opposition, who confronted the Prime Minister with a battery of discursive counter-attacks in which he accused Heath of completely failing to uphold the nation's 'status honour' and to effectively defend the 'national interest' in his government's negotiations with the EEC. At the same time, the rebellious Conservative faction led by Enoch Powell, the widely read Daily Express, and numerous 'anti-European' organizations also attempted to symbolically delegitimate Heath's attempt to identify membership of the EEC with the maintenance of British power and status, by depicting the entry 'into Europe' as a digraceful national defeat, and even a form of national treason. Hence, not surprisingly, British public opinion remained largely divided on the 'Europe' question as membership became official on the first day of 1973.

Once Wilson regained power, with the promise that he would renegotiate the terms of Britain's EEC membership and would let 'the people' decide if they wanted to remain 'in Europe', he eventually readopted the discursive position that the Common Market was a good thing for 'the nation'. After the agreements reached at Dublin summit of 1975, the Labour Prime Minister ensured that the 'national interest' had now been protected, and that it was therefore safe for Britain to remain in the Common Market. Hence, when the promised referendum took place, the Labour government ultimately recommended a 'Yes to Europe', primarily through the invocation of pragmatic reasons of economic necessity. As I have shown, the campaigning for this popular vote provoked a passionate battle of national paradigms, in which each side strove to

depict their cause as the truly patriotic defense of the sacred national collectivity and its future generations. 'Europe' was alternatively depicted by the 'pros' as the option of national strength, prosperity, pride, and prestige, or as the path of national weakness, defeatism, shame, and humiliation by the 'antis'. Rival national we-images were thus the fundamental symbolic legitimators which were employed by both sides in the debate. However, the 'pro' cause was clearly better equipped both in terms of economic support and political leadership, and the British people ultimately said 'Yes to Europe' by a very wide margin.

Nevertheless, it seems as if this 'Yes' was in the end a rather faint-hearted one,[50] since as I have pointed out, it was based not so much on the inherent attractiveness of 'Europe', but rather on the belief that no other feasible options were now available to a weakened, diminished Britain. Indeed, this motivation was encapsulated in the slogan 'there is no alternative', often employed by the 'pros', which appears to imply that remaining 'in Europe' represented the better of two evils, rather than something which was considered to be emotionally appealing in itself. As Hugo Young (1998: 296) has put it, what settled the referendum was 'fear rather than exultation: the fear of the unknown, as represented by a world outside Europe... not, alas, the enthusiasm of the British people for dealing in their newly discovered destiny.' Indeed, with the advantage of hindsight, given that Britain's 'Euro-sceptic' or 'Euro-phobic' reputation has continued up to the present day, it seems evident that the 'Yes' of 1975 was motivated primarily by the pragmatic calculation of economic needs and the wary acceptance of Britain's dependence on the Common Market at that stage of its history, rather than on a passionate, widespread adoption of Europeanism as a new national vocation and an emotive source of collective pride. This will be further illustrated in my third and final chapter on the British case, which will focus on the discursive controversies concerning 'Europe' that erupted once again in the early 1990's, at the time of the Maastricht summit.

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[50]I am borrowing this expression from Jowell and Hoinville (1976: 6): 'we were only just Europeans; full-hearted numerical consent concealed a very faint-hearted emotional consent.'

6. Maastricht: Avoiding the 'conveyor belt to federalism'

In the previous chapter, I noted how during the 1975 referendum campaign, both Prime Minister Wilson and the Conservative leader of the opposition, Margaret Thatcher, supported a 'Yes to Europe', while denying that this in any way implied a threat to Britain's status as a fully sovereign, independent nation-state. At that time, 'the Common Market' was portrayed by these figures as a fundamentally economic partnership that safeguarded Britain's 'national interests', without involving a shameful reduction of the nation's self-governing powers. From this perspective, a politician such as Thatcher could define herself as a 'pro-European', while fully rejecting the concept of a federal 'United States of Europe'. By the end of the 1980's, however, the supranational dimension of the European project was gathering increasing strength. With Jacques Delors at the head of the European Commission, plans were drawn up for the creation of a single European currency and a central European bank, as well as the introduction of a European social charter to protect the welfare of workers, and the development of a common European foreign policy. Delors openly advocated federalism as the right road for Europe, and in an address to the European Parliament delivered in July 1988, he predicted that in ten years, 80% of laws affecting economic and social policies would be passed at the European rather than the national level (cited in George 1994: 193).

These bold proposals for deeper European integration provoked a new outbreak of discursive clashes in Britain concerning the nation's relationship to Europe, which reached a high point at the time of the Maastricht summit in December 1991, when the 'Treaty of European Union' was officially agreed. If in the 1960's and 1970's, the debate had been about whether or not Britain should 'go into Europe', in the late 1980's and early 1990's it became a passionate conflict regarding how 'the nation' should deal with the growing tide of supranationalism in the European Community. Once again, Eurosceptics and Europhiles attempted to invoke national symbols and mobilize national sentiments in order to promote their respective causes amongst the British public.

Before analyzing the polemics that surrounded the Maastricht summit itself, which will be the main focus of this chapter, I shall firstly contextualize this event by looking at the conflicting discourses on European integration which emerged during Thatcher's final years as Prime Minister.

6.1 Thatcher's symbolic crusade against the 'suppression of nationhood' by a 'European superstate'

Although Thatcher always supported the completion of the Single European Market, she depicted the federalist project of economic and political union promoted by Jacques Delors as a highly dangerous threat to Britain's 'historic independence', and hence to the maintenance of national pride. On 20 September 1988, in the famous speech she delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges, the British Prime Minister proclaimed:

> To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality... Our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German.[1]

From Thatcher's perspective, the survival of 'nationhood' and 'our (national) pride' was therefore totally incompatible with the construction of a federal Europe – a project which was denigrated as 'folly', something which only lunatics could possibly encourage. In her view, the patriotic self-respect of each country could only be maintained by respecting all the traditional powers of the nation-state. She wholehartedly supported a 'family of European nations' in which the member states would collaborate closely at the level of inter-governmental cooperation, but this had to be achieved in a way that preserved 'the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country'. Furthermore, the 'social dimension' of Europe

[1] *The Times*, 21 September 1988.

promoted by Delors to protect the rights of workers was also condemned by the British Prime Minister as a totally illegitimate interference of the European Commission in the national economies of the member states, which threatened the accomplishments of her own government's *laissez-faire* policies: 'We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels.' This highly influential speech became a sort of symbolic milestone for British Euro-scepticism, and it even led to the creation of a 'Bruges group' of Conservative MPs who supported the principles laid out by the Prime Minister (H. Young 1998: 423).

Thatcher's hostility to European integration, however, provoked intense divisions within her own party between those who supported her negative attitude to the 'creeping federalism' of Brussels, and those who believed she was severely harming Britain's 'national interests' and making 'the nation' look ridiculous in the eyes of the world, by isolating the country from the European mainstream. These conflicts became very evident, for instance, during the campaign for the European elections of June 1989. On the one hand, Thatcher insisted that she would vigorously oppose the construction of 'a socialist superstate in Brussels which submerges our identity and snuffs out our sovereignty', and referred to the 'historic greatness' of Britain to defend her position:

> When we talk of the United Kingdom, we are not talking of some flimsy or recent creation. We are talking of a great and ancient citadel within whose walls the people of these islands have sheltered for almost four centuries. Within whose walls liberty, justice, and human progress have flourished in a manner unsurpassed anywhere else in the world.[2]

In Thatcher's discourse, therefore, Britain was depicted as a proud nation that could not possibly tolerate the further 'surrender' of its self-governing powers to 'alien' European institutions. Indeed, a running theme of her premiership was the 'revival of Britain', the return of 'British

[2] *The Times*, 13 May 1989.

greatness' after many years of shameful decline (Larsen 1997: 45-6). This ideal was reinforced by the nation's 'victory' in the Falklands War and the re-kindling of the 'special relationship' with the United States, with Ronald Reagan as Thatcher's favoured partner in the Western world's struggle against the 'evil Soviet empire'. From this standpoint of renewed national grandeur, the potential submersion of Britain in a federal Europe and the replacement of the pound by a common European currency was presented as an utterly humiliating, unacceptable reduction of the nation's standing in the world. Britain was 'no ordinary country', and hence it was a nation that still had a much greater role to play on the world stage. Thatcher's discourse therefore illustrated a continuity with other symbolic representations I have analyzed in previous chapters of 'Europe' as a demeaning notion from the British perspective.

Not all Conservatives, however, agreed with Thatcher's increasingly Europhobic stance. Edward Heath, for instance, intervened during the same campaign in a television appearance, during which he attempted to ignite national sentiments against the Prime Minister, by stating that her 'anachronistic attitudes' would humiliate Britain, by turning her into 'a second-rate power in a two-tier Community'.[3] Similarly, Michael Heseltine criticized Thatcher's 'gruding' approach to Europe, and warned that 'we cannot fight for Britain's self-interest from the touchlines of history'.[4] In a book which was published during this period, entitled *The Challenge of Europe: Can Britain Win?*, Heseltine suggested that the truly patriotic thing to do at this stage of British history was to fully commit the nation to a European future:

> I have no doubt that our country must take its place on the bigger stage... I yield to no none in my pride in Britain's past; it makes me all the more impatient to build on it... The tide of history has carried us close to Europe's shore. We should accept that destiny; the wind will never be more favourable... There is no empire to sustain us; we are no longer an industrial super-power; we can no longer pretend that Britain is in any sense an equal partner of the United States. There is nowhere for us to go except as part of a European consortium... There are those who fear that in moving closer to Europe, Britain will lose her identity. On the contrary, I believe that within Europe she will find a much greater one.(1989: xiv, 14)

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[3] *The Times*, 15 May 1989.
[4] *The Times*, 15 May 1989

Hence, from the perspective of Conservatives such as Heath and Heseltine, the Prime Minister was severely harming the nation through a misguided, illusory defense of national sovereignty, because for them it was only by joining forces with the other member states of the European Community that Britain could gain any real influence in the world. In their view, Europe would hardly 'suppress' nationhood, as Thatcher feared. On the contrary, Europe was the only way to maintain British prestige and national pride at this stage of its history.

The Conservatives performed very poorly in these European elections, losing ten seats to the Labour Party, and this defeat was interpreted as a rejection of Thatcher's antagonistic, 'Little Englander' rhetoric against Brussels.[5] Polls at the time suggested that 55% of the British people considered membership of the European Community 'a good thing', and so Thatcher's antagonism towards Europe was increasingly seen by leading Conservatives as an electoral liability. At this point, Labour had become much more enthusiastic about Europe, since the social dimension promoted by Delors was seen as an effective strategy to combat Thatcher's free-market policies. The European Community was thus no longer portrayed as a 'capitalist club' by Labour's leaders, because it now coincided to a much greater extent with the aims defended in the party's own brand of patriotic discourse in defense of 'the British people'. Hence, after previously advocating complete withdrawal from the EC in the general election of 1983, Labour now presented itself as the more 'pro-European' of the two main British parties, offering a clear alternative to Thatcher's increasing hostility to the EC (Pilkington 1995: 213-5).

During the course of the following year, in July 1990, another significant episode took place which provoked an emotionally charged debate on Europe in the British public sphere. In an interview with *The Spectator* Thatcher's Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, defined the project of a European single currency 'as a German racket to take over the

[5] *The Times*, 19 June 1989.

whole of Europe', in which the French were behaving 'like poodles'. Referring to the growing ambitions of the European Commission, he declared:

> When I look at the institutions to which it is proposed that sovereignty is to be handed over, I'm aghast. Seventeen unelected reject politicians with no accountability to anybody... I'm not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might as well give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly.[6]

The public outcry that such statements provoked in the media ultimately led to Ridley's resignation from Thatcher's government. Nevertheless, his views were apparently not very far from those of the Prime Minister herself. In fact, in the midst of this scandal, *The Independent on Sunday* published the minutes of a confidential meeting during which Thatcher and a panel of advisers had discussed the potential dangers of German nationalism in the wake of its reunification.[7] During the course of this reunion, German 'national character' was described as a mixture of 'angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality'. It was suggested that Germans had 'a tendency to over-estimate their own strengths and capabilities', and that although their ambitions for physical conquest seemed to have dwindled, they might again be 'brainwashed into barbarism'. Indeed, it was claimed that 'the way in which the Germans currently used their elbows and threw their weight about in the European Community suggested that a lot had still not changed'. A cartoon on the front page of *The Spectator* summed up Ridley's claims by portraying him as a daring vandalist who had painted a black moustache on a poster of Helmut Kohl, in such a way that it made him look like Adolf Hitler [reproduced on the following page].

An editorial in *The Independent on Sunday* condemned such attitudes as an illustration of 'Downing Street paranoia' which reflected 'the feelings of a generation for whom Britain's victory was the last, unquestionable triumph before a post-war history of disappointments'. This newspaper's view was that the Germans had become 'a cultured and civilised people again',

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[6] *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[7] *The Independent on Sunday*, 15 July 1990.



The Spectator, 14 July 1990

whose democratic institutions 'are, in many ways, in better order than our own'. In any case, even if German nationalism were to reemerge, it was argued that the project of European integration offered the best guarantee against this potential threat:

> Even if atavistic fears were well founded, the only conceivable strategy for living with a powerful neighbour whose intentions were uncertain would be the one which the French, Italians, and Dutch have pursued ever since the Messina conference in 1957. The whole object of the European Community was to lay down a system of law which could govern the relations of European states in those areas which had proved so inflammatory in the past.[8]

The EC, concluded this article, was 'the only game in town', but Britain was playing its hand 'like a drunken gambler with the most blithe and reckless disgregard for our European morrow.' An editorial in *The Guardian*, similarly, mocked the anxiety over Germany and Europe in the Prime Minister's circle. It suggested that 'Britain's economic fortunes are umbilically tied to Europe', and that there was only one thing the nation could do ensure its future prosperity, influence, and prestige: 'We can be a full, democratic part of a Europe that binds over the old wounds, renounces the old wars, and seeks to create something better. That is what West Germany, voluntarily and with commitment has done'.[9]

Nevertheless, Ridley's outburst was not without supporters. An article published in *The Times*, for instance, commended him for drawing attention to what the supposedly 'real truth about Europe united' – in other words, the 'federalism by stealth' that was being carried out by the European Commission, in order to create 'a United States of Europe in which the nation will have been reduced to the status of regions'. Little by little, the author of this text warned, the European Commission had been 'invading Britain, assuming powers which for centuries have been our own', and Ridley had been right to bring this issue to the centre of political debate: 'If we are to submerge our national identity in a larger European mass, we will at least now be

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[8] *The Independent on Sunday*, 15 July 1990.
[9] *The Guardian*, 13 July 1990.

doing it while we are awake and alert'.[10] An editorial in this same newspaper warned that, in fact, it was not entirely inappropriate to associate the dominance of Brussels with German power:

> Increased use of majority votes in the Community, coupled with the dominance of the Germany over that of lesser states, could lead to the edicts of Brussels merely reflecting German attitudes and goals... Pretending the EC is not about power is simply absurd. And when the strongest member, Germany, becomes stronger still, other members should naturally ponder whether this matters, and if so, in what way.[11]

The article was illustrated with cartoon which showed a panic-stricken Ridley, fearfully pointing at the march of the 'EMU army': a group of 'goose-stepping' Nazi soldiers [see next page].

The Times also published a poll in the midst of the Ridley Affair according to which 53% of British respondents stated that they feared the reunification of Germany would lead to a return of fascism.[12] Indeed, it is interesting to observe how the divisions on this issue were reflected in letters sent by various British citizens to this newspaper:

> What I cannot understand, or condone, is the narrow-mindedness of people who cannot see the fundamental reality of today – that no nation in the Community could survive economically outside it. Britain is fortunate to be a member of a club which is growing in importance and stature every day and it ill behoves a government minister to level schoolboy jives at another member or at the duly appointed officers of the club.[13]

> Do people not understand that out future lies in a strong Europe? The continued prestige that Mrs Thatcher so longs for in Britain can only be maintained in the long term by everybody committing themselves to a united continent.[14]

> Might it not be that Mr Ridley, in his recent interview, was voicing the feelings and even convictions of many thousands of people in this country, who have memories and knowledge of more than the last 40 years, and are thereby becoming increasingly uneasy by some of the recent trends in Europe?[15]

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[10] *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[11] *The Times*, 16 July 1990.
[12] *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[13] G. Kelly, *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[14] W. Kings, *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[15] J. Stobart, *The Times*, 13 July 1990.

Amid sound and fury, real truth about Europe united



Tim Congdon commends Nicholas Ridley for focusing the nation's attention on the march of federalism

Nicholas Ridley's outburst was necessary. It has alerted the British public to the scale of the hijack now intended by the "reject politicians" of Brussels. There is no doubt that Jacques Delors and Sir Leon Brittan (among other employees of the European Commission) want a unified European state in which Britain would have lost its sovereignty and independence. Indeed, in some of their recent speeches M Delors and Sir Leon have scarcely bothered to deny that their eventual goal is a United States of Europe in which the nations will have been reduced to the status of regions.

The puzzle is that this drastic redefinition of who we are and how we relate to our neighbours has not been more noticed. For some time M Delors, Sir Leon and their associates have been busy on a process of so-called "federalism by stealth". Leaders of nations make vague statements of commitment at European summits, which they discover, some months later, oblige them to accept detailed legislation in areas previously the responsibility of national parliaments. Little by little the European Commission has been invading Britain, assuming powers which for centuries have been our own. Slowly and discreetly, in committee rooms late at night, Brussels has been stealing authority from Westminster. At least Mr Ridley has brought the subject to the centre of the political debate. If we are to submerge our national identity in a larger European mass, we will at least now be doing it while we are awake and alert.

But much of Mr Ridley's interview with *The Spectator* was ludicrous. In particular, the references to Germany as the ogre of Europe and to the Bundesbank's financial prowess as the key weapon in a new German drive for European domination were exaggerated to the point of absurdity. They were grossly unfair in neglecting the contribution Germany has made to the prosperity and stability of the post-war world. They were also factually wrong, in overlooking facts about the monetary history of the 20th century.

Mr Ridley said that a joint European monetary policy was "a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe" and claimed that "the deutschmark is always going to be the strongest currency, *because of their habits*" (the magazine's emphasis).

Now this misses a vital detail, that — of all the many organisations and institutions on the European continent affected by possible monetary union — the Bundesbank has traditionally been one of the most sceptical. It is well known that, at least until nine months ago, Karl Otto Pöhl, the Bundesbank's president, was on good terms with Mrs Thatcher, because both shared grave doubts about the viability of a sidgle European currency. It is also a matter of undoubted public record that throughout the Eighties the Bundesbank discouraged the private use of the ecu in West Germany. It is odd, to say the least, that currency imperialism should be described by Mr Ridley as a German "habit".

Yet, more seriously, Mr Ridley seems to have forgotten his modern history. He talked as if he thought German monetary machismo was — dare one use the phrases — genetically determined and historically inevitable. (Editor of *The Spectator*: "But Mr Ridley, it's surely not axiomatic that the German currency will always be the strongest?" Mr Ridley: "It's because of the *Germans*.")

But German money machismo is not genetically determined and historically inevitable. In 1922 and 1923 the Weimar hyperinflation inflicted on Germany an episode of total currency disintegration. Although France and Italy have suffered hyperinflations in the 20th century, they were mild compared with Weimar. In fact, it is Britain that is unusual among the large nations of Europe in never having had a hyperinflation. Until 1945 — and arguably until the dissolution of the sterling area in the late Sixties — other European nations could quite reasonably have accused us of currency imperialism.

Moreover, Mr Ridley also failed to remember the main achievement of the Thatcher government. Like the enthusiasts for British participation in the European monetary system, *he took it for* granted that West Germany had always had a lower inflation rate than Britain and that an inflation gap in favour of Germany would continue for the foreseeable future. He did not deny that British membership of the EMS would cut inflation. In this respect he was at one with the great army of economic commentators and advisers who *campaign for* early EMS entry.

But they — and, less excusably, Mr Ridley — are suffering from collective amnesia. Has everyone forgotten what happened in the first five years of the Thatcher government? Between 1979 and 1983 Britain reduced its inflation rate far more than any other European country. In the three years, 1983, 1984 and 1985, British inflation was lower than the European average. Indeed, in 1983 there was virtually no difference between retail price inflation in West Germany and Britain. *And all this was achieved while Britain was not a member of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS.*

As Mrs Thatcher and her cabinet colleagues, including the particularly articulate Nigel Lawson, told the world, Britain had reduced inflation because it had controlled the money supply. Nor is there any secret about why British inflation has subsequently risen towards 10 per cent, while German inflation has remained at minimal levels. It is because Britain stopped controlling the money supply in 1985, whereas the Bundesbank continued to pursue deliberate money supply targets.

Mr Ridley has rightly alerted the British to a genuine threat to independence, but he has misunderstood the causes of inflation. It is not the result of national "habits", racial characteristics, mobile manners, xenophobia, nationalism, an urge to dominate the rest of Europe or anything of the sort. It is the result of excessive growth of the money supply. If the Bundesbank could teach that lesson to the leaders of the Conservative party (or rather teach it to them once again), it would do something more for the prosperity and stability of modern Europe.

The author is economic adviser to Gerrard and National Holdings.

> I support Nicholas Ridley, intemperate or not. We were asked whether we wished to join a common market for our goods, not a common country to which we would have to surrender our freedom and individuality.[16]

These rival standpoints illustrate how Ridley's outburst against Germany and the European Commission were seen by some as an embarrassing, harmful episode which would further damage Britain's reputation in Europe, while others saw it as a valid warning against the dangerous threats that the nation was being confronted with due to the rise of supranationalist institutions in Europe (behind which the ugly face of a resurgent German power was supposedly hidden).

These controversies inevitably continued, as further steps were taken during this period in the process of European integration. On 28 October 1990, at a special European Council meeting held in Rome, Britain was outvoted by eleven to one in the decision to aim for a single currency by the end of the decade. In the press conference that followed this reunion, the British Prime Minister furiously proclaimed that she would veto any attempt to impose a single currency, and would never put to Parliament a bill to abolish the pound.[17] On the following day, in a highly emotive discursive performance delivered in the House of Commons, she denounced the proposals on economic and monetary union agreed by her eleven EC partners as 'the back door to a federal Europe', and depicted Jacques Delors as a dangerous threat to British independence that had to be stopped at all costs for the good of the nation:

> The President of the European Commission, Mr Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community. He wanted the Commission to be the Executive and the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No. No. No.[18]

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[16] M. Coffman, *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
[17] *The Times*, 29 October 1990.
[18] *The Times*, 31 October 1990.

The capacity of Thatcher's discourse to ignite patriotic sentiments in defense of the British pound was perfectly encapsulated in the following letter, sent to *The Times* on the following day by Maurice Wood, an Anglican Bishop:

> The United Kingdom and the Commonwealth find their deep and lasting cohesion vividly affirmed by the Sovereign's head on every stamp, every coin, and every note. Our family of nations, each owing allegiance to her Majesty the Queen in a variety of ways, would become immeasurably fragmented by an impersonal and dull set of common European coins and notes. The Prime Minister has a shrewd sense of broad national identity, when she calmly resists a single European currency. We are not only a major European country, but we are a world power in and through the Commonwealth and the Sovereign's head symbolises this strong and cohesive and continuing unity. The Prime Minister is courageous and correct in this matter. She deserves our open support.[19]

One can observe in such discourse a continuing emotional resistance to European integration as something which could severely diminish national greatness, based on the popular attachment to a self-flattering we-image of Britain as 'a world power in and through the Commonwealth'. In fact, it was precisely at this point that the top-selling newspaper *The Sun*[20] launched its own fierce symbolic attack against Jacques Delors, in an attempt to whip up nationalist rage against the Frenchman who was supposedly trying to run British people's lives from Brussels [reproduced on the following page]. Under the headline, 'UP YOURS DELORS', the newspaper stated:

> At midday tomorrow Sun readers are urged to tell the French fool where to stuff his ECU... We want you to tell Froggie Common Market chief Jacques Delors exactly what you think of him and his countrymen. At the stroke of noon tomorrow, we invite all true blue Brits to face France and yell 'Up yours, Delors'. The ear-bashing from our millions of readers will wake the EC President up to the fact that he will NEVER run our country. His bid to replace the pound with the faceless ECU is the last straw after centuries of Froggy Brit-baiting... Remember, folks, it won't be long before the garlic-breathed bastilles will be here in droves once the Channel Tunnel is open. So grab your megaphones, turn south, and let'em hear the British lion ROAR. And the best of British to you all![21]

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[19] *The Times*, 1 November 1990.

[20] In the early 1990's, *The Sun* was by far the most popular newspaper in Britain, enjoying an average daily circulation of 3,698,000 copies. In second place was *The Daily Mirror* (2,931,000), after which came *The Daily Telegraph* (1,068,000), *The Guardian* (422.000), *The Times* (399,000), and *The Independent* (388,000). Figures cited in *Los Medios en la Construcción de la Unidad Europea*, Madrid, FUNDESCO (1993).

[21] *The Sun*, 1 November 1990.

THE Sun

Thursday, November 1, 1990 25p Audited daily sale for September 3,979,230 Thought: Joques-ass)

UP YOURS DELORS



At midday tomorrow Sun readers are urged to tell the French fool where to stuff his ECU



THE Sun today calls on its patriotic family of readers to tell the feelthy French to FROG OFF!

They **INSULT** us, **BURN** our lambs, **FLOOD** our country with dodgy food and **PLOT** to abolish the dear old pound.

Now it's your turn to kick **THEM** in the Gauls.

We want you to tell Froggie Common Market arsel Jacques Delors exactly what you think of him and his countrymen.

At the stroke of noon tomorrow, we invite all true blue Brits to face France and yell "Up Yours, Delors."

The ear-bashing from our millions of readers will wake the EC President up to the fact that he will NEVER run our country.

His bid to replace the £ with the faceless ECU is the last straw after centuries of Froggy Brit-baiting. They:

BURNED alive British lambs earlier this year because they couldn't match our quality.

JEERED Mrs Thatcher when she visited Paris to boost celebrations for the bicentenary of the French Revolution last year.

FOUL

BANNED British beef after falsely claiming it had mad cow disease.

BLEATED when we found their foul soft cheese was riddled with listeria bugs.

GAVE IN to the Nazis during the Second World War when we stood firm.

TRIED to conquer Europe until we put down Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815.

Remember, Jules, it won't be long before the panic-stricken Nazillos will be here in droves once the Channel Tunnel is open.

So grab your megaphones, turn south and let 'em hear the British lion **ROAR**.

And the best of British to you all!

Where to boot at the Gauls — Pages 2 and 3

£292,000 LOTTO — Page 9 • £31,000 BINGO — Page 35

The Sun, 1 November 1990

In the crude, xenophobic discourse employed by this tabloid newspaper, the pound was depicted as a sacred symbol of British nationhood was being threatened by a despicable foreigner. This attack, furthermore, was extended to the entire French nation, which was negatively stereotyped as slimy, disgusting animal (the 'frogs'), in contrast to the positive we-image of proud strength and nobility represented by the symbol of the 'British lion'.

In the midst of this anti-Delors campaign, however, Thatcher's Europhobic version of British patriotism received a major setback, when her deputy Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, decided to resign on 2 November, in protest at her hostility towards the European Community. In his letter of resignation, Howe stated that the Prime Minister's attitude would make it very difficult for Britain to hold and retain a position of influence in Europe.[22] The objective of his resignation, therefore, was to discredit her supposedly patriotic campaign in defence of 'the nation'. A few days later, Howe delivered a scathing speech in Parliament to further explain his decision, in which he harshly attacked the Prime Minister's stance on Europe once again. As in other episodes I have analyzed in previous chapters, Howe invoked the revered symbol of Winston Churchill in order to legitimate his Europeanist position from a patriotic standpoint:

> We commit a serious error if we think always in terms of surrendering sovereignty and seek to stand pat for all time on a given deal by proclaiming, as the Prime Minister did two weeks ago, that we have surrendered enough. The European enterprise is not and should not be seen like that, as some kind of zero sum gain. Sir Winton Churchill put it much more positively 40 years ago when he said: 'Is is not possible and not less agreeable to regard this sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty as the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions?' I find Winston Churchill's perception a good deal more convincing and encouraging for the interests of the nation than the nightmare image sometimes conjured up by the Prime Minister, who sometimes seems to look out on a Continent that is positively teeming with ill intentioned people scheming, in her words, to extinguish democracy, to dissolve our national identity, to lead us through the back door to a federal Europe.[23]

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[22] *The Times*, 2 November 1990.
[23] *The Times*, 14 November 1990.

From Howe's perspective, the Prime Minister's antagonistic attitudes were hardly doing a good service to the British people. On the contrary, as in earlier periods, there was a real danger that Britain might suffer serious consequences by 'missing the bus' of European integration once again:

> The tragedy is... that the Prime Minister's perceived attitude towards Europe is running increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation. It risks minimising our influence and maximising our chances of being once again shut out. We have paid heavily in the past for late starts and squandered opportunities in Europe. We dare not let that happen again. If we detach ourselves completely as party or as a nation from the middle ground of Europe, the effects will be incalculable and very hard to ever correct.[24]

Implicitly, Howe was suggesting that Thatcher was no longer fit to serve the interests of the British people, and that her supposedly patriotic defense of British freedom against the dominance of Brussels was in reality doing serious harm to the nation. This episode was followed on the very next day by Michael Heseltine's announcement that he would challenge Thatcher for the Tory leadership. Nevertheless, although Thatcher was ultimately ousted from office as a result of this contest, she was replaced not by Heseltine, but by her own preferred successor, John Major.

6.2 The run-up to Maastricht: an impassioned discursive contest over the defense of Britain's 'national interest'

Early in his premiership, Major signalled an apparent break with his predecessor's stance on Europe, by delivering a speech in an official visit to Bonn, during which he proclaimed:

> My aims for Britain in the Community can be simply stated. I want us to be where we belong. At the very heart of Europe. Working with our partners in building the future. That is a challenge we can take up with enthusiasm. We want to arrive at solutions which enable us to move forward more united, not less.[25]

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[24] *The Times*, 14 November 1990.
[25] *The Times*, 12 March 1991.

This change of tone appeared to symbolize the beginning of a new era in Britain's relations with Europe. Major declared that he spoke for a generation who grew up in the aftermath of the Second World War, for whom Europe was a cause of political inspiration:

> We were barely adult when, in 1963, Britain's Conservative government made our first application to join the Community... The Conservatives recognised that it was in Europe that Britain's destiny lay; in Europe that we could best secure the welfare and prosperity of our people.

Major therefore seemed to be promoting a new national we-image of Britain as a cooperative, enthusiastic partner in the project of European integration. In this way, national pride could be derived by portraying the British as 'good Europeans', and shaking off the stigma of narrow-minded nationalism for which Thatcher had been severely criticised during her final years in power. Nevertheless, as the Maastricht summit approached, it became evident that there were considerable limits to the new Prime Minister's 'Europeanism'.

During the parliamentary debates that took place on the 20th and 21st of November on the treaty negotiations, Major outlined his government's position as follows. He wished Britain neither to abandon the Community nor to stay in grudgingly, but to play 'a leading role' in Europe.[26] However, this did not mean that every idea that was marketed with a European label should be submissively accepted, but rather that Britain should try to build 'the sort of Europe we believe in'. Hence, the Prime Minister proclaimed that he would not tolerate the imposition of a single European currency, which was a decision with tremendous implications that could only be taken in the future with the consent of the British Parliament. Neither would he accept the introduction of a social charter on the regulation of working conditions, which was viewed as a programme that would harm the competitiveness of British industry in world markets, and drive away inward investment from Japanese and American companies. Furthermore, Major was

[26] *The Times*, 21 November 1991.

not prepared to accept 'the idea of a European Federation', which would lead to the European Community having 'an unacceptable dominance over our national life'. Hence, he assured that he would not sign a treaty that described the Community as having 'a federal vocation' – the words which were included in the initial working draft of the treaty. From Major's perspective, therefore, Britain's 'national interest' at Maastricht was defined primarily in terms of rejecting the federalist conception of Europe, as well as maintaining the country's right to opt out of both the project of monetary union and the social charter.

The Labour leader Neil Kinnock, however, portrayed Major's position as a 'dreary, demeaning, and ultimately self-defeating posture'.[27] In an emotionally charged discursive effort to mobilize national sentiments against the Conservative government, he suggested that its policies would put the country 'in the second division of the European Community'. If Britain stayed out of the single currency, the consequences could be potentially disastrous: 'What would inward investors, who want and need access to to the markets of the whole community, really think about locating in this semi-detached country?' Kinnock, furthermore, considered it morally shameful that only Britain, as a result of the Conservative government's attitudes, would refuse to guarantee its people 'the same minimum rights as their fellow Europeans' by rejecting the social chapter of the treaty. The Labour leader, therefore, tried to discredit Major's supposedly patriotic defense of Britain's 'national interest', by depicting the proposed opt-outs from the single currency and the social chapter as a recipe for national disaster that would severely harm Britain's future prosperity, its political influence, and its moral reputation in Europe. 'Opting out', Kinnock declared, 'would mean losing out.' Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that one thing the Labour leader did not challenge was the Government's rejection of the so-called 'f-word' of federalism, since on this point there appeared to be a consensus between the two main British parties.

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[27] *The Times*, 21 November 1991.

It was Margaret Thatcher, however, who made the greatest headlines in the press by delivering an impassioned speech in which she warned his successor that the Maastricht Treaty involved an 'enormous' and, in her view, 'unacceptable transfer of responsibility' of the House of Commons to EC institutions.[28] Using a vivid, fear-provoking image, she defined this process as 'the conveyor belt to federalism' and suggested that this dangerous mechanism would not be stopped simply by removing the word 'federal' from the treaty. The project of the single currency implied that national governments would surrender their capacity to determine fundamental economic policies to 'unaccountable' European institutions. Hence, the ex-Prime Minister demanded a referendum to 'let the people speak' on an issue that went 'to the heart of our democracy and our Parliament.' She suggested to Major that in the same way she used to employ her handbag to fend off threats to Britain in European summits, Major should employ a cricket bat in defence of the nation.

On the second day of the Maastricht debates, the deep Conservative divisions on European matters were illustrated once again when Edward Heath intervened to depict his own version of the British 'national interest'. As one would expect, the ex-Premier who had taken the country 'into Europe' identified the maintenance of British influence and national pride with the need to wholeheartedly take part in the project of economic and monetary union. Being excluded from this project, warned Heath, could lead to a disgraceful reduction of British prosperity and status:

> Can you imagine a situation where our partners have a single currency and our businessmen are left out? It is unthinkable. How would it be possible to make the City of London the financial capital of the Community if we were outside the single currency? It is not feasible.[29]

Divisions were also visible within the Labour Party, however, as an intervention from the veteran opponent of European integration, Peter Shore, demonstrated:

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[28] *The Times*, 21 November 1991.
[29] *The Times*, 22 November 1990.

> We are promised a further assault upon what is left of our national independence. Let there be no shame at all about our commitment to not just our independence but also the democracy that we have, with all its imperfections, which is a damn sight better in this House of Commons than it is anywhere else in Europe.[30]

These words portrayed the British democratic tradition as a great source of national pride, since it was infinitely superior ('a damn sight better') than in any other European country. This was, therefore, something which had to be preserved at all costs against the rising tide of European federalism.

The day after the parliamentary debates ended, Margaret Thatcher continued her patriotic campaign against the Maastricht Treaty in a television interview that was also widely reported in the press, in which she insisted that it would be 'arrogant' and 'wrong' not to allow the 'voice of the people' to be heard by holding a referendum on the issue of the single currency [reproduced on the following page].[31] In her view, just because the other eleven member states wanted to carry out this project, the British people should not allow themselves to be 'dragged along'. When the television interviewer suggested that this could potentially lead to the British pound becoming 'a weak little currency on the edge', Thatcher jumped up and proclaimed: 'No. We most certainly will not. Have a little bit more faith in your own fellow countrymen!' Hence, the ex-Prime Minister continued to defend Britain's capacity to maintain its 'greatness' without having to join a common European currency. Implicitly, she was accusing those who argued that Britain had 'no other alternative' of shameful defeatism, of 'losing faith' in their countrymen's ability to maintain British prosperity and prestige independently, without being forced to join the European monetary union. Citing the revered Churchill symbol for her own purposes, she proclaimed:

> Whatever happened to the British lion of whom Winston said it was his privilege to give the roar? And Winston said in 1953: 'We will be with Europe but not of it, and when they ask us why we take that view, we will say we dwell in our own land.'

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[30] *The Times*, 22 November 1990.
[31] *The Observer*, 24 November 1991.

'It was the chimes of Big Ben that rang out across Europe during the war — I do not want our powers taken away'

THE following is an edited transcript of Mrs Thatcher's interview on Friday's *News at Ten*. She was first asked by Michael Brunson, ITN's political editor, whether Britain shouldn't stay on board Europe's economic and mopetary train:

MT: I think you're well advised to use that word, because if you're getting on board a train, you're going to a particular destination. If you don't like that destination, it's best not to get on board. The whole structure of the treaty, in my view, is shaped and framed as a kind of conveyor belt. If you get on, you have to sign up to the destination of a single currency.

Q: Isn't this all rather old-fashioned stuff — this sentimental attachment to having the Queen's head on £5 notes?

MT: No. That's what they're trying to convince you. That is totally false and it is not only the Queen's head, important as that is. Parliament is the monarch, the Lords and the Commons, and when you take away the responsibilities of that Parliament for the financial affairs of the nation, you take away the right to issue your own currency, not only now, but for always for future generations. If they (Germans, French, Dutch, etc) want to go ahead, yes, of course they can do it, it is not for us to stop them.

Q: We shall be a weak little currency on the edge of it?

MT: No. We most certainly will not. Have a little bit more faith in your own fellow countrymen. It was we who rolled back the frontiers of socialism, and we were the first country to do it.

Q: And what do you make in this circumstance?

MT: Now one moment — let me turn the tables — because you have not, in fact, put the other question. What is the answer of the Government which says we believe in choice, we will give the people choice? How are they to give the people choice about whether or not their powers shall be taken away by this Parliament?

Q: Well, the answer from the Government's point of view was made very clear, was it not, by the PM John Major — first of all he said that Parliament is sovereign. He disagrees with you that this is such a major issue and, indeed, he has absolutely, categorically, as far as he is concerned, ruled out a referendum. He says one will not be offered after Maastricht . . .

MT: I am aware of that, and he still has to answer the question: how then will the people make their views known on whether or not they want their powers taken away? And it is a very serious question, and it is a question to which that is no answer.

Q: But I think John Major will say at the election . . .

MT: If at the election there is no choice between the three parties on this great constitutional issue, how is a person to vote who says, 'I do not want our powers taken away'? Our Parliament is central to the life of our nation. It was the chimes of Big Ben that rang out across Europe during the war. I do not want our powers taken away. How is he to make that view known? Is he to abstain? No. It is for the Government to answer. You cannot, Mr Brunson, but they haven't answered it.

A government that believes in choice is depriving the people of choice on a big constitutional issue and the Government that proposes to do — and I don't know yet whether it does — so much injury to the constitution by taking such a big chunk of it away is not in a position to plead the constitution. Parliamentary supremacy means a supremacy of the voice of the people, it is the voice of the people — if you deny that to be heard I think it is arrogant and I think it is wrong.

Q: You have spoken with obvious passion. 'Arrogant and wrong', those are strong words to use.

MT: That is my view. We are talking about the issues, that is my view.

Q: But you are also making it absolutely plain that as far as you can see, monetary union has gone quite far enough and shouldn't go further. I don't see how you can continue to give your support to John Major.

MT: I said what I have said now in the House of Commons. He knows the views of many of us, they are held passionately. I have been a long time in Parliament. Mr Heath held the alternative view equally passionately, except there's one difference. I am prepared to submit that viewpoint to the people and advise a referendum. I am prepared, really, to be guided by the people, because our only authority comes from the people. They are not.

Q: But you have spoken with such passion about the way this country may be about to take a misguided step and I wonder, and I put it to you, don't you sometimes still feel: 'My goodness me, if I were still PM things would be very different'?

MT: What is the point of thinking that? It may well be correct because I took the decisions in a very clear way and very, very firmly and there was always a reason why, and we went out and said: this is what we are going to do, this is why we are going to do it. But these things did happen a year ago; I totally accept them.

I still have a role, and I hope that the things I have said will influence the PM at Maastricht. These changes, they are bringing them in too fast, people are against them, and they are against, I think, their fundamental instinct, and we should not allow ourselves to be dragged along.

Someone said, or a number of people have said, 'Oh you must, you must, the others will do it.' When did Britain follow the other 11? Just because they wanted to do it? That's a recipe for 'whatever you say, we will do it'.

Whatever happened to the British lion of whom Winston said it was his privilege to give the roar? And Winston said in 1953, 'We will be with Europe but not of it', and when they ask us why we take that view, we will say we dwell in our own land.'

Call to battle: Mrs Thatcher appeared distraught and anguished during the interview, as if she could barely keep in check her anger towards Mr Major. A close friend said: "I was genuinely shocked. I thought I knew her very well, but now I wonder if I know her at all."

The Observer, 24 November 1991

From Thatcher's perspective, therefore, Britain could still be a great power on its own, it could still defend its parliamentary powers and maintain its distinctive national pride without having to join the pooling of European sovereignty represented by the project of the single currency. This patriotic hostility against the Maastricht Treaty was also similarly voiced on television during this period by another leading Eurosceptic, Norman Tebbit, who proclaimed that the British people would never tolerate being governed by 'foreign language speakers'.[32]

In the discursive conflicts that erupted in the British public sphere during the period that preceded the Maastricht summit, one can therefore observe a passionate symbolic contest over the 'national interest', and how it could best be served in this new critical juncture of European integration. On the one hand, John Major stressed the need to protect Britain from three fundamental threats emanating from the proposed treaty: the 'federal vocation' which could lead to an unacceptable dominance of European institutions over the nation's life, the imposition of a single currency, and the introduction of a social charter which would harm the country's economic interests by, as he put it, 'clogging up the arteries of industry'.[33] On the other, Neil Kinnock depicted this position as a way of leaving Britain isolated and shamefully excluded from a project of monetary union from which the nation could simply not afford to be left out, and from a social chapter that would protect the fundamental rights of British workers. In the meantime, Thatcher continued her anti-Brussels crusade by depicting the Maastricht Treaty as a dangerous threat to British freedoms and an unacceptable reduction of the nation's grand stature, while Heath pursued his attempt to identify the maintenance of British prosperity and national pride with full-hearted participation in the project of European unity.

These rival representations of the British 'national interest' portrayed in the discourse of politicians were largely mirrored in the positions adopted by different newspapers. *The Times*

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[32] *The Independent*, 10 December 1991.
[33] *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 December 1991.

and the *Telegraph*, for instance, commended the Major government's 'sensible' approach of waiting prudently, rather than rushing ahead to embrace the dangerous, idealistic projects promoted by European federalists:

> The other 11 states remain determined to humour Jacques Delors and the federalists... Need Mr Major worry muchy about this? He is rightly proud of his refusal to commit a future parliament to something as fundamental as monetary union... Reserving Britain's position on economic union is not a wilful refusal to take part in European co-operation. It is a gesture of sanity and caution. If other European states are more cynical, or more nervous, or simply more careless of the future, so be it. If Britain is to stand alone, it is right to do so.[34]

> Britain's stance has been important and not insular. If the mechanics of economic and political union are moving too fast, they are moving too fast for the good of the whole, they are too fast for all Europe, not just Britain... Too much power stripped from too many electorates and granted to too many international bodies will induce its own reaction: a nationalist upsurge which no amount of central policing will suppress. EMU and political union will collapse in bitterness and fascism... If the other partners to these treaties overreach themselves, Britain should be outspoken in crying stop.[35]

> Let us be frank: from the British standpoint, whatever comes out of this meeting will be damage limitation. We do not want closer political or monetary integration at present; we have enough to be going on with. This is by no means a negative or dishonorable stance; in taking it, we are not merely engaged in protecting our independence, but limiting the injury that could be suffered by others if the Europe of the philosophers runs so far ahead of itself down the federalist road that it falls over its own peoples... Plainly, if a reasonable agreement can be achieved that enables us to remain in the long negotiating game that lies ahead, to check the extremists and put the EC on a sane and realistic path for the future, then that will be the best outcome both for the Government and for this country.[36]

The discourse of these two newspapers therefore coincided in presenting a flattering self-portrayal of Britain as the only sane, cautious member state of the EC – the only country in which the implications of a European monetary union had truly been thought out, and which had the courage to resist the rising tide of impassioned European federalism. Britain was thus depicted as the voice of sensible rationality, while 'the eleven others' were supposedly being carried away by emotive European idealism. This position, furthermore, was morally legitimated by the claim that it was not just a question of egoistically pursuing Britain's self-interests, but of

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[34] *The Times*, 3 December 1991.
[35] *The Times*, 9 December 1991.
[36] *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 December 1991.

generously protecting all Europeans from the 'nationalist upsurge' that could be provoked by an excessive transfer of power to supranational institutions.

In contrast to this standpoint, however, the editorial discourse of newspapers such as The Independent and The Guardian adopted a much more favourable view of European integration, and regretted Britain's continued negativism towards this process:

> There is something uplifting, even inspiring, about this last phase in the efforts of the 12 member states of the EC to forge a new treaty on political, economic and monetary union... Much of the self-congratulation over the vigorousness of the debate in this country is misplaced. It has been more muted on the Continent largely because closer integration, in almost any form, is seen as an unalloyed gain. Only in Britain is the further whittling away of purely national decision-making viewed with such suspicion. Yet who can regret, for example, that tough, centrally agreed standards for the protection of the environment have been imposed on these islands? When Mr Major emerges from the fray, it is to the positive aspects of European integration, as well as to the fear of the consequences of being left on the sidelines, that he must appeal. The logic of history is on his side.[37]

> The Government's positioning is poor. It is not at the heart of anything, let alone Europe, because it has no stable allies among the Twelve... We can't in truth, keep dragging along like this.[38]

From this perspective, European integration was identified with 'the logic of history', and British resistance to this process was depicted as an embarrassing, misguided, backward-looking attitude. A number of cartoons published in these two newspapers graphically illustrated this same critical standpoint. One of them depicted Margaret Thatcher as a Union Jack with a pearl necklace, who nostalgically sang 'RULE BRITANNIA, BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES...' Another showed Thatcher and her Euro-phobic Tory sidekick, Norman Tebbit, as the famous protagonists of Miguel de Cervantes's classic novel Don Quixote, both of whom were getting ready to tilt at a windmill which had the word 'MAASTRICHT' written on it. A third cartoon depicted an extremely lean and hungry British Lion, who had been given a meatless bone

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[37] *The Independent*, 9 December 1991.
[38] *The Guardian*, 21 November 1991.

labelled 'OPT-OUT' to calm his voracious appetite, but who clearly felt tempted by the pleasant odour emanating from the boiling cauldron of 'MAASTRICHT'. Finally, a fourth cartoon showed John Major and his Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, on a minuscule boat which had been named 'HMS OPT-OUT', and was decorated with a reproduction of London's Big Ben clock. The British leaders were semi-attached by a rope to a luxurious ocean liner called 'EMU MAASTRICHT', at the helm of which was Captain Jacques Delors, and where Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand relaxed placidly on the upper deck, looking down at the two Englishmen with a paternalistic smile. John Major, however, stubbornly tried to tempt the 'Europeans' into his little British boat, assuring them that there was still 'lots of room' left for others to join their opt-out from the monetary union, while Foreign Minister Hurd attempted to do the same by diplomatically offering them the classic English cup of tea.

All of these ingenious cartoons, therefore, adopted the same symbolic strategy of ridiculing the government, in order to pour scorn on its supposedly patriotic approach to the upcoming European summit. This same weapon of sharp critical humour was also brilliantly employed in an advertisement with which The Guardian announced the publication of a special section that would analyze all the details of the Maastricht reunion, a few days before this 'historic summit' took place. It displayed a picture of John Major next to Francois Mitterrand, with a caption in which the British Prime Minister's dithery approach to the European Union was illustrated with the following statement: 'Yes Mr Mitterrand we absolutely, categorically, possibly, maybe, could be going into Europe' [reproduced on the following page].

A critical, 'pro-European' representation of the British 'national interest' was also exemplified by an impassioned article written by the Labour MP Giles Radice, published by The Independent.[39] This politician argued that for a long time, the nation's leaders had been 'seduced by an anachronistic idea of Britain' that had led them to remain aloof from the process of European integration. In the current situation, although John Major had adopted a style that was

[39] *The Independent*, 18 November 1991.



The Independent, November 22 1991



The Independent, November 18 1991



The Independent, December 2 1991

The Guardian, 3 December 1991

In the Guardian next week, special reports on the events leading up to the Maastricht summit. Plus Friday's Guardian Europe offers opinions on the subject from all of Europe's most prominent newspapers.

The **Guardian**



"*Yes* Mr Mitterrand we absolutely, categorically, possibly, maybe, could be going into Europe."

The Observer, 1 December 1991

'a welcome change from Mrs Thatcher's strident English nationalism', in his attitude to Maastricht he was also trying to portray himself as 'a doughty defender of a Britain besieged by marauding continentals'. However, according to Radice, the time had come to stop devoting British energies to preventing the integration process from going ahead, and to make a positive contribution to Europe's future. It was only by pooling sovereignty with the other member states of the EC that Britain could retain a respectable position of national strength: 'In today's world, the most effective way a medium-sized nation can exert influence is by joining with others. That is the case for European integration John Major must make this week.'

Hence, one can see how the arrival of the Maastricht summit reignited once again the symbolico-emotional battle of rival patriotisms in the British political arena, between those who identified the nation's interests and the maintenance of its pride with a wholehearted commitment to the project of European integration, and those who believed that the country needed to protect itself from the dangerous threats that this process represented. In the following two sections, I shall illustrate how this discursive conflict unfolded during the actual summit itself, by analyzing the way in which the agreements reached were alternatively presented as a great victory or a humiliating defeat for the people of Britain.

6. 3 'Game, set, and match for Britain': Maastricht as a national victory

On the eve of the Maastricht summit, Jacques Delors delivered a provocative speech at a rally of European federalists. Surrounded by banners that proclaimed 'History will not stop for Europe', and an enthusiastic crowd which shouted 'Federal Union Now!', Delors became the high priest of a political ritual in which the ideal of 'European Union' was the worshipped totem.[40] The group included a number of young British federalists, who identified themselves in their T-shirts as a vanguard of enlightened individuals who were 'a generation ahead' of those who continued

[40] *The Independent*, 9 December 1991.

to stubbornly resist the development of European integration. In front of this congregation, the President of the European Commission confidently declared: 'Federalism is the guiding principle. It's a word you should speak out loud... it is not a pornographic expression'. Furthermore, in a direct allusion to the British government's negative attitudes, he declared that the EC had been paying too much attention to the one country that kept saying 'no, no, no', and defended the social chapter of the treaty by stating that Europe should be 'a Europe for workers and not only a Europe of business'. *The Times* described this address as 'a determined assault against Britain's position on European political union', while *The Sun* stated that Delors had 'blasted Britain as "shame faced" in the battle over a European superstate.' The impression given by these newspapers was that the Maastricht summit was a tough battlefield in which the Prime Minister had to fight coureageously in order to protect Britain from the federalist threat represented by Delors. Hence, from this perspective, the ultimate results of the negotiations were presented at the end of the summit as a great triumph for the nation for three fundamental reasons: the word 'federal' was deleted from the final version of the treaty and replaced by the more ambiguous, less controversial concept of an 'ever closer union'; Britain retained the right to opt out of the European single currency, for which the target date of 1 January 1999 had been set; and Britain also excluded itself from the social charter, which was signed in a separate protocol by the other eleven member states.

On the day the agreements were reached, the British Prime Minister therefore depicted his accomplishments in a language that combined images of victory from sports and warfare:

> It's game, set, and match for Britain. We surrendered nothing. We lost nothing. I am delighted. It is a good day for Britain and a good day for Europe.[41]

Major's discourse was thus a perfect example of what I have called the politics of national sentiment – i.e. the attempt to symbolically legitimate a particular decision or policy by

[41] *The Times*, 11 November 1991.

mobilizing we-feelings of national pride or 'group charisma' in order to build up popular support for it. Britain had reasons to celebrate, Major suggested, because it had neither 'surrendered' nor 'lost' anything. At the same time, in order to deflect any possible accusations of narrow-minded 'nationalism', a discursive attempt was also made to morally legitimate this position by claiming that all the member states had benefited from British wisdom: it was not only 'a good day for Britain', but also 'a good day for Europe'. The triumphant imagery of a sporting victory was further elaborated by Major's minister for EC affairs, Tristan Garel-Jones, who used the language of cricket to describe the Prime Minister's triumph: 'It is important to look at the number of singles he hit as well as the boundaries. By the end he was scoring pretty freely.'[42]

Furthermore, in the speech he delivered in Parliament on the day after the Maastricht summit ended, Major received loud cheers from his party when he reiterated that the new treaty was one 'which safeguards and advances our national interests'.[43] The Prime Minister declared that he had curbed the 'grandiose' designs for a federal European Union, secured the right of a future UK to decide whether or not to join the single European currency, and blocked the 'creeping extension of Community competence' into the sphere of industrial relations.[44] In this way, he predicted that Britain could become 'a paradise' for Japanese investment, since it would not be saddled with the EC's employment regulations.[45]

This same rhetoric of victory was of course also employed in the newspapers which were sympathetic to the Conservative government's perspective on the Maastricht summit. The main headline of *The Times*, for instance, proclaimed: 'Major wins all he asks for at Maastricht' [reproduced on the following page], and its editorial discourse stated:

> For the Treaty of Rome now read the Fudge of Maastricht. Last night, Britain stuck to its principles and was isolated... John Major did not seek confrontation in Maastricht... But when others seek to run before they can walk, only a fool runs with them... Britain will be

[42] *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1991.
[43] *The Guardian*, 12 December 1991.
[44] *The Independent*, 12 December 1991.
[45] *The Independent*, 12 December 1991.

THE TIMES

No 64,200 WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 11 1991

'Game, set and match for Britain'

Major wins all he asked for at Maastricht

FROM ROBIN OAKLEY AND GEORGE BROCK IN MAASTRICHT

EUROPEAN leaders agreed historic treaties on political and economic union early today after John Major won the removal of a clause giving the EC a new power in social affairs, labour law and social security.

"It's game, set and match for Britain", Mr Major declared after announcing his main objectives at the Maastricht summit. "We succeeded in that. We lost nothing. I am delighted. It is a great day for Britain and a good day for Europe."

WHAT THEY SAID AT THE TALKS

Why don't you just opt out?
President Mitterrand

It's arm wrestling, we shall see how it ends
Ria Mastrobuoni
Italian spokesman

We don't want a Europe of shopkeepers, a Europe just of travelling salesmen
Elizabeth Guigou
French European minister

Mr Major's victory was achieved after a day of negotiations in which Britain was isolated by the other 11 countries. He insisted that it would veto any political treaty without a social chapter.

The conflict over the issue had left the summit teetering on the brink of collapse throughout yesterday, and one diplomat described the debate as like a street fight. France and Germany had been infuriated by what they saw as Britain's intransigence, while Mr Major found himself beset in between the other governments' determination to maintain the social chapter and the potential dangers of having to sell a compromise to his party. He also feared many Labour Re-

Odd man in: John Major arriving for a long day of negotiation which ended with the "European Eleven" ag

The Times, December 11 1991

> accused of sabotaging Maastricht. It has not done so. It has forced Maastricht to be sensible. Britain has helped the EC to be realistic about its immediate future.[46]

Once again, Britain was depicted as the 'sensible', 'realistic' partner that had put the brakes on the dangerous path of supranational integration favoured by the other member states, who were said to be acting like 'fools'. Hence, it was suggested that there was no reason to feel shame about Britain's isolation on the projects of the single currency and the social chapter. On the contrary, the British had every reason to feel proud about their accomplishments in Maastricht.

The *Daily Telegraph*, similarly, described Major's performance as 'a notable diplomatic success' which had saved the nation from great 'perils and disadvantages'. Britain had avoided 'immediate bondage in an unhealthy centralisation of monetary, social, defence, and foreign policy', as well as 'being dragged willy-nilly towards a single currency'. Furthermore, by opting-out of the social chapter, Major had achieved a 'semi-detached position' which far from harming the nation, 'could make Britain seem notably attractive to foreign investors seeking moderate labour costs and settled labour relations'.[47] An article by a political commentator of this newspaper similarly suggested that although Maastricht had produced 'a two speed Europe', it was one in which 'Britain is not lagging behind, but alone in the fast lane'.[48]

Not surprisingly, the language of patriotic triumphalism was even more marked in the discourse employed by *The Sun*, which in its reports on Maastricht highlighted the Prime Minister's 'F-WORD VICTORY', his 'EURO WIN OVER UNIONS', and the way in which he had 'scored triumph' and 'scooped the Jackpot' by playing 'the winning hand in Europe' [reproduced on the following page]. Its editorial heaped even more praise on Major's successful performance in defense of the nation:

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[46] *The Times*, 11 December 1991.
[47] *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1991.
[48] *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1991.

THE Sun

Tuesday, December 10, 1991 25p Audited daily sale for October 3,705,400 Today's TV: Pages 24 and 25

How Major played the winning hand in Europe

By TREVOR KAVANAGH, Political Editor

A LOT of surprised people learned the hard way yesterday that it's a dangerous mistake to underestimate Gentleman John Major.

Hard-eyed political poker player Francois Mitterand woke up too late and paid a heavy price in damaging French presidential prestige.

Socialist Mitterand [illegible] was too concerned to safeguard [illegible] Delors and [illegible] Thatcher.

With [illegible] BRILLIANTLY out-bluffed [illegible] Delors and [illegible] a triumph for the [illegible] Europe Treaties and [illegible] Social [illegible]

Ace


JOKER ... Jacques Delors was just too clever


JOKE ... Francois Mitterand was left the loser

Rave

Joy

Joke

SET TO BACK OUT

OTHER EC countries are set to follow Britain and reject the social charter, it was claimed last night.

Although [illegible] agreed at the 11 nations who signed the charter had [illegible] they had given [illegible] about it.

The doubters include Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

A senior [illegible] source said it [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

> John Major, facing odds of eleven to one in Maastricht, showed he is made of steel. He gave no quarter as Britain secured a deal which, in the Prime Minister's words, wins us game, set, and match.
> Britain now has the right to decide what's best for us. We can CHOOSE whether or not to join a single European currency.
> We can CUT ourselves off from the worst aspects of empire-building by Eurocrats like Jacques Delors.
> We can PICK the plums from the social charter on workers' rights, ignoring Mr Delors' sops to the all-powerful French and German trade unions.[49]

The British Prime Minister was thus depicted as a heroic patriot that demonstrated he was 'made of steel', by standing up for the nation's interests in spite of being heavily outnumbered by the other eleven member states. Thanks to his courageous efforts, the 'Eurocrats like Jacques Delors' and their ambitions of 'empire-building' had been prevented from harming 'us'. Hence, no foreigner would be able to impose anything on Britain, because the Prime Minister had secured the nation's right to decide 'what's best for us'. This same discursive framework of a British 'we' against a European 'them' was also employed in a section entitled 'HOW BRITAIN SUCCEEDED AT MAASTRICHT', which drew up a list of the main 'victories' that the national 'we' had 'won' against 'the others':

> FEDERAL EUROPE
> The word 'federal' is deleted from the treaty on European unity. Instead it talks of 'ever closer union' – back to the wording used when the Common Market was founded in 1957.
> Result: WIN
> SINGLE CURRENCY
> Britain accepts the principle of a single currency by 1999. But Britain wins the right to decided if, and when, we adopt it.
> Result: WIN.
> SOCIAL CHARTER
> Europe will not be allowed to force us to accept their rules on working conditions, which would give power back to the unions. The other 11 countries go ahead without us.
> Result: WIN (...)

[49] *The Sun*, 12 December 1991.

Nevertheless, *The Sun* suggested that some 'defeats' and 'draws' also had to be acknowledged in the battle against the growing powers of Brussels and the deepening of European integration:

> COMMISSION POWERS
> Britain conceded a stronger role for Brussels in environment, education, consumer protection, public health, and transport.
> Result: LOSE
> EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
> The Euro Parliament wins small concessions giving it some powers to veto EC legislation. But the sovereignty of Westminster remains.
> Result: DRAW...
> ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
> Richer nations such as Britain and Germany must contribute to a regional fund so that poorer countries like Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece can catch up economically.
> Result: LOSE

The image depicted in the discourse of *The Sun* was thus that of a Britain still besieged by the threatening Other of European federalism, even if at Maastricht the Prime Minister had successfully managed to block the advance of this dangerous foreign enemy. An important battle had been won for the nation, but the war was not yet over.

6.4 'Britain in the second division of Europe': Maastricht as a national defeat

In contrast and opposition to the triumphalist discourse employed by John Major and his supporters, the leading members of the Labour Party launched a patriotic counter-attack in which they tried to channel national we-feelings against the Prime Minister. As a result of the opt-outs from the single currency and the social chapter, Britain's position after summit was described with an imagery of defeat, in order to provoke collective sentiments of national shame. The following quotations can serve to exemplify the symbolic representation of the Maastricht Treaty which was employed in the discourse of the opposition:

> 'When it is obvious that the other 11 governments are prepared to accept the draft before them at Maastricht and this Government is not, this Government is confessing to a unique combination of political prejudice and economic weakness that marks it out from the rest of the Community and marks Britain down in that Community.' (Neil Kinnock, cited in *The Independent*, 11 December 1991)

'It is the first step in a two-speed Europe. We are dead in the water alone, adrift from the rest of Europe.' (Glynn Ford, Leader of UK Socialist MEPs, cited in *The Independent*, 12 December 1991)

'What would two opt-outs mean for Britain? Out of the first division, into the slow lane, left behind in Europe.' (George Robertson, Labour European Affairs spokesman, cited in *The Guardian*, 11 December 1991)

'It means, effectively, isolation for Britain.' (Tony Blair, Shadow Employment Secretary, cited in *The Guardian*, 11 December 1991)

'This is a defeat for the British people. We have become more and more isolated as the negotiations have gone on. The double opt-out is bad for Britain as under this government we will be condemned to the second division in Europe.' (John Cunningham, Labour campaigns coordinator, cited in *The Daily Telegraph*, 11 December 1991)

'Pasty-faced Englishmen waving their Union Jacks and shouting "boo" at Johnny Foreigner are never an edifying sight, either on the football terraces or in an inter-governmental conference.' (George Galloway, Labour MP, cited in *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1991)

From this perspective, therefore, the outcome of the Maastricht summit was depicted in entirely negative terms which implied a humiliating loss of national status. Britain was variously described as 'weak', 'marked out', 'marked down', 'dead in the water', 'adrift', 'in the slow lane', 'in the second division' 'isolated', and 'defeated'. In the last quotation I have cited, Major and his colleagues were even compared to xenophobic English hooligans at a football game, waving their national flags and shouting insults at foreigners, in an attempt to mock their supposedly patriotic defense of 'the national interest' against the European threat. It was therefore implied that the Conservatives were making Britain look rather ridiculous in front of its EC partners. The Maastricht summit, from this standpoint, could in no way be considered a source of national pride. On the contrary, Major's performance was utterly disgraceful, and the British people were encouraged to feel ashamed about a Prime Minister that was making their country the laughing stock of the European Community.

Furthermore, in the Parliamentary debates that took place after the Maastricht summit, Labour's leader continued to pursue this discursive strategy in order to symbolically discredit the Prime Minister and his government. In response to Major's claim to have advanced and

safeguarded Britain's 'national interest', he proclaimed that the Prime Minister had abdicated from his responsibilities in Europe, adding that 'our country's interests cannot be served by isolation and opt-out'.[50] According to the Labour leader, what the Prime Minister had accomplished in Maastricht was 'a self-imposed exile from the mainstream in the Community' which would 'severely disadvantage the British people'. By opting out of the economic and monetary union, Britain would lose all influence over this process, and ultimately have to accept 'conditions determined by others'. Furthermore, Kinnock suggested that the Prime Minister had lowered Britain to a humiliating, 'uncivilised' level by rejecting the social chapter: 'When is this government going to learn the lesson that civilised standards help efficiency and competitiveness, and exploitation and unjustice harm efficiency and competitiveness?' Major was similarly attacked in this same debate by the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, who declared that instead of putting Britain at the heart of Europe, as he had initially promised, the Prime Minister was 'condemning this country to be semi-detached from the process.'

In the press, this same image of Maastricht as a national defeat was exemplified by the discourse employed to describe the results of the European summit in *The Guardian*. Under the headline, 'EC unites on historic treaty with Britain in the slow lane' [reproduced on the following page], this newspaper's report stated in its opening paragraph:

> European leaders this morning unveiled a historic European Union treaty, but one that had all the hallmarks of a two-speed Europe – with Britain in the slow lane.[51]

The pro-European position of this newspaper was also illustrated in an editorial which was critical not only of Major's patriotic triumphalism, but of the way in which the leaders of the other member states had done exactly the same thing:

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[50] *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1991. All other citations in this paragraph are from this newspaper.
[51] *The Guardian*, 11 December 1991.

40p
Wednesday
December 11
1991
Published in London
and Manchester

The Guardian

NEWSPAPER OF THE YEAR

'Opt out' of social chapter curbs is expected to be magnet to Japanese investment

EC unites on historic treaty with Britain in the slow lane

The decisions

On other pages

What they said

Dutch riot police crack down on farmers in Maastricht yesterday protesting at EC agricultural policy after presenting a petition

The Guardian, December 11 1991

> No leader amongst the Twelve went home humiliated or defeated yesterday; all were variously triumphant. Mr Kohl and Mr Mitterrand and Mr Andreotti and Mr González all proclaimed victory, though on greatly different grounds. The saga of battling John was a second feature elsewhere. Rampant federalists should note that phenomenon carefully. We are still light years away from any hint of a super-state. Summit warfare is waged in entirely national terms – underpinned by the perception (for Mr Mitterrand just as much as for Mr Major) that trophies have to be brought back in pseudo-triumph. It is the voters – French, German, British – who have to be put first... But is this, any longer, a serious way of conducting serious business? Increasingly, it is not.

In its own editorial discourse, *The Independent* referred to the Major government's opt-out from the single currency 'a classic British error' which severely imperilled the country's economic future and therefore damaged 'the national interest':

> The outcome shows that Britain has committed the classic error of underestimating its partners' determination to achieve an ambitious goal. Such misjudgements follow a reliable pattern. "We are pragmatists", the British say. "It's all wildly optimistic Euro-rhetoric. They don't really mean what they say. We've pointed out the realities. It won't happen"... So the British are dragged along in the wake of everyone else, having wasted much diplomatic effort on justifying their negative position and keeping an escape route open... If our major EC competitor's form a currency union, there is no way Britain could afford not to be a part of it... Governments are elected to take tough decisions, not to postpone them when delay threatens to damage the national interest.[52]

Furthermore, in relation to the opt-out from the social chapter, the Sunday edition of this same newspaper depicted this decision as one which presented a humiliating image of Britain as Europe's 'discount store' – a 'bargain basement' in which Japanese investors could buy their labour cheaply:

> Mr Major has sent a dismaying message, not just to our European partners, but to the world about how Britain sees its future. The message is that Britain is a low-cost, low-wage economy, offering a European version of the economies of the Far East... By his actions in Maastricht, Mr Major has told the British people that their future lies in a discount store on Europe's fringes, where their labour will be piled high at bargain basement prices.[53]

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[52] *The Independent*, 11 December 1991.
[53] *The Independent on Sunday*, 15 December 1991.

The representation of the Maastricht summit as a source of national shame rather than pride was in fact stated explicitly in a letter sent to *The Independent* by Peter Luff, the director of the European Movement in Britain:

> Although the Maastricht council lived up to its promise and delivered an agreement that has set a course for fill European union, if the British government believes that its role in the negotiations has placed it at the heart of Europe, it is deluding both itself and the British people. Instead of a *sense of shame* that we are unable to face the disciplines of monetary union and unwilling to commit ourselves to a set of principles outlining social justice for the Community, the Government *appears to take pride* in these failures... We are, yet again, on the periphery and not at the centre of translating a Community treaty into reality.[54]

The same vision of national humiliation was also defended in another letter sent by Norman Willis, the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, who argued that Major's opt-outs could only 'damage Britain in the eyes of the world' and leave the country and its working people 'on the margin of the European Community'.[55]

As a contrast to the patriotic triumphalism exemplified by *The Sun*, it is interesting to note the sensationalist depiction of Maastricht as a national disaster which was presented in the *Daily Mirror*, a tabloid sympathetic to the position of the Labour Party. With headlines such as 'BUNGLER MAJOR CAUGHT IN EURO AMBUSH', 'IT'S DIVISION TWO BRITAIN', and 'EURO DEAL LEAVES US OUT IN THE COLD', this newspaper employed the same imagery of sports and warfare as in *The Sun*, but with a diametrically opposed view of the Maastricht battle's results [reproduced on the following page]:

> ISOLATED Britain was plunging towards second division status in Europe last night as John Major botched the EC summit negotiations. In a humiliating rout, EC partners ambushed the inexperienced Premier as they finally lost patience with Britain's stalling on the single currency issue.
> They decided there could be no turning back and swept aside Mr Major's plea not to fix a timetable...

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[54] *The Independent*, 12 December 1991.
[55] *The Independent*, 12 December 1991.

DAILY Mirror
Tuesday, December 10, 1991 NEWSPAPER FOR THE NINETIES 25p

PAGE 1 DAILY MIRROR, Wednesday, December 11, 1991

We've been put in the second division, says Labour chief

A DEFEAT FOR THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN

DOTCH: Major

Bungler Major caught in Euro ambush

From ALASTAIR CAMPBELL
Political Editor, in Maastricht

ISOLATED Britain was plunging towards several division status in Europe last night, as John Major hastened the EC summit negotiations.

In a humiliating rout, EC partners ambushed the inexperienced Premier as they finally lost patience with Britain's stalling on the single currency issue.

They decided there could be no going back and swept aside Mr Major's plea not to fix a timetable.

EC leaders at the Maastricht summit are being asked to endorse a deal soon that would lead to economic and monetary union no later than January 1, 1999.

"We are not looking for a compromise," said Dutch finance minister Wim Kok.

Refusal

"You cannot find a compromise between yes and no."

Short of an overnight miracle, it seems the new treaty – to be initialled tomorrow – will carry an opt out clause highlighting Britain's refusal to back one of the central agreements.

Government sources tried to present the opt out clause as a triumph, saying they had won the right of Parliament to decide.

But Parliament would always have had the last say. And in any case, Mr Major wanted a general opt out clause, not one isolating Britain.

The Premier also claimed victory over the other leaders' agreement to drop the controversial word "federal".

And he threatened to

Euro deal leaves us out in the cold

From ALASTAIR CAMPBELL
in Maastricht

BRITAIN was left completely isolated in Europe last night as Premier John Major almost wrecked the EC summit.

He stubbornly refused to sign the historic treaty of Maastricht unless a whole chapter on social policies was dropped.

Britain's 11 EC partners finally agreed in order to save the treaty.

Mr Major's refusal to sign the single currency issue was also formally confirmed.

It means that on the two most important issues, Britain is condemned to the second tier of a two-tier Europe.

The dropping of the social chapter, which includes a charter on work

STUBBORN: Major

[illegible] rights, was a sensational reding to two days of bitter argument.

The other EC members stressed their commitment to the charter – dramatically undermining Britain's isolation.

Mr Major treated it a 1am Press conference this morning: "I'm very happy with the outcome. I think it's a success for Britain and the whole of the Community."

PAGE 2 DAILY MIRROR, Tuesday, December 10, 1991

IT'S DIVISION TWO BRITAIN

DUTCH TREAT: Puppet PM

Major gets a peas of the action

THE Spotting laugh report of John Major has made a bigger impact in Europe than the real thing.

For the TV comedy's standing joke about the grey man's tedious obsession with peas has tickled the Dutch.

Soon after Mr Major boasted on at the Golden Tulip in Maastricht, hotel staff told astonished customers: "He has just asked for six plates of peas to be sent up."

■ From Page One

accept the whole treaty unless the social charter standing side-by-side with the rest – was watered down.

But, as the Murray ground out yesterday, both issues are red herrings.

The "social" climbdown is widely believed to be a face saving exercise agreed in advance.

Reject

And Mr Major has no power to reject the treaty. If he says no today, the other states will go ahead without Britain.

Now the treaty will be a disaster – leaving Britain outside the mainstream of EC development and wanting of overseas investors.

And there was further

Summit wrong, John?

BBC diplomatic editor John Simpson came to an embarrassing halt half way through his interview of Chris Patten [illegible] when he confessed he couldn't remember the name of Britain's Chancellor Ian Lamont. He [illegible] could manage Boys' work blizzard, with the answer, Simpson muttered back as one Norman Lamont.

but [illegible] for Mr Major over dark new [illegible] agreement [illegible] Europeans [illegible] Britain's [illegible] policy.

And to complete the rout Dutch farmers [illegible] Peter Hain [illegible] highlighted Britain's [illegible] to [illegible] a [illegible] European [illegible] policy to be agreed by [illegible] voting.

The scene of [illegible] down [illegible] people made it clear the other nations were [illegible] to regard Mr Major's political problems [illegible].

Keen to [illegible] the humiliating [illegible] claim the beleaguered Premier [illegible] Mitterrand [illegible] Chancellor Helmut Kohl [illegible] could swamp Boys' work blizzard, with the answer, Simpson muttered back as one Norman Lamont.

Defeat

But the treaty will make it clear it will be in place within eight years – with or without Britain.

Labour foreign affairs spokesman Gerald Kaufman said: "John Major seems to be heading for a major defeat."

He forecast that Britain would have no choice but to join a single currency if our partners go ahead in 1999.

Britain would be "economically crippled" if sterling was left on the sidelines, Mr Kaufman warned.

PAGE 2 DAILY MIRROR, Thursday, December 12, 1991

DISASTER! KINNOCK BLASTS EURO DEAL

Double opt out puts Britain in second division

Daily Mirror, December 10-12 1991

> Now the treaty will be a disaster – leaving Britain outside the mainstream of EC development and scaring off overseas investors.[56]

In relation to the opt-out from the social chapter, the *Daily Mirror* depicted this decision in its editorial discourse as a 'BOTCHED JOB' that reduced Britain to the shameful status of a developing third world country in which workers would be denied their basic rights:

> John Major says he is not prepared to put British jobs on the line by signing the European Social Charter. What cant!...
> He says that the Japanese and others would not build factories here if we adopted the Social Charter because their costs would go up. That is admitting that under the Tories Britain can compete in the world only by being turned into a sweat shop.[57]

The political cartoonist of the *Mirror* further ridiculed Major's supposedly 'patriotic' defense of Britain's legitimate right to be 'different' from 'Europe', by depicting the Prime Minister getting ready to have breakfast with his Foreign Minister at the 'Summit Hoteel' in Maastricht, and asking the Dutch waiter – who uselessly offered a 'Menu Continental' – to please bring them a 'pot of tea and full English breakfast for two'. This same symbolic representation of the Maastricht summit as a source of national embarrassment and humiliation was also perfectly encapsulated in another cartoon published by this newspaper, in which Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand, riding a shiny black limousine with European flags, overtook an old, broken down car driven by Major, with a tattered Union Jack and a hood design resembling Margaret Thatcher's face [reproduced on the following page].[58]

At the same time, it is interesting to note that some members of the Conservative Party also saw Maastricht as a national failure, and publicly distanced themselves from the official triumphalism of the government. On the one hand, Eurosceptics such as Nicholas Ridley considered that in spite of Major's claim to have 'surrendered nothing' and protected Britain

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[56] *Daily Mirror*, 10 December 1991.
[57] *Daily Mirror*, 12 December 1991.
[58] *Daily Mirror*, 12 December 1991.



Daily Mirror, December 9 1991



Daily Mirror, December 12 1991

from the threat of European federalism, the reality was that this danger had in no way been eliminated. In an article published in *The Times*, entitled 'Maastricht will reinforce the battlements of fortress Europe', Ridley warned:

> The whole thrust is towards a federal union, despite the omission of the offending F-word. The community will enter upon stages two and three of the Delors plan for economic and monetary union with a single currency and an independent central bank. This inevitably means the transfer of control of economic policies to the centre, and the end of the sovereignty of national parliaments over interest rates, exchange rates, and budget deficits. It reduces them to the status of rate-capped county councils with economic power wielded from the centre... My view is that the exemptions we have obtained are worth very little. The full pressure of the law and the community spirit will be upon us to conform on both counts and to conform soon.[59]

On the other hand, in a speech delivered in Parliament, Geoffrey Howe suggested that it was completely absurd to imagine that Britain could maintain its prosperity, influence, and prestige in the world if it excluded itself from the single European currency:

> On the assumption that the conditions for EMU... are fulfilled, do we help to create an ecu, which will probably be the currency of the world's largest trading block, likely to displace the dollar, or do we want to plough a lonely furrow on the outside, losing our practical influence in the name of a sovereignty which no longer exists, locked into a conveyor belt not of federation, but of economic outer space?[60]

The battle of rival patriotisms within the Conservative Party therefore continued, with some viewing Maastricht as a dangerous step forward in the construction of a federal Europe that would reduce the British Parliament to the shameful status of a 'county council', while others feared the humiliating isolation of a Britain which could end up in 'economic outer space' as a result of its opt-out from the single currency.

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[59] *The Times*, 12 December 1991.
[60] *The Times*, 20 December 1991.

6.5 Conclusion: Maastricht and the symbolic manipulation of the British pride-shame balance

In this chapter, I have attempted to analyze the Maastricht summit as a 'political spectacle' (Edelman 1988) in which both the Major government and the Labour opposition attempted to mobilize the national we-feelings of the British people in order to legitimate their respective positions on the new European treaty. I have shown how the defense of 'the national interest' became an object of political dispute, and rival discourses were employed to manipulate the British pride-shame balance both in favour and against the agreements that were ultimately reached. Using the language of Goffman and Bourdieu, one can understand the Maastricht summit as a kind of 'interaction ritual' on a macro level, in which the maintenance of the national 'face' was at stake in this particular 'game of international honour'. John Major, as the symbolic representative of the nation, was judged according to the success with which he had supposedly defended Britain's interests and upheld the country's prestige in this reunion. The discursive battle which erupted can thus be characterized as a contested symbolization of national status – a symbolic struggle to depict the results of Maastricht as either a triumph or a humiliation.

The Prime Minister and his supporters in the media therefore employed a language of victory and national pride, proclaiming that the fundamental interests of the British people had been protected by eliminating the word 'federal' from the treaty, and by opting out of the single currency and the social chapter of the treaty. In this way, it was proclaimed that Major had shown his mettle as a tough negotiator who could not be bossed around by the other member states, but was capable of protecting the interests of the British people in the European arena. A discursive attempt was also made to legitimate this standpoint from a moral perspective, by suggesting that Britain was not a 'bad European', but rather that it was trying to slow down the misguided federalist idealism of other member states. In fact, Britain was depicted as the only country that was not being carried away by emotive, quixotic supranationalism, but instead

represented the voice of inter-governmental rationality and wisdom. This was depicted as the right road not just for Britain, but for Europe as a whole.

In contrast to this, the Labour opposition and its allies in the press employed a language of defeat and national shame in their own symbolic depiction of the Maastricht summit, suggesting that it would isolate Britain from the European mainstream, and relegate the nation to a 'second division' or 'second-class status'. Rather than leading Britain to the heart of Europe, the Prime Minister excluded the nation from the two most important projects of the treaty: the single currency and the social chapter. In this way, the country's future economic prosperity was imperilled, and the fundamental rights of workers would be ignored, placing Britain in the shameful status of Europe's 'sweat shop' for Japanese and American companies. Britain thus continued to be the grudging, 'bad European', and Major was accused of damaging the country's reputation on the world stage, through his negative attitudes to Europe.

At the time of Maastricht, one could therefore conclude that in Britain, there continued to be a fundamental ambivalence towards the project of European integration. On the one hand, there was clearly a strong consensus on the need to be a part of the European Community in order to maintain the nation's prosperity and influence, illustrated by Major's promise to put the country 'at the heart of Europe'. At the same time, however, the fearful image of a 'conveyor belt to federalism' which would abolish the pound and severely reduce British Parliament's powers was widely depicted as a shameful, demeaning option which had to be avoided at all costs. The fact that the rejection of the 'f-word' and the double-opt out from the Maastricht treaty could be triumphantly presented as a 'victory' in the British public sphere clearly illustrated a continuing strong clash between national sentiments and the process of European integration.

III. Spain: 'Europe' as a symbol of national resurgence

"Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem and Europe the solution."

José Ortega y Gasset

7. Attempts to 'enter Europe': The humiliating exclusion of a 'backwards nation' during the Franco dictatorship

When the project of European integration began to take shape in the aftermath of World War II, the reins of the Spanish state were in the hands of Francisco Franco, a dictator who had risen to power with the support of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The incompatibility between the ideals of European unification and the principles defended by the Francoist regime are evident when one considers that the *Generalísimo* originally described his military uprising in 1936 as a 'holy crusade' to protect the Catholic 'essence' of *la patria* from what he defined as the 'bastardized, frenchified, Europeanizing' doctrines of modern liberalism (Franco 1975: 116). Although Spain remained formally neutral throughout the Second World War, Franco did not conceal his moral identification with the kind of 'European order' envisioned by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. On the contrary, he enthusiastically demonstrated his support for the Axis powers not only by granting them logistical aid, but also through the rhetoric of his speeches, the quasi-fascist ceremonial of his regime, and the impassioned discourse of his controlled press.[1] It seems evident that until the final stages of the World War, Franco was convinced that the Spanish nation's 'status honour' would be bolstered through the establishment of a new empire in North Africa, after the expected triumph of the Nazis. Through this renewal of imperial prestige, he hoped that the national shame of 1898, the year when Spain lost its last overseas colonies, would finally be wiped out from the conscience of his countrymen. In this way, *España* would finally recuperate its status as a 'great nation', and the concept of being *español* would once again become an emotive source of collective pride on the world stage.

[1] My understanding of Franco and Francoism has been guided fundamentally by the excellent historical studies of Carr and Fusi (1981), Payne (1987) and Preston (1993). With regard to the relations between the Franco regime and Europe, I have primarily relied on the studies of Armero (1978), Preston and Smyth (1984), Pollack and Hunter (1987), Pereira Castañares and Moreno Juste (1991a, 1991b), La Porte (1992), Bassols (1995), Moreno Juste (1998a), and Franzé (2000).

However, the victory of the Allies radically changed Franco's plans of conquest and glory for the Spanish *patria*. Instead, his regime's evident collaboration with the defeated totalitarian powers led to a humiliating period of international ostracism, which included the exclusion of Spain from the United Nations, as well as the Marshall Plan for economic recovery. In the kind of Europe envisioned by Hitler, Franco's Spain would presumably have been a respected, prestigious partner, but in the Europe that actually followed the Second World War, the country soon became a denigrated outsider. Nevertheless, as the tensions of the Cold War began to mount, Franco's fervent anti-communism appealed to the United States, and in 1953 a treaty was signed between the Spanish state and the American government. This bilateral agreement provided desperately needed funds to Spain, in return for the establishment of American military bases on its territory. Following this crucial foreign policy 'success' (from the Francoist perspective), diplomatic relations were re-established with the Western world, and in 1955 Spain was finally accepted into the United Nations. 'The nation' therefore ceased to be an international outcast, at least in part, and in this way the regime received a vital boost of prestige and moral legitimacy.

Franco, however, was much less fortunate with regard to the process of European integration. In this sphere of the international stage, Spain remained a humiliated outsider throughout his dictatorship. Although the *Generalísimo* attempted to appease his continental neighbours by defining his regime as 'the sentinel of the West', and the Spanish state as a noble guardian that was committed to protecting 'Europe's Christian civilization' fom the onslaught of Moscow's atheistic Communism, Spain was completely excluded from the negotiations which ultimately gave rise to the European Economic Community in 1957. Nevertheless, a request to enter the Common Market was officially put forward by the Spanish state in 1962, after Franco's reluctant abandonment of 'virile', 'self-sufficient' Hispanic autarky, and his pragmatic decision to implement a new policy of capitalist development and international trade. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime, and the morally repugnant stigma of its previous association with the Nazis and the Facists, Spain's entry into 'Europe' remained an unfulfilled

aspiration until the end of his lifelong rule. Although a commercial trade agreement was signed between the Spanish state and the EEC in 1970, the desire to become 'fully European' could not be satisfied as long as the old sidekick of Hitler and Mussolini continued to rule Spain. Hence, as the legitimacy of the Francoist dictatorship gradually eroded over the years, 'Europeanism' became increasingly identified by many of its political opponents with the desire for a genuine recuperation of Spain's dignity on the world stage, through a complete modernization and democratization of the country. The aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to illustrate how in the case of Spain, a very different sociohistorical process from that which was experienced by the people of Britain ultimately led to a widespread symbolic and emotional association of *Europa* with the end of a shameful *atraso*, or 'backwardness', and hence with the recovery of national pride and self-respect.

7.1 The confrontation between liberal 'Europeanizers' and Catholic 'traditionalists' in early twentieth century Spain

The symbolic identification of 'Europe' with modernity, and hence the resistance to 'Europeanization' by all those who fervently defended the maintenance of Spain's traditional Catholic values, can be traced back to the intellectual and political debates which followed the so-called *desastre* ('disaster') of 1898. As mentioned above, this was the year when Spain lost its last overseas colonies, Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, in a short war with the United States. The tremendous impact of this event on Spain's national self-esteem must be understood in the context of the times. This was 'an age when the possession of colonies was seen as the hallmark of a vigorous nation', a period when the fashionable ideas of social Darwinism 'posited that in the forward march of civilisation, the weaker powers had to give way to the stronger' (Balfour 1996: 107). This hierarchic prestige-ranking of countries according to their imperial power was illustrated by a humiliating speech delivered in 1898 by the British Prime Minister, Lord Salibury, in which Spain was described as a 'dying nation' (Balfour 1996: 107). Hence, after a period in which a mass call-up of over 200,000 soldiers had been justified through the

invocation of *el honor nacional* ('national honour'), and Spaniards had been glorified in the press as a valiant 'race' of warriors who were innately superior to the 'plebeian' American people, the total defeat suffered at the hands of the United States was a major blow to Spanish collective pride.

Spain's loss of imperial status also provoked an intellectual outpouring of books on the shameful downfall of *la patria*, the loss of its historic greatness, and hence the disappearance of its prestige in the world. Hence, many of the writers in the so-called 'Generation of 98' attempted to find the underlying roots of Spain's infirmity, as well as to suggest possible remedies. What is interesting in relation to the topic of this dissertation is that throughout this period, the 'Europeanization' of Spain was already being proposed during as the ideal solution for the nation's shameful backwardness. The most fervent and influential defender of this idea was undoubtedly Joaquín Costa (1981 [1900]), an impassioned intellectual who was convinced that Spain would only be saved from its deteriorating condition if it fully assimilated 'Europe's rational mentality' and purged itself from all 'African' influences. What was absolutely indispensable, he proclaimed, was the 'deafricanization and Europeanization of Spain', and the 'remaking of the Spaniard in the European mould' (cited in Beneyto 1999: 23). 'Europe', in Costa's mind, was essentially the land of science, education, technology, and progress. In his view, this was the only medicine that would allow Spain to survive in the fierce global struggle of national 'races', where only 'the fittest' could possibly survive. Other important figures, such as the renowned Spanish neurologist, Ramón y Cajal, similarly believed that 'the sickness of Spain is none other than its remoteness from Europe; in other words, from science' (cited in Serrano 1998: 190).

Not all intellectuals, however, agreed with this symbolic invocation of 'European modernity' as the ideal solution for Spanish decadence, since many saw the adoption of 'foreign' or 'alien' ideas as a dangerous threat to the unique traditions, and above all the Catholic spirituality, of the 'national soul'. This was also a time when German Romantic theories of nationhood had spread to Spain, and began to inspire a number of literary attempts to define the 'essence' of the Spanish

people through idealized depictions of the barren Castillian landscape and the pious stoicism of the rural peasantry (Abellán 1988: 37-8). The diplomat and essayist Angel Ganivet (1990 [1897]), for instance, was repelled by the irreligious, egoistic materialism of 'European modernity'. In his view, 'European civilization' was characterized by 'anti-human', 'anti-natural', and 'pitiless mercantilism', while Spain was a morally superior land of Catholic spirituality, generosity, and idealism (cited in Beneyto 1999: 83). Hence, according to Ganivet, the resurrection of Spain could only come from the inside, by looking for the truth and the strength that lay hidden in the depths of the national soul. In his view, Spain should fully resist the misleading temptation of European modernity, because with time it would ultimately be *them*, the Europeans, who would ultimately beg *us*, the Spaniards, to teach them the moral truths and the spiritual strengths of what he called *la España eterna, virgen y madre*, 'the eternal Spain, virgin and mother'.

One can see, therefore, the way in which during this difficult period of collective anxiety and uncertainty, 'Europe' was seen by some Spanish intellectuals as an 'inspiring Other', an ideal model which should be imitated to save the nation by modernizing it, while others viewed it as a 'threatening Other', a terrible danger which should be avoided at all costs to preserve the purity of the nation's Catholic soul.[2] Indeed, this opposition between European modernization and Hispanic traditionalism (*europeísmo y casticismo*) led to a notorious public confrontation between the two most famous and influential philosophers of early twentieth century Spain, Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset. Both of these thinkers were fully 'Europeanized' Spaniards, in the sense that they spoke several European languages and were very familiar with the intellectual currents of thought on the other side of the Pyrenées. However, while Unamuno ultimately developed a rather hostile attitude to the project of 'Europeanization', Ortega fully embraced it with passionate conviction. As Salvador de Madariaga pointed out, these two

[2] The concept of inspiring and threatening Others has been coined by the Greek social psychologist Anna Triandafyllidou (2000).

philosophers most clearly represent the two main patriotic responses which emerged amongst Spain's intellectuals after the 'disaster' of 1898: 'one saw the salvation of Spain in its own substance; the other, in its renovation through the influence and example of Europe' (1989: 94).

Unamuno's fundamental philosophical concern was what he called *el sentimiento trágico de la vida* (the tragic sentiment of life). By this he referred to the feeling of anxiety which uniquely arises in human beings, as a result of their awareness of death. Man, said Unamuno, is *un animal enfermo* (a sick animal), because he is the only creature who is conscious of his own mortality (1988 [1912]: 22). This fundamental problem of the human condition was, in his view, the most important issue which philosophy had to address. As a Catholic who had bitten from the fruit of modern scientific reasoning, Unamuno himself was torn throughout his life between the need to believe in the immortality of his soul, and the rationalist denial of this longing for eternal life. In fact, it was precisely this inner struggle between scientific reasoning and Catholic faith which provoked his ambivalent stance toward the project of 'Europeanization'.

In some of his early writings, Unamuno had originally promoted the idea that the Spanish people could only reawaken if they opened the windows of their *patria* to the influence of 'European winds' (1966 [1895]: 866). Eventually, however, he turned against the project of 'Europeanization', because he identified this notion with a dogmatic scientific mentality that would completely wipe out the spirituality of the Spanish people, and the vital consolation offered by their religious belief in eternal life. In a famous essay he wrote against 'European modernizers', Unamuno wrote:

> I ask myself, alone with my conscience: Am I European? Am I modern? And my conscience responds: no; you are not European, that which they call European, you are not modern, that which they call modern... And if I do not feel European or modern, is that because I am Spanish? Are we Spaniards ultimately incapable of yielding to Europeanization and modernization?... I must confess that, the more I meditate on it, the more I discover the intimate repugnance that my soul feels towards everything that is supposed to represent the guiding principles of the modern European spirit, towards the scientific orthodoxy of today, towards its methods, towards it tendencies.(1983 [1906]: 926)

Hence, in opposition to the 'European' obsession with scientific knowledge, and the widespread denigration of Spain's so-called 'Africanism', Unamuno claimed that Spain had a valuable religious tradition with African roots, represented by 'that great ancient African' Saint Augustine. He viewed this legacy as a source of legitimate collective pride, a treasure of spiritual wisdom that should never be abandoned, but which Spain should spread throughout the world.

Furthermore, Unamuno proclaimed that the national religion of the Spanish people was represented by their great literary hero, Don Quixote, who stood for an undying, utopian faith in the immortality of the soul – in opposition to all rationalistic, scientifically-minded 'Europeanizers'. Therefore, he concluded that a full-scale 'Europeanization' was simply incompatible with the spiritual needs of the quixotic Spanish people. Spain, in his view, was a land of mystics with *un alma medieval* (a medieval soul), and therefore it could never become a 'modern' land of scientists, unless it completely allowed its true national spirit to be conquered and swallowed up by the rationalistic European Other. In opposition to those who had turned modern technology and machinery into new objects of collective worship, Unamuno proclaimed, "¡*Que inventen ellos*!", "Let them (in other words, the 'Europeans') invent!" (1988 [1912]: 289-90). Although he acknowledged that some degree of 'European modernization' was undoubtedly a pragmatic necessity, Unamuno insisted that the Spanish people would completely betray their own national soul if they gave up their age-old religious spirituality, and above all their faith in personal salvation. Hence, even if the 'Europeanization of Spain' may admittedly have been necessary to some extent, Unamuno proclaimed that the 'Hispanization of Europe' was an equally important and noble task which Spaniards could proudly undertake. In this way, Spain would heroically save 'modern Europeans' from their obsession with 'scientific knowledge', which Unamuno referred to as 'investigations about the nature of life', by revealing to them the fundamental importance of 'spiritual wisdom', which he defined as 'meditations concerning the problem of death'.

In contrast to Unamuno, however, Ortega fully took up Joaquín Costa's proposals for national salvation through 'European regeneration'. In his view, there were absolutely no doubts

about what the Spanish *raza moribunda* ('dying race') needed in order to recover a respectable position on the world stage (1989 [1911]: 18). Only the adoption of Europe's 'scientific rationality' could rescue Spain from the calamitous, humiliating condition in which it found itself. In opposition to those who continued to idealize the supposed spiritual and cultural virtues of the nation, Ortega promoted what he called the *el patriotismo del dolor* ('the patriotism of pain'), which consisted in drawing attention to the miserable backwardness of Spain, in order to perceive, by contrast, the marvels of the *magnífica posibilidad europea* ('magnificent European possibility') (1989 [1911]: 18). As he put it in a public lecture in Bilbao, delivered in 1910:

> Regeneration is inseparable from Europeanization; for this reason, from the moment in which the reconstructive emotion was felt – the anguish, the shame, and the desire – the idea of Europeanization was conceived. Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem and Europe the solution.(1983 [1910]: 521)

Spain, in Ortega's view, was an 'invertebrate' nation threatened by internal, egoistic particularisms and ignorant, indocile masses (1972 [1921]). It was, in short, a decadent country in danger of self-destruction, which could only be saved by the rise of a new, enlightened elite with a fully modern or 'Europeanized' mentality.

Not surprisingly, therefore, a bitter conflict of rival national ideals erupted during this period between Unamuno and Ortega over the controversial issue of 'Europeanization'. One of its most famous episodes involved a heated exchange of insults in a series of letters published in the Madrid newspapers *ABC* and *El Imparcial* in September 1909. Unamuno initiated this intellectual duel by mocking the *papanatas* (gullible simpletons), who were dazzled by the supposed wonders of 'European modernity', and proclaimed that a nation which had produced the mystic poetry of Saint John of the Cross was preferable to one that had given birth to the cold rationalism of René Decartes. In response, Ortega called Unamuno *el energúmeno español* (the

hotheaded Spaniard), and responded that in fact, 'without Descartes, we would be left in the dark and see nothing'.[3]

The contrasting attitudes towards 'Europeanization' in the work of these two philosophers can be explained by considering their diveregent attitudes towards Catholicism and its promise of eternal salvation. Unamuno, as we have seen, was a man deeply tortured by the philosophical doubts that had largely eroded his own religious faith in the afterlife, and hence was terrified by the possibility that death signified the complete annihilation of the human person. Ortega, however, was an agnostic thinker who did not find the finitude of life particularly tragic, since in his view, the consciousness of mortality was precisely what made human life an exciting, urgent task, a dramatic adventure, a voyage full of risks in which one would should not waste a minute and always strive to do one's best, knowing that time is limited by the inevitable arrival of death (1972 [1939]: 132). Indeed from this perspective, the urgent task that Ortega felt it was his patriotic duty to push forward as an intellectual was the political, economic, and cultural modernization of his country – a national project which for him was encapsulated by the concept of 'Europeanization' (Gray 1989).

This impassioned discursive battle between Unamuno and Ortega was not, of course, a purely academic debate. On the contrary, these two intellectuals were very well-known public figures, and the issues they were debating with regard to the 'problem of Spain', and whether or not 'Europe' was the best solution to recuperate the nation's honour and dignity in the world, were at the heart of the political conflicts of the time. It has been suggested that in fact, the debate over the desirability of adapting Spanish institutions to those of the rest of Europe 'had been the stuff of national political controversy ever since the second half of the eighteenth century', when the ideas of the European Enlightenment were alternatively seen by the country's elites as a recipe for civilized progress, or as a dangerous foreign heresy (Preston and Smyth 1984: 25). One important aspect of this confrontation is that at the time of the Napoleonic

[3] The quotations from both letters are cited in Ortega y Gasset (1989: 36-7).

invasion of Spain in 1807-8, many of the country's liberal reformists supported the occupation forces of post-revolutionary France. This apparent betrayal of 'the nation' in fact had a clear patriotic motivation, since the collaboration of these Spaniards with the French invaders was fundamentally based on the belief that a revolutionary modernization of Spain was exactly what the country needed in order to make progress. Nevertheless, by siding with the foreign occupiers, these liberal reformers placed a convenient symbolic weapon in the hands of their conservative opponents, since from then on the project of European modernization could be denigrated as 'alien' or 'anti-Spanish':

> The 'real' Spain was defended by reactionaries as an immutable social hierarchy dominated by the traditional triumvirate of crown, church, and aristocracy. Any attempt to challenge the socio-economic status quo could be condemned as the sinister manoueverings of national apostates and foreign agents: 'Europeanizers'. (Preston and Smyth 1984: 26).

During the turbulent decades that preceded the ultimate rise to power of General Franco, this opposition between 'European' modernization and 'national-Catholic' traditionalism was in fact one of the fundamental cleavages that divided Spanish elites and contributed in a crucial manner to the outbreak of the Civil War (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 129). Some historians have illustrated this point by referring to the concept of the 'two Spains': 'the notion of a contest between the Spain of progress and free thought which looked to Europe and the inward-looking Spain of traditionalist Catholic values' (Carr 1980: 12). To a great extent, what one eyewitness observer of the Civil War called 'the Spanish cockpit' (Borkenau 1974 [1937]) was indeed a clash between two radically opposed projects of 'national salvation', in which the contested issue of religion played a key role (Gifford 1997). Both the right and the left claimed to be passionately concerned with the health of their patient (the 'Spanish nation' or 'Spanish people'). However, while one side believed that the cure was to be found in the preservation of the nation's Catholic 'soul', and the maintenance of its traditional socio-economic and political structures, the other was convinced that the only possible remedy was 'European' secularization and democratization – or, in the case of its more extreme factions, the success of a Marxist

revolution.[4] General Franco's triumph in 1939 meant that the symbolic paradigm of 'national-Catholic' traditionalism had successfully defeated, at least for the time being, the rival patriotic project of national salvation though 'European modernization'.

7.2 Franco's victory: the defeat of liberal 'Europeanizers', the rise of a new imperial ambition, and the defence of 'Europe's Christian Civilization'

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, Franco defined his military uprising in 1936 against the Second Republic as a struggle of the 'ideal Spain' against what he called the 'bastard, frenchified, and Europeanizing Spain of the liberals' (Franco 1975: 116). From the Francoist perspective, the 'ideal Spain' was the Spain of the Catholic Kings, of Charles V, and of Philip II, the Spain of global prestige whose moral mission was 'to defend and extend all over the world a universal and Catholic idea, a Christian Empire' (Franco 1975: 116). The principles of liberalism, which the new regime's propaganda equated with 'freemasonry', as well as their application through the political system of democratic parliamentarism, were considered to be directly responsible for the national degeneration and shame of 1898, as well as the 'anarchic chaos' of the Second Republic (Carr and Fusi 1981: 16). Therefore, these 'alien' or 'foreign' concepts had to be permanently eradicated in order to rescue 'the nation' from its utterly shameful, humiliating condition. Similarly, all tendencies towards peripheral autonomy and separatism had to be eliminated through a complete centralization of power, as well as a firm imposition of the Castilian language and culture throughout the Spanish territory. The liberalism of 'Europeanizers', according to Franco, was nothing but the first dangerous step towards a country's collapse into Communism. Hence, in opposition to what he labelled the 'inorganic democracy' of other European countries, Franco promoted 'organic democracy', a 'natural order' based on traditional 'Spanish institutions' such as the Church, the family, and local municipalities.

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[4] This has been explored in detail by José Álvarez-Junco (1997).

After the Francoist forces emerged victorious in the Civil War, the regime's official discourse therefore divided Spanish society into two camps: the *vencedores* (victors), who represented the 'true Spain', and the *vencidos* (vanquished), who represented 'anti-Spain' (Carr and Fusi 1981: 18). Franco thus tried to rally support for himself by symbolically identifying his leadership with the very survival of 'the nation', while his opponents, including those he classified as liberal 'Europeanizers', were morally stigmatized as enemies of *la patria*. Until the final years of his dictatorship, during which all the media institutions of symbolic power were controlled by the regime, only this exclusive Francoist vision of the 'Spanish nation' and its foreign-inspired 'enemies' could be officially promoted in the public sphere (thereby alienating all opponents of the regime from the very concept of *España*).

It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that the discourse of Francoism was wholly 'anti-European'. In fact, what one can observe is that a particular symbolic representation of the 'true Europe' was developed in order to coincide with the Francoist conception of the 'true Spain'. Essentially, the crusade of Catholic Spain represented by the forces of Francoism was placed within the larger context of a continental struggle for the preservation of 'Europe's Christian civilization', threatened by the 'evil forces' of liberalism and communism. The following examples from public speeches delivered by the *Generalísimo* during the Civil War can serve to illustrate this point:

> This is a conflict for *the defense of Europe*, and, once again, Spaniards have been entrusted with the glory of carrying at the point of their bayonets the defense of civilization, the maintenance of a Christian culture, the maintenance of a Catholic faith... (Burgos, 1 October 1937, cited in Franco 1975: 49, my italics)
>
> Our struggle represents *the salvation of Europe*, and within it we aspire to live long days of peace, a peace compatible with the honour of our name and the dignity of our history. (Zaragoza, 1 April 1938, cited in Franco 1975: 50, my italics)

In such instances, one can see the ways in which Franco symbolically constructed and ritually manipulated a particular conception of 'Europe' and 'European civilization' which corresponded with his particular conception of the 'Spanish nation'. Through this rhetoric, he attempted to legitimate his struggle from an ethical standpoint, by relating it to the preservation of moral

values which were not only those of the 'true Spain', but also those of the 'true Europe'. In statements made to foreign journalists, he employed the same discursive tactics:

> By fighting against communism, we believe we are doing *a service to Europe*, since communism is a universal danger. (Interview with *Journal de Geneve*, December 1938, cited in Franco 1975: 51, my italics)

Hence, while it is undoubtedly true that Franco mobilized national we-feelings in opposition to those 'bastard liberal Europeanizers' who had been influenced by 'anti-Spanish' ideas, it is clear that he also did so by identifying his struggle for 'Christian Spain' with the salvation of 'European civilization'. The 'real Spaniards' could feel legitimately proud, according to Franco, for the heroic way in which they had successfully defended 'Europe's Christian civilization' from the atheistic immorality of liberals and communists.

For much of the Second World War, it is clear that Franco linked his depiction of the Spanish national we-image with the kind of 'European order' which was envisioned by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. There were many occasions during the course of this conflict in which 'Europe' was invoked by the *Generalísimo* as a way of identifying his national project with the continental ambitions of the Axis powers. For instance, on 17 July 1941, the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Franco delivered a public address in which he presented the World War as an uninterrupted sequence of Axis triumphs, and spoke of:

> these moments when the German armies lead *the battle for which Europe and Christianity have for so many years longed*, and in which the blood of our youth is to mingle with that of our comrades of the Axis as a living expression of our solidarity.(Cited in Preston 1993: 441, my italics)

In fact, it seems evident that until the victory of the Allies became increasingly obvious in 1944, the *Generalísimo* attempted to gratify the collective self-love of Spaniards, by presenting himself as the leader who would wipe out the shame of 1898 and guide them to a new age of imperial splendour in which 'the nation' would finally recuperate its lost prestige in the world.

As Pollack and Hunter (1987: 7-9) have pointed out, the Spanish press and educational system reflected 'a notorious pro-Axis bias throughout World War II, and in general, the various

agencies of socialization were used to instil support for the Axis cause.' The discourse of the regime continuously invoked the supposed existence of an international *conjura judeo-masónica* (conspiracy of Jews and freemasons), in order to justify calls for *unidad nacional* (national unity), and promoted the notion of *Hispanidad* – a we-image of Spain as the *Madre Patria* (mother country) of a pan-Iberian movement which included not only Latin America, but also an as yet non-existent, reborn *Imperio Español* which would be built with the generous collaboration of the Axis powers.

The best way to illustrate this initial Francoist attempt to rebuild Spanish national pride with dreams and fantasies of a new empire is by looking at the public ceremonial of the regime during the years in which the eventual triumph of the Axis powers was clearly expected (Preston 1993: 328-330). The mass rituals which followed Franco's victory in the Civil War are particularly illustrative of the obvious efforts to symbolically identify his regime with the nation's past imperial greatness, and hence with a rebirth of this historic glory. After a series of spectacular parades in the major provincial capitals of Andalusia and Valencia which took place from mid-April to mid-May of 1939, the *Generalísimo* received a hero's welcome in the capital, where the main streets had been draped in the red and yellow colours of the Nationalist forces. On May 20, a carefully staged ceremony took place at the basilica of Santa Barbara, in which Franco presented his 'sword of victory' to Cardinal Gomá, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of all Spain. Surrounded by the military relics of Spain's 'heroic crusades' against *los moros* (the Moors), Franco was blessed by the Archbishop and offered the following public prayer to the Spanish nation:

> Lord God, in whose hands is right and all power, lend me thy assistance to lead this people to the full glory of Empire, for thy glory and that of the Church. Lord: may all men know Jesus, who is Christ the son of the Living God. (Cited in Payne 1987: 208)

This emotionally charged political ritual, therefore, was designed to symbolically link Franco's leadership with the authority and guidance of an omnipotent deity who would supposedly lead *la patria* once again to an honourable position of imperial power and global prestige.

Franco's attempt to establish a symbolic association between his regime and the heroic splendour of the Spanish past is also evident if one considers the colossal monument which the *Generalísimo* commissioned in 1940 as a moral homage to those who had fallen in the name of the 'true Spain' during the Civil War. This gigantic mausoleum was to be built in order to evoke the greatness of Spain's imperial age, and hence to link the Franco era with that of the Catholic Kings, Charles V, and Philip II. As Franco himself put it when he publically announced the creation of this national totem:

> The dimension of our Crusade, the heroic sacrifices involved in the victory and the far-reaching significance which this epic has had for the future of Spain cannot be commemorated by the simple monuments by which the outstanding events of our history and the glorious deeds of Spain's sons are normally remembered in towns and villages. The stones to be erected must have the grandeur of the monuments of old, which defy time and forgetfulness... (Cited in Preston 1993: 351)

A few months later, on July 17 1940, the fourth anniversary celebrations of Franco's military uprising, the nation's renewed imperial ambitions were once again proclaimed by its leader:

> We have shed the blood of our dead to make a nation and to create an empire... We have a duty and a mission, the command of Gibraltar, African expansion, and the permanence of a policy of unity... (cited in Preston 1993: 370)

This pretension to recover of Spain's past imperial status was clearly supposed to be achieved through a partnership with Hitler and Mussolini. Franco displayed his identification with the totalitarian powers and their own particular vision of Europe through the slogans, insignias, and rituals adopted during this period by his regime: the raised-arm Fascist salute, the blue shirt, the red and black flag, the slogans *Arriba España* ('Upward Spain') and *Una Patria, Un Estado, Un Caudillo*, evidently an imitation of *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer* (Payne 1987: 171-2).

Spain, however, never formally entered the World War on the side of the Axis powers, and only provided them with logistical support (Halstead 1980: 62). This was mainly due to the fact that the country was in no condition to take part in another conflict after its own Civil War. Nevertheless, Franco was clearly eager to derive territorial benefits from the expected Axis triumph, and for this reason he contemplated entering the war in its final stages. Ultimately,

however, he was disappointed by the fact that Hitler made only vague promises to him about the amount of imperial booty he would receive after the war (Preston 1993: 398-400). In any case, what seems clear is that until the defeat of the Axis became increasingly evident in 1944 – the year when Franco made the symbolically significant gesture of removing the photographs of Hitler and Mussolini which until then had been prominently displayed on his desk (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 13) –, the propaganda of his regime attempted to boost the collective self-love of Spaniards through promises of imperial glory and the rebirth of national prestige within a new 'European order', which would be guided by the totalitarian triumvirate of Germany, Italy, and Spain. The victory of the Allies, however, radically altered Franco's plans of renewed power and grandeur for 'the nation'. Instead, Spain soon found itself completely isolated and excluded from the new post-war international order.

7.3 Spain's international isolation and the birth of the Franco regime's 'European vocation' during the post-war era

During the initial years that followed the end of the World War, the Franco regime was punished, both in a material and a symbolic sense, for its evident collaboration with the defeated Axis powers. Instead of the mythical 'path to empire' which the *Generalísimo* had promised 'the nation', the Spanish regime quickly became an outcast in the new Europe. At the founding conference of the United Nations in June 1945, Spain was not allowed to become a member because of its association and identification with the totalitarian powers. This was ratified at Potsdam in August 1945 and again in March 1946, when a Tripartite Declaration of the US, Britain, and France announced that:

> as long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned. (Cited in Preston 1993: 554)

In April 1948, Spain was also excluded from the Marshall Plan and its Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe, for the very same reasons (Bassols 1995: 14).

During this period of total international ostracism, it is interesting to observe the way in which Franco struggled to preserve his regime's legitimacy by mobilising national we-feelings of collective indignation in mass rituals, as well as through his symbolic monopoly of all media institutions. He repeatedly declared that the hostility of other countries was a conspiracy of the fatherland's foreign enemies, inspired above all by the most dangerous demons in the Francoist imagination: 'freemasons' and 'reds'. It was even suggested that in fact, all of this was really due to the pitiful envy of those who could not bear Spain's glorious rebirth in the world after the triumphant victory of his forces in the Civil War (Preston 1993: 535). Resisting international opposition to the regime was thus presented as a matter of national dignity, honour, and survival. As Armero (1978: 68) puts it:

> (Franco) did everything he could to maintain his power, and he successfully stirred up the enthusiasm and patriotism of Spaniards in order to do so... Francoist propaganda constructed, for many years, the theory that the world despised us, that it persecuted us, and that it wanted to interfere in our sovereign decisions.

In December 1946, when the possibility of implementing sanctions against Spain was being discussed in the United Nations, the regime organised a series of massive 'patriotic demonstrations of national irritation', which culminated in a huge rally in the *Plaza de Oriente* of Madrid, where about 700,000 people assembled to hear their *Generalísimo*, chanting slogans against the Russians, the French, and foreigners in general. Franco, constantly interrupted by the defeaning applause of his supporters, denounced 'those abroad who speculate with your loyalty and our domestic peace' and suggested that 'the proof of Spain's resurgence is the fact that the rest of the world is dangling from out feet' (cited in Preston 1993: 561). Four days later, in another public ceremony held in Zaragoza to commemorate the heroic resistance of Spanish patriots against the Napoleonic invasion, Franco affirmed the superiority of his political principles and claimed that, from both a moral and a social perspective, Spain was 'ten years ahead of other nations' (cited in Preston 1993: 562).

The point is that during these years of harsh international hostility, Franco constantly manipulated Spanish national we-feelings against 'foreign enemies' in order to maintain the legitimacy of his rule, and it cannot be denied that to a considerable extent, he succeeded. According to Payne (1987: 357), 'there is little doubt that much of moderate Spanish opinion rallied to the regime during its period of ostracism.' At the same time, this same rhetoric of national strength, sovereignty, and unity in the face of foreign hostility was also invoked to legitimate the regime's disastrous economic programme of national autarky. During these initial post-war years, a policy of centralised economic control, import substitution and economic protectionism through high tariff walls, was also presented as a heroic defence of national independence and autonomous patriotic regeneration, in the face of a hostile, envious external world. The 'Spanish nation', it was claimed, was 'manly' enough to make itself powerful and prosperous, without having to resort to foreigners and make itself dependent on anyone. According to Richards (1996: 149), 'autarky, the state's strategy of economic self-sufficiency, can be explained by the particular conception of the nation which the regime sought to foster' – in other words, a nation that could stand proudly on its own and become *una, grande y libre* ('one, great, and free') in isolation. However, by the early 1950's, the undeniable truth was that autarky had in fact led the Spanish *patria* to total economic despair: 'There simply were not enough raw materials, goods, and services produced within the country to maintain even a Third World level of existence' (Arango 1995: 18). It was in this drastic situation of widespread penury and hunger that the United States provided Franco with a new vital source of money, national prestige, and moral legitimation, by making Spain an honourable partner in the Western world's Cold War crusade against the the 'threatening Other' of Soviet Communism.

In September 1953, the American government and the Franco regime signed an agreement by which Spain would receive over one billion dollars of aid over a period of eight years, in return for allowing the establishment of US military bases on its territory. Two years later, Spain was admitted into the United Nations, and hence the days of total international ostracism came to an end. Franco's moral authority and his claim to be 'the nation's' saviour thus received a crucial

boost after the economic deal was struck with the Americans. This was typically proclaimed through a series of mass public ceremonies, while the official Francoist press claimed that the rest of the world was 'speechless with admiration' (cited in Preston 1993: 625). All of this culminated in the ritual apotheosis of President Eisenhower's visit to Spain in December 1959, which included spectacular parades and warm public embraces with Franco (Preston 1993: 680-1, Payne 1987 458-9). The objective was evidently to depict the *Generalísimo* as the leader who had led Spain to an alliance with the world's greatest power, in order to cooperate in its noble moral mission against the 'cancer' of Marxism. As I noted in my introduction to this chapter, it was this reincorporation of Spain into the 'Western family' which gradually led to the regime's definitive abandonment of autarky, and to the pragmatic adoption of a new programme of capitalist development and international trade.

After the agreement with the United States was signed, the *Generalísimo* began to marginalise the falangist wing of his ruling coalition, and increasingly placed economic affairs in the hands of a group of young technocrats, most of whom belonged to a lay Catholic organization known as the Opus Dei (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 133). After a government reshuffle in 1957, three members of Opus Dei – Alberto Ullastres, Mariano Navarro Rubio, and Laureano López Rodó – held key positions in economic affairs as Ministers of Commerce, *Hacienda* (taxation and budget), and Planning. Most of these men had been trained in the leading business schools of the USA, France, and Great Britain, and they all believed that Spain had to be modernized through the liberalization of the Spanish economy and its integration into the international market system. As Arango (1995: 71) has put it, the Opus Dei technocrats 'shared philosophical convictions that reconciled modern capitalism with Catholicism.' In particular, they felt that entry into the European Economic Community was a vital necessity for Spanish interests, and hence it was within this new context that the regime's so-called 'European vocation' was born. General Franco, the defender of 'autarkic national independence' and the opponent of 'Europeanizing liberals', was about to make some pragmatic concessions to ideas which had previously been classified as 'anti-Spanish'.

It is crucial to stress, however, that the economic liberalization supported by the new ruling elite of technocrats was in no way supposed to imply any type of reform in the political sphere. Initially, Franco was in fact quite reluctant about abandoning autarky and accepting the economic policies of his new ministers, since he feared that foreign investment and international commerce could easily open the door to dangerous 'alien' influences from abroad. According to Payne (1987: 470), the finance minister Rubio appealed to Franco's sense of patriotism and national pride in order to convince him of the need for economic change. After going through a vast number of technical arguments and data, Rubio insisted that no other alternative existed in order to save Spain from poverty and his government from bankruptcy. Franco thus eventually agreed to allow this new economic phase in the evolution of his regime, as long as it did not imply any fundamental political changes.

The implementation of this technocratic development plan soon proved to be an enormous success from the economic perspective, with Spain accomplishing growth rates during the 1960's exceeded only by Japan (Carr and Fusi 1981: 49). This material prosperity provided the regime's ideologues and propagandists with a new discourse of legitimation which now invoked the increasing living standards and consumer comforts of 'the nation'. Within the framework of this new economic policy of liberalization and internationalization, Spain joined the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development between 1958 and 1959. However, in relation to the EEC, Franco was particularly worried about the possibility that an approximation towards the Common Market could be used by his opponents as an ideal opportunity to put international pressure on his regime and force him to implement political reforms. According to Preston (1993: 700), he regarded the EEC as 'a fief of freemasons, liberals, and Christian-Democrats.' In fact, until the early 1960's Franco and his supporters had publically attacked 'Europeanism' (Payne 1987: 528), which in their minds clearly continued to have a symbolic association with the dangers of modern liberalism. One book written by a regime propagandist stated that 'European integration is a work of anti-Spain to favour the masonic and capitalist

powers' (cited in Alvarez de Miranda 1985: 24). Another article published in the regime-controlled *Journal of Political Studies* claimed that 'the criteria of selection for European organizations is a consequence of a Marxist conspiracy which, to dominate Europe more effectively, aims to exclude Catholic parties' (cited in Alvarez de Miranda 1985: 24). In the discourse of Francoism, as I have already suggested, the only concept of 'Europe' which so far had been officially acceptable was the idea of a community of Christian values which the regime had always defended, by protecting it from the twin threats of liberalism and communism. As Franco put it in his ritualized 'New Year's Message the Nation' of 1958: 'If some day Europe manages to recover its integrity, its soul, and its mission, it shall owe this first of all to the Spanish crusade' (Franco 1975: 782).

Nevertheless, Franco's new team of technocratic ministers was completely convinced that Spain's incorporation into the European Common Market was a vital component of their scheme for the country's economic development. Hence, Franco ultimately authorized the Spanish foreign minister, Fernando María Castiella, to officially request entry into the EEC (Payne 1987: 529). He did so 'with the greatest reluctance' (Preston 1993: 700), but it seems clear that he did not really have much of a choice, considering the fact that his team of technocrats warned him that otherwise the consequences for the Spanish economy would be dire. Nevertheless, Franco had already made it clear that the regime's approximation to 'Europe' would be limited to economics, and that this would in no way alter the political principles of his regime. What arose, therefore, was the propagation of a new discourse on 'Europe': a 'European vocation' which focused exclusively on the economic interests of 'the nation' with regard to the 'Common Market'. In a public address delivered in Burgos on 1 October 1961, which commemmorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Franco's proclamation as Head of State, the *Generalísimo* defined the extent of his 'Europeanism' as follows:

> The transcendental fact of the movements towards European economic integration are being taken into account for our development... Spain must progress at the same rhythm as Europe, it must adapt itself to the economic and social programmes of the world, but it must also conserve, without intrusions or conditions, its political stability and its national independence. For this reason, any possibility of integration has to be analyzed taking into account that the Spanish economy will not suffer disadvantages in any of its basic sectors,

> and always respecting the continuity of the political institutions to which Spain owes its current living standards, its growing reputation abroad, and its firm international position. (Cited in La Porte 1992: 292)

Hence, Franco showed his support for the project of European integration and Spain's incorporation into the Common Market as long as 'the nation' did not suffer any sort of economic harm. At the same time, since in his discourse the 'good of the nation' was presented as totally inseparable from his own leadership and the supposedly incomparable guidance of his regime, 'joining Europe' was acceptable only as long as it did not imply any political changes in Spain. As the quotation cited above suggests, according to Franco 'the nation' owed to his regime's political institutions 'its current living standards, its growing reputation abroad, and its firm international position.' Hence, from this official perspective, the Common Market was vital to 'the national interest', but it would be absurd to suggest any political reforms in order to 'join Europe', since it was the Franco regime which had successfully boosted the collective influence, prosperity and prestige of 'the nation' in the first place.

7.4 The 1962 application to 'enter Europe': a 'transcendental milestone for the future of Spain'

On 9 February 1962, the Spanish state officially requested the possibility of associating itself with the European Economic Community. A letter written by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, was presented to Maurice Couve de Murville, at that time president of the Council of Ministers of the EEC. It stated that

> Spain's European vocation, repeatedly confirmed throughout its history, has once again found an occasion to manifest itself at this moment when the path towards integration is transforming into reality the ideal of European solidarity. (Cited in La Porte 1992: 326-7)

The Spanish state requested 'an association, susceptible to the possibility of eventually reaching a full integration' into the EEC. Hence, the Franco regime publically presented the aim of 'entering Europe' as an important aspiration for 'the nation', which in this way could continue

on its current path of economic growth and prosperity. In this official discourse, 'Europe' therefore stood for a crucial objective which would benefit the economic interests of 'the nation', and in this sense it became an important national goal which was fully sanctioned and supported by the Francoist propaganda. The regime clearly hoped that acceptance into the EEC club would add further moral legitimacy to it, after the boost that had already been provided by the American agreement and the entry into the United Nations.

The best way to illustrate this is by looking at the legitimating discourse with which the main national newspapers presented Spain's request to 'enter Europe'. Considering the fact that the press was controlled by strict official censorship until the final years of the dictatorship, one can thereby consider the ways in which the Franco regime attempted to promote its 'Europeanism' amongst the Spanish people through the symbolic channels of the media. It is first of all noteworthy that on the two days that followed the presentation of the request, the main newspapers gave prominent first-page treatment to this event. Dailies such as the falangist *Arriba*, the conservative-monarchist *ABC*, and the church-controlled *Ya* all presented the regime's decision as a crucial decision for Spain's future, a vital move for the country's economic development and its further incorporation into the 'Western family'. This was therefore a time in which 'Europe' and its 'Common Market' became basic ingredients in the regime's attempt to legitimate itself through a new symbolic framework which stressed Spain's successful economic growth and improved international standing.

Arriba, for instance, entitled its main front-page story on 10 February 'SPAIN REQUESTS ITS ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMON MARKET' [reproduced on the following page], and published the entire text of the Spanish Foreign Minister's letter to the EEC's Council of Ministers. In another article, entitled 'FAVOURABLE RECEPTION IN EUROPE', this newspaper's Brussels correspondent called the event a 'transcendental milestone for the future of Spain' and noted the 'satisfaction' with which the letter had been received in the main EEC headquarters. He also referred to the enormously cordial way in which all the 'serious' Belgian newspapers (i.e. those that were not 'socialist' or 'communist') had reported on Spain's request,

Arriba

Núm. 9.119.—II época.—Madrid, sábado 10 de febrero de 1962

FUNDADO POR JOSE ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA—ORGANO DE F. E. T. Y DE LAS J. O. N. S.—LARRA, 14—[illegible]

ESPAÑA SOLICITA SU ASOCIACION AL MERCADO COMUN

NUESTRO EMBAJADOR EN BRUSELAS ENTREGO LA PETICION AL CONSEJO DE MINISTROS DE LA COMUNIDAD ECONOMICA EUROPEA

EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL ESPERA SEAN CONSIDERADOS LOS ASPECTOS AGRICOLAS Y LAS RELACIONES ECONOMICAS CON LOS PAISES IBEROAMERICANOS

La Oficina de Información Diplomática del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores ha facilitado la siguiente nota:

«En cumplimiento de la acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo de Ministros, el excelentísimo señor conde de Casa Miranda, embajador de España acreditado ante el Mercado Común, ha hecho entrega ayer en Bruselas de una carta del Ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores dirigida al presidente del Consejo de ministros de la Comunidad Económica europea solicitando la apertura de negociaciones en orden a una posible incorporación de España a dicha Comunidad.

El citado documento dice así:

Madrid, 9 de febrero de 1962.

exportaciones agrícolas a los países de la Comunidad constituyen un capítulo fundamental del comercio exterior español, cuyo mantenimiento y aumento son de la mayor importancia para cumplir con los medios de pago sin los cuales debe desarrollo se vería dificultado, mi Gobierno no duda de que ese aspecto será debidamente considerado en la vasta tarea de que se podrán encontrar soluciones mutuamente satisfactorias.

Otro de interés manifestado por su Gobierno está convencido de que los pactos que unen a España con los países americanos no han de sufrir merma con su integración a la Comunidad, antes al contrario pueden ser una positiva contribución para resolver los problemas planteados entre aquellos y ésta.

En consecuencia, espero, señor presidente, que las autoridades de la Comunidad darán buena acogida a la solicitud de negociaciones que formulo, cuyo desenlace, entre tanto, acepte las seguridades de mi alta consideración.

Fdo.: Fernando M.ª Castiella.»

FAVORABLE ACOGIDA EN EUROPA

ESPECIAL SATISFACCION EN BRUSELAS, SEDE DEL MERCADO COMUN

Por JESUS VALLE

BRUSELAS.—A las diez en punto de la mañana de este viernes 9 de febrero de 1962, fecha que ha de quedar destacada a marcar un hito trascendental para el futuro de España, el conde de Casa Miranda, como embajador acreditado cerca de la Comunidad Económica Europea, ha hecho entrega al secretario general del Consejo de [illegible]

[illegible] la Comunidad una carta [illegible] del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores don Fernando María Castiella, el mismo conde de Mayalde, [illegible]

CONSEJO DE MINISTROS

INFORME SOBRE LA POSIBLE ASOCIACION

Ante el Mercado Común

"LA APORTACION DE ESPAÑA ES VALIOSA"

—dice "L' Aurore"

"España considera el porvenir con confianza y reclama el puesto que le corresponde"

PARIS.—«España acaba de dar un paso formidable», dice «Le Monde» en un artículo titulado «España, a las puertas del Mercado Común». Es —añade— como el último paso de un largo camino iniciado en 1953 con el acuerdo militar firmado con los Estados Unidos para acercarse a la comunidad de los pueblos atlánticos. Este retorno se ha caracterizado

(Continúa en la página 9.)

SATISFACCION EUROPEA

CRONICAS DE BRUSELAS, BONN Y LISBOA

(Página 9)

Arriba, 10-11 February 1962

applauding the economic reforms which were bringing the country up to the levels enjoyed by the rest of Europe. This favourable response was supported by a report from the Bonn correspondent, who claimed that in Germany 'the presence of Spain [in the EEC] had been missed.' On the following day, this sense of international cordiality and favourable receptiveness to Spain's new 'European vocation' continued on the front page of *Arriba*, which in massive print quoted a statemente from the French newspaper *L'Aurore*: 'THE CONTRIBUTION OF SPAIN IS VALUABLE'. A sub-title further quoted this newspaper as saying 'Spain looks to the future with confidence and claims the position which rightfully belongs to it', and another article beckoned the reader to read more on page 9 about the 'EUROPEAN SATISFACTION' which the correspondents from Brussels, Bonn, and Lisbon had witnessed and written about. That day, *Arriba* also included an explanatory text which described the history and nature of the EEC as an organization with 'an economic potential which places it in the top position of the world, followed by the United States and the USSR.' The newspaper's writers further insisted in yet another article that the Spanish request was receiving 'Commentaries of praise in the world's press'. The objective of such discourse was clearly to ignite the Spanish people's we-feelings of national vanity, and thereby to boost the popularity of the Franco regime, through the supposedly widespread signs of admiration and deference which Spain was receiving throughout Europe and the world.

A very similar discursive tone was evident in the representation of this 'national event' in other important newspapers. *ABC* also devoted its front page on February 10 and 11 to Spain's official request to participate in the EEC. The first day's headline was 'SPAIN REQUESTS AN ASSOCIATION TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY' [reproduced on the following page], which was followed on the next day by the claim that 'SPAIN HAS TAKEN ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP IN ITS INCORPORATION TO THE WESTERN FAMILY' [reproduced on the following page]. As in *Arriba*, numerous articles stressed the 'favourable reception' which Spain's intentions had received all over Europe, as well as in the United States, and published articles illustrated by figures that showed the 'triumph of the Common Market'

MADRID, SABADO 10 DE FEBRERO DE 1962 - EJEMPLAR 1,50 PESETAS

ABC

DEPOSITO LEGAL - M. 13 - 1958

DIARIO ILUSTRADO AÑO QUINCUAGESIMO QUINTO. NUM. 17.445 80 PAGINAS

ESPAÑA SOLICITA LA ASOCIACION CON LA COMUNIDAD ECONOMICA EUROPEA

SE MENCIONA EN LA SOLICITUD LA POSIBILIDAD DE LLEGAR "A LA PLENA INTEGRACION, SALVADAS LAS ETAPAS INDISPENSABLES PARA QUE LA ECONOMIA ESPAÑOLA PUEDA ALINEARSE CON LAS CONDICIONES DEL MERCADO COMUN"

TAMBIEN AFIRMA EL DOCUMENTO QUE LAS RELACIONES DE ESPAÑA CON LOS PAISES AMERICANOS NO SUFRIRAN MENGUA Y PUEDEN SER UNA POSITIVA CONTRIBUCION PARA RESOLVER LOS PROBLEMAS PLANTEADOS ENTRE AQUELLOS Y LA COMUNIDAD

La Oficina de Información Diplomática, del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, ha facilitado la siguiente nota:

«En cumplimiento de un acuerdo adoptado por el Consejo de Ministros, el conde de Casa Miranda, embajador de España, acreditado ante el Mercado Común, ha hecho entrega hoy en Bruselas de una carta del ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores dirigida al presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la Comunidad Económica Europea, solicitando la apertura de negociaciones en orden a una posible integración de España en la misma.»

El citado documento dice así:

"Madrid, 9 de febrero de 1962.

Excmo. Sr. Maurice Couve de Murville, presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la Comunidad Económica Europea.

Señor presidente:



MADRID, DOMINGO 11 DE FEBRERO DE 1962 - EJEMPLAR TRES PESETAS

ABC

DEPOSITO LEGAL - M. 13 - 1958

DIARIO ILUSTRADO AÑO QUINCUAGESIMO QUINTO. NUM. 17.446 92 PAGINAS

ESPAÑA HA DADO OTRO PASO IMPORTANTE EN SU INCORPORACION A LA FAMILIA OCCIDENTAL

LA PETICION PARA ASOCIARSE AL MERCADO COMUN DEMUESTRA EL INDISCUTIBLE MEJORAMIENTO DE NUESTRA ECONOMIA

"Los españoles desean demostrar su vocación europea"

DECLARACIONES DEL SEÑOR ULLASTRES A TRAVES DE RADIO NACIONAL SOBRE LA INCORPORACION DE ESPAÑA AL MERCADO COMUN

El ministro de Comercio, don Alberto Ullastres, hizo ayer las siguientes declaraciones en la "Ultima hora de la actualidad" de Radio Nacional de España:

"El paso que acaba de dar el Gobierno español, bajo la directa inspiración del Caudillo, significa, simplemente, que consadera que ha llegado el momento que estaba ya en la mente de todos, un

Washington 10. (Crónica de nuestro corresponsal, por "telex".) Los círculos financieros internacionales de esta capital acogen hoy con interés y complacencia la noticia de la petición de asociación hecha por España a la Comunidad Económica Europea. La Prensa recoge la noticia con amplitud y detalle. El "Times", de Nueva York, publica en primera página un largo despacho de uno de sus corresponsales en París, subrayando la importancia del paso que acaba de dar el Gobierno de Madrid, que considera de "grandes consecuencias políticas y económicas para España y para Europa."

La petición española es interpretada aquí en dos aspectos. Uno de tipo político-económico occidental, que al contribuir a la futura unión económica de todo el occidente europeo refuerza la posición de la Administración norteamericana hacia la liberalización de tarifas y el intercambio competitivo con el Mercado Común Europeo. La batalla de las tarifas y la política de puertas abiertas a la competencia europea constituye en este momento uno de los grandes objetivos de la Casa Blanca y los asesores económicos del presidente Kennedy.

positivo beneficio inmediato para sus productos agrícolas de exportación, el 85 por 100 de los cuales va a los países del Mercado Común y a Inglaterra.

En resumen, los observadores internacionales de esta capital estiman hoy que la petición española de asociación con el Mercado Común es una demostración más de la estabilidad y el ajuste general de la economía del país a las realidades económicas—y a la prosperidad—de Occidente.

José María MASSIP

ABC, February 10-11, 1962

from an economic perspective. Other news headings stressed ideas such as the 'EUROPEAN VOCATION OF SPAIN', its 'SPECTACULAR EVOLUTION' in the economic sphere, and the 'HISTORIC DECISION' which its government had taken. *ABC* also cited the full text of a statement given by the Minister of Commerce, Alberto Ullastres, to the main Spanish national radio station, in which the decision was described as 'one more landmark in Spain's trajectory of European and international integration.'

The very same discourse of national excitement was also visible in the coverage of *Ya*, which entitled its 10 February front-page headline 'EXCELLENT RECEPTION TO THE POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION OF SPAIN TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET'. This newspaper cited numerous Spanish bankers and businessmen who stressed the enormous economic benefits which entry into the EEC would bring to Spain, and reiterated the cordial attitude of the European and American press. In an emotionally charged editorial entitled 'Towards the Common Market', *Ya* stated:

> Not only history but also today's reality illustrate to a great degree the European vocation of Spain. And, indeed, we can assure that, following the political imperatives of its own national policy, the Spanish state will be an ideal and vigorous collaborator in the great task of building a powerful Europe which will be capable of resisting the Soviet threat and emerge as a model of cohesion and economic and cultural splendour for the world.

On February 15, another editorial stressed the 'great opportunity' for the nation's economy which an association with the EEC represented, and assured that thanks to the regime's decision to request the opening of negotiations with Brussels, 'Spain has not failed to catch the bus.'

One can clearly sense, therefore, the sort of 'emotional climate' (Barbalet 1998) which was created by the Francoist media's symbolic depiction of the official request to 'enter Europe' and of Spain's new 'European vocation.' The Common Market was presented as a crucial national aspiration, a vital step forward in the consolidation of the country's economic growth, and hence the resurgence of its international prestige. The days of imperial fantasy and heroic resistance in the face of external hostility were over. Following the agreement with the United States and the adoption of the technocratic programme for economic development, a new national we-image

was developed by the Franco's propagandists, which above all stressed the rise of living standards and Spain's proud reincorporation into the 'Western family'. As Pereira Castañares and Moreno Juste (1991a: 139) have put it, the regime elaborated 'new legitimating myths to replace the old postwar version' of the national we-image, based on the idea of 'efficacy' and the possibility of participating in the world's most powerful and prestigious economic bloc. The new source of collective pride was to be the rise of Spain to 'European' levels of growth, comfort, and status. It is undoubtedly noteworthy, however, that the controlled press of the regime made absolutely no references to the political gulf which separated the Spanish dictatorship from the other member states of the EEC, and selectively concentrated only on the 'favourable' and 'cordial' responses which the request had elicited in some conservative European newspapers. The situation depicted was one in which 'the nation', under the incomparable guidance of its *Generalísimo*, was firmly on course to enter a 'Europe' which welcomed it with open arms. As La Porte (1992: 334) puts it, 'the future was seen with great optimism... The issue was treated from the purely economic perspective, avoiding all references to the political principles which had inspired the [EEC] organization.'

The Franco regime, however, would soon discover that 'joining Europe' would not be as easy as receiving the warm embrace of Uncle Sam. Only a few days before the Spanish request had been officially put forward, on 25 January 1962, the European Parliament approved a report on the political conditions required for adhesion into the EEC, written by the German socialist Willi Birkelbach, which asserted that 'democratic forms of government' were 'a necessary condition' for admission into the EEC. A few weeks later, in a session held on 19 February, Birkelbach himself proposed a motion against the Spanish request, due to the fact that the Franco regime lacked democratic legitimacy, and guaranteed neither basic political freedoms nor the protection of human rights. In a plenary session of the European Parliament held on 29 March, the socialists once again protested against Spain's petition, arguing that the adhesion of a dictatorial regime to the EEC would betray the ideals of the Treaty of Rome and seriously diminish its prestige. As one might have expected, this opposition to the Franco regime's

ambition to enter the EEC without implementing any political reforms was completely silenced in the Spanish national press (La Porte 1992: 342-356). The official response of the EEC's Council of Ministers to the Spanish state's petition was therefore a cold statement on 7 March, which simply acknowledged the reception of the letter in which the request had been made (Bassols 1995: 38). Although this was a time in which Charles De Gaulle's concept of a *Europe des patries* favoured the possible acceptance of the Spanish regime, and in fact the French leader was attracted to the idea of gaining Franco's cooperation in the construction of a merely inter-governmental European alliance which would be independent from the United States (Armero 1978: 87-88), the authoritarian character of the Spanish regime ultimately made it impossible for Spain to be accepted into the EEC.

During this same period, the Franco regime began to face a period of social unrest. A series of major strikes in Asturias, León, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa began to undermine its legitimacy, and the repressive measures with which the armed forces responded simply served to further weaken the Spanish state's case for an association with the EEC (La Porte 1992: 381). Franco, nevertheless, was unwilling to budge on the political front, and continued to fight on with his constant invocations of the Spanish nation's supposed superiority, and the righteousness of its moral mission in the Western world. On 27 May 1962, he delievered an emotive speech in Madrid in which he insisted:

> We are the most important point of Western political resistance; we are the country in which, thanks to your efforts, Communism has been defeated for the first time... If we do not want to lose this glory, we must resign ourselves to become the target of its attacks. Liberalism is one of the principal doors through which Communism penetrates, and they will not forgive us for having closed that door and that path... Our apparent lack of adjustment with the rest of the world is only temporary. One day soon we will see how they all come towards us on the same road which we cleared. (Cited in La Porte 1992: 396)

The *Generalísimo* thus continued to defend a Spanish we-image whose great emotive source of collective pride was its morally worthy goal of leading the rest of the world to 'see the light': liberalism and communism were the worst possible evils which any country could suffer, and hence the Francoist political system was clearly at the vanguard of economic, social, and ethical

progress. Why, then, should anyone want to change anything, why should anyone want to imitate other nations who had not yet converted to this virtuous cause? Nevertheless, in spite of the regime's total monopoly of all the official media institutions of symbolic power, other rival we-images of Spain were beginning to develop and spread. In particular, many of those Spaniards who opposed Francoism, both within the country and in exile abroad, were increasingly beginning to unify under the symbolic banner of 'Europeanism' – a 'Europeanism' which in their minds was not limited purely to national economic interests, but which also stood for the overthrow of a 'shameful, anachronistic dictatorship' and hence for Spain's recuperation of liberty, democracy, and moral self-esteem.

7.5 The Munich affair: 'Europe' as a unifying symbol for the anti-Francoist opposition

From the moment the process of European integration began to take shape after the World War, many opponents of Franco's authoritarian system immediately saw the development of a peaceful unification of the continent as an opportunity to put international pressure on the regime, in order to overthrow Franco and accomplish the democratization of Spain. The 'new Europe' of the victorious Allies was one which aimed to overcome the disastrous consequences of totalitarianism and nationalist aggression, through a gradual process of supranational integration. Hence, within the symbolic framework of this new project, Franco, the old partner of Hitler and Mussolini, was widely regarded as a shameful anachronism, as a frightening reminder of the frightening 'Europe' that could have been. Within Spain, as I have already noted, 'Europeanization' had in any case already become a symbol of 'democracy' and 'modernity' during the years that followed the 1898 'disaster'. After Franco's triumph in the Civil War, it seems evident this symbolic ideal of 'Europe' continued to play the same role amongst Spaniards who opposed the victorious forces of authoritarian conservatism represented by Francoism, and who wished to pursue their own patriotic vision of Spanish nationhood.

In May 1948, Spanish exiles participated in the international conference in The Hague where the ideals of a post-war European unification were put forward by Winston Churchill, who

argued that non-democratic single party systems should be automatically excluded from the 'new united Europe'. During the course of this reunion, the prestigious Spanish politician and intellectual Salvador de Madariaga – who had played a prominent role in the Second Republic, as well as in the League of Nations – delivered an impassioned address in which he envisioned the emergence of a future European patriotism that would devote itself above all to the preservation of Europe's cultural treasures:

> Above all we must love Europe; our Europe, sonorous with the roaring laughter of Rabelais, luminous with the smile of Erasmus, sparkling with the wit of Voltaire; in whose mental skies shine the fiery eyes of Dante, the clear eyes of Shakespeare, the serene eyes of Goethe, the tormented eyes of Dostoievski; this Europe to whom La Gioconda for ever smiles, where Moses and David spring to perennial life from Michelangelo's marble, and Bach's genius rises spontaneous to be caught in his intellectual geometry; where Hamlet seeks in thought the mystery of his inaction, and Faust seeks in action comfort for the void of his thought; where Don Juan seeks in women met the woman never found, and Don Quixote, spear in hand, gallops to force reality to rise above itself; this Europe where Newton and Leibniz measure the infinitesimal, and the Cathedrals, as Musset once wrote, pray on their knees in their robes of stone; where rivers, silver threads, link together strings of cities, jewels wrought in the crystal of space by the chisel of time... This Europe must be born. And she will, when Spaniards say 'our Chartres', Englishmen 'our Cracow', Italians 'our Copenhagen'; when Germans say 'our Bruges', and step back horror-stricken at the idea of laying a murderous hand on it. Then Europe will live, for then it will be that the Spirit that leads history will have uttered the creative words: FIAT EUROPA! (Madariaga 1952: 2-3, cited in Puntscher Riekmann 1997: 66)

Following this meeting, Madariaga and other anti-Francoist exiles founded the Federal Spanish Council of the European Movement (Tusell 1977: 385). This association, which included representatives from many different political tendencies, denounced the repressive nature of the Franco dictatorship in international forums. For instance, when in 1957 the possibility of Spain being accepted into NATO was discussed, it published the following manifesto:

> We, Spanish citizens who have been deprived of the exercise of our citizenship by a military dictatorship, wish to warn NATO that the entrance of Franco's Spain into this organization would demolish its moral authority.(Cited in Tusell 1977: 386).

Of course, the existence of such 'Europeanist' protest movements abroad was completely concealed from the Spanish population by the regime. Nevertheless, in spite of the total monopolization of all media institutions, even within Spain the Francoist propaganda could not

prevent the development of symbolic challenges to its own official visions of 'the nation' and of 'Spanish patriotism'. In 1954, a society known as the Spanish Association of European Cooperation was founded by a group of moderate nonconformists, who timidly began to oppose the regime by reference to the democratic principles of 'Europeanism'. Fernando Alvarez de Miranda (1985: 24), one of the men who participated in this movement from its earliest origins, writes that during this period, 'European unification became an inevitable point of reference for all of those who supported democratic and liberal values'. The development of this protest movement led to the fact that in the language of the regime's propagandists, the accusation of being a 'Europeanist' became practically synonymous with that of being a 'Communist' (1985: 25). Hence, not only among exiled democrats, but also within some elite minority groups in Spain itself, the possibility of bringing Spain closer to a democratic Europe was seen as a way 'to escape the asphyxiating political gag of Francoism' (1985: 26). As I have shown, the regime's official 'European vocation' was limited to the economic benefits of taking part in the Common Market, while fervently rejecting the need for adopting the supposedly 'dangerous' and 'inferior' political institutions of liberalism. In opposition to this discourse, however, a rival 'Europeanism' arose which openly stood for the rejection of a 'backwards' regime and for the 'democratization' of Spain. These rebel 'Europeanists' viewed the Franco regime as something that Spaniards should be ashamed of and attempt to overcome, in order to recover their collective pride through the recuperation of the basic freedoms and rights which had been denied to them.

In 1961, the Spanish Association of European Cooperation attempted to organize a 'Europeanist Week', in association with the International Secretariat of the European Movement, presided by Robert Schuman, which was to take place during the month of September in Palma de Mallorca. Ultimately, however, the regime's officials decided to suspend this reunion, fearing that it could receive dangerous publicity and harm Franco's image (Tussell 1977: 394). Nevertheless, the celebration of the IV Congress of the European movement, which took place in Munich from 5 to 8 June 1962, provided an ideal opportunity for moderate anti-Francoist opponents from both within the country and in exile abroad to unify under the symbolic banner

of 'Europeanism' against the dictatorship and its official paradigm of Spanish national greatness. Monarchists, Christian democrats, repentant falangists, and others from inside Spain met exiled socialists, liberals, and Basque and Catalan nationalists in what was to become one of the most notable gestures of organized political opposition during the Franco years (Payne 1987: 500-01, Preston 1993: 702-3). The meeting took place only four months after the regime had officially requested to enter the EEC, and its aim was therefore to promote the idea that only democratic reforms would allow Spain to gain full recognition and acceptance by the European Community. Salvador de Madariaga, the veteran anti-Francoist opponent from the exiled group, addressed the assembled delegates as follows:

> Europe is not only a Common Market and the price of coal and steel; it is also and above all a common faith and the price of Man and of liberty... Should not Europe consider it essential for public life to circulate with full freedom among all its members? And if madame de Sévigné could write to her daughter: 'your stomach hurts me', cannot Europe say to Spain: 'your dictatorship hurts me'? (Cited in Tussell 1977: 395)

José María Gil Robles, a Christian democrat leader who had come to the Munich meeting from within Spain, declared that, contrary to Franco's claim that the Spanish nation needed authoritarian discipline in order to avoid a descent into total anarchy and chaos:

> The Spaniards who have come here are convinced that there is no incompatibility between the Spanish people and the ideals of democracy. We are convinced that we are capable of establishing and maintaining a political system based on the awareness and effective guarantee of essential liberties, from the freedom of expression to the freedom of labour unions, in accordance with the principle of political self-determination, which may again allow the Spanish people to be in control of their own destiny. (Cited in Tussell 1977: 395)

At the end of the reunion, the Spanish participants signed a joint manifesto which asserted that adhesion to the European Communities should necessarily compel every member state to establish genuinely representative and democratic institutions, to guarantee basic human rights, to recognize the distinct 'cultural personality' of the different 'natural communities' of Spain, to permit the free organization of labour unions, as well as their right to strike, and to permit the organization of political parties (Bassols 1995: 42).

Hence, for the first time since the Civil War, Spaniards from across much of the political spectrum had joined forces to oppose the Franco dictatorship and demand democratic reforms under the common unifying symbol of 'Europeanism'. Once again, it should be stressed that these Spanish 'Europeanists' were clearly as motivated by an emotive patriotic sensitivity towards 'the nation' as Francoists were with their own passionate adherence to Spain's 'Christian mission' in the world. As Alvarez de Miranda, who participated in the Munich meeting, has written: 'we also insisted in our profound love for the *patria*... not for one moment did I doubt the sincerity of my posture, of its utility for Spain' (1985: 38). Hence, these were men who wanted to recuperate national pride and self-esteem by pushing forward process of complete democratization in Spain. Without such a political transformation, in their view the desired entry into 'Europe' and the achievement of a 'European' status would never be possible. In other words, what is observable here is the continuining confrontation between two rival, incompatible, emotionally charged we-images of 'the nation' and its role in 'Europe': the official one represented by the Franco regime and its 'European/Christian' crusade against liberalism and communism, in opposition to the rebellious one represented by the democratic 'Europeanizers' and their attempt to recover national self-respect through the recovery of political liberty.

The regime, however, was perfectly aware of the dangers which this unity of the moderate opposition could represent for its survival, and hence it quickly reacted with severe repressive measures. Many of the delegates from the interior were arrested or sent into exile for their participation in the Munich meeting. One of the articles in the so-called *Fuero de los Españoles*, the regime's cosmetic charter of rights, was immediately suspended. In this way, the Francoist state's authorities were legally empowered to suspend the rights of residence of some of the participants, and to confine them in the remote island of Fuerteventura, in the Canary archipelago, as a form of exemplary punishment. Furthermore, the regime organized a massive propaganda campaign in the media, which mobilized collective sentiments of national outrage against these 'filthy traitors', who had 'betrayed the fatherland' and jeopardized its vitally

important attempts to enter the European Economic Community. The discourse which was employed in the main national newspapers during the days which followed the Munich reunion is worth analysing in some detail, for it is highly charged with constant emotive invocations of *la patria*, and the despicable way in which it had been 'insulted', 'sold out to foreign enemies', and 'stabbed in the back' by this group of 'treacherous conspirators'.

On 9 June, *Arriba*, *ABC*, and *Ya* all published a report in their front pages which was disseminated by EFE, the state's official press agency [reproduced on the following page]. It defined the Munich reunion as *El Contubernio de la Traición* ('The Collusion of Treason') and *Una Maniobra Indigna Contra España* ('A Contemptible Stratagem Against Spain'). The men who had participated in the event were described as 'protagonists of the circumstances which led Spain to the Civil War', and their 'theatrical reconciliation' was defined as a 'ridiculous conspiracy' against 'the nation'. They were accused of wanting to demonstrate that Spain was 'essentially anti-European', and hence that the Common Market 'should close the door in its face'. The report claimed that these 'filthy conspirators' had attempted to turn the Munich Congress into a 'platform of attack against Spain', but that in fact none of their claims had been taken seriously by those who were the nation's 'genuine friends' in the European Movement.

For days, the main newspapers' editorials chided and denigrated the men who had participated in the reunion. On 10 June, *Arriba* entitled its front page editorial 'A RECONCILIATION OF TRAITORS' [reproduced on the following page], and raved against the 'outdated liberal clichés' of these 'demagogues' and 'fools', as well as their despicable defence of political parties, which 'would soon lead the country into chaos.' Another article denounced the way in which these men had 'turned their backs against the needs of Spain, the anxiety of Spain, the propriety of Spain, the solitary and proud Spain.' *ABC* also devoted an editorial to the Munich affair on 10 June, entitled 'THE COMEDY OF PROMISCUITY' [reproduced on the following page], in which the reunion was defined as a 'shamelessly hostile episode against the present and future interests of Spain', while the participants themselves were classified as the 'eternal enemies' of the fatherland, men who were said to 'represent nothing and no one.' The

Arriba

Núm. 9.220.—II época.—Madrid, sábado 9 de junio de 1962

FUNDADO POR JOSÉ ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA. ÓRGANO DE F. E. T. Y DE LAS J. O. N. S.—LARA, 11. MADRID (1).—Teléf. [illegible]—Dirección Telegráfica: ARRIBA.—Depósito Legal M. 11.—1958.—Un plan.

El contubernio de la traición

«FRANCE-SOIR» DESCUBRE UNA INDIGNA MANIOBRA CONTRA ESPAÑA

BASES PARA EL PLAN GENERAL DE ORDENACION Y DESARROLLO DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL Y LANERA

Decretos de reposición de materias primas con franquicia arancelaria

Otros acuerdos del Consejo de Ministros, celebrado bajo la presidencia de S. E. el Jefe del Estado

Decreto-ley por el que se suspende el artículo 14 del Fuero de los Españoles

Las empresas que desde el extranjero quieran instalarse para dentro del régimen y el principio de libertad han encontrado eco y comprensión en algunos preceptos que, amparados en los términos que el Fuero de los Españoles les permite, se han acomodado a las exigencias nacionales.

En el Ministerio de Información y Turismo se facilitó esta mañana, a la prensa la siguiente referencia de lo tratado en el Consejo de Ministros celebrado en el día de ayer bajo la presidencia de S. E. el Generalísimo el Jefe del Estado:

PRESIDENCIA DEL GOBIERNO.—Decreto por el que se modifica el artículo 5.º del Reglamento de 5 de Diciembre de General del Servicio Geográfico y Catastral, aprobado por el mismo de 15 de marzo de 1956.

Decreto sobre reorganización de la Comisión de Ordenación para la aplicación de la ley de Hidrocarburos a las concesiones otorgadas.

Decreto por el que se aprueba

(Continúa en la página 22)

Marcel Niedergang ha asistido a la reunión ultrasecreta de Munich

PARIS.—La crónica telefónica recibida en Munich, «France-Soir» publica una información de Marcel Niedergang, en la que queda al descubierto lo que puede llamarse el contubernio de la traición a España, por estar compuestas elementos de diversas tendencias aliados a comunistas y socialistas, figurando entre ellos Giménez Fernández, el jefe del partido socialista, Llopis, y Gil Robles.

El cronista informa que esta reunión secreta ha tenido lugar en Munich durante los días 5 y 6 del junio, en vísperas del Congreso del Movimiento Europeo.

Durante cuarenta y ocho horas han cambiado impresiones en los salones de la capital bávara: han pasado revista a sus ancinas y a sus esperanzas y se han cambiado también sus amenazas. Todos ellos llegaron al acuerdo de condenar fervorosamente al Régimen y desear su sustitución en el plazo más breve posible, dice textualmente Niedergang en su crónica.

La resolución final adoptada por unanimidad es, en efecto, una auténtica declaración de guerra, ya que en ella se exige la organización de los partidos políticos y la autonomía separatista de las regiones.

Se dice en la crónica que durante dichas conversaciones se vieron dos grupos antagónicos: los militares. El Régimen de Franco puede con pilares: la Iglesia y el Ejército. Si el Ejército comprende que la mayoría de los españoles desean un cambio de régimen, se pondrá de nuestro lado.

«Por ahora los españoles cuentan con los europeos. Aunque su resolución no ha sido firmada, será adoptada por el Congreso del Movimiento Europeo, que se reúne en Munich el jueves y viernes, concluye el cronista. (Efe.)

Arriba

LOS CATOLICOS ITALIANOS SIENTEN ESCRUPULOS DE VOTAR A LOS DEMOCRISTIANOS

La alianza con el socialismo ha sido excomulgada reiteradamente por la Iglesia

EL CARDENAL RONCALLI, EN 1956, CONSIDERABA A LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA A LA IZQUIERDA CON EL MARXISMO COMO BLOQUE SOCIAL

LA OAS ORDENA QUE NO SE ATAQUE A LA POBLACION MUSULMANA EN ARGELIA

EN UNA EMISION RADIADA ANTES DE DARSE A CONOCER HOY SE LEYERON IMPORTANTES REVELACIONES

El Centro Cultural musulmán de Argel, destruido por una bomba

RECONCILIACION DE TRAIDORES

"El Fernando" destaca y celebra la reunión de Munich

LA TRAICION Y LA ESTUPIDEZ, ALIADAS EN SUCIO CONTUBERNIO CONTRA ESPAÑA

Los restos de la más estéril politiquería—Gil Robles y Llopis—se dan la mano en Munich

LA LUCHA EN VIETNAM

PRIMERA FASE: OPINIONES Y CONSECUENCIAS

Arriba, June 9-10 1962

MADRID, DOMINGO 10 DE JUNIO DE 1962 - EJEMPLAR TRES PESETAS

ABC

DEPOSITO LEGAL - M. 13 - 1958

DIARIO ILUSTRADO AÑO QUINCUAGESIMO QUINTO. NUM. 17.547 128 PAGINAS

MARCEL NIEDERGANG HA ASISTIDO A LA REUNION ULTRASECRETA DE MUNICH

"FRANCE-SOIR" DESCUBRE LA INDIGNA MANIOBRA CONTRA ESPAÑA

EL CONTUBERNIO DE LA TRAICION

París 8. (Servicio especial de la Agencia Efe.) En crónica telefónica, fechada en Munich, "France Soir" publica una información de Marcel Niedergang, en la que queda al descubierto lo que puede llamarse el contubernio de la traición a España, por estar conjurados elementos de diversas tendencias aliados a comunistas y socialistas, figurando entre ellos Jiménez Fernández; el jefe del partido socialista, Llopis, y Gil Robles.

El cronista informa que esta reunión secreta ha tenido lugar en Munich durante los días 5 y 6 de junio, en vísperas del Congreso del Movimiento Europeo.

Durante cuarenta y ocho horas, en los salones de la capital bávara han cambiado impresiones. Han pasado revista a sus sueños y a sus esperanzas y se han cambiado, también, sus amarguras. Todos ellos llegaron al acuerdo de condenar formalmente al régimen y desear su sustitución en el plazo más breve posible, dice textualmente Niedergang en su crónica.

La resolución final, adoptada por unanimidad, es, en efecto, una auténtica declaración de guerra, ya que en ella se exige la organización de los partidos políticos y la autonomía separatista de las regiones.

Se dice en la crónica que 60 delegados consiguieron su visado de salida bajo los más diversos pretextos. Siete tendencias principales estaban representadas en la mayoría de los casos por sus propios dirigentes, los monárquicos liberales partidarios de la vuelta a España de la Monarquía en la persona de don Juan de Borbón, los demócratas-cristianos de la derecha, al frente de cuya delegación figuraba el escritor Sr. Gil Robles; los demócratas-cristianos de la izquierda, cuyo líder es, según el cronista, el ex ministro Jiménez Fernández; la Acción Católica Obrera (H. O. A. C.), que, según Niedergang, ha sido la organizadora principal del reciente movimiento huelguístico que ha paralizado a varias provincias españolas durante más de un mes; el Frente de Liberación Popular; los movimientos catalanes, en los cuales están comprendidos los anarquistas, han apoyado los principios de esta reunión, así como los vascos.

La España de la emigración había mandado a Munich unos 30 representantes encabezados por el Sr. Llopis, jefe del partido socialista español, refugiado en Francia.

Todos los delegados asistieron con emoción al primer apretón de manos entre Llopis, el socialista, y Gil Robles, el monárquico. No se habían visto desde 1946. El cronista lo describe así:

Llopis, pequeño, frágil, con pelo gris, sucesor de aquel papa intransigente que fue Prieto.

Niedergang estima que la gran debilidad del plan de los conjurados de Munich salta a la vista. Están de acuerdo en lo que desean, pero aspiran a que otros se encarguen de la operación. ¿Quién? Interrogados separadamente, los delegados tienen la misma obsesión: los militares. El Régimen de Franco posee dos pilares: la Iglesia y el Ejército. Si el Ejército comprende que la mayoría de los españoles desean un cambio de régimen se pondrá de nuestro lado. Por ahora los españoles cuentan con los europeos. Aunque su resolución no ha sido firmada, sería adoptada por el Congreso del Movimiento Europeo, que se reúne en Munich el jueves y viernes, concluye el cronista.—Efe.

Un nuevo «Pacto de Munich»

Munich 8. (Del corresponsal de la agencia Efe.) Los salones del Gran Hotel de la capital de Baviera fueron testigos hace unos días de una escena pintoresca, aunque ciertamente no nueva en los anales de la más estéril politiquería española. Dos hombres, ayer enemigos irreconciliables, se estrechaban cálidamente la mano y, olvidando fácilmente las consecuencias que gestos análogos trajeron para su pueblo, quisieron así subrayar una aparente reconciliación que, cual nuevo "Pacto de Munich", fuese firme promesa de mil venturas para los españoles.

Estos hombres se llaman José María Gil Robles, antiguo jefe de la C. E. D. A., y Rodolfo Llopis, actual secretario general del Partido Socialista Obrero Español en el exilio. Ambos fueron importantes protagonistas de los avatares que condujeron a España a la guerra civil. Separados por las trincheras de aquella lucha por ellos provocada, tienen ahora la osadía de proceder a una teatral reconciliación en público y ofrecerla a los españoles como adecuado dintel de un futuro más o menos democrático, en el que, naturalmente, serían ellos quienes dirigiesen el cotarro. Como si los españoles no tuviésemos memoria...

La conmovedora escena fue contemplada, casi con lágrimas en los ojos—según afirma una crónica de *Frontera Soir* que acaba de llegar a nuestras manos—por algo más de un centenar de flamantes "delegados" de grupitos y subgrupitos en el exilio o clandestinos. Un curioso maridaje, que no dejará de asombrar al lector, había nombres como los de Prados Arrarte, Alvarez de Miranda, Fernández de Castro, Alfonso Prieto, Satrústegui y Ridruejo, de una parte, y de otra, Fernando Varela, ministro del llamado Gobierno republicano español; Irujo y Landaburu, por los separatistas vascos; el inefable Salvador de Madariaga, Martínez Peñalba, Javier Flores, etc.

Para esta reunión se había buscado solapadamente el amparo del Congreso Internacional del Movimiento Europeo, que se ha celebrado estos días en Munich. El Movimiento Europeo es una de las numerosas asociaciones privadas que han hecho suyas la idea de lograr la unidad continental. Goza de cierto prestigio por reunir en su seno personas muy conocidas del mundo político internacional. Nombres como los de León Blum, De Gásperi, Churchill, Adenauer, Robert Schuman y Spaak se han sucedido en su presidencia de honor.

Este corresponsal tiene noticias fidedignas de que por lo menos desde abril último los dirigentes políticos del exilio español estaban preparando cuidadosamente una maniobra para transformar el Congreso Internacional del Movimiento Europeo en una plataforma de ataque a España.

La maniobra había de tener dos aspectos: el primero sería la "mise en scène" de una aparatosa reconciliación entre las fuerzas en el exilio y los españoles residentes en la Península, la cual culminó en el apretón de manos entre Gil Robles y Llopis, ya referido. Y el segundo consistiría lisa y llanamente en conseguir que el Congreso del Movimiento Europeo se opusiese formal y solemnemente a la solicitud española de asociación al Mercado Común.

Fue relativamente fácil para el "gobierno" del exilio conseguir, a través de sus conexiones con el Movimiento Europeo, —Salvador de Madariaga es en el seno de

LA O. A. S. CESA EN SUS ATAQUES CONTRA LOS ARGELINOS

"Concentraremos nuestros esfuerzos para la destrucción de objetivos militares y económicos"

Argel 9. La Organización del Ejército Secreto ha ordenado a sus fuerzas que cesen en sus ataques contra los musulmanes. Durante una emisión clandestina el locutor, después de hacer el anterior anuncio, añadió: "La O. A. S. ha decidido atacar solamente objetivos económicos y militares." "La Organización ha prohibido a sus miembros que atenten contra los musulmanes. De ahora en adelante nadie será capaz de actuarnos de atacar a los argelinos." Añadió que la Organización no es responsable de la reciente ola de asaltos y robos que se ha registrado en las principales ciudades del territorio.

"Eso lo están haciendo grupos de ladrones y vulgares atracadores—acusó—. Nosotros advertimos a aquellos que han sido los autores de esos delitos que serán castigados." El locutor siguió: "El lunes por la tarde estaremos en situación de revelar a ustedes cosas que aclararán puntos que ahora parecen enigmáticos. La situación actual requiere que les pidamos a todos ustedes que esperen cuarenta y ocho horas más. Nos gustaría que supieran la alegría que tendríamos al decirles a ustedes que la comunidad europea ha sido salvada, que Occidente se ha salvado".—Efe.

same discursive hostility was equally visible in the leading article published on the same day by *Ya*, entitled 'WORSE THAN FOOLISHNESS', which summed up the event as follows:

> (...) it is intolerable that Spaniards, for political ends, have begged for an international action which, whether they like it or not, would be directed not only against the regime, but also against the nation, and would be a lever which, by making the system fall apart, would bring damages, possibly lethal ones, to the country.

After effectively whipping up national we-feelings in this way through the symbolic vehicles of the media, the regime further strengthened its position by organizing a series of mass protests against the Munich 'traitors'. Thousands of pamphlets and leaflets distributed throughout the country asserted: 'Munich: the pact of treason. The people denounce the collusion of pseudo-Catholics, pseudo-monarchists, and pseudo-democrats... Khrushchev applauds them all...' (cited in Tusell: 407). The culmination of these collective protest rituals took place on Saturday, January 16, when the *Generalísimo* himself addressed the masses in Valencia to voice 'Spain's outrage' against the betrayal of these false 'Europeanists'. Describing himself as the 'captain of the ship', he stated that the reality of 'our resurgence' had disconcerted 'our enemies' and provoked jealousy and anger all over the world. As a result of Spain's transformation since the end of the Civil War, the country had become a 'motive of admiration', which was denigrated abroad by the 'natural enemy of political parties', as well as by the 'Communist inflitration in Europe'. Constantly interrupted by the frenetic applause of his followers, who chanted 'Those from Munich, to the gallows!', Franco mocked the 'liberal world which is still fashionable in Europe', and defended the unquestionable superiority of 'our revolution.' In its front page headline on the following day, *Arriba* highlighted a statement in which Franco proclaimed that 'THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF SPAIN CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY A REGIME SUCH AS OURS' [reproduced on the following page]. At the end of his speech, the *Generalísimo* proudly concluded that, therefore, 'in spite of the small clouds that may confront us along our path, the sun has come out for Spain.

The Francoist press typically inflated its discursive representation of these protests, speaking of 'the nation's unanimous adhesion', and showing pictures of the crowds which surrounded the

CIEN MIL TRABAJADORES ACLAMAN A FRANCO EN VALENCIA

Arriba

Núm. 9.228.—II época.—Madrid, martes 19 de junio de 1962

FUNDADO POR JOSE ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA—ORGANO DE F. E. T. Y DE LAS J. O. N. S.—LARRA, 14 MADRID (1)—Teléf. 2 23 20 12.—DEP. L. M. 41 1958. 1,50 PTAS.

"LA TRANSFORMACION SOCIAL DE ESPAÑA SOLO PUEDE HACERLA UN REGIMEN COMO EL NUESTRO"

FRANCO, CON LOS TRABAJADORES

Nadie puede estar más interesado que el obrero en la fortaleza de las estructuras de sus Empresas

CUANDO LA HUELGA REPRESENTA PARA LOS PUEBLOS LA RUINA Y LA ESCASEZ, NO PUEDE PERMITIRSE DE NINGUNA FORMA

Trascendental discurso del Caudillo en un grandioso acto de afirmación sindicalista

VALENCIA, (Por teléfono. De nuestro director, Sabino Alonso-Fueyo.)—A los veintitrés años de la Victoria y veintiocho años tras el comienzo de la Cruzada, Franco sigue teniendo la admiración y el cariño de su pueblo como el primer día. Valencia está demostrando ampliamente en estos momentos tal afirmación con esa francamente unidad de los valencianos en la lealtad a su Caudillo. En su paso por las calles de la ciudad, en los distintos centros y dependencias que visita, en cada encuentro que tiene con los trabajadores. Por todas partes donde pasa, el Caudillo Franco recibe un verdadero entusiasmo, un amor de la multitud, que ha sabido vincular su nombre a los valores más fundamentales de la Patria, que cuida en él como garantía del mejor futuro de España.

Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado ha tenido el domingo una jornada intensa y alecionadora; visitó las obras del decreto de absorción, inauguró nuevos edificios previnciales y varios grupos de viviendas, es decir, que ha querido ser testigo presencial de la profunda transformación operada en Valencia, bajo su mandato, como testimonio irrefutable de una política de realidades. Veintitrés años de paz han hecho posible el milagro de la reconstrucción de España, que ahora marcha con paso seguro hacia nuevas formas de superación, hacia metas inéditas de existencia, en experimentados todavía por nosotros. «En la natural evolución—dijo Franco en la inauguración del nuevo hospital—, los pueblos caminan hacia formas nuevas, y en ellas, todo lo que estorba al bien común, a la eficacia, al progreso económico, a la justicia y a las realizaciones sociales será rechazado, y, en cambio, todo lo que sea útil, eficaz y constructivo será aceptado.»

Si la jornada del domingo resultó fecunda en inauguraciones y, al mismo tiempo, aleccionadora por el grado de entusiasmo que el pueblo valenciano brindó a su Caudillo, la de ayer, en la Institución Sindical «San Vicente Ferrer», adquirió una dimensión realmente histórica, inolvidable, podría decirse que sin precedentes.

La preocupación de la Delegación Nacional de Sindicatos por una [illegible] progresiva y

(Continúa en la página 6.)

EN LA MISMA NAVE

Resultará muy provechoso repasar la historia militar y política de Francisco Franco. ¿Soldado de buena estrella? ¿Político afortunado? Sobre ambas circunstancias ha habido multitud de especulaciones. A Francisco Franco se le tiene por un hombre de suerte. Es una leyenda de color de rosa que no resiste un riguroso análisis. Francisco Franco —y reiteramos deliberadamente cualquier incidencia en la teoría del providencialismo— es sencillamente la síntesis de un conjunto de virtudes humanas que se poseen en virtud de un raro privilegio. Franco es, como se dice ahora, un "fuera de serie". Los enemigos del exterior le han sometido a infinidad de pruebas. No hablemos ya de cuando era acosado a solicitaciones por la máquina militar más poderosa de Europa, allá en los años cuarenta. En el comedio de esta década fue juzgado y condenado por la camarilla de los prepotentes vencedores, cercado, asediado y puesto al margen de la ley internacional. A España y a Franco se le negaron entonces derechos inmensos elementales que los hombres no están autorizados a negar. Se negó a nuestro país el "jus comercii", el derecho a comprar alimentos y primeras materias para su industria. Los hechos demostraron que esta sensacional necedad no era suficiente para alterar el pulso español ni para hacer temblar la mano firmísima de Francisco Franco.

Pero bajo la calma aparente de la recuperación, de la plenitud de derechos, la tierca confiura no ha cesado. Esta España que ocupa uno de los primeros puestos en el escalafón mundial del turismo, que anualmente es visitada, recorrida, husmeada por muchos millones de extranjeros, recibe un trato oprobioso en la mayor parte de los mecanismos informativos, que, ante la prisa y la pereza características de nuestro tiempo, son los verdaderos creadores de las corrientes de opinión. Se intenta turbar la calma de España, ignorar sus virtudes, estigmatizar odiosamente su sistema político y exagerar sus defectos y sus inevitables fallos. Se trata, en suma, de conturbar su ánimo, de interferir las relaciones entre el pueblo y el Estado y de minar la serenidad de quien rige los destinos del país. ¡Vano empeño!

"Somos los propios españoles los que muchas veces, ante el incalificable espectáculo del ataque, descemos ver a un Franco tonante, desmelenado, ardiendo en ira

(Continúa en la página 9.)

Durante el acto de inauguración de la nueva Institución Sindical de Formación Profesional "San Vicente Ferrer", de Valencia, el Caudillo pronunció el siguiente trascendental discurso:

Valencianos y trabajadores que me escucháis:

La inauguración oficial de esta Institución Sindical "San Vicente Ferrer", de Formación Profesional, me ofrece la ocasión de reencontrarme y de poder hacerles partícipes de mi pensamiento sobre el futuro social de nuestra Patria, que os afecta tan directamente.

Los españoles somos solidarios en el destino, no podemos huirnos a los dictados de la geografía y de la historia; a golpe de invasiones se forja nuestra nacionalidad. Mucho antes que otros pueblos, España ya era nación, y al templarse nuestro carácter en la lucha forjamos fuerza de nuestra independencia y proyectamos nuestro genio por el mundo, hasta que la invasión de doctrinas extrañas acabó sumiéndonos en la decadencia. El secreto para anularnos o vencernos fue siempre el mismo: el dividirnos interiormente; así perdimos los mejores años en que el mundo se transformó, con un siglo de constantes luchas internas. Aquella España que al unirse al resto nos gustaba, nos empujó a la Revolución. Esta vino

(Continúa en la página 4.)



Arriba, June 19 1962

Generalísimo, with headlines such as: 'ALL OF SPAIN REITERATES ITS ADHESION TO THE CAUDILLO' and 'THIS IS SPAIN' [reproduced on the following pages]. Nevertheless, in spite of such an absurdly hyperbolic exaggeration, it seems undeniable that to a considerable extent, the regime accomplished its fundamental objective: the 'Europeanism' of the democrats who had raised their voices in the Munich reunion was symbolically and emotionally delegitimated, by being stigmatized as an anti-patriotic, anti-Spanish 'betrayal of the nation'. As Tusell (1977: 422) puts it, 'the arousal of ardent feelings of nationalism... demonstrated the support which [the regime] continued to enjoy in broad sectors of the country.'

Hence, in opposition to the silenced discourse of the democrats, the regime continued to defend the superiority of its own 'European vocation'. In another speech delivered in Valencia on 18 June, Franco spelled out very clearly the only kind of 'Europeanism' which was morally acceptable in the symbolic universe promoted by his regime:

> In any case, our will towards Europe is firm and sincere; we feel European, but this does not mean that we are willing to exchange either our interior health or our internal peace in order to please foreigners.(Cited in Franco 1975: 792)

In his 1962 New Year's Eve address to 'the nation', the *Generalísimo* reiterated the same point once again:

> In relation to Europe, of which we are a part, our feelings are clear and formally defined. As a part [of Europe], we have a definitive European vocation, and as Europeans, we defend a consideration of equality which implicates us as long as it respects our personality.(Cited in Franco 1975: 796)

As usual, 'our personality', in other words the 'national personality of Spaniards', was symbolically equated in this discourse with the political institutions of the regime. Franco, furthermore, noted in this same speech that what interested Spain was not 'sharing European egoism', but instead 'incorporating a human and social significance to foreign policy, a Christian conscience of justice among peoples...' (Cited in Franco 1975: 796-7). Hence, at least for the time being, the rival patriotic we-image of the opposition – the idea that Spain could only regain its collective self-esteem in the world and become 'European' through democratic reforms –

TODA ESPAÑA TESTIMONIA SU ADHESION AL CAUDILLO

SON YA INCONTABLES LOS TELEGRAMAS Y CARTAS RECIBIDAS EN LOS GOBIERNOS CIVILES CONDENANDO Y DESPRECIANDO LA REUNION DE MUNICH

Son ya incontables los abundantes testimonios de fidelidad a los Principios del Movimiento y de inquebrantable adhesión al Jefe del Estado que se han sucedido en estos días por pueblos y ciudades de España. En los Gobiernos Civiles se reciben continuamente telegramas de los pueblos de la provincia, de los Consejos Provinciales y Locales del Movimiento, de Ayuntamientos y Diputaciones, de las Hermandades de ex Combatientes, ex Cautivos, División Azul, Frente de Juventudes, Sección Femenina, Militantes del Movimiento, Sindicatos y de diversas entidades oficiales y particulares. Todos los despachos telegráficos están encaminados en los mismos términos de lealtad a Franco y repulsa de la reunión de Munich.

El popular clima de patriotismo, pese a quienes por una estrecha actitud desean quitarle importancia o no consideran de interés su divulgación, es la prueba más potente de cómo la hora grave de España ha reaccionado ante la reunión de Munich y quienes a ella acudieron.

En Lérida

LERIDA.—El Consejo Provincial del Movimiento ha cursado al Jefe del Estado un telegrama, en el que se le expresa una ferviente e inquebrantable adhesión, así como a los Principios fundamentales del Movimiento. A la vez se repudia enérgicamente la antipatriótica maniobra de los enemigos de España reunidos recientemente en Munich.

El envío de este telegrama había sido acordado en una reunión plenaria del Consejo Provincial del Movimiento, bajo la presidencia del Gobernador Civil, Serrano Montalvo, en el curso de la cual el Delegado Provincial de Asociaciones, en nombre de todas las entidades adheridas, y especialmente en el día de la Hermandad de ex Combatientes, ex Cautivos y Familiares de Caídos, hizo unas amplias manifestaciones condenatorias de lo que calificó de agorero asalto de Munich.

Añadió que los allí reunidos eran representan a nada ni a nadie, si no es a su propia ambición y a un triste recuerdo histórico.

El Alcalde de la ciudad, el Presidente de la Diputación, los Procuradores en Cortes y los Alcaldes se adhirieron a la actitud del Consejo, que también transmitió un telegrama al Secretario General del Movimiento.

Por su parte, la Organización Sindical, en una reunión de la Junta de Mandos, acordó enviar sus máximas repulsas a las maquinaciones y manejos políticos intentados en Munich por un pequeño grupo de fracasados y traidores, y en este sentido fue cursado un telegrama a la Casa Civil del Jefe del Estado. (Cifra.)

En Sevilla

SEVILLA. — El Consejo Provincial del Movimiento se ha reunido con carácter extraordinario. A la sesión asistieron, además de los miembros del referido Consejo los Mandos del Frente de Juventudes, presidente de Hermandades y Asociaciones, jerarquías de la Organización Sindical, Presidentes y Secretarios de los Sindicatos Provinciales y los jefes de diversos distritos de la capital.

Al término de la reunión se hizo públicas una nota en la que, entre otras cosas, se dice:

Esta Jefatura Provincial, recogiendo el sentir de la adhesión de todos los asistentes, alienta su postura en los siguientes términos:

Frente a quienes intenten perturbar la paz social, reivindicamos la bandera de la justicia social lanzada por la Falange desde antes de nuestro glorioso Alzamiento cuando su actitud era incomprendida por unos y odiada por otros.

Frente a quienes intenten perturbar la paz política mostramos nuestra firme adhesión al Jefe del Estado y Jefe Nacional del Movimiento reiterando una vez más nuestra fe inquebrantable a los principios del 18 de Julio, cuya eficacia operativa hubo de ser llevada a la práctica precisamente ante el fracaso político de quienes ahora pretenden resucitar un sistema que hubo de ser violentamente repudiado por el Ejército y el pueblo en armas. (Cifra.)

En Huelva

HUELVA.—En reunión celebrada por el Consejo Provincial del Movimiento, el Gobernador Civil y Jefe Provincial, Pérez Cubillos, pronunció un discurso de elevados tonos patrióticos, poniendo de manifiesto las maniobras desarrolladas en Munich por elementos antiespañoles.

«Tenemos fe—dijo—en Dios; tenemos fe en quienes rigen los destinos de la Patria; tenemos fe en nuestro Caudillo y tenemos fe en la reconstrucción y en el advenimiento de la nación y no permitiremos jamás que nuestra Victoria, conseguida a trueque de tantos sacrificios, de tantas vidas y tantos mártires, pueda somos arrebatada por quienes en la vida exploraron contra un dolor para explotar los destinos de nuestra Patria.»

Después de las palabras del Gobernador, el Consejo acordó por aclamación hacer constar en acta su más ferviente y leal adhesión al Jefe del Estado, así como manifestar su más enérgica repulsa por las incalificables maniobras y el desprecio absoluto a España puesto de relieve en la reunión de Munich.

En el Gobierno Civil se reciben telegramas en tal sentido de Corporaciones, entidades y Consejos Locales de la provincia, así como de muchos particulares. (Cifra.)

En Tarragona

TARRAGONA. — Continúan recibiéndose en el Gobierno Civil gran *cantidad de telegramas de Ayuntamientos* y Consejos Locales de la provincia, en los que se expresan su adhesión y el deseo de que se lleve a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado la inquebrantable voluntad de la provincia de permanecer fiel a las órdenes del Caudillo Franco ante la maniobra de Munich y del establecimiento de los lazos contactos entre las fuerzas políticas que allí tuvieron lugar la pasada semana. Por su parte, la Casa Civil de Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado ha cursado sendos telegramas al Gobernador Civil, Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento y Diputación, agradeciendo, en nombre del Caudillo, las muestras de lealtad y fervor patriótico demostrados por la provincia tarraconense con ocasión del trascendental acto celebrado en el cerro de Garraitas. (Cifra.)

En Castellón

CASTELLON DE LA PLANA.—Conmemora esta ciudad el vigésimoquinto aniversario de su liberación por las fuerzas del Ejército Nacional. Con tal motivo se han organizado diversos actos, el primero de los cuales se celebró ayer tarde en la Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento, presidida por el Gobernador Civil, Subjefe Provincial, Alcalde y otras jerarquías, y al que asistió gran número de falangistas y público, que llenaban por completo el salón y los vestíbulos.

El Delegado Provincial de Organizaciones del Movimiento y Consejero Nacional, Pidal, pronunció unas palabras, y cerró el acto el Gobernador con un discurso, que fue muy aplaudido.

Con anterioridad, el Consejo Provincial del Movimiento celebró una reunión, en la que, después de tratar diversos cuestiones de interés local y provincial, acordó por unanimidad reiterar a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado la adhesión de la Falange establecimiento y condenar la maniobra de Munich, llevada a cabo por los tradicionales enemigos de España.

En Valladolid

VALLADOLID.—El Consejo Provincial del Movimiento ha dirigido a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado el siguiente telegrama:

"La Falange de Valladolid, que defendió con su sangre los postulados de nuestro Movimiento en Alto León y todos hogares España los necesarios, transmite, una vez más, invicta esperanza, su Jefe Nacional y Caudillo de España, adhesión inquebrantable siempre dispuesta rápida ante traición maniobra enemigos España alientes masones y marxistas. Como siempre, dispuestos a cumplir órdenes. Arriba España. — Consejo Provincial del Movimiento."

En Vitoria

VITORIA. — En reunión celebrada por el Consejo Provincial del Movimiento, presidido por el Gobernador Civil se tomó el acuerdo, haciéndose eco del unánime sentir de los alaveses, enviar un expresivo telegrama de inquebrantable adhesión a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado, como respuesta al ayuntamiento de Munich y las fuerzas políticas, al mismo tiempo, la firme confianza que Alava tiene en el porvenir y futuro de la Patria.

El Ayuntamiento, por su parte, en la sesión de ayer acordó enviar otro telegrama al Caudillo en los mismos términos. (Cifra.)

En Pamplona

PAMPLONA. — El Jefe Provincial del Movimiento de Navarra y Gobernador Civil, Antonio Rueda, ha dirigido al Ministro Secretario General del Movimiento, José Solís el siguiente telegrama:

"Consejo Provincial del Movimiento de Navarra ante nueva maniobra antiespañola de Munich hace público absoluto desprecio a reunidos que traicionan la memoria de los combatientes nuestros caídos, alineándose con los culpables y contra España. (Cifra.)

En Bilbao

BILBAO. — Reunido en sesión extraordinaria el Consejo Pleno de FET y de las JONS, bajo la presidencia del Jefe Provincial, para tratar de las noticias últimamente aparecidas en relación con lo que se ha llamado "contubernio de Munich", se acordó telegrafiar al Caudillo de España su más entusiasta y fervorosa adhesión con la más enérgica repulsa del alentados especialmente que han ofrecido al exterior los enemigos de nombre. (Cifra.)

En San Sebastián

SAN SEBASTIAN. — Reunido el Consejo Provincial del Movimiento en sesión plenaria, acordó elevar a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado, Generalísimo Franco un telegrama de lealtad y adhesión a su persona y a su obra, y la más indignada repulsa por el comportamiento de los principales de desdichado episodio de Munich. (Cifra.)

En Palencia

PALENCIA.—La Diputación Provincial ha tomado el acuerdo de enviar un telegrama al Ministro de la Gobernación para que haga llegar a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado el testimonio de adhesión de la Corporación palentina y la protesta más enérgica contra la maniobra antiespañola en Munich. (Cifra.)

En Almería

ALMERIA.—En la Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento se ha reunido el Pleno del Consejo, presidido por el Gobernador Civil y Jefe Provincial del Movimiento, do acordó, por aclamación, elevar enérgica protesta contra las turbias maniobras que han tenido lugar en Munich y expresando también su repulsa hacia los partidos políticos. Se acordó, asimismo, expresar al Caudillo la incondicional adhesión de la Falange almeriense. (Cifra.)

En Zaragoza

ZARAGOZA. — Son numerosas las Corporaciones y Ayuntamientos de distinto carácter que han elevado a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado telegramas de inquebrantable adhesión y de repulsa contra la conjura de Munich, ante la hostilidad de los enemigos de España de la guerra de Alemania, la Hermandad Provincial de ex Cautivos y Familiares de caídos de la guerra de Liberación han cursado telegramas reiterando la inquebrantable y firme adhesión al Jefe del Estado y de protesta por el contubernio de Munich. (Cifra.)

En Salamanca

SALAMANCA.—El Consejo Provincial del Movimiento se ha reunido con carácter extraordinario en sesión plenaria. El Jefe Provincial informó de la reunión de Munich en la que un grupo de traidores de nacionalidad española, de diversas tendencias políticas, adoptó en alarde compuesto el acuerdo de condenar al Régimen español y pedir su sustitución en el plazo más breve posible. El Consejo, como portavoz del sentimiento recogido en la ciudad y provincia mostró su indignación y repulsa ante la lamentable actuación de este grupo de desalmados entre los que al parecer se encontraba algún salmantino, y adoptó por unanimidad el acuerdo de elevar a la Casa Civil de su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado y al Ministro Secretario General del Movimiento su formal protesta contra esta traición y su inquebrantable adhesión leal e incondicional del Consejo Provincial y de la Falange salmantina a la persona del Caudillo y a los Principios fundamentales del Régimen, a cuyo fin fueron cursados los correspondientes telegramas inmediatamente después de celebrada la reunión. (Cifra.)

En Pontevedra

PONTEVEDRA.—En la reunión el Consejo Provincial del Movimiento en sesión plenaria bajo la presidencia del Gobernador Civil y Jefe Provincial se acordó, por unanimidad, dirigir un telegrama a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado testimoniándole la más leal adhesión con la más firme repulsa por la conjura que Leopoldo que tuvo pasado con prolongado eclipse enemigos del progreso y de la paz de la Patria. (Cifra.)

En Huesca

HUESCA.—El Consejo Provincial del Movimiento, reunido en sesión plenaria, acordó enviar un telegrama a la Casa Civil de Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado, agradeciendo transmita al Caudillo la enérgica protesta por el intento contubernio de un grupo de traidores a la Patria en Munich, y el testimonio al Caudillo de España de su más firme lealtad, adhesión y cariño, tanto a su persona como a los Principios del Movimiento Nacional, cuya defensa y todos los componentes valientemente dispuestos a mantener como el 18 de julio.

Otro telegrama, redactado en parecidos términos, ha sido cursado al Ministro Secretario General del Movimiento. (Cifra.)

En Jaén

JAEN.—El Gobernador Civil y Jefe Provincial del Movimiento ha enviado el siguiente telegrama al Jefe de la Casa Civil de su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado:

«Ruego a V. E. transmita a Su Excelencia el Jefe del Estado lo siguiente:

Ahente que se conocieron las vilas maniobras de Munich se vienen recibiendo en este Gobierno Civil y Jefatura de Falange cuantiosos de cartas, telegramas y visitas personales de Corporaciones, entidades, representaciones y particulares de toda la provincia, testimoniando enérgica protesta y profundo indignación por tenebroso contubernio entre especiales traicionales, traidores a la Patria, y sus tradicionales enemigos marxismo-comunistas exigiendo se les aplique con todo rigor la ley que exalta los delitos de alta traición. Al dar cuenta V. E. tan nefanda reacción provincia Santa Reina, espera personal repulsa, con fervorosa adhesión e inquebrantable disciplina al Caudillo de España Salvador alentado mente.—Gobernador Civil.

Arriba, June 14 1962

ESTA ES ESPAÑA

Aquí está, en primera fila, en aire de limpia pasión política, en actitud de fervor, en gesto de solidaridad y entusiasmo, como un solo hombre para depositar su voto en un referéndum público y democrático para el que no ha sido preciso ni el más leve despliegue de esa que se llama campaña electoral o amortización de la opinión pública. España está al cabo de la calle. Y por eso le ha bastado con unas pocas informaciones en la Prensa, escuetas noticias de la ocupación de las estratosféricas de Munich, para apresurarse, en un plebiscito referendum espontáneo, a elegir su candidato. Si de dirección se trata—se ha dicho España a sí misma—este es nuestro caudillo. ¡Sí lo sabremos bien, después de veintiocho años!

Dicho y hecho. Se han izado unas banderas, se han cantado unas canciones, se ha gritado a los vientos de todas las rosas el nombre del Capitán, el nombre de Franco, y España se ha puesto en marcha. Algo así como si desde los secretos laboratorios de las emociones, donde la tira pulsa sus más sutiles notas espirituales, se hubiera pronunciado otra vez el lejano mandamiento: «¡En, las provincias, en pie!» Por los calidos caminos de una primavera en sazón, de una primavera que no se marchita, que ha visto nacer, crecer y florecer tres largas generaciones de españoles, España se ha llegado hasta sus plazas mayores. Unidos en un colosal corro de brazos apretados, en una piña de corazones sencillos y dispuestos, los españoles se han preguntado: ¿Qué pasa? ¿Quiénes son ellos? ¿Qué quieren? ¿En nombre de quién hablan? Y por esos caminos, de esas plazas mayores, recias y sobrias, ha surgido el grito unánime, el clamor expresivo, la canción común, el nombre mil veces proclamado del único Capitán: el nombre de Francisco Franco.

No ha sido efímero fogonazo de un castillo de fuegos de artificio: no ha sido la movilización de unos fáciles resortes de nostalgia... Importa creer que detrás de todo esto hay algo que España no olvida. Detrás del multitudinario coro del fervor popular, detrás de las canciones y las banderas, reflectivos años de historia le dan a Franco la razón. Junto a las gargantas de los millones de españoles que le aclaman está el canto armonioso de una España que es mejor, la melodía inigualable de las fábricas, el brazo reivindicador de los torrentes de los embalses, el giro de las turbinas, la promoción de las empresas agrícolas, el canto sublime de la paz de España. ¿Lo habían olvidado los viejos españolazos, los creyentes generadores de las aguas turbias?... Ellos, creo; nosotros, no.

Aquí está España. Con ella su Caudillo: «He aquí mis poderes—ha contestado Franco—, la unión más estrecha con mi pueblo». Ese pueblo le ovaciona, le aclama, le replica—como la Inmortal le dijo este octubre con la frase de un poeta español—: «Mire adelante... que Dios va de su mano, que el mar y el cielo son unos propicios, Capitán».

Antonio IZQUIERDO
(Foto Pastor.)

Arriba, June 6 1962

was tabooed in the official discourse of the Francoist state. Instead, the only 'Europeanism' which was officially permitted continued to be the idea that the Spain of the *Generalísimo* had more of a right to be classified as 'European' than anyone else, because it continued to defend the spiritual heritage of Christian civilization from the dangerous threatening Others of liberalism and communism. Hence, from the Francoist perspective, in order to enter the EEC there was absolutely no need to change the political institutions of a regime which, after all, fervently defended the true moral values of 'Europe'. As an editorial published in *Arriba* put it:

> Spain proclaims its European vocation with the highest merits. No one can deny that thanks to her, Europeity irradiated and irradiates its spiritual values all over the world, and neither can anyone deny that in the worst moments of crisis of our civilization, Spain placed herself at the vanguard of the defence of those values.[5]

Therefore, according to the regime's official discourse, Spain's 'European vocation' was in fact far more genuine than that of the EEC's member states, since the latter's democratic liberal institutions were seen as wicked threats to Christian 'Europeity'. Communism was looked upon as the worst conceivable enemy of this metaphysical 'European spirit', and so it was argued that no one could possibly claim to have fought this lethal infection with greater zeal than Franco's Spain.

7.6 The 1970 trade agreement with the EEC: a small and insufficient approximation to 'Europe'

The regime's repressive measures against the rebel democrats who participated in the Munich reunion 'severely damaged the Spanish case for entry into Europe' (Preston 1993: 703). The following year, Franco's decision to execute the Communist Julián Grimau provoked a wave of demonstrations against Franco in the major capitals of Europe, as well as in the United States, further distancing Spain from the aspiration to be admitted into the EEC. Nevertheless, the

[5] *Arriba*, 20 June 1962.

efforts of Spanish diplomats eventually bore some minor fruits. In 1964, the EEC announced that it would allow the opening of 'exploratory talks' with the Spanish state, albeit at a purely economic level. For six long years, however, there were no palpable results which the regime could publicly present to the population as a step forward on the road to Europe, increasingly 'demonstrating to the Spanish that there was enormous resentment among the membership of the EEC at the continued existence within Spain of nondemocratic governmental institutions' (Salisbury 1980: 75). On June 29 1970, however, the Franco regime finally accomplished a small victory in the European arena: a preferential trade agreement was signed between the Spanish state and the EEC, which involved a series of reciprocal tariff reductions on industrial products. During an initial stage of six years, the commercially weaker Spain would receive the larger reductions, 60 to 70%, versus 25-30% on the part of the Common Market. The second stage of the deal remained unspecified, although it was implicitly assumed that a gradual process of harmonization of policies would lead to Spain's effective inclusion in the Common Market, though only from the economic point of view (Salisbury 1980: 102). Eight years after the initial request to 'enter Europe' had been officially put forward by the Spanish state, the regime 'was only able to obtain some commercial advantages which, although beneficial, could hardly compensate for the failure of not having accomplished the objective of full integration' (Pereira Castañares 1991b: 100). The official Francoist propaganda had always made the promise that the *Generalísimo* would lead 'the nation' into 'Europe'. Nevertheless, in the most fundamental sense, Spain remained an excluded outsider, and it was increasingly obvious that this was because 'Europe' rejected its dictatorial regime.

It is interesting to observe, in any case, how this relatively insignificant 'European success' was presented in the Spanish press as a hugely important national triumph, made possible through the wise guidance of the *Generalísimo*. On 30 June, for instance, *Arriba* devoted the main story of its front page to the commercial deal with the EEC, with the massive headline 'AGREEMENT', under which a sub-title cited the words of the Spanish Foreign Minister, López Bravo, who asserted that 'our approximation to Europe is due to the perseverance of Franco'

[reproduced on the following page]. The text on the front page highlighted the symbolic significance of the fact that the Spanish flag could be seen 'waving among those of the "Six"' in Luxemburg, where the treaty was signed. This was seen as 'a recognition which pays homage to the man who has directed Spanish politics with tenacity towards this new European alliance, the Spanish Head of State Francisco Franco.' In its internal pages, this newspaper called the event a 'historic date', and printed the speech delivered by the foreign minister López Bravo before signing the agreement, which stressed that 'Spain has decided to anchor itself more firmly in Europe', and that 'Our country feels present in the Europe which is uniting.' *ABC* also devoted its main front-page story to the signing of the EEC agreement, and similarly drew attention to the way in which at the site of the event, 'the flags of the six countries of the Common Market could be seen waving, and at the geometric center was the Spanish flag' [reproduced on the following page]. It was thus claimed that Spain, even if only partially and incompletely, was in no way a humiliated outsider: it had finally been 'accepted into Europe'. In its editorial on that day, entitled rather optimistically 'AT THE DOORS OF EUROPE', this newspaper further asserted that the agreement would be 'of great utility as an instrument for our approximation to Europe'.

It is clear, therefore, that the aspiration to 'enter Europe' continued to be a hugely important national objective promoted by the regime itself, and hence a relatively minor success such as this 1970 trade agreement was presented by Franco's propagandists as proof that the *Generalísimo* could lead Spain to the widely desired 'European' status. However, only a few months after this deal had been signed, the regime's decision to execute six alleged terrorists of ETA, the Basque terrorist group which had arisen to challenge the Francoist notion of 'national unity', provoked indignation throughout Europe and once again left Spain morally isolated. Hence, although Franco eventually bowed to the protests from abroad and commuted the death sentences, the situation of international hostility provoked yet another propaganda campaign against the 'foreign enemies' of Spain. The regime exhorted Spaniards to 'unite against the world' during a mass protest ceremony held on 16 December 1970, and *Arriba* railed against the 'twisted interests of Europe' that had inspired the international campaign against *la patria* (cited

Arriba

DIRECTOR: JAIME CAMPMANY. — EMPRESA: PRENSA Y RADIO DEL MOVIMIENTO

ESPAÑA MERCADO COMUN

ACUERDO

AYER EN LUXEMBURGO FUE FIRMADO EL ACUERDO PREFERENTE

• A LA VOLUNTAD PERSEVERANTE DE FRANCO SE DEBE NUESTRO ACERCAMIENTO A EUROPA

(López Bravo)

A las doce menos cuarto de la mañana del lunes, 29 de junio, España daba el primer paso para su incorporación a una Europa que se une en el Mercado Común. Por parte española firmó el Acuerdo preferente don Gregorio López Bravo, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores; en representación de la Comunidad Económica Europea, el presidente del Consejo de ministros, Pierre Harmel, y el presidente de la Comisión.

Protagonista, pues, de la jornada de ayer en Luxemburgo, España, cuya bandera ondeaba entre las de los "seis". Este reconocimiento equivale a rendir homenaje al hombre que ha dirigido tenazmente la política española hacia esta nueva alianza europea, al Jefe del Estado español, Francisco Franco, AM lo ha hecho notar en Luxemburgo López Bravo.

V. PAG. 3

«Este suceso es un gran paso adelante en el camino de la aproximación económica entre España y el Mercado Común», dice el presidente de la Comisión europea, Jean Rey, que aparece en el centro, junto con el presidente del Consejo de las Comunidades, Pierre Harmel, y el Ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores, López Bravo, en el momento de la firma. (Telefoto Cifra.)

ESPAÑA-MERCADO COMUN EUROPEO

ACUERDO COMERCIAL PREFERENTE

Fue firmado, a las 11,40 de ayer, por López Bravo, Pierre Harmel y Jean Rey

«LO IMPORTANTE ES COMENZAR Y PERSEVERAR», DIJO EL MINISTRO ESPAÑOL DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

CONDECORADOS POR ESPAÑA

LA GRAN CRUZ DE ISABEL LA CATOLICA A HARMEL Y REY

"ESPAÑA HA DECIDIDO ANCLARSE MAS FIRMEMENTE EN EUROPA"

«Nuestro país se siente presente en la Europa que se une»

Discurso de López Bravo en el acto de firma del Acuerdo preferente

Arriba, June 30 1970

MADRID, MARTES 30 DE JUNIO DE 1970 - NUM. 20.053
CUATRO PESETAS

ABC

DIRECTOR: TORCUATO LUCA DE TENA
DEPOSITO LEGAL: M 13 - 1958 - 108 PAGS.

AYER SE FIRMO EN LUXEMBURGO EL ACUERDO ESPAÑA-MERCADO COMUN

POR PARTE ESPAÑOLA SUSCRIBIO LOS DOCUMENTOS EL SEÑOR LOPEZ BRAVO, Y POR LA C. E. E. LOS SEÑORES PIERRE HARMEL Y JEAN REY

El Acuerdo Preferencial entre la Comunidad Económica Europea y España fue firmado ayer por la mañana en el Centro Europeo de Kirchberg, de Luxemburgo, por el ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores, don Gregorio López Bravo; el presidente en ejercicio del Consejo de Ministros del Mercado Común, Pierre Harmel, y el presidente de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, Jean Rey. En la gran explanada que da acceso al Centro Kirchberg ondeaban las banderas de los seis países del Mercado Común, en el mástil correspondiente a los diez se encontraba la bandera española.

(Comentarios, declaraciones, discursos y análisis del Acuerdo en págs. 22 a 26)

ABC

DIRECTOR: Torcuato LUCA de TENA
DIRECTOR ADJUNTO: Pedro de LORENZO
SUBDIRECTOR: Jesús REVUELTA IMAZ

REDACCION, ADMINISTRACION Y TALLERES: SERRANO, 61. MADRID.
APARTADO 43.
TELEFS. 2251710 - 2759408 y 2255020

Editor: PRENSA ESPAÑOLA, S. A.

A LAS PUERTAS DE EUROPA

Un largo y, en ocasiones, desesperante proceso negociador entre España y el Mercado Común ha fructificado formalmente ayer con la firma del Tratado comercial preferencial en el Centro Europeo de Luxemburgo. El Acuerdo es de importancia práctica, concretamente por cuanto en él se sistematizan las relaciones económicas y comerciales entre los "Seis" y nuestro país. Pero es la más inmediata virtud del documento de Luxemburgo la de disciplinar, emplazándolo a unas convocatorias de riguroso contraste, el desarrollo y expansión de la economía española. Tiene el Acuerdo, por desgracia, algunas insuficiencias, aunque en absoluto imputables a la eficacia negociadora de nuestra representación en los largos y difíciles debates, sino debidas a limitaciones propias al Mercado Común, escasamente evolucionado, por ejemplo, en lo que se refiere a la unificación de su política agrícola. Pero, pese a tales limitaciones, el Tratado preferencial es, económica y comercialmente, de gran utilidad como instrumento para nuestra aproximación a Europa.

in Preston and Smyth 1984: 27-8). Nevertheless, in spite of this renewed atmosphere of international isolation and 'patriotic resistance to foreigners', Franco boldly claimed in his 1970 New Year's address that the commercial agreement with the EEC was one of the 'exemplary symptoms of the strength and maturity with which Spain confronts its mission in the international stage' (Franco 1975: 823).

At this point, however, the regime's official discourse was being rejected by broader and broader sectors of the Spanish population. It was becoming increasingly obvious to many Spaniards, even within the regime's own power structure, that if Spain truly wanted to become 'European', political democratization was a necessary condition for this ideal to become a reality. By the 1970's, Spain had been transformed into an industrialized, mobile, better educated society by Franco's own regime, and as many historians have illustrated, these changes gradually eroded its legitimacy and rendered it obsolete (Carr 1980, Carr and Fusi 1981, Gilmour 1985, Arango 1995). The great irony of Francoism is that a 'crusade' which was initially launched to preserve the traditional Catholic values of *la España eterna* ('the eternal Spain') eventually led to the country's economic and social modernization – a process which eventually made its own discourse of legitimation sound completely anachronistic. The regime's famous tourist slogan, 'Spain is different', an image that sought to entice visitors to a spiritual land of 'picture-book villages seemingly untouched by time, and austere cities where life seemed to be locked away behind stone walls and iron gates' (Arango 1995: 1), was completely untenable by the late 60's and early '70's. At this point, students, intellectuals, workers, Basque and Catalan nationalists, and even many representatives of the Catholic Church were publicly rejecting the official visions of 'the nation' and 'Spanish patriotism' promoted and defended by official regime discourse. The exposure to alternative lifestyles through the mass presence of tourists and the migration of Spanish workers abroad, as well as the influence of American films and television programmes, had an enormous cultural impact on the Spanish population. Many Spaniards, particularly in the younger generations, therefore began to feel increasingly alienated from the old-fashioned,

repressive, paternalistic discourse of the regime, and longed to live in a land of 'genuine liberty', just like 'the rest of Europe', where a 'free use of the body' was tolerated.

The exclusion of Spain from the EEC only served to widen this increasing gap between the national we-image promoted by official Francoist discourse, and the rival patriotic paradigm of all of those who wanted to recuperate collective pride by living in a 'modern' and 'democratic' society that could be fully accepted into 'Europe':

> The official attitudes and actions of [European] Community institutions, made evident during the 1960s and 1970s, impressed upon Spaniards the fact that political democratization was a precondition of entry into the EEC, an ambition which became both cause of, and focus for, the burgeoning democratic sentiment.(Preston and Smyth 1984: 30)

The regime was therefore increasingly losing the symbolic monopoly by which it defined the 'essence' of *España* and its 'European vocation'. Rival conceptions of 'the nation' and 'Europeanism' were gaining ground, particularly those which linked complete democratization with the desired entry into the EEC. As the Socialist politician Fernando Morán (1980: 289) has put it, for the increasing number of people in Spain who opposed the regime:

> Europe was during the dictatorship a myth: something unattainable in the circumstances of the times, and precisely because of those prevailing deficiencies. Consequently, Europe was perceived as an idealized reality and the march towards it appeared as something which unequivocally represented the end of autocracy.

The *Generalísimo* himself, however, never showed any willingness whatsoever to revise his rigid, exclusionary symbolic classifications of those people who were 'really Spanish' and those who belonged to the treacherous, foreign-inspired 'anti-Spain'. In his 1971 'New Year's Message the Nation', he insisted once again that:

> The realities of Spain... are still not understood and are even rejected by the recalcitrant representatives of old liberal politics which are progressively and pathetically extinguishing themselves. (Cited in Franco 1975: 826).

A year later, in spite of the evident impossibility of Spain being accepted into the EEC without a process of democratic reforms, Franco would still stubbornly continue to claim that:

> Our fatherland is a part of Europe and aspires to occupy within it, economically and politically, the position which history offers us and which the qualities and merits of Spaniards deserve. (Cited in Franco 1975: 827).

The final days of his regime, however, made it patently clear once again that the aspiration to 'enter Europe' would never be satisfed without a political transformation. On September 27 1975, five Basque separatists were executed by a firing squad. A furious international condemnation of the regime followed, which included the EEC's total suspension of its negotiations with Spain. 'Europe', once again, had rejected and denigrated Franco's Spain because of its utter disregard for 'the principles of justice and humanity' (cited in Bassols 1995: 121). The old *Generalísimo* and his remaining diehard propagandists, nevertheless, still managed to organize one last mass ritual of 'national irritation' against the 'foreign enemies' of *la patria*. On 1 October 1975, in front of an assembled crowd of those who still continued to worship their totemic national leader, Franco warned his countrymen that the envious forces of 'anti-Spain' were once again threatening the fatherland. All 'true Spaniards', he proclaimed, should feel proud about their adherence to the values of 'real patriotism', while all others were nothing but shameless traitors:

> All of this is due to a masonic leftist conspiracy of the political class, in collusion with Communist-terrorist subversion in the social sphere, which honours us and denigrates them... Evidently to be Spanish has today once again become something important in the world. (Cited in Franco 1975: 869)

Franco, in what was to be his last public appearance, still clearly commanded a considerable degree of popular support, and during the following days, walls all over Madrid were covered with the slogan, 'Say "no" to Europe' (Preston and Smyth 1984: 28). However, the inflated Spanish we-image of the Francoist propaganda was no longer very convincing. On the contrary, the hostility of 'Europe' towards the Franco dictatorship was for an increasing number of Spaniards something to be ashamed of, not something to celebrate proudly because it proved that

foreigners were supposedly jealous of 'national greatness'. In many minds, Francoism had rather become a humiliating reminder of the fact that they could still not fully consider themselves 'Europeans', because they still lived in a 'backwards, undemocratic nation'.

7.7 Conclusion: 'Europe' as an unfulfilled aspiration

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the we-image of Spaniards was devastated by the loss of their nation's imperial status after the 1898 'disaster'. During the decades of extreme instability which followed this humiliating blow to collective self-esteem, a symbolico-political struggle emerged between two rival, emotionally charged conceptions of the Spanish nation. On one side were those who defended the 'Catholic essence' of Spain and the continuation of its evangelical imperialistic mission in the world. On the other were those who wholeheartedly embraced the ideals of liberalism, secularism, modernization, and hence 'Europeanization' as the most effective remedies for Spain's loss of interational prestige. This was one of the fundamental ideological divisions in Spanish society that ultimately erupted during the Spanish Civil War. Ultimately, however, the victory of General Franco's forces signified the temporary triumph of Hispanic traditionalism, Catholicism, and imperialism over liberal 'Europeanizers', as well as Communists and peripheral nationalists. In opposition to the discourse of 'European modernization', which was stigmatized by the new regime as 'anti-Spanish', Franco defended a conception of 'Europe's Christian civilization' which coincided with his vision of Spain's religious crusade against the twin threatening Others of liberalism and Marxism.

During the initial years of his rule, the expected triumph of the Axis powers led Franco and his propagandists to build up a Spanish we-image based on the glories of imperial expansion which would supposedly resurrect national pride after the World War. However, the victory of the Allies led to a period of total international isolation, during which the regime effectively mobilized national we-feelings against the hostility of Spain's 'foreign enemies'. At the same time, the regime attempted to symbolically construct a Spanish self-image of 'independence' and 'self-sufficiency', in harmony with its autarkic economic policies. By the early 1950's, this

situation had led to widespread poverty and hunger in Spain, but the regime was able to find a new source of wealth, prestige and moral authority through the 1953 agreement with the United States. Spain then became an honourable partner in the American struggle against Soviet Communism. At that point, Franco placed economic affairs in the hands of the Opus Dei technocrats, and the regime developed a new patriotic discourse of legitimacy based on the development and modernization of 'the nation'.

Within the context of this new economic programme, the Francoist state requested entry into the European Economic Community, as a further source of both commercial benefits and international prestige. The concept of 'Spain's European vocation' and its aspiration to 'enter Europe' developed during this time as part of the Francoist propaganda's official discourse. This 'vocation', however, was limited to the nation's economic interest in joining the Common Market, as well as to the claim that Spain's defence of Christian values entitled it to be classified as 'European' as much as anyone else. There was never any suggestion, however, that this 'Europeanism' should imply political changes. On the contrary, Francoist propaganda continued to deride the liberal democracy of other European countries as an 'inferior' system and a 'dangerous' step towards Communism. Nevertheless, the non-democratic character of Francoist Spain blocked the regime's attempts to associate itself with the EEC, and increasingly revealed to Spaniards that political reforms would be necessary in order to be accepted as 'Europeans'. Hence, those Spaniards who were opposed to the Francoist regime both within the country and in exile began to unify under the symbolic banner of 'Europeanism'.

A rival, patriotic we-image of Spain which saw the renewal of the nation's international status through its democratization and entry into 'Europe' therefore gradually developed and spread. Initially, this democratic challenge to the regime's official conceptions of Spain and its 'European vocation' were largely silenced and labelled as 'anti-patriotic' through the Francoist monopolization of all media institutions. However, by the time of Franco's death, it had become increasingly evident to many Spaniards that their 'European vocation' would never be satisfied without the implementation of political reforms. The exclusion from the EEC thus became a

symbol of Spain's shameful 'backwardness' in many minds. 'Europe', from this widely shared perspective, remained an unfulfilled aspiration, a necessary condition for the recovery of national pride and prestige, and hence it was widely recognized that such a recovery would only be possible through the country's full democratization. This will be illustrated in the following chapter, where I shall analyze the powerful emergence of a new political discourse on 'freedom', 'modernity', and 'Europeanization', which initially emerged during Spain's transition to democracy, and which ultimately reached their symbolic peak in the 1985 signature ceremony in which 'the nation' finally entered 'Europe'.

8. 'Going into Europe': A triumph for 'modernity' and 'democracy'

When Franco died, no European leaders attended the elaborate funeral ritual which was organized in Spain to honour the *Generalísimo* and his life of *servicio a la patria* ('service to the fatherland').[1] In fact, the only significant head of state who came to pay his respects to the deceased Spanish leader was the Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet. During the last period of Franco's life, 'Europe' had already made it perfectly clear that a non-democratic Spain would never be allowed to participate in the project of continental unification. As the last chapter indicated, only a few weeks before Franco's death, the execution of five alleged terrorists was condemned by the EEC as an unacceptable violation of human rights, and all negotiations with Spain were therefore suspended. In the words of one Spanish author, the end of Franco's life was characterized by 'the clamours of the civilized world against the dictatorship' (Armero 1989: 20). The implication of such a statement is that according to this writer, Spain could certainly not consider itself a part of 'the civilized world' at this point. On the contrary, from an anti-Francoist perspective, Spain was still embarrassingly close to the 'Third World levels' of a 'banana republic', due to the 'backwardness' of its political system. Indeed, there was a joke at the time according to which Africa began 'south of the Pyrenees' (Arango 1995: 253).[2] For Spaniards who shared a pro-democratic standpoint, the absence of European dignitaries at Franco's funeral clearly illustrated once again his regime's moral isolation and hence their country's lack of international respectability.

The aspiration to 'enter Europe' had been repeatedly promoted by the Francoist authorities themselves since the early 1960's, but in the end they had failed to make this collective aspiration a reality. Spain therefore remained an excluded outsider, and this humiliating situation catalyzed the desire for a process of democratization among broader and broader sectors of the

[1] Reported, for instance, in *ABC*, 21 November 1975.

[2] The Spanish journalist Fernando Jáuregui (1983) has referred to this Spanish we-image of political, economic, and cultural backwardness vis-à-vis Europe as 'the Pyrenées mountain complex'.

population. The 'Europeanizing' discourse of the democratic opposition forces, whose voices had been silenced for many years and stigmatized as 'anti-patriotic' by the regime, were quickly gaining ground. In fact, due to this increasing popular pressure, even within the Francoist political apparatus there was a growing realization that fundamental changes would be necessary if Spain was ever to become accepted as a modern 'European' nation.

Nevertheless, there were still powerful factions, particularly in the circles of the armed forces, who radically opposed any violations of Francoist orthodoxy. Such men believed it was their moral duty to rise up in arms if, from their own particular standpoint, *la patria* became threatened after the death of their leader by the dangerous forces of 'liberalism', 'anarchy', or 'separatism'. It is interesting to note that when Franco's death was publicly announced, many Spaniards celebrated with champagne, and people spontaneously danced in the streets of numerous Basque towns (Preston 1986: 76). At the same time, however, large crowds of people gathered in Madrid to silently file past his coffin and respectfully bow their heads with sincere affection (Share 1986: 74), and leading newspapers such as *ABC* proclaimed in their headlines that General Franco was still *VIVO EN LA HISTORIA* ('ALIVE IN HISTORY') [reproduced on the following page]. It was therefore far from clear whether a reconciliation between the 'two Spains' would be possible after the dictator's death, and hence whether a transition to a 'European' form of democracy could take place without bloodshed.

Within this context of political tension and uncertainty, King Juan Carlos I stepped in as the new symbolic figurehead of the Spanish people. As Franco's appointed successor, he was educated under the dictator's supervision, and had sworn loyaly to the principles of the regime's single party, the *Movimiento*, in 1969. Hence, many expected him to follow in the political footsteps of the *Generalísimo*. Franco himself had famously insisted in his final years that everything was *atado y bien atado*, 'tied down and well tied down', in order to ensure the survival of an authoritarian power structure after his death. Nevertheless, in the end this proved to be the dictator's greatest miscalculation, for King Juan Carlos clearly decided to legitimate his monarchy by promoting the tranformation of Spain into a modern liberal democracy. Instead of



ABC, 21 November 1975

maintaining the symbolic division which Francoist discourse constructed between the victorious 'Spain' of Catholic authoritarianism and the vanquished 'anti-Spain' of liberalism and communism, the new monarch presented himself as a leader who stood for a much wider and more inclusive definition of 'the nation': a man who proclaimed his wish to be 'King of all Spaniards', independently of their political creed. Juan Carlos was conscious of the increasing demands for democratization amongst the country's industrial, financial, and professional elites, who were fed up with Spain's incapacity to be accepted into the EEC. Hence, with the full support of the new monarch and his advisers, a new we-image of 'the nation' was symbolically constructed and defended by a broad spectrum of moderate forces on both the right and the left: the vision of a Spain which aspired to 'freedom', 'modernity', and 'democracy'. What is fascinating in relation to the topic of this dissertation is that all of these patriotic ideals became fully identified with the desire to achieve a 'European' status. This chapter, therefore, will analyze the new public discourse on 'the nation' which emerged during Spain's transition to democracy, and which reached an emotional peak of prestige and collective pride when the country's accession to the European Economic Community was finally achieved in 1985.

8.1 The coronation rituals of a new totemic leader: King Juan Carlos calls for a 'free', 'modern', and 'European' Spain

On November 22 1975, only two days after Franco's death, King Juan Carlos addressed the Spanish people for the first time as their new leader.[3] In the main chamber of the Spanish Parliament, dressed in an impeccable military uniform, the young monarch delivered his inaugural speech. The royal crown, as well as a large crucifix, were neatly placed by his side, next to the podium from which he spoke to *el pueblo español* [see photograph reproduced on the

[3]My analysis of this event is based entirely on the reports of *ABC*, 23 November 1975. The entire text of the King's address was published on that day by this newspaper.



ABC, 23 November 1975

following page]. Behind him sat his wife, Queen Sofia, and his three children, Felipe, Elena, and Cristina. In this emotionally charged, highly ritualized setting of power-transition and power-legitimation, the new King delivered an address which was a cautious mixture of sensitivity and respect towards those who genuinely felt saddened by Franco's death, as well as optimistic hope for those who desired a political transformation of the country.

Juan Carlos I began by acknowledging the importance of Franco as an 'exceptional figure' in Spanish history:

> His memory will constitute for me an obligation of action and loyalty towards the functions which I now assume in the service of the fatherland... Spain will never be able to forget the man who as a soldier and a statesman has devoted his entire existence to serve it.

At the same time, the King gave numerous signs, albeit in an inevitably ambiguous language, of his plans for democratic reform in Spain. He spoke of the beginning of 'a new epoch in Spanish history' and a future which would be based on 'a consensus of national harmony'. More specifically, he asserted with apparent democratic conviction that:

> A free and modern society requires the participation of all in the forums of decision-making, in the media, in the different spheres of education, and in the control of national wealth. To make this participation more real and effective should be a collective enterprise and the task of the government.

Finally, and most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, at the end of his address the King made a passionate appeal to 'Europe' and highlighted the rightful claim of Spain to be considered 'European':

> The idea of Europe would be incomplete without a reference to the presence of the Spaniard, and without a consideration of the acts of many of my predecessors. Europe should reckon with Spain, for we Spaniards are European. It is a necessity of the moment that both sides should understand that this is so and draw the consequences that derive therefrom.

Hence, already in this initial speech, the new monarch timidly suggested that his aim was to lead Spain into 'Europe', via the achievement of 'freedom' and 'modernity'. His language had to be

cautious, given the fact that there was still a powerful Francoist 'bunker' which radically opposed any deviations from the authoritarian path. The King, as Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, necessarily had to show great sensitivity towards the figure of the *Generalísimo*, who was still highly revered in military circles. Nevertheless, with hindsight one can clearly perceive in this inaugural address the beginnings of the new patriotic discourse on 'the nation' which emerged during this period, and with which the new monarch aimed to legitimate his reign: the aspiration to install a 'European' form of democracy. It was a discourse which, in order to avoid the possibility of violent confrontation, had to strike an uneasy balance between cautious respect for the Francoist past, and enthusiastic hope for a 'democratic' and 'European' future.

A few days later, on 27 November, another elaborate ceremony took place which was again designed to symbolically mark and legitimate the changeover of power into the hands of King Juan Carlos.[4] In this case, the context was that of a religious *rite de passage*: a coronation mass to celebrate the proclamation of the new monarch and the emotive hopes he represented for 'the nation'.[5] Huge crowds, waving the national flag and chanting 'Spain with the king!', lined the streets to salute Juan Carlos and his family, as they arrived at the church of *San Jerónimo el Real* in the center of Madrid. It is noteworthy that, in striking contrast to the absence of European leaders at Franco's ceremony, the new King's coronation mass was attended, among others, by the Presidents of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as by the Duke of Edinburgh. The presence of such figures provided an important symbolic boost to the authority of Juan Carlos, by portraying him as a new source of international status and respectability for Spain. The popular enthusiasm elicited by the arrival of such foreign leaders was illustrated by chants such as 'Europe, Europe!' and 'Hooray for Europe!' from the crowds which greeted them

[4]My analysis of this event is based on the reports of *ABC*, 28 November 75.

[5] The term *rite de passage* was initially coined by the French anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep (1977 [1909]). It was subsequently developed by Victor Turner (1969), and has recently been applied to the study of the Spanish transition to democracy by Laura Desfor-Edles (1998).

as they arrived to the church. After the national anthem was played and a spectacular military parade took place in honour of the new monarch, the coronation mass began.

During this religious service, the Archbishop of Madrid, Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, delivered a homily which is worth considering in some detail, for it clearly illustrates the way in which Catholic Church authorities also played a role in the rejection of Francoist ideology, and the construction of a new public discourse on 'the nation'. As the last chapter illustrated, for many years the Church had played a very important role in the legitimation of Francoism, and indeed religious icons were always key ingredients in the symbolic paraphernalia of the regime. One important aspect of this was that from the Francoist perspective, to be a 'good Spaniard' necessarily implied being a 'good Catholic'. However, after the Second Vatican Council and the emergence of a younger generation of priests, many liberal-minded members of the Catholic Church joined the anti-Francoist cause and rejected such narrow, exclusivist definitions of 'Spanishness' (Carr and Fusi 1981: 152-56). This was illustrated in the discourse of tolerance and openness employed by Cardinal Tarancón in the coronation mass of King Juan Carlos.

A few days before this ceremony, the Archbishop of Madrid had already published a letter to the faithful in which he asserted that 'patriotism is compatible with all sincere and honest political forms which have as their objective the common good.'[6] Now, in front of the newly crowned monarch, Tarancón asked Juan Carlos to become 'King of all Spaniards' and stated:

> I pray that you may possess the wisdom and discretion to open paths for the future of the Fatherland, so that, in accordance with human nature and the will of God, the politico-juridical structures may offer all citizens the possibility of participating freely and actively in the life of the country.[7]

After this remarkably pro-democratic homily, one of the prayers of petition voiced by the Archbishop invoked divine guidance for this same political cause:

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[6]Published by *ABC*, 23 November 1975, p. 15.
[7]*ABC*, 28 November 1975, p. 7.

> For all of us here united, so that, without distinctions of religious creed, race, ideology, or condition, we may work for a more just, happy, and fraternal humanity, let us pray to the Lord.[8]

My point is that although for many years, Church authorities had identified themselves with Franco's narrowly partisan project of 'national Catholicism', some of them were now positioning themselves on the side of those who did not necessarily identify 'patriotism' with a particular religious or ideological outlook. The discourse of the Archbishop of Madrid during the coronation ritual of Juan Carlos supported the construction of a Spain in which one could legitimately work for the common good of the *patria*, without going to church on Sundays or upholding all the moral commandments of Catholicism. Even powerful sectors of the Church, therefore, were openly in favour of 'European' democratization.

It is also worth drawing attention to the inevitable excitement which was generated in Spain on the day of the new monarch's coronation, as a result of the declarations of support which were made by the French President, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, in relation to the country's 'European' aspirations:

> Spain is a part of Europe. I would even say that Spain, because of its history and its civilization, is one of the founders of Europe, and we wish, therefore, that Spain may be able to participate with us in the great task of our time, which is, precisely, the political unification of Europe.[9]

The Spanish press paid great attention to these words, and interpreted this atmosphere of supportive warmth from European dignitaries as a signal that the desired entry into 'Europe' was imminent, due to the new political situation in Spain after Franco's death. On 29 November, *ABC* devoted its entire front page to two large photographs of the new monarch: one showed him chatting in a casual manner with the German President, Walter Scheel, and the other pictured him enjoying breakfast in the company of the French leader, Giscard D'Estaing [reproduced on

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[8] *ABC*, 28 November 1975, p. 8.
[9] *ABC*, 28 November 1975, p. 13.

the following page]. The headline was 'VISA FOR EUROPE', and the sub-text claimed that these symbolic gestures of friendliness were 'an undoubted clearing of the path for our immediate European policy'. This newspaper's editorial on that day also focused its attention on these hopeful signs of Euro-respectability:

> Don Juan Carlos expressed before Parliament, on the historic occasion of his proclamation as King, the European vocation of Spain... The response of Europe has been clear. This renovation of a European openness by King Juan Carlos has been immediately followed by the cordial openness of Europe towards Spain and its King... Spain is now closer to Europe because Europe recognizes itself more in the signs and the potential for change and participation incorporated by the Crown to our national reality.[10]

On the following day, the same newspaper published an article in which the journalist Luis María Ansón called upon his fellow citizens to help the new monarch

> organize moderation, so that all Spaniards, without exclusions or violence, may participate in political decisions within democratic pluralism; and so that as soon as possible, the youth of Spain may be offered their two great aspirations: liberty and Europe.[11]

In all of this, one can sense an emotional atmosphere of collective hope for the renewal of Spain's international respectability and self-esteem, through the changes which King Juan Carlos seemed to represent. Thanks to the new monarch, it was claimed that Spain was closer than ever to 'liberty' and 'Europe'. Nevertheless, there was still much tension and uncertainty in the air. Juan Carlos still had to prove his democratic credentials to a very skeptical opposition, and in fact the clandestine left-wing press proclaimed in its own headlines: 'No to an imposed King!' and 'No to the Francoist King!' (Cited in Preston 1986: 78). The fundamental point for the purposes of this thesis, in any case, is to highlight the initial, timid emergence of a new official discourse on 'the nation' which aimed to overcome the old distinction between the 'patriotism' of Francoists and the 'anti-patriotic conspiracies' of the regime's opponents, through a new,

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[10] *ABC*, 29 November 1975, p. 3.
[11] *ABC*, 30 November 1975, p. 3.

ABC, 29 November 1975

more inclusive we-image: a Spain that could only become 'European' by recovering 'democracy' and 'freedom'. King Juan Carlos, inevitably stigmatized in many circles because he was seen as 'Franco's boy', needed to find new sources of legitimacy in order for the monarchy to find mass support. From the very beginning of his reign, it is clear that the pledge to make Spain 'European' was one of the key ideals which were repeatedly invoked by the King and his supporters for this purpose.

8.2 The identification of 'democracy' with 'Europe' during the transition period

The relatively peaceful process which transformed the Spanish political system from an authoritarian Catholic regime to a liberal pluralist democracy has been extensively analyzed by many authors.[12] It is not my purpose here to give a detailed account of this complex metamorphosis, but rather to focus above all on the way in which 'Europe' and the idealized concept of becoming 'European' were symbolically identified during these years with the 'modernization' and 'democratization' of Spain. The aspiration to 'enter Europe' was one of the fundamental issues on which there was a broad consensus in Spain amongst a wide spectrum of moderate forces on both the right and the left. Hence, this collective aspiration was undoubtedly one of the key points of coincidence which made the negotiated transition to democracy possible. As the socialist politician Fernando Morán (1980: 289) has put it:

> At the time of the transition from dictatorship to democracy [Spain's Europeanism] attained almost a metapolitical worth and constituted one of the facts on which the unanimity which permitted change was established.

'Europe', for many Spaniards, was not merely a question of economic benefits and commercial advantages. It was also clearly a matter of recovering national prestige and self-respect, of

[12] My own understanding of the transition has been guided by the excellent studies of Carr and Fusi (1981), Gilmour (1985), Preston (1986), Share (1986), Pérez-Díaz (1993), Aguilar (1996), and Desfor-Edles (1998).

overcoming the 'anachronistic' political structures and cultural 'backwardness' of the past for good.[13]

When Franco died, EEC authorities officially expressed their hope that democracy would soon be reestablished in Spain, and made it clear that only such a political transformation would permit the country's participation in the project of European union (Armero 1989: 32-33). Nevertheless, the first government appointed by King Juan Carlos inevitably disappointed those who hoped for immediate change, since the new monarch initially maintained Franco's last Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro, in his position. With hindsight, it seems probable that this decision was taken due to the necessity of implementing change slowly and cautiously, in order to avoid the possibility of a military backlash. In any case, whatever the reasons, the re-appointment of Arias deflated the hopes for democratic renewal of many Spaniards, for this man was still clearly committed to the Francoist conception of Spain, and hence he continued to think of parliamentary democracy as something alien and dangerous. His emotional attachment to the *Generalísimo* was made very visible when he wept profusely as he read Franco's testament to the Spanish people in a television broadcast, aired on the day after the dictator's death [see photograph reproduced on the following page]. It was also symbolically illustrated by the fact that his office was decorated with an enormous portrait of Franco, in contrast to a diminutive photograph of King Juan Carlos (Preston 1986: 80).

Of course, in his inaugural speech as Prime Minister of the Monarchy's first government, Arias did not fail to make a reference to the nation's 'European aspirations' and he promised to put all his efforts behind this desired objective:

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[13] In January 1976, the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (Center for Sociological Investigations) carried out a poll which suggested that amongst the general population, 73% of Spaniards were in favour of their country's entry into the EEC, and 65% supported the 'necessary political reforms' which had to be carried out in order to accomplish this objective. It is also worth noting that both age and levels of education were the two crucial variables which determined the degrees of 'Europeanism' of Spanish citizens. For instance, in the age range of 15-24 and 25-44, 84% and 79% of those polled were 'in favour of Europe', while amongst those who were 65 or older, support for the EEC fell to 51%. Similarly, amongst university students, 'Europeanism' was popular amongst 87%, while amongst those with only basic primary schooling, support for the EEC fell to 60% (figures cited in Moreno Juste 1998b: 127).

LA INCONTENIBLE EMOCION DEL PRESIDENTE

A las diez de la mañana don Carlos Arias Navarro dirigió al país, a través de la radio y la televisión, un emotivo mensaje, que ya publicamos en nuestras últimas ediciones de ayer y que reproducimos íntegramente a continuación. El presidente, visiblemente emocionado, dio lectura a un folio que el propio Generalísimo Franco dejó escrito como último mensaje al pueblo español. Reproducimos las palabras del presidente del Gobierno:

Españoles:

Franco ha muerto. El hombre de excepción que ante Dios y ante la Historia asumió la inmensa responsabilidad del más exigente y sacrificado servicio a España ha entregado su vida, quemada día a día, hora a hora, en el cumplimiento de una misión trascendental. Yo sé que en estos momentos mi voz llegará a vuestros hogares entrecortada y confundida por el murmullo de vuestros sollozos y de vuestras plegarias. Es natural; es el llanto de España, que siente como nunca la angustia infinita de su orfandad; es la hora del dolor y de la tristeza, pero no es la hora del desfallecimiento ni de la desesperanza.

Es cierto que Franco, el que durante tantos años fue nuestro Caudillo, ya no está entre nosotros, pero nos deja su obra, nos queda su ejemplo, nos legó un mandato histórico de inexcusable cumplimiento. Porque fui testigo de su última jornada de trabajo, cuando ya la muerte había hecho presa en su corazón, puedo asegurarles que para vosotros y para España fue su último pensamiento, plasmado en este mensaje con que nuestro Caudillo se despide de esta España a la que tanto quiso y tan apasionadamente sirvió:

ABC, 21 November 1975

> The government, recognizing that the process of European integration constitutes a fundamental fact, will search firmly and progressively for mutual and acceptable solutions which will facilitate the integration of Spain in that reality.(Cited in Armero 1989: 22-3)

However, this was still very much the Francoist version of Spain's 'European vocation', for Arias was clearly not willing to initiate a genuine process of democratization and give up what he saw as unique Spanish 'traditions' in order to join the EEC. As he declared to an American journalist:

> We wish to join European institutions with full rights. And that means we are willing to construct a democracy with Spanish characteristics which will allow us to move towards the political currents of the free Europe without having to give up our traditions.(Cited in Armero 1989: 21)

When Arias spoke in this way of 'a democracy with Spanish characteristics', he was essentially demonstrating his allegiance to all the basic tenets of Francoism and its particular version of 'the nation'. In other words, the democratic institutions of other European countries were viewed as something which could never work in Spain, given the 'national character' of its people. Hence, in his public speeches he repeatedly praised the achievements of the deceased dictator and continued to vilify much of the democratic opposition for acting in an 'anti-patriotic' manner (Share 1986: 76). The left's minimum demands of full amnesty for all political prisoners, the legalization of all political parties, free trade unions, and free elections, were simply not negotiable with Arias (Preston 1986: 80-1).

The EEC, however, had already made it clear that entry into 'Europe' would never be allowed without a genuine process of full democratization. The more liberal-minded members of the Arias cabinet, such as the Foreign Minister José María de Areilza, were perfectly aware of this, and hence they pressured the Prime Minister to initiate genuine reforms in the democratic direction. In fact, during the first few months of 1976, Areilza visited the capitals of the member states of the EEC, guaranteeing them that a process of genuine democratization would soon be initiated in Spain (Bassols 1995: 154-5). Prime Minister Arias, however, remained a hostage of the Francoist 'bunker' and of his own passionate attachment to the legacy of the *Generalísimo*.

At the most, he was willing to put forward a watered down version of democratic reforms, but this was totally unacceptable to the increasingly confident and unified opposition forces. Meanwhile, Basque terrorism continued to rise, large-scale industrial strikes began to spread, and mass demonstrations in favour of amnesty for political prisoners took place throughout Spain. Such an increase in popular militancy and violence was quickly threatening to erode the legitimacy of the new King and the promise of democratic change he supposedly represented. He was therefore advised by his liberal-minded councillors to distance himself from the Francoist Arias, and in April he declared to the American magazine *Newsweek* that the Prime Minister was 'an absolute disaster'. This statement was widely publicized in the Spanish press, and the King's office made no denial of its validity (Share 1986: 78).

Two months later, in June 1976, Juan Carlos made an official state visit to the United States, in which he received the backing of the American government for a programme of 'modern democratization'. Speaking before the U.S. Senate, the Spanish King promised to oversee a transition to democracy in his country, employing a discourse that clearly represented a repudiation of his Prime Minister's Francoist intransigence:

> The monarchy will uphold the principles of democracy, social peace, and political stability while at the same time assuring the orderly access to power by the different governmental alternatives, according to the freely expressed wishes of the people.(Cited in Share: 81)

A few weeks later, on 1 July, Juan Carlos asked for and received Arias's resignation. The stage was then finally set for the successful process of 'democratization' and 'Europeanization' under the new Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez.

Initially, the choice of Suárez delighted the Francoist *continuistas*, and horrified the democratic opposition, for he was also a man who had held very high posts in the authoritarian regime's power structure. Under Franco, Suárez had directed the public radio and television networks, which were obviously key instruments of regime propaganda, and he had more recently served as secretary general of the *Movimiento*. Nevertheless, Suárez clearly understood the popular urge for democratic change, as well as the King's desire to legitimize his monarchy

through Spain's political transformation and the recovery of its international respectability. Hence, in less than a year, he successfully implemented a process of reform from above, in continuous dialogue with the forces of the opposition, which made possible the construction of a bicameral system based on universal suffrage, the amnesty of over 400 political prisoners, the legalization of all political parties, the re-establishment of free trade unions, and the celebration of the first free elections in June 1977.

Of all the reforms initiated by Suárez, the most daring and controversial was the legalization of the Communist Party in April of that year, for it granted legitimacy to a collectivity which from the Francoist perspective represented the ultimate incarnation of *la anti-España* ('anti-Spain'). The eradication of Marxism was, after all, one of the fundamental causes for which the Civil War crusade to save 'the nation' had been fought back in the 1930's. This decision therefore provoked enormous indignation in military circles, in spite of the fact that in return for its legalization, the Communist Party accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy and its national flag. By granting official legitimation to the Communists, a crucial step was taken in the symbolic construction of a new, much more inclusive concept of 'the nation' in which any political creed could put forth its views and take part in political life without being officially stigmatized as 'anti-patriotic'. Clearly, the celebration of elections without the participation of the Communists would not have been taken seriously by other European states, and hence the legalization of this party was a fundamental step for the achievement of a fully democratic, 'European' status. Hence, even for many Spaniards who despised the Communist ideology, the legalization of *los rojos* ('the reds') was a vital decision which was necessary for Spain to be accepted as a 'normal European democracy'.

The same applies to the measures adopted by Suárez in relation to the demands of Basque and Catalan nationalists. The Prime Minister similarly ignited the rage of the Francoist 'bunker' by stomping on another sacred tenet of their own particular version of *España*: its centralized, indivisible unity. By the time of the June elections, Basque and Catalan symbols, ceremonies of nationhood, and political organizations had also been fully legalized. Once again, such moves

were vital for Spain's achievement of a democratic status which would be acceptable to 'Europe'. In the minds of the reformists, it was thus absolutely crucial for the Spanish 'national interest' to take these political steps towards genuine democratization. But from the perspective of orthodox Francoists, these measures represented the worst conceivable treachery of 'the nation', and hence military barracks were flooded during this period with propaganda which railed against the government for the way in which it had deteriorated 'patriotic values' (Preston 1986: 89). However, because King Juan Carlos was Franco's appointed successor, his endorsement of these democratic reforms made possible the fact that many military men accepted them in the name of 'patriotic' obedience and duty to their commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, there were widespread rumours of military conspiracies and the possibility of a *coup d'état* during much of this period.

All of this therefore illustrates the continuation of an ongoing symbolico-political division between different conflicting views of 'Spain' and 'the good of the nation'. On the one hand, there was now the consensus of a broad majority of moderate forces, crucially supported by the King and Suárez, who fully accepted Spain's need to become a 'modern European democracy' in order to ensure political stability, improve the country's status, and recover its international respectability. On the other, there remained the ideals of nostalgic Francoists, with their unshakable emotive affiliation to the *Generalísimo* and their patriotic dogmas on 'the eternal enemies of Spain'. This division eventually reached a dramatic climax in the attempted military coup of Februrary 1981, which will be considered later on in this chapter.

In any case, what is crucial for the purposes of this dissertation is to note how in the discourse of Suárez and his team of reformist ministers, the success of the democratization process was repeatedly linked to the possibility of 'entering Europe' during this delicate transition period. In its initial programmatic statement as the new government of the Monarchy, the Suárez cabinet officially manifested its 'will towards integration in the European Communities' (cited in Bassols 1995: 161). In itself, such an announcement would not have necessarily demonstrated a shift from Francoist discourse, since from the 1960's the regime had

always insisted on its own particular 'European vocation'. However, it soon became evident that for the first time, the need to fully democratize and transform the political structures of Spain was explicitly acknowledged in official governmental discourse as an indispensable condition for the accomplishment of the 'European' objective. This was particularly evident in the language employed in relation to the EEC by Suárez's Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja, in his statements to the media. As Armero (1989: 45-53) has shown, from the moment of his initial appointment to the celebration of the first democratic elections in June 1977, Oreja repeatedly explained to the Spanish people that 'Europe' was impossible without the successful installation of a democratic system:

> For historical and geopolitical reasons, Western Europe constitutes the immediate focus of our attention, and within it, the Europe integrated in the Common Market. We cannot remain outside the Community, not only for political but also for economic reasons, and so Spanish foreign policy must be directed towards finding the conditions under which we may be able to participate in the complex edifice which is housed in Brussels.[14]

'Europe' was therefore seen as vital for the interests of 'the nation', and the 'conditions' which were required for the accomplishment of this objective were now stated openly and clearly:

> Spain is in the process of a transformation of its structures and its institutions. The government which Prime Minister Suárez presides has clearly declared its recognition of the fact that sovereignty resides in the people and that the people will determine through universal suffrage the composition of the future Chambers... Undoubtedly, the result of this will be that our political system will be on an equal par with that of Western society. This will clearly facilitate our penetration into into the three economic, political and defensive institutions which are the Common Market, NATO, and the Council of Europe.[15]

Therefore, during the very same period in which the Suárez government was implementing its full-scale programme of democratic reform, the necessity of this change was linked with Spain's aspirations to 'enter Europe', and its desire to be 'on an equal par' with 'Western society'. After four decades, the Francoist symbolic monopoly of 'Spain' and its own particular brand of

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[14] *Cambio 16*, 16 August 1976 (cited in Armero 1989: 47).
[15] *ABC*, 26 September 1976 (cited in Armero 1989: 49).

patriotic 'Europeanism' had been defeated, and the discourse of the anti-regime democratizers who had united against the dictator in the 1962 Munich reunion now became the officially sanctioned language of the Spanish government. It was now openly acknowledged that to 'Europeanize', the nation necessarily had to 'democratize', and so the Spanish Foreign Minister repeatedly insisted that a new request for adhesion to the EEC could only be possible after the celebration of free elections:

> When Spain complies with the necessary political and economic conditions, the request for entry into the Community will be put forward, but this will not be possible before the general elections. (Cited in Armero 1989: 51)

When these first elections finally took place in June, the extent to which the Francoist conception of *España* had been defeated was clearly illustrated by the results. The majority of Spaniards clearly opted for the aspiration to 'liberty', 'democracy', and 'Europe'. As Carr and Fusi (1981: 227) have put it, 'the elections were a triumph for moderation and change'. The Spanish population clearly rewarded the reformist efforts of Suárez, whose centrist coalition Union of the Democratic Center (*Unión de Centro Democrático* - UCD) won 34.8% of the vote and 165 seats in the 350-member Congress. The other main victor was the moderate left, represented by Felipe González's Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* - PSOE), who won 28.5% of the vote and 118 seats. For the purposes of this thesis, it is highly significant that in their campaign slogans, both of these parties promised to satisfy the Spanish people's aspiration to become 'European': 'Vote center. The ideologies that make possible a democratic Europe. The people that will make possible a democratic Spain'; 'The key to Europe is in your hands. Vote PSOE' (cited in Desfor-Edles 1998: 57).

At the same time, it is equally noteworthy that the extreme right, represented by the 18 July National Alliance, gained no seats in these first elections, and even the relatively moderate right-wing Popular Alliance (*Alianza Popular* - AP), led by the former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga and other prominent figures from the old regime, only managed to win 16 seats. On the other side of the spectrum, the Communists (*Partido Comunista de España* – PCE) were also

relatively unsuccessful, gaining merely 20 seats. The radical antagonisms of the past had thus largely been overcome, and so in opinion polls, four out of five Spaniards now defined themselves as belonging to the area between right and left of centre (Preston 1986: 122).

If, as Paloma Aguilar (1996) has shown, the Civil War was widely viewed in Spain as the tragic collective memory of the past that had to be avoided at all costs during the transition to democracy, one could say that 'Europe' became the mythical aspiration for the future which the majority of Spaniards desired to reach during this delicate period. The dominant we-image was now that of a nation which desired to overcome the polarized divisions of the past through 'European' forms of democracy and the successful maintenance of a peaceful, 'civilized' co-existence. As Arango has put it:

> Most profound was the popular opinion that Spain must never again repeat the horrors of the Civil War. This historical memory shaped the Spaniards' view of the future, and the most exhilarating consensus in this area was the wish to be like other Western Europeans, all of whom, in 1977, were democratic.(1995: 114)

Similarly, the Spanish sociologist Víctor Pérez-Díaz (1993: 21) has referred to the transition as a period during which 'a new invented tradition and a new identity' emerged in this country's public sphere: a 'symbolic politics of coexistence', in which the ideal of a new, democratic Spain implied 'connotations of modernity ("modern Spain" as opposed to "traditional Spain", or perhaps "backward Spain") and of belonging to Europe (a "European Spain" as opposed to a "different Spain" or the "isolated Spain" of the past).' This new politico-cultural idiom, as Pérez-Díaz has shown, pervaded the symbolic universe of everyday politics, and it involved the elaboration of new, emotionally charged totemic icons, such as the 'sacred text' of *la Constitución* (the Constitution), the 'exemplary institution' of *la monarquía parlamentaria* (the Parliamentary Monarchy), and the collective national ritual of *las elecciones* (the democratic elections). Hence, during this crucial period of Spanish history, one can observe that national we-feelings were successfully channelled by a new elite of political leaders in the direction of 'European democratization'. For many Spaniards, the success of this process was at that time (as

it still remains today) a fundamental source of national pride, in the aftermath of General Franco's death:

> After decades of being told by Franco and his minions that they were incapable of ruling themselves democratically, the majority of Spaniards were justifiably proud of the way things were turning out. (Preston 1986: 122)

8.3 The 1977 request to 'enter Europe' and the prolonged efforts of the Spanish nation to be recognized as a 'modern democracy'

As soon as democracy had been achieved and hence the political obstacles on the road to the EEC had disappeared, the elected Suárez government wasted very little time in demonstrating its determination to achieve the widely desired membership to 'Europe'. A few days after his victory, the Spanish Prime Minister – now endowed with a new aura of democratic authority – declared in front of a huge crowd of journalists:

> Spain is Europe and forms a part of it. Europe receives with the contribution of democratic countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the contribution of peoples, and of geographic and political structures, which is evidently very important.(Cited in Bassols 1995: 187)

The phrase 'Spain is Europe' could now be uttered with a new national self-confidence. Given that the possibility of 'entering Europe' had become fully identified with the achievement of democracy, at this point there was no longer any reason to doubt Spain's rightful claim to 'Europeity'. One can therefore observe in this sort of discourse how the concept of being 'European' had in effect become so linked to EEC membership, that it was not something a country could simply *be* through mere geographical location, history, or cultural background, but rather a status-symbol which had to be *achieved* through the accomplishment of certain political and economic conditions. For many Spaniards, it was only through the successful accomplishment of this 'European' status that the stability of democracy could be secured and international prestige could be fully recovered. This process, however, turned out to be much longer than expected.

On 28 July 1977, only six weeks after its electoral victory, the young Spanish democracy officially presented its request to open negotiations with the EEC in order to gain full membership in this organization. Two days before, Marcelino Oreja, who was re-appointed as Foreign Minister in the new cabinet, had declared to the media:

> The decision adopted by the government of requesting the entry of Spain into the Common Market is authentically national. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 192)

Hence, one can clearly see the way in which the necessity of participating in the supranational community of 'Europe' was typically justified through the symbolic invocation of 'the nation': this was an 'authentically national' decision. In Spain, moreover, no political party challenged this official government discourse. The claim that 'the nation' clearly needed to 'enter Europe' was endorsed by all the parties represented in the Spanish Parliament, as well as by both business organizations and trade unions. (Bassols 1995: 192) The overwhelming support shown in the elections for a democratic political system was therefore mirrored by an identical enthusiasm for integration into Europe.

The Spanish government's official petition to Brussels was marked by a brief political ceremony or 'media performance' during which Foreign Minister Oreja handed three letters from Prime Minister Suárez to the President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, the Belgian Henri Simonet, requesting Spain's adhesion into the EEC, the ECSC, and Euratom. This 'historic event' was, of course, amply covered by the national press. The country's two leading newspapers at that time, *El País* and *ABC* (the latter leaning towards the left, and the former towards the right)[16] devoted their main front page stories to the political ritual of request, publishing photographs of the key moment in which the Spanish Foreign

[16] *El País* was born in 1976, one year after Franco's death, and it quickly became *el periódico de la transición*, the leading newspaper of the transition period, a position which it has maintained up to the present day, with the conservative *ABC* remaining in second place since that time (Fuentes and Sebastián 1998). In the late 1970's, *El País* had a daily average circulation of 183.000, while *ABC* had approximately 130.000 readers. Figures cited in *Anuario de El País*, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.

Minister handed the official petitions and enthusiastically shook hands with the EEC representative [reproduced on the following page]. The emotive discourse employed by the journalists covering this political ceremony once again illustrates the symbolic identification of 'democratization' and 'Europeanization' in the collective consciousness of Spaniards:

> In this historic hour... Spain has reached the end of a road which began on 9 February 1962 and which was obstructed by a whole series of political problems that today the young Spanish democracy has been able to overcome.[17]

> Europe, from today onwards, is something possible, attainable, and even close at hand for Spaniards. Having overcome the political obstacles which for many years impeded the Spanish request for adhesion to the European Communities, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcelino Oreja, has culminated the process which precedes the opening of negotiations... It has been the Spanish people who with their desire for democracy have carved the path towards a liberal society which makes possible the entry of Spain into the community club. Without the minimum requirements of parliamentary democracy, the trip of Mister Oreja would not have been possible. One cannot request entry into a club without guarantees of being admitted.[18]

One can see, therefore, how the mere fact of being welcomed in Brussels and having the chance of requesting Spain's adhesion to the EEC as a fully fledged democracy in itself represented a crucial boost to national pride. Spain was no longer a denigrated 'backward disctatorship', it had managed to prove its 'democratic credentials', and so it now had every right to be recognized as a 'normal European nation'.

Nevertheless, it soon became evident that entry into the EEC would certainly not be automatic, although at this point the difficulties had more to do with economic than with political circumstances. From the beginning, the new request met the opposition of France, because the agricultural sector in this country feared the threat represented by competition from Spanish products (Bassols 1995: 193). This became one of the main obstacles which prolonged the waiting period that Spaniards had to experience before they could definitively call themselves 'Europeans'. The Suárez government, in any case, made every effort to show the Spanish people

[17] *ABC*, 29 July 1977, p. 8
[18] *El País*, 28 July 1977, p. 3

EL PAIS
DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA
MADRID, v
v.Talleres: Miguel Yuste 40. Madrid 17 / Teléfono 754 20 00 / Precio: 15 pesetas / Ediciones urgentes: 16 pesetas

El señor Oreja entrega en el palacio de Egmont al presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la CEE, Henry Simonet, las solicitudes españolas

Marcelino Oreja presentó en Bruselas la solicitud de adhesión

España pide su ingreso en las Comunidades Europeas

A las 12,30 de ayer, el ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores, Marcelino Oreja, cumplió en Bruselas el acto histórico de presentar la solicitud de adhesión de España a la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE), con lo cual Madrid dio un paso significativo en el proceso iniciado en 1960, año en que designó a su primer embajador ante la Comunidad.

Henry Simonet, presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la CEE, que recibió de manos del señor Oreja la petición de ingreso en las tres grandes instituciones europeas —CEE, Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero (CECA) y Comunidad Europea del Organismo del Átomo (Euratom)— declaró que se trataba de un «acontecimiento importante», y añadió que «también [la comunidad] quiere ampliarse». El [illegible] Mercado Común, aunque «podrá dar lugar a [illegible]»

[illegible] puso énfasis en la existencia del «pleno Gobierno democrático» español, y se manifestó «entusiasta» a que la CEE «globalice» el tratamiento de las candidaturas de España, Portugal y Grecia, que ya están «maduras para el ingreso de países que aguardan en el umbral de las puertas del Mercado Común».

En las demás capitales europeas, la noticia de ayer no [illegible] es evidente hacia un [illegible] grados de [illegible]

El País, July 29 1977

España pidió el ingreso en el Mercado Común

El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, don Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, en nombre del Gobierno español, entregó ayer en Bruselas al presidente del Consejo de Ministros de las Comunidades Europeas, Henry Simonet, las tres cartas con la demanda de adhesión a la C. E. E. (Comunidad Económica Europea), C. E. C. A. (Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero) y Euratom (Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica). En los documentos se solicita la apertura de negociaciones para llevar a cabo el proceso de integración en el Mercado Común. (Fotos Europa Press.)

ABC, July 29 1977

that it was doing everything possible to get them 'into Europe'. Between August and September of 1977, the Prime Minister toured the capitals of the nine member states of the EEC, and assured Spaniards, through his declarations to the media, that in every country he had found enthusiastic support for the Spanish request (Bassols 1995: 200). In November, a partial penetration into the European sphere was achieved through Spain's entry into the Council of Europe, another 'historic occasion' which once again was ritually marked by an emotive ceremony in which Foreign Minister Oreja reaffirmed the Spanish people's full identification with the defence of 'human rights' and 'democratic pluralism' (Armero 1989: 90). National pride was thus being slowly rebuilt in the sphere of morality and ethical respectability: after years of dictatorship and international opprobium, Spain was now being defined as equally 'democratic' and as a nation which upheld 'human rights' as much as any other 'European' country.

In February 1978, the government further demonstrated its interest in satifying Spain's European aspirations, by creating a cabinet-level position devoted exclusively to relations with the EEC. The new minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was quickly dubbed 'Mr. Europe' in the media (Salisbury 1980: 113). These concerted efforts finally bore fruit on 5 February 1979, when negotiations were officially opened in Brussels between the Spanish state and the European Communities. As usual, in a style which by now was entirely habitual in Spain, the political discourse which surrounded this new step on the road to 'Europe' continued to emphasize the link between democratization and Europeanization. Before travelling to Brussels, Foreign Minister Oreja declared to journalists:

> You must not forget that for us the entry of Spain into the EEC has not only an economic, but also a political content. Many issues which affect us would be better resolved within the Community. Furthermore, we feel identified with Europe in the defence of peace, political pluralism, and democracy.(Cited in Armero 1989: 81)

This was the new national 'we' which had powerfully emerged in post-Franco Spain: an officially sanctioned version of 'the nation' which fully identified with 'the democratic values of Europe.' The Francoist repudiation of 'vile' and 'inferior' liberal politics, generally condemned

in the regime's discourse as 'judeo-masonic conspiracies', had practically disappeared from the public sphere.

It is also undoubtedly significant that the President of the European Commission during this period, Roy Jenkins, welcomed Spain's negotiating team with a speech that linked their presence in the EEC with the successful transition to democracy:

> This is a happy day for you and for us. Spain is a part of Europe, and Europe is incomplete without Spain... You come to this table with the immense authority provided by the total support of your people and of all political parties, through which Spanish public opinion expresses itself. I would like to express my admiration not only for your government, but also for your King, for the notable and peaceful way with which Spain has achieved a profound constitutional change in such a short time. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 221)

The Spanish people were thus finally receiving gestures of deference, respect, and admiration from 'Europe', after the long period of isolation and denigration that had been experienced during the Franco dictatorship. It is perhaps worth recalling here the insights of Charles Cooley on the 'looking glass self', which I referred to in my introductory chapter. Cooley argued that the more human beings admire and respect those who honour them, the greater the feelings of pride which they experience in response to such gestures of deference. From this perspective, one could say that 'Europe' had clearly become an idealized 'significant Other' – to use George Herbet Mead's language – in Spain, and hence that the warm way in which the Foreign Minister of *la España democrática* was received in Brussels was a potent source of national self-esteem.

In March 1979, the second general elections were held in Spain, three months after the referendum in which the Spanish people approved, by a wide majority, the new democratic constitution drawn up by representatives from all the main political parties. The UCD remained in power, and continued its full-scale 'Europeanist' offensive. Shortly after the elections, a parliamentary debate took place on Spain's request to join the European Communities. The discourse of the leading governmental figures continued to stress the crucial importance of accomplishing the 'European' objective for the consolidation of Spain's young democracy. Calvo Sotelo, the minister for relations with the EEC, declared that, aside from the evident economic opportunities represented by the Common Market:

> Europe should also be for us the ultimate cause which should give meaning to this legislative term; it should be the great adventure abroad in which our new State may be strengthened and secured; it should be the place of coincidence, and I would even say, the place of consensus, for all the political forces represented here.(Cited in Armero 1989: 83)

Foreign Minister Oreja similarly continued to emphasize the link between Spain's participation in 'Europe' and the moral commitment to human rights:

> The Spanish government, which has made the defence of human rights one of the fundamental dimensions of its foreign policy, is in favour of a model of society based on the affirmation and defence of these rights... Spain will work with the European Communities and its institutions to defend the universal respect... for those rights, because we are convinced that the foundation of political order and social peace lies in the respect of the dignity of the human person.(Cited in Armero 1989: 86)

In the context of the new legislative term, the government's efforts to achieve Spain's adhesion to the EEC retained the support of all the political parties represented in Parliament (Bassols 1995: 224). Hence, above and beyond the commercial benefits of participating in the Common Market, the 'Europe' of 'liberty' and 'human rights' was presented as a model of ethical prestige for the Spanish nation, and as the best way to protect the fragile democratic structures that had been constructed during *la transición*. 'Europe', apart from everything else, was an opportunity to shake off the stigma of Francoist xenophobia and cruelty, of police tortures and executions by firing squad. An interesting parallel can perhaps be drawn here with the way in which the enthusiastic adoption of a European identity appears to have functioned in Germany, as a way of overcoming the collective guilt of the Nazi past (Forsythe 1989). In the discourse of Spain's new leaders, 'Europe' also became a symbol of moral renewal after the collapse of an authoritarian dictatorship.

Nevertheless, in spite of the Suárez government's efforts, the country's 'European' aspirations were clearly not being fulfilled with the quickness which many had expected. Precisely because of the fact that in Spain the achievement of democracy had been linked to the possibility of 'entering Europe', people could simply not understand why at this point it was taking so long for the country to be accepted into the EEC (Share 1986: 214-5). This unfulfilled

expectation, along with other major problems such as economic recession, unemployment, the continuing escalation of Basque terrorism, and the increasing rumours of military conspiracies against the government, led to an inevitable *desencanto* (disenchantment) with democracy. Many critical voices began to claim that in the end, democracy was simply not delivering the goods it had promised. Spain, after all, had hardly become a paradise after the death of Franco and the first free elections. As Raymond Carr (1980: 179) has put it:

> Spaniards expected the mere installation of democracy to solve every problem from structural unemployment to pollution and access to education. To take a serious example: since the undemocratic nature of the Francoist regime had effectively kept Spain out of the European Community, then the coming of a democratic regime would ensure automatic and immediate entry. This hope was not realized.

Unfortunately for Spaniards, in spite of their collective desire for 'Europe', there were still major obstacles on this path. The opposition of the French agricultural sector to Spain's entry remained very strong, and hence politicians in this country preferred to secure electoral support by promising to defend their own 'national interests' rather than to welcome the young Spanish democracy with open arms. In June 1980, with general elections on the horizon in France, President Giscard D'Estaing declared that further European enlargement would have to be indefinitely postponed until all the economic and institutional problems represented by this expansion were fully resolved (Bassols 1995: 237-41). 'Europe', therefore, seemed to be in no hurry to open its doors to Spain after all, even after the country's political transformation. Relations with France were further strained by the fact that French territory was becoming the sanctuary of ETA terrorists. This situation of European policy failures led to massive criticism of Foreign Minister Oreja, who was accused of incompetence by the media and had to be removed from his post in September 1980 (Armero 1989: 89).

Furthermore, during this same period Suárez's governing UCD party coalition began to fall apart, as the differences between its Christian Democrat, its Social Democrat, and its Liberal wings came to the surface over controversial issues such as the legalization of divorce. An artificial union of political families, which had been forged during the consensus period of the transition, was beginning to crumble (Arango 1995: 140-42). The Prime Minister himself was

being intensely criticized for his incapacity to resolve Spain's problems, and eventually he gave up and decided to resign on January 29, 1981. All of this inevitably contributed to a further increase in the intensity of the *desencanto* with democracy.

It was in this context of renewed tension and uncertainty that the military men who felt that *la patria* and its 'true patriotic values' had been betrayed after Franco's death attempted to resurrect the 'spirit of the national crusade'. The authoritarian 'bunker' apparently interpreted the atmosphere of *desencanto* as a sign that the Spanish people were fed up with democracy and longed for a return to 'law and order' (Preston 1986: 160). As mentioned earlier, the legalization of the Communists and the devolution of regional autonomy to Basques and Catalans was seen as the ultimate treason to the Spanish nation in the minds of staunch Francoists. The continuing rise of ETA terrorism had confirmed, in their view, that democracy could only lead to separatism and chaos. Hence, on 23 February 1981, while the nomination of the new Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was being submitted to a parliamentary vote, a group of armed civil guards led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina stormed into the Spanish Congress, firing a round of warning shots in the air with their machine guns, and shouting *Todos al suelo!* ('Everyone to the floor!') Tejero then announced that *sus señorías*, the 'right honourable members of parliament', would be held hostage until further notice. Suddenly, the 'European Spain' of 'democracy' and 'human rights' was being threatened by the terrifying ghost of the *Generalísimo* (although, from the perspective of the conspirators themselves, *la patria* was of course being saved from the forces of anarchy).

Nevertheless, in less than 24 hours, this attempt by nostalgic Francoists to resuscitate their version of 'the nation' failed, primarily because King Juan Carlos, as Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, opposed the conspiracy and rallied the majority of Spain's military leaders on his side. At 1 a.m. on 24 February, the monarch addressed the Spanish people in a television broadcast, reassuring them that the coup had failed and that 'our democracy' had been saved (Arango 1995: 143). This dramatic event clearly revealed the continuing fragility of Spain's democratic structures. Nevertheless, in the end it also bolstered the public image of the King as

'guardian of the nation's will' and revived the emotional climate of popular enthusiasm for political liberty which had characterized the transition period. On 27 February, three million people demonstrated in favour of democracy in Madrid and other cities, clearly illustrating the extent to which Juan Carlos had interpreted the wishes of the majority (Preston 1986: 201). For many Spaniards, the attempted coup was therefore a shameful reminder of the Spain that had been, while the intervention of their 'democratic King' became a renewed source of national pride, a symbol of the Spain that could be.

With regard to the main theme of this dissertation, it is interesting to observe the way in which the challenge to democracy represented by the so-called *23-F* was inevitably seen as a fundamental threat to the nation's 'European' aspirations. During the hours of uncertainty which followed the shocking sound of Tejero's gun shots as he entered the parliamentary chamber, for many Spaniards it seemed as if everything that 'the nation' had achieved in the approximation to 'Europe' was suddenly being lost. As the whole world watched, the Spanish democracy, 'our democracy', was being humilated.[19] Furthermore, once the coup had failed, the official declarations of support which emanated from EEC authorities reaffirmed the symbolic link between the survival of democracy and the possibility of taking part in the project of European unification:

> The Commission has always been convinced that the Spain of democracy had its place in the European Community... The Commission has always admired the quickness with which Spain has recuperated the democratic traditions of Europe, a quickness which was the expression of a great political maturity... The Commission trusts that the initiators of violence, which have wanted to provoke subversion, have in fact provoked a reaffirmation of the constitutional order. (Cited in Bassols 1995: 225)

All the usual points were therefore emphasized yet again: only 'the Spain of democracy' could find a place in the EC, only the recuperation of 'the democratic traditions of Europe' could allow Spain its rightful place in the process of supranational integration.

[19] I have often heard Spaniards describing the 1981 coup in such terms.

A few weeks later, on March 13, the European Parliament approved a resolution which transmitted exactly the same message: the Spanish people and their King were congratulated for overcoming a threat to their young democracy. At the same time, they were also reminded that:

> A system of pluralist parliamentary democracy and the respect of human rights constitute the necessary conditions for the accession and membership of any country to the European Community.(Cited in Bassols 1995: 256)

Finally, on 16 March, the new Spanish Foreign Minister, José Pedro Pérez Llorca, travelled to Brussels and declared before his European colleagues that although the coup had threatened the liberty and democracy which the Spanish people had conquered in the previous five years, it had also provoked an important positive effect:

> to reaffirm our conviction in the necessity of consolidating the construction of the democratic institutions of the State, whose firmness has been significantly demonstrated after this challenge, and of culminating the objective which is an inseparable corollary of that construction: our full integration into the European Community.(Cited in Bassols 1995: 259)

The official government discourse was therefore as determined as ever in its Euro-democratic convictions: if the coup had undoubtedly strengthened the Spanish people's faith and enthusiasm in democracy, it had similarly strengthened their desires to join the European Community as a way of fortifying this collective achievement. Indeed, membership to 'Europe' was once again presented here as the culmination, the ultimate goal of Spanish democracy. Hence, the Foreign Minister begged the EEC authorities to show generosity towards his country, because 'what is really at stake is the will of that immense majority of Spaniards who has decided to live in liberty' (Cited in Bassols 1995: 259).

The failed coup therefore did nothing but strengthen the belief of many Spaniards that 'the nation' desperately needed 'Europe' to secure it once and for all from the threat of 'backwardness' and 'opression'. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe how during their trial, the conspirators who organized the 1981 revolt were totally unwilling to give up their own particular vision of Spanish reality. On the contrary, they stubbornly insisted that they had been

motivated solely by 'patriotism' and by their love for 'national values', in spite of the fact that for most Spaniards, the whole episode was a source of collective embarrassment and humiliation, a chilling return to Francoist backwardness (Preston 1986: 218). National self-esteem was now widely based on the achievement of a 'European' form of democracy, and hence in many Spanish minds, nothing could have provoked greater shame than the triumph of the nostalgic Francoists.

This massive popular support for European 'modernization' and 'democratization', with its implicit rejection of everything the *coup d'état* had stood for, was confirmed in the next general elections, which took place on 28 October 1982. The UCD, racked by internal divisions, suffered an enormous defeat, while Felipe González's Socialists won an absolute majority. Less than seven years after Franco's death, Spaniards had voted for the largest party on the left (a very 'anti-Spanish' or 'anti-patriotic' thing to do, from the perspective of the *Generalísimo*). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the discourse of the PSOE was not one of radical socialist transformation. Since 1979, this party had abandoned the concept of Marxism and moderated its proposals, until in the 1982 elections it successfully occupied the centrist position previously represented by the UCD (Pollack and Hunter 1987: 143). In effect, the young and dashing Felipe González became the spokesperson of 'Europeanization', the new charismatic leader who promised to definitively consolidate the fragile Spanish democracy and lead 'the nation' to the paradise of 'modernity'.[20] Hence, in the inaugural speech he delivered in the Spanish Parliament as the nation's new Prime Minister, González therefore assured Spaniards that he would 'work with tenacity to eliminate the obstacles which still stand in the way of our full integration in the European Communities' (cited in Bassols 1995: 280). Under the Socialists, therefore, 'Europe' was still the great legitimating symbol, the national aspiration that remained

[20] As Holman has written, 'once in power, an ideological offensive was carried though, aimed at presenting the comprehensive hegemonic project of the PSOE as the only possible one, the only way to realize what was seen as essential for the future of Spain: the country's modernization and Europeanization' (1996: 79).

unfulfilled, and hence the ideal of 'catching up with Europe' was constantly invoked by the new government (Holman 1996: 80).

It was finally on 29 March 1985, after a long, exasperating waiting period, that Felipe González officially announced in a special 'media performance' to 'the nation' – a live broadcast on Spanish television – that all obstacles had been overcome: the negotiations with Brussels had successfully concluded, and so Spain had at last been accepted 'into Europe'. It is worth citing extensively from this emotionally charged political ritual, for it perfectly captures the dominant affective meaning of 'Europe' which was symbolically constructed in post-Franco Spain:

> Today, with honour and satisfaction, I address all the citizens and peoples of Spain to transmit to them a message of hope in our future. Early this morning, a transcendental, irreversible step has been taken for our integration in the European Economic Community... For Spain, this is a deed of great significance. As a historic fact, it signifies the end of our age-old isolation. It signifies, as well, our participation in the common destiny of Western Europe. For democratic Spain, for the Spain which lives in freedom, it also signifies the culmination of a process of struggle of millions of Spaniards who have identified freedom and democracy with integration in Western Europe. For Spain as a social reality, as an economic reality, it undoubtedly signifies a challenge, the challenge of modernity and competition, a challenge to which I am certain that our workers, our businessmen, our scientists, our professionals, and society as a whole will rise up... I think we have the obligation to do so, and that we are going to comply with this obligation of leaving our children a Spain with a greater level of economic efficiency, a greater level of culture, and a greater capacity for solidarity. A Spain which, in Europe and with Europe, will play the role which is concordant with the history of Spain, of our own Spain, and which in Europe and with Europe, will play the role which our collective will as a people, as a nation, will be capable of forging.[21]

'Entering Europe' was therefore something which could be confidently announced in the Spanish public sphere 'with honour and satisfaction'. It was 'a deed of great significance', because it signified the end of Spain's 'age-old isolation', the culmination of the struggle for 'freedom and democracy', and the opportunity to rise up to 'the challenge of modernity'. In short, it was 'in Europe and with Europe' that Spain's future generations would benefit from 'a greater level of economic efficiency, a greater level of culture, and a greater capacity for solidarity'.

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[21] *El País*, 30 March 1985.

This triumphalist discourse, furthermore, was widely echoed in the press. For instance, in an article entitled *Aleluia por Europa* ('Alleluia for Europe') [reproduced on the following page], the editor-in-chief of *El País* stated that the encounter with 'Europe' signified above all 'the discovery of a mental and ideological space still new to us, in which the words invoked for so long by Spanish intellectuals – tolerance, freedom, and rights – are deeply rooted in a way which will inevitably and happily benefit us.'[22] Similarly, ABC displayed on its cover an EEC door which opened widely to welcome Spaniards inside its terrain of prosperity and prestige [reproduced on the following page], while an editorial in this newspaper, entitled *Un Día Histórico*, 'A Historic Day' asserted that this achievement was:

> a turning point which will anchor us, for a long time, in the orbit of the nations in which individual rights, free enterprise, and the freedom of ideas impose themselves upon any totalitarian temptation... a space which is still, in spite of everything, the geographic platform of reason and liberty.[23]

Another article in *ABC* also celebrated the way in which Spain had finally ceased to be 'African', by proclaiming that 'from yesterday, Europe no longer ends at the Pyrenées', and defining the accession into the EEC as a 'genuine democratic baptism' that had saved the dignity of the Spanish people.[24] 'Europe' was thus presented in these emotionally charged discourses as the ideal antidote for all remaining traces of Francoist backwardness, and as the fundamental collective achievement that made possible the recovery of national self-respect by finally being recognized as a 'modern democracy'.

8.4 The 1985 signature ceremony of accession into 'Europe': a ritual of national effervescence and collective self-veneration

[22] *El País*, 31 March 1985.
[23] *ABC*, 29 March 1985.
[24] Manuel Blanco Tobio, '*¿Daremos la talla?*', *ABC*, 31 March 1985.

EL PAIS

DIRECTOR: JUAN LUIS CEBRIAN — DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA — MADRID, DO

Redacción, Administración y Talleres: Miguel Yuste, 40 / 28037 Madrid / ☎ (91) 754 38 00 / Precio: 75 pesetas. Sin suplemento semanal: 45 pesetas

La 'cumbre' de Bruselas despejó los últimos obstáculos para la adhesión a la CEE

España y Portugal ingresarán en el Mercado Común europeo el 1 de enero de 1986

España y Portugal ingresarán en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) el 1 de enero de 1986. La *cumbre* de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los diez llegó ayer, en un ambiente de euforia europeísta, a un acuerdo sobre los programas mediterráneos integrados, con lo que Grecia levantó sus últimas reservas sobre la ampliación de 10 a 12 miembros. Culminaba así una semana decisiva para los dos países de la Península Ibérica, que tuvo su primer jalón en la madrugada del viernes, cuando el Consejo de Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de los diez llegó a un acuerdo con los representantes españoles y portugueses para cerrar todos los capítulos que faltaban por negociar.

Según Bettino Craxi —primer ministro italiano y presidente del Consejo Europeo de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los 10 países que conforman actualmente la Comunidad Económica Europea—, el tratado de adhesión debería firmarse a finales del próximo mes de mayo. Jacques Delors, presidente de la Comisión Europea, estimó, sin embargo, que todavía queda mucho trabajo por delante y que serán necesarios tres meses al menos para firmar el tratado.

La *cumbre* ha tenido un éxito sin precedentes en los últimos años. Se han resuelto casi todos los problemas pendientes. El futuro de Europa se discutirá en el Consejo Europeo de Milán de finales del mes de junio, se tratará de una reunión dedicada al debate institucional, de la que puede salir la convocatoria de una conferencia intergubernamental para redactar un tratado de unidad europea. Todavía no se ha decidido la presencia española y portuguesa en esa reunión del máximo nivel, pero se da casi por seguro que, si se ha firmado el tratado de adhesión, Felipe González y Mario Soares estarán presentes en la misma.

Como consecuencia del acuerdo logrado ayer sobre los programas mediterráneos integrados (PIM), se desbloqueó también la situación presupuestaria de la CEE. El *agujero* existente será cubierto por medio de aportaciones directas de los diez.

Tras el fin de las negociaciones, los diferentes sectores económicos y sociales españoles han comenzado a reunirse para analizar las repercusiones del acuerdo. El ministro de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, Carlos Romero, se reunió ayer con los consejeros autonómicos de Pesca y Agricultura para realizar un primer análisis conjunto del acuerdo hispano-comunitario.

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GARCIA FRANCES

Bettino Craxi (derecha) y Giulio Andreotti, durante la conferencia de prensa que ponía fin a la *cumbre* europea.

Aleluya por Europa

JUAN LUIS CEBRIAN

A pesar de que el Tratado de Roma tiene más de un cuarto de siglo de existencia, la construcción de Europa se encuentra apenas en sus comienzos. Las razones son fáciles de entender: deshacer una historia de siglos recorrida de nacionalismos, guerras, divisiones y luchas en la búsqueda de una Europa *distinta no es sencillo*. Se oponen a ello no sólo los egoísmos particulares, las burocracias autóctonas y los prejuicios intelectuales. Fronteras largamente establecidas, fruto del militarismo triunfante, una Babel de lenguas y un sinfín de presiones exteriores contribuyen a deformar el proyecto y a acomodarlo a su propio interés. Pero 25 años, si bien se mira, no es nada en la historia del continente. Y la incorporación de la Península Ibérica, España y Portugal, a las Comunidades no llega tan tarde como los pesimistas pretenden.

Algunos se preguntan por qué ese echar las campanas al vuelo de la clase política y gran parte de los medios de comunicación después del acuerdo de Bruselas. Suscitan dudas sobre las condiciones de integración —que en parte todavía desconocemos, pero que sin duda no han de ser las mejores pensables— y argumentan razonadamente que el primer impacto de la adhesión en la economía doméstica de nuestro país va a suponer desesperanzas y perplejidades: viviremos un par de años duros, obligados a reconvertir industrias, a reformar explotaciones agrícolas, a pagar mayores impuestos y a desarrollar más inteligencia y capacidad de trabajo frente a la competencia foránea. Todo ello es verdad, sin género de dudas, y sería peligroso repetir con Europa los mismos espejismos que se crearon con la democracia: la solución a nuestros problemas no puede venir de fórmulas mágicas, y nuestra integración europea no busca en realidad ser una solución a nada, sino incorporarse a un proyecto de unidad, aunque lejano, nada utópico. Y en el caso español es de especial trascendencia, ya que objetiva la ruptura del aislamiento tradicional de nuestro país, que arrastramos desde las guerras de religión.

Página 15

El País, March 31 1985



ABC

MADRID, VIERNES 29 DE MARZO DE 1985

CEE

EL MERCADO COMUN ABRE SUS PUERTAS A ESPAÑA

Con este mismo título y con esta misma imagen anunciábamos en nuestra portada del 18 de enero del año pasado la vía libre a España para su ingreso en el Mercado Común. El Gobierno del señor González se sometió inteligentemente en 1983 a la política de Estados Unidos en la cuestión OTAN, y a cambio la gran potencia americana prestó su apoyo en la lucha contra el terrorismo y el ingreso español en la Europa unida. El Gobierno socialista ha negociado con bastante torpeza y un punto precipitadamente, y por eso ingresamos en el Mercado Común aceptando condiciones consideradas como leoninas por algunos observadores. Pero aunque se pudo entrar mas airosamente, es mejor estar dentro que fuera. Se trata de una cuestión de Estado, y por eso la oposición con todas las reservas a la escasa habilidad negociadora del Gobierno se ha sumado a la operación. En la madrugada de ayer las negociaciones quedaron virtualmente terminadas con la aprobación por ambas partes de los últimos capítulos en discusión. Con ello concluye el largo camino emprendido por España en 1962 para su integración en el Mercado Común Europeo. Nuestra nación será miembro de pleno derecho de la CEE en enero del año que viene. Editoriales en tercera, artículos de Fernando Morán, Manuel Fraga, José María de Areilza, Miguel Boyer, Oscar Alzaga, Jaime Carvajal, Espasa y Santiago García Echevarría y amplia información de nuestros enviados especiales en capitales europeas

ABC, 29 March 1985

On 12 June 1985, a spectacular ceremony was organized by Spanish authorities to mark the nation's accession into the EEC.[25] The official entry of Spain into the Common Market would not take place until 1 January 1986, but the signing of the treaty on this day was transformed into a major 'national event' by the government. The ritual, which took place at the Royal Palace in Madrid, was attended by King Juan Carlos, Felipe González and his entire cabinet, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and other leading EEC authorities, the leaders of all political parties, the heads of Spain's regional governments, bankers, businessmen, trade union leaders, artists, writers, sportsmen, and many other national personalities. The famous Catalan painter, Salvador Dalí, drew 17 special drawings to commemmorate the event, all of which depicted the mythical Greek story of Europe's abduction by Zeus [see report on the following page]. They were given as a special present to each of the treaty's signatories, with a caption written by the artist: 'We are the bull that abducted Europe for ourselves.'[26] The 'we', of course, was the proud national 'we'of Spain, a 'we' which, like the Greek God of the ancient myth, had finally managed to seduce the irresistible *Europa*. The mayor of Madrid, Enrique Tierno Galván, also published a special proclamation in which he called Europe 'the Reason of the universe that guides the rest of the world's peoples with the light of intelligence and the health of its sentiments'.[27] After declaring that on this day 'we are more European than we have ever been', he asked his fellow citizens, *los madrileños*, to show the world their exhuberant happiness on such a joyous occasion: 'the discovery that we are a part of the Europe that has discovered itself'. The enormous importance which Spanish authorities gave to the event was futher illustrated by the fact that the main public television channel broadcast the entire ceremony live from the grand hall of the Royal Palace, which had been decorated with the flags of all the EEC's member states. In this way, the entire nation was invited to participate in this civil liturgy of collective self-veneration.

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[25]My analysis of this event is based entirely on the reports published in *ABC*, *El País*, and *Diario-16*.
[26]*El País*, 12 June 1985.
[27]The entire text was published by *Diario-16*, 12 June 1985.

EL PAIS

DIRECTOR: JUAN LUIS CEBRIAN — DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA — MADRID, MIERCOLES 12 DE JUNIO DE 1985

Redacción, Administración y Talleres: Miguel Yuste, 40 / 28037 Madrid / ☎ (91) 754 38 00 / Precio: 50 pesetas / Año X, Número 2.992

La ceremonia, que comienza a las 20.30, estará presidida por el rey Juan Carlos

España se incorpora definitivamente a Europa con la firma, hoy, del tratado de adhesión a la CEE

La firma del tratado de adhesión de España a la Comunidad Económica Europea, que se llevará a cabo en el palacio Real de Madrid a partir de las 20.30 de hoy, representa la culminación de un proyecto histórico para España y pone fin a un largo período de negociaciones, que se iniciaron en 1962 y se formalizaron hace ocho años. La ceremonia, presidida por el rey Juan Carlos, no contará con la presencia de ninguno de los jefes de Estado de los países comunitarios, aunque sí participarán en la firma seis primeros ministros europeos. Ayer, el Gobierno se reunió en el Congreso de los Diputados, en sesión extraordinaria del Consejo de Ministros, para autorizar la firma de la adhesión española a la Comunidad Europea. El tratado será ratificado por el Parlamento español el próximo día 25.

El presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, dio ayer instrucciones para que se invitara al acto de la firma a los 17 presidentes de las comunidades autónomas. Todos ellos, a excepción de Joaquín Leguina, presidente de la Comunidad de Madrid, habían sido excluidos de la ceremonia en las listas elaboradas por el protocolo de Presidencia. Al parecer, en la decisión de Felipe González influyó la petición de Jordi Pujol, presidente de la Generalitat catalana, que le había mostrado su deseo de estar presente en el acto. Alberto Ullastres, primer embajador de España en la CEE, no ha sido invitado.

Alianza Popular, por su parte, criticó la forma en la que el Gobierno había llevado a cabo la negociación y anunció que presentará una enmienda a la totalidad de la ley orgánica del tratado de adhesión. Algunas organizaciones agrarias y ganaderas, descontentas por el trato que se da al sector en el tratado de adhesión, han convocado para hoy una manifestación de protesta en Madrid.

Aunque no se conocen con exactitud las repercusiones que puede tener para España el ingreso en la CEE, un estudio de la Comisión Europea señala que la reducción de aranceles a que obligará la adhesión supondrá para la economía española un descenso del 3% del PIB.

Páginas 13, 49 y 50
Editorial en la página 10

Suplemento especial de 32 páginas sobre el ingreso de España en la CEE. Incluye los textos del tratado y del acta de adhesión.

Dalí dibujó 'el rapto de Europa'. El pintor Salvador Dalí ha realizado con tinta china una serie de 17 dibujos para cada uno de los firmantes, esta noche, del acuerdo y los protocolos de entrada de España en la CEE. Además de los dibujos, basados en el mito griego del rapto de Europa por Zeus, el padre de los dioses convertido en toro, el artista incluye un poema inédito dedicado a Gala y una advertencia, a modo de dedicatoria, para los europeos: "Somos el toro que raptó a Europa para nosotros".

Página 38

EE UU intercambia en Berlín cuatro espías del Este por 25 occidentales

Estados Unidos procedió ayer al mayor intercambio de espías con el bloque socialista desde el final de la II Guerra Mundial. El puente de Glienicke, que separa los dos sectores de Berlín, fue escenario en la mañana de ayer del canje de 23 espías occidentales presos en la República Democrática Alemana (RDA) y Polonia por cuatro ciudadanos del Este (dos alemanes, un polaco y un búlgaro) detenidos en EE UU. Dos liberados más en la RDA pasarán a Occidente en los próximos 15 días.

Los cuatro liberados por Washington son *superespías*, según informó la televisión alemana, y entre ellos se encuentra Alice Michelson, una alemana de la RDA, de 61 años, detenida el 1 de octubre de 1984, cuando intentaba sacar de EE UU información secreta. Algunos de los 25 liberados por la RDA y Polonia —cuya identidad se mantiene en secreto— son ciudadanos del Este que trabajaban para Occidente.

Página 3

HOY, EN EL PAIS:

Un aristócrata y un funcionario jubilado, presuntos implicados en la falsificación de títulos nobiliarios

Página 17

Reagan dice que no quiere derribar militarmente al régimen de Nicaragua

Página 7

El atentado contra el Papa se ordenó desde la Embajada de la URSS en Bulgaria, según afirma Alí Agca

Página 2

El Tribunal de Cuentas descubre irregularidades en dos contratos de compra de

Such an event can thus be analyzed as another fascinating illustration of political symbolism concerning 'the nation', within the context of European integration. It shows how national sentiments in Spain were ignited during this 'historic occasion', as the country's leaders and citizens proudly assumed their new 'European' status. Following Emile Durkheim, one can define this emotionally charged ceremony as a ritual of 'collective effervescence': a mass adoration of *la España democrática* and its 'European achievement', as well as an affirmation of national pride to celebrate the fact that this old aspiration had finally been achieved. At the same time, following the emphasis on the political efficacy of ritual highlighted by authors such as Lukes and Kertzer, one can observe how such a ritual was employed to bolster the popularity and strengthen the legitimacy, or what Bourdieu would call the 'symbolic capital', of those power-holders who had guided 'the nation' towards its European goal: King Juan Carlos, Felipe González and his government, as well as more generally, all state authorities since the transition to democracy. In the Spanish case, entry into 'Europe' clearly symbolized the triumph of 'modernity' and 'democracy', the culmination of a difficult process that had begun after Franco's death. Hence, this elaborate *rite de passage* into the EEC can be viewed as an important symbolic effort to further legitimate the constitutional monarchy and its democratic institutions, and hence as one more step in the delegitimation of the previous authoritarian regime. Indeed, in a country where the very name of the nation, *España*, had almost become a taboo due to the symbolic monopolization of the term which was carried out by Franco and his propagandists, the idea of a 'modern', 'democratic', and hence 'European' Spain was employed to morally relegitimate the concept of Spanish nationhood.

The collective joy of the occasion was partly marred, however, by the fact that ETA terrorists assassinated four people on the very same day: an army colonel, his chauffeur, and a policeman in Madrid, as well as a Navy officer in the Basque city of Portugalete. The choice of this particular day was obviously no coincidence: a ritualized moment of 'national celebration' such as this one was chosen by this Basque separatist group in order to make clear that it had absolutely nothing to cheer about. On the contrary, for ETA and its supporters, *España* remained

a symbol which stood for the oppression of what they saw as their own 'nation', *Euzkadi*, and hence on a day which was supposed to mark the 'Spanish national success' of 'entering Europe', the terrorists attempted to spoil the festivities by murdering four men who in their own minds were classified as 'enemies of Basque freedom'. Nevertheless, in spite of this renewed attempt to destabilize the young Spanish democracy and delegitimize the central state's definition of *España*, the spectacular Euro-celebrations went ahead as planned, aside from the last-minute cancellation of a fire-works display which had been originally scheduled on this special day's agenda.

The presence of the head of the Basque regional government, José Antonio Ardanza, at the signature ceremony, and his declarations of support for Spanish entry into Europe, illustrates how in any case, the radical separatist posture of the ETA terrorists was not shared by the more moderate Basque Nationalist Party. Ardanza stated to journalists that the Basque people were ready to accept the challenge represented by Spain's accession into the EEC, because 'we want to be a modern and European country'.[28] The same applies to the Catalan nationalist leader Jordi Pujol, who also attended the ceremony and declared that the accesion into Europe was a very positive move, because it represented the end of an isolation period which had harmed the whole of 'Spanish society' for a very long time.[29] According to figures cited in Hutchinson (1994: 147), during the 1980's some 40% of Basques claimed to be exclusively Basque, and only 15% of the population in Catalonia described themselves as solely Catalan. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the discourse of Basque and Catalan nationalists, Spain was (and is) usually referred to with the cold, bureaucratic concept of 'the state', but never with the warm, emotionally charged ideal of 'the nation' (which is reserved solely for the notions of *Catalunya* and *Euzkadi*).

In all the main speeches which were delivered during the signature ceremony, entry into the EEC was logically presented as the climax of the process which has been traced throughout this

[28] *ABC*, 13 June 1985.
[29] *ABC*, 13 June 1985.

chapter: the symbolic linkage between 'democratization', 'modernization', and 'Europeanization'. Hence, in the opening address,[30] King Juan Carlos welcomed the representatives of Europe in the following manner:

> Spain is proud to receive the most illustrious dignitaries of the European Communities and the nations which integrate them. You represent what the Spanish people understand by Europe: the principles of liberty, equality, pluralism, and justice, which also preside over the Spanish constitution. The Spanish people welcome you with satisfaction, and conscious of the great significance which this event implies.

Long gone were the days of Franco's 'European vocation': the 'European Spain' with a 'Christian mission' to preserve its 'national soul' from the dangerous forces of 'liberalism', the 'judeo-masonic conspiracy' and 'the reds'. This was now the 'Europe' that had been conquered by the transition to democracy: the 'Europe' of 'liberty', 'equality', 'pluralism', and 'justice' which 'the nation' had successfully reached. It was, indeed, the 'Europe' through which King Juan Carlos had found widespread popular support for a monarchy initially stigmatized due to its Francoist origins.

The King also stressed that Spain, in spite of its centuries of co-existence with Islamic and Hebrew cultures, as well as its expansion abroad to America, 'had never lost its desire to be European.' In any case, this multicultural heritage, according to Juan Carlos, in no way diminished Spain's 'Europeanness', because a closed, fortified 'Europe', disdainful of other peoples, would not be true to itself:

> This is why Spain, by manifesting its ties to Hispanic-speaking peoples, and encouraging friendship with the African and Arab world, does not diminish its Europeity, but rather manifests it creatively.

In this way, the monarch's discourse represented a repudiation of Francoist Spain, its 'Euro-Christian' religious purity, and its fear of 'foreign contamination'. The new we-image of 'the nation' was one of tolerance and openness, and these were now defined as the true values of

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[30] The entire text of the address was published by *El País*, 13 June 1985.

'Europeity'. Hence, in the name of his people, the King manifested Spain's will to contribute to the construction of a united Europe, an objective 'which fills our future with hope'. This illustrates how although 'nationalism' is often equated exclusively with its xenophobic manifestations, there are contexts in which national we-feelings can conceivably be channelled in the opposite direction: a nation may construct an image of itself as 'open' and 'tolerant' of 'others', and may feel proud of such a 'modern' ethical choice (even if actual behaviour may not really be consistent with this self-claim). In the context of this signature ceremony, 'Europe' was identified in Spanish political discourse with the achievement of this moral renewal.

The address delivered by Felipe González followed the very same discursive path.[31] The Spanish Prime Minister called the treaty of accession a 'historic occasion', which was vital 'to complete the unification of our old continent and to overcome the age-old isolation of Spain'. He recalled the country's 1977 request to enter the EEC after the recuperation of democracy, and affirmed that the unanimity shown by all political groups in relation to this issue 'reflected the overwhelming desires of the majority of Spaniards, for whom the integration of Spain in Europe was identified with participation in the ideals of liberty, progress, and democracy.' The symbolic link between Europeanization and the struggle for democratization was further stressed in his speech by a homage to those Spaniards who 'assumed personal risks' during the Franco regime by attending the European reunions of The Hague in 1948 and Munich in 1962. Through membership in the European Community, González solemnly declared, 'it is an entire nation that recuperates the sense of its history.'[32] Furthermore, like King Juan Carlos, the Prime Minister also stressed Spain's cultural links with Latin America and Africa, and suggested that because of them, 'Spain understands the universality of Europe'. Once again, the Spanish nation's supposed

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[31] The entire text of this speech was published by *El País*, 13 June 1985.

[32] González's reference to the anti-Francoist Munich reunion in 1962 demonstrates how, as Berta Álvarez-Miranda (1996: 310) has argued, 'Since 1957, the Community and the European Movement had offered a common terrain for the different sectors of the opposition to Franco's regime and to the most modernizing and open-minded sectors within the authoritarian system itself. The tradition of delegitimization of Francoism, from the opposition, as a result of its international isolation and, in particular, its exclusion from the EC, had transfomed the latter into a symbol of democracy.'

allegiance to the 'European' values of openness, tolerance, and respect for other cultures was reaffirmed with pride.

Aside from these ideals, the other major symbol invoked by González in relation to 'Europe' was, of course, 'modernity'. For Spain, entry into the EEC represented 'a challenge of modernity which requires a change of mentalities and of structures.' Nevertheless, the Prime Minister emphasized that he was convinced that the Spanish people would succesfully rise up to such a challenge, in order to 'cross the threshold of the next century with confidence and firmness'. In the name of his nation, González promised that Spain would be 'neither a burden nor an obstacle' to the progress of European unification, but that on the contrary, the Spanish people would collaborate 'as much as our energies allow us' in this goal. This ceremony, he concluded, was 'an act of faith in Europe... of hope in a more just, more cohesive, and more unified Europe'. In a clear reference to the terrorists who on that very day had challenged the very concept of 'the Spanish nation' with the language of gunfire, the Prime Minister ended his emotive address by stating that Spain would devote its energies to the construction of 'a Europe of peace and justice', and that this was something that 'no one, through coercion or violence' would be able to prevent. The imagery of Spanish political discourse on 'Europe' therefore reached its ultimate climax: 'the nation' had become 'European' through a democratic transformation, a moral commitment to tolerance and human rights, and a passionate desire to be 'modern'. The project of European unification was therefore fully equated with all the ideals which represented great sources of collective pride for a nation that until very recently had suffered the painful stigma of 'backwardness'.

At the same time, the Spanish ego was further flattered by the speeches of the main European figureheads which attended the signature ritual.[33] At that time, the rotating Presidency of the European Community was held by Italy, and hence both its Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, as

[33]Published by *El País*, 13 June 1985.

well as its Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, praised Spain for the democratic transformation which had made possible its acceptance into the European club. Craxi, for instance, stated:

> Today your great country finalizes a process which demonstrates the wisdom, the tenacity, and the far-sightedness of its people and the Spanish government... We have always considered your country an essential part of Europe, not only due to its geographical location, but also because of the history, the culture, and the art of Spain have developed in parallel to those of the other great European nations.

Andreotti's address similarly piled on even more 'European' deference on the Spanish nation:

> For Spain, entry into the Community constitutes a new occasion that will allow it to play the role which its traditions and its potentialities assign it in the community of European nations. We find ourselves before a country which, while preserving its own individuality, has always been a protagonist of European history... [In Spain] the European ideal assumes the symbolic value of a choice in favour of democracy and liberty.

Finally, it was perhaps the words of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors (the closest thing in the European Community that resembles a totemic, symbolic incarnation of 'Europe') which struck the most emotive chords of Spanish nationhood:

> Spain has finally joined us. I can say it very simply: we needed you... How can we not feel stronger and more ambitious with a Spain that has now reached the rank of a world industrial power, a Spain that has found a way to reconquer liberty and democracy, a Spain that wants to conserve its essential values while at the same time firmly establishing itself within modernity?

Just in case there had ever been any doubts, the 'Europeanness' of Spain was now affirmed plainly and clearly by 'the Europeans' who had the 'symbolic power' to acknowledge or deny this fact. From now on, there would be no further ambiguities or insecurities with regard to this aspired status-ranking. Following the terminology of Norbert Elias, one could say that the 'established' Europeans had finally welcomed the Spanish 'outsider' into their bossom. Spain was no longer a subordinate, humiliated, or denigrated 'them-group', it had now succeeded in becoming a part of the European 'we-group'. Francoist 'backwardness' had been defeated, and

European 'modernity' had triumphed. As the ex-foreign minister José María de Areilza put it in an article published on that day,[34] Spain's participation in Europe would finally allow the country to overcome what he called *el síndrome del Africanismo* (the 'syndrome of Africanism') – in other words, its obsessive sense of cultural, scientific, and technological inferiority in relation to the rest of the Western world. The great collective ambition of *el pueblo español* had therefore been achieved: Spain was no longer 'African'. On the contrary, as a popular saying stated, *ya somos europeos* –'we', the Spanish people, had finally become 'European'.[35]

Among the majority of Spain's citizens, the day's events were undoubtedly experienced as a major boost in national pride,[36] judging from the kind of coverage presented in the three leading national newspapers.[37] First of all, it is worth simply stating the obvious: the signature ceremony was by far the major story of the day, with pages and pages of details and photographs on every aspect of its proceedings. Hardly any attention was paid to the fact that Portugal had also 'entered Europe' on the very same day with a similar ritual: the major 'European happening' of the day was of course the Spanish one (while the reverse was undoubtedly the case in Portugal). If anything, the Madrid ceremony was partly outshined in terms of press coverage by the terrorist acts of ETA. Indeed, it is interesting to observe how the discourse of the main national dailies depicted the Euro-ritual as a symbol of the new, proud Spain of 'liberty', 'modernity' and 'democracy', in direct contrast and opposition to the old, shameful Spain of 'violence', 'barbarity', and 'intransigence' represented by the assassinations of the Basque separatist group.

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[34]*ABC*, 12 June 1985.

[35]Such discourse, of course, reveals a rather arrogant, derogatory vision of Africa which clashes with the vision of 'multicultural openness' and 'equal respect for other peoples' that was noted earlier in the speeches of the King and Felipe González.

[36] Between 1985 and 1990, Eurobarometer opinion polls showed that between 60 and 67% of Spaniards considered their country's membership in the EEC 'a good thing', while only between 4 and 7% described it as 'a bad thing'. The rest considered it 'neither a good thing or a bad thing' (15-20%), or responded that they did not know or were not sure how to answer the question (11-17%). Figures cited in Álvarez-Miranda (1996: 308).

[37] In 1985, the three leading national dailies, whose coverage of the signature ritual I have analyzed, were *El País*, whose daily average circulation was 348.364, *ABC* (218.739), and *Diario-16* (130.461). Figures cited in *Anuario de El País*, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.

El País, for instance, entitled its front-page headline 'SPAIN JOINS THE PROJECT OF A UNITED EUROPE WHILE ETA ATTEMPTS TO SPREAD TERROR' [reproduced on the following page], and in its editorial article, 'Europe, against the enemies of liberty', this newspaper stated:

> Yesterday's terrorist assassinations did not manage to overshadow the historic moment of Spain's entry into Europe... The desperate attempt to spread terror in an indiscriminate manner clashed with our society's vocation of modernity.

'Europe' was therefore typically identified with the Spanish people's 'modern' ethical aspirations, while ETA was defined as 'a violent minority which tries to detain the clock of history', and their actions were viewed as 'a vain and desperate attempt to prevent the progress of solidarity and freedom in this country.' A cartoon in *El País* encapsulated the emotional atmosphere of the signature ritual by depicting Prime Minister González as the driver of a train called 'EUROPE', who cried out to King Juan Carlos, 'Your Majesty, Europe!', to which the Spanish monarch responded: 'Eureka!' [reproduced on the following page].

Interestingly, this newspaper claimed that the terrorists of ETA who had attempted to spoil the day's festivities were 'barbarians who manipulate fallacious nationalist emotions', and this was contrasted to 'the project of a European supranationality, based on popular sovereignty, respect for human rights, the guarantee of liberties, the struggle for peace, and the exercise of tolerance'. However, such claims typically obscure the fact that the political ritual of adhesion into the EEC also clearly involved the igniting of national sentiments (in this case, the sentiments of affiliation to 'the Spanish nation' represented by the central state). Hence, it could equally be said that such a ceremony also manipulated the 'nationalist emotions' of all those individuals who were loyal to the idea of the Spanish nation. What one should recognize is that in the case of ETA and its supporters, national we-feelings were channelled towards violence (the representatives of the Spanish state were killed in the name of 'Basque freedom'), while in the case of most Spaniards, national sentiments were directed towards the proud acceptance of and allegiance to the idea of a European supranationality. In this way, one can observe that the

EL PAIS

DIRECTOR: JUAN LUIS CEBRIÁN — DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA — MADRID, JUEVES 13 DE JUNIO DE 1985

Redacción, Administración y Talleres: Miguel Yuste, 40 / 28037 Madrid / 69 (91) 754 38 00 / Precio: 50 pesetas / Año X. Número 2.990

A las 20.53 de ayer, el presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, firmaba el tratado de adhesión

España se une al proyecto de la Europa unida mientras ETA intenta sembrar el terror

A las 20.53 de ayer, España ingresaba en la Comunidad Económica Europea. La firma del presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, culminaba un largo proceso de acercamiento de nuestro país. Pocas horas antes, los terroristas sembraban de luto esta fecha histórica al asesinar, en tres atentados distintos, a un coronel jurídico del Ejército, a su chófer, a un policía nacional y a un brigada de la Armada. Los dos primeros murieron en Madrid acribillados a balazos, y el policía, al estallar una bomba trampa colocada en el mismo coche en el que huyeron los terroristas autores del primer atentado. A las tres de la tarde, un brigada de la Armada, José Millarengo, era asesinado de un disparo en la cabeza en Portugalete (Vizcaya). El presidente González cambió su discurso del palacio Real y añadió una significativa frase referente a los atentados: "España aportará su esfuerzo a la consecución de una Europa de la paz y de la justicia. Nadie, mediante la coacción o la violencia, podrá torcer este propósito de paz".

Editorial en la página 10

GARCIA FRANCES

El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Fernando Morán (a la izquierda de la mesa) y el presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, en el momento histórico de la firma del tratado de adhesión. El rey Juan Carlos contempla sentado el acto.

Madrid y Lisboa, dos nuevas capitales de la Comunidad

España y Portugal entraron en el día de ayer a formar parte de la CEE, tras la firma de los respectivos tratados de adhesión, realizada en Madrid y Lisboa. La delegación española, presidida por Felipe González, se desplazó a primeras horas de la mañana a la capital portuguesa para asistir al acto de la firma. A primera hora de la tarde volvió a Madrid y se desplazó al palacio Real, en el que, a las 20.53, el presidente del Gobierno sentenció oficialmente la entrada en Europa.

Páginas 13 a 19

Dibujo entregado por Dalí al Rey de la serie *El rapto de Europa*, realizada por el pintor para conmemorar el ingreso de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea.



RAUL CANCIO

Un policía nacional, con el uniforme manchado de sangre, sale del aparcamiento de la calle de Felipe II, de Madrid, tras haber hecho explosión la bomba trampa.

Cuatro personas, asesinadas ayer en tres atentados

Cuatro personas fueron asesinadas ayer en tres atentados terroristas cometidos en Madrid y Portugalete (Vizcaya). El coronel jurídico del Ejército Vicente Romero González-Calatayud y su chófer, el civil Juan García Jiménez, fueron asesinados a balazos a primera hora de la mañana, en Madrid, por un comando compuesto por dos hombres y una mujer. Horas después, el policía nacional Esteban del Arco García murió víctima de la explosión de una bomba trampa colocada en el mismo automóvil usado para huir por los terroristas autores del primer atentado. A mediodía, el brigada de Marina José Millarengo era asesinado de un disparo en Portugalete.

Páginas 20 a 23

El País, June 13 1985



El País, June 13 1985

emotions of affiliation to a nation cannot be classified *a priori* as necessarily xenophobic or destructive, for they can conceivably be mobilised to construct cooperation and unity across national boundaries.

Another leading national newspaper, *Diario-16*, significantly entitled its main front-page headline 'DEMOCRACY INTEGRATED SPAIN INTO EUROPE' [reproduced on the following page], an implicit allusion to the Franco regime's incapacity to do so. Its second main story centered on the terrorist actions, and explicitly contrasted one event with the other: 'ETA CLOUDED THE DAY WITH FOUR ASSASSINATIONS'. A cartoon published in the opinion section reflected the same dichotomy between the joy of Europe and the tragedy of terrorism: a bottle of champagne had been cracked open by four bullet holes [reproduced on the following pages]. This was also very visible in the emotive discourse of the newspaper's editorial article, 'ETA, against Europe':

> As on so many other occasions when the Spanish democratic system has taken successive steps towards its consolidation, the terrorist organization ETA, dramatically present in all the transcendental landmarks of the Spanish pluralist process, decided to leave its despicable stamp of blood yesterday on the signature ceremony of the Spain's Treaty of Adhesion to the European Communities... Indeed, the entry of Spain into the European Community, which represents an explicit support for Spanish democracy, constitutes a serious setback for all of those who still believe they can still defeat the State, ripping off a piece of its territory and constructing an impossible Albania.

ABC entitled its own front-page headline, 'MADRID, CAPITAL OF EUROPE' [reproduced on the following pages], and its own editorial called the accession into Europe 'a Copernican change and the beginning of a rationality indispensable for our country'. As in the other newspapers, one of its opinion columnists also wrote that the ETA terrorists:

> have covered in blood our entrance into the market of liberties and the concert of progress, as if they wanted to demonstrate that a country in which savage and ferocious beasts with a human appearance still exist has managed to slip through the doors of Europe.

An identical dichotomy thus characterized the discourse of all the main national dailies, and indeed it was probably a dichotomy that existed in many Spanish minds: 'Europe' stood for

Diario 16

Año X - Número 2.898
Precio: 50 pesetas
Madrid, jueves 13 junio 1985
Información y Prensa, S. A.

El Rey Juan Carlos presidió la histórica firma de nuestra adhesión a la CEE en el Palacio Real de Madrid

La democracia integró a España en Europa

MADRID.—Tres días antes del octavo aniversario de las primeras elecciones democráticas de 1977, que inauguraron un nuevo sistema político en España, el Gobierno firmó ayer el tratado de adhesión de nuestro país al Mercado Común en una solemne sesión en el Palacio Real, presidida por Don *Juan Carlos*, y a la que asistieron seis jefes de Gobierno y más de trescientos invitados.

Tras la firma del tratado, un texto de 65.000 folios que contiene las condiciones de nuestra incorporación a Europa, el presidente del Gobierno español, *Felipe González*, pronunció un discurso en el que destacó la importancia histórica del acto, *«un jalón fundamental para superar el aislamiento secular de España»*.

El presidente del Ejecutivo se hizo eco del *«temor»* con el que algunos países comunitarios contemplan nuestra integración, *«porque piensan que podría alterar definitivamente los delicados equilibrios puestos en pie por los tratados fundacionales»*.

En este sentido quiso dejar claro que *«no seremos ni carga para la Comunidad ni obstáculo lo que entorpezca su marcha hacia formas superiores de integración política y económica»*, y subrayó la voluntad decidida del Gobierno español para *«avanzar con los que quieran avanzar y hasta donde se quiera avanzar»*.



J. LUIS GUTIERREZ /D16

Momento en que Felipe González estampa su firma en el tratado en el acto de ayer en Lisboa.

El solemne acto de la firma se inició con un discurso de bienvenida pronunciado por Su Majestad Don *Juan Carlos I*. El Rey de España destacó el significado de la fecha: *«Un gran día* —dijo— *para España y Portugal»*, pero también *«un gran día para Europa. Un día que debe tener significado positivo más allá de nuestras fronteras»*.

Don *Juan Carlos* puso énfasis en subrayar esta dimensión *transeuropea* de la Comunidad, por cuanto *«en su ser esté el tratar de ir más allá de sí misma. Una Europa cerrada, desdeñosa de lo ajeno, sería menos Europa»*.

Al Monarca español le siguieron en el uso de la palabra los italianos *Bettino Craxi*, presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la CEE, y *Giulio Andreotti*, presidente del Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas, y el francés *Jacques Delors*, presidente de la Comisión Comunitaria.

El acto finalizó con una cena en el Palacio de Oriente, ofrecida por los Reyes de España.

Los líderes políticos españoles expresaron, sin reservas, su satisfacción por la incorporación de nuestro país a la Europa comunitaria, si bien manifestaron sus críticas en aspectos puntuales.

Págs. 4, 5, 6 y 7
Editorial, pág. 2

Un coronel, un chófer, un artificiero y un brigada muertos, en Madrid y Euskadi

ETA empañó la jornada con cuatro asesinatos

MADRID.—La organización ETA empañó ayer la solemne jornada de la firma de adhesión de España a la Comunidad Económica Europea, perpetrando cuatro asesinatos en tres acciones terroristas.

A las diez de la mañana, horas antes de que fuera firmado en el Palacio Real el tratado de adhesión, un comando de tres terroristas de ETA, dos hombres y una mujer, asesinaban a tiros en la calle General Oráa, de Madrid, al coronel auditor *Vicente Romero González-Calatayud* y a su chófer, *Juan García Jiménez*.

Los terroristas condujeron el coche que les había servido para perpetrar esta acción hasta el aparcamiento de la avenida de Felipe II, donde lo aparcaron tras colocar una sofisticada trampa-bomba con 25 kilos de goma-2. Al intentar desactivar el artefacto, a las 12,30 del mediodía, se produjo una gran explosión que causó la muerte al artificiero *Esteban del Amo* y heridas graves a otros seis policías nacionales y un policía municipal.

Paralelamente a esta acción, otro comando etarra asesinaba en Portugalete al brigada de la Armada *José Nillarengo*.



DANIEL GLUCKMANN Y ENRIQUE CANO/D-16

El artificiero herido, al que hubo que amputarle un brazo, conducido por sus compañeros.

Págs. 8 a 15



Diario-16, June 13, 1985

ABC, June 13 1985

progress, liberty, democracy, and modernity, while ETA was the chilling reminder of an 'uncivilized' past in which guns and bombs, rather than words and ideas, were the main weapons employed in the political arena.

Once this elaborate signature ritual had taken place, a final waiting period of several months passed before the emotional atmosphere of Euro-excitement and Euro-pride was once again rekindled with the arrival of the new year, when the entry into the Common Market became official on 1 January 1986. It is undoubtedly noteworthy, for instance, that in his traditional 'Christmas Eve Message to the Nation',[38] King Juan Carlos congratulated his countrymen for achieving the desired integration 'into Europe', a goal which was once again equated with 'our closer approximation towards modernity'. The monarch therefore called upon Spaniards 'to open their arms, without fear and without fatigue, with confidence and security in ourselves, to a community essentially committed to the survival of the West.' The same clichéd message was thus reiterated one more time: Modernity was Europe, Europe was the West, and belonging to such a space of collective identity was presented as something unquestionably positive, something 'the nation' had every right to be proud of. Hence, in their first editions of 1986, the main national newspapers did not fail to highlight the 'WELCOME', 'WILLKOMEN' 'BIENVENUE', or 'BENVENUTO' with which *España* had now been warmly received into 'Europe' [reproduced on the following page], as well as the image of the crucial 'historic moment' when the Spanish flag was finally raised at the EEC's headquarters in Brussels for the first time, during the early hours of New Year's Day, 1986 [reproduced on the following page]. Furthermore, their editorials similarly continued to harp on Spain's admirable 'European' achievement, and the hopes represented by the nation's 'European' future. As *El País* put it:

> We shall finally end our interior isolation and participate fully in the construction of the modern world... The European road responds to the imperative of reason and history. To assume it consciously and deliberately signifies one more step in the path of maturity. Good morning, Europe.

[38]The entire speech was published by *ABC*, 26 December 1985.



ABC, January 2 1986

REUTER

La fotografía recoge el momento en que la bandera española fue izada en la madrugada de ayer por primera vez en la sede de las Comunidades Europeas en Bruselas.

El País, January 2 1986

Las banderas de España y Portugal, ante la CEE

Desde ayer, las banderas española y portuguesa ondean junto a las de los otros países miembros ante la sede en Bruselas de la Comunidad Económica Europea. El comisario de la CEE y actual vicepresidente de la Comisión, Lorenzo Natali, ha manifestado que España y Portugal «reequilibran no sólo geográficamente, sino también políticamente la Comunidad». Seguramente, España y Portugal traerán un espíritu que no es sólo mercantil, aportarán un empuje político»

ABC, January 2 1986

8. 5 Concluding summary: 'Europe' as a confirmation of democratic maturity

'For Spain, democracy was identified with Europe, and Spain's renewed democracy has been its passport to the continent' (Arango 1995: 314). This chapter has illustrated how in Spain, the ideal of 'entering Europe' became directly linked to the success of the country's modernization and democratization after General Franco's death. King Juan Carlos, initially stigmatized in the circles of the opposition due to the fact that he was the dictator's appointed successor, soon displayed his commitment to a genuine process of democratic change, with 'Europe' as the ethical model and the ultimate objective. It was through such a commitment that his monarchy received a widespread popular support, by representing Spaniards independently of their political affiliation. After a brief period of Francoist continuity under Carlos Arias Navarro, the reformist team headed by Adolfo Suárez rapidly tranformed Spain into a modern liberal democracy, through the legalization of all political parties and trade unions. What is vital for the purposes of this study is that throughout this delicate transition period, the aspiration to 'enter Europe' was linked directly to the success of the democratization process, and indeed was one of the fundamental points of consensus amongst the moderate political forces on both the left and the right which ultimately permitted its favourable outcome.

After the first elections had taken place in 1977, the first Suárez government immediately presented a new request to join the European Community, now with the confidence of a fully fledged democracy. In the official political discourse of post-Franco Spain, 'Europe' was depicted not only as a matter of economic benefits, but also of moral commitment to the ideals of democratic pluralism and human rights. From this perspective, it was believed that only through 'Europe' would Spain be able to secure the stability of its young democracy and recuperate its international respectability. Nevertheless, the waiting period was a long one, particularly due to the constant opposition of the powerful French agricultural sector, and hence the continued incapacity to fulfill Spain's 'European' aspiration became an important aspect of the so-called *desencanto* with democracy which arose during these years. The 1981 *coup d'état*, however, demonstrated the continuing fragility of the new democratic structures, which were only saved

by the dramatic intervention of the King. This event, however, renewed the popular spirit of consensus and enthusiastic commitment to the ideals of the transition, as well as further strengthening the belief in Spain's need to secure its democracy through membership in the EEC. After the fall of the divided UCD party in 1982, the Socialists of Felipe González fully maintained the symbolic identification of 'Europeanization' with 'democratization' and 'modernization', until in 1985 the achievement of Spain's accession into the EEC was celebrated with a spectacular ceremony of national exhuberance and self-veneration. 'Europe' therefore became a great source of national pride, as it signified the country's successful achievement of the great collective aspirations which had been symbolically constructed by the leading political figures of the transition, after the death of General Franco.

My fundamental point is that in Spain, 'entering Europe' was generally viewed as a great promotion or a step up in the world's hierarchic ladder of power and status. In other words, it provided Spaniards with a new, highly attractive and self-flattering we-image. This was true in various crucial spheres of international rivalry and prestige-ranking: the EEC represented a superior position in terms of economic prosperity, political muscle, and moral respectability. 'The nation' received not only greater possibilities for material well-being, but also a better opportunity for making its voice heard in the world, as well as the West's recognition of its democratic credentials. 'Europe', in short, was widely perceived as a major improvement in the global 'group charisma' of the Spanish people. It was by gaining the status of a 'free', 'democratic', and hence 'European' nation that many Spaniards recuperated pride in themselves *as Spaniards*. The years of humiliating isolation were over, 'backwardness' had finally been overcome, 'democracy' had been conquered, and so, as one intellectual triumphantly put it:

> The Common Market opens its doors to us – and at the same time we open our own... *Modernity is here*, and almost everything, in economics, culture, and politics, has changed since 1898. (Racionero 1987: 12, my italics)

Therefore, in the case of Spain, adopting a European supranationality and showing enthusiasm for the project of European integration hardly clashed with national sentiments. On the contrary, 'Europe' was in many ways exactly what the national self had been thirsting for.

9. Maastricht: Contributing to the unity of Europe 'with dignity and prestige'

On 24 December 1991, King Juan Carlos I appeared on Spanish television to deliver his traditional 'Christmas Eve Message to the Nation'. Two weeks earlier, the country's Prime Minister, Felipe González, had taken part in the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, an event which had been widely depicted in the media as a 'historic step forward' that had put Europe on the road towards economic and political unity.[1] During his yearly summary of the nation's achievements on the world stage, the King referred to Spain's participation in the Maastricht summit as follows:

> We find ourselves before the creation of new political systems, of different unions, of segregations which until very recently no one could suspect. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union is taking place, in Europe the opposite phenomenon is occuring, a process which links economic, monetary, political and security relations, in order to achieve unity. An objective of unity in which Spain participates directly, with dignity and prestige, with its own personality and clear criteria, which has been manifested in the reunion that has recently taken place in Maaastricht, and in which we must all collaborate with our work, our efforts, and with a spirit of sacrifice which will undoubtedly bring forth its fruits in the near future.[2]

The Maastricht Treaty was thus defined by the King as 'an objective of unity' to which Spain was contributing 'with dignity and prestige'. It was a goal which all Spaniards were encouraged to support with enthusiasm. Indeed, immediately after highlighting the importance this national accomplishment, Juan Carlos I went on to remind his countrymen of what this represented for a country which for a long time had been excluded from the process of European integration:

> That is why we must be proud of the civilized and harmonious way in which we have accomplished the establishment of our democracy, when so many believed that this was practically impossible.

---

[1] This point will be empirically illustrated throughout this chapter.
[2] *Diario-16*, 26 December 1991.

The discourse employed by the King in this televised political ritual therefore illustrates how, fifteen years after Franco's death, the concept of 'belonging to Europe' was still being invoked in the Spanish public sphere as a symbol of Spain's 'civilized and harmonious' transition to democracy, and therefore as a fundamental source of national pride. From this perspective, Spain's participation in the 'historic' summit of Maastricht was viewed as a demonstration that the Spanish people had definitively consolidated their status as respected 'Europeans'. As I shall illustrate in this chapter, the goal which emerged now was to make Spain a leading, influential member of the newly baptised 'European Union', and to ensure that the country would never again be 'left behind' like in the past.

9.1 The run-up to Maastricht (I): Promoting Spain's need to catch 'the high speed European train'

In Spain, the arrival of the Maastricht summit was marked by numerous emotive proclamations which, like the King's Christmas speech, aimed to remind Spaniards of the fundamental importance which belonging to 'Europe' represented for the prosperity and prestige of their nation. For instance, on the day this event began, the editor-in-chief of *El País*, Juan Luis Cebrián, wrote an article in which he stated:

> Whatever reading one makes of Spain's integration in the European Community, there is no doubt that the results are brilliant for our country. Isolated for centuries from the great continental tendencies, obsessed with the adventure of the Indies, and enclosed in the armed defense of the Catholic faith, we Spaniards discovered our political maturity and the radiance of economic well-being through our reencounter with Europe.[3]

[3] *El País*, 9 November 1991. At this time, *El País* remained the leading national daily, with an average daily circulation of 394.686, followed by *ABC* (292.631), *El Mundo* (134.175), and *Diario-16* (131.626). In this chapter, in order to maintain a continuity with the three newspapers I analyzed during the transition process and the entry into the EEC, I have looked at the coverage of Maastricht in *El País*, *ABC*, and *Diario-16*. Figures cited in *Anuario de El País*, Madrid, 1993, p. 180.

Spain's membership of the European Community was thus typically framed within a historical narrative of national progress and self-improvement, a successful 'rags-to-riches' story through which the country had gone from poverty, isolation, and backwardness to 'political maturity' and 'the radiance of economic well-being'. The challenge now, according to this leading journalist, was for Spain to be at the forefront of any future advances in the process of European integration. In his view, it was likely that 'a Europe of two velocities' would soon be created, in which a reduced group of countries, led by France and Germany, would push forward the process of economic and political union. At this point, therefore, the crucial question was whether Spain would be able to catch this 'high speed European train', in spite of its still relatively low levels of economic, political, and cultural development. This was the fundamental challenge which had to be faced by the nation's government: 'whether Spain will belong to the nucleus of [the European] galaxy, or will remain, once again, on the periphery of its history'. After recovering national pride by successfully getting 'into Europe', the next objective would therefore be to maintain this collective self-esteem by belonging to the vanguard of countries which would lead the construction of the European Union.

Similarly, one of the leading columnists of *ABC*, Darío Valcárcel, suggested during this same period that as a fully fledged member of the European Community, Spain was no longer *una nación acomplejada*, 'a nation with an inferiority complex'.[4] It was rather 'a rich and contradictory country', which continued to be hampered by 'dark aspects' such as public and private corruption, but was increasingly growing thanks to a dynamic population of 'professionals, professors, and businessmen capable of creating, competing, and selling'. Although this writer acknowledged that 'after a long period of isolation, Spain cannot aspire to a position of leadership in the construction of Europe', he stressed that the best hopes for the national future could only be found 'within the club where the great European interests are decided'. From this perspective, the project of the European Monetary Union was defined as 'a

[4] *ABC*, 26 November 1991.

life raft' and 'an injection of rationality' for the national economy. 'Europe', in such journalistic discourses, was therefore depicted as an ongoing national aspiration, and a potential solution for the continuing deficiencies which Spain still suffered in comparison to the other, 'more developed' and 'advanced' European countries.

The symbolic portrayal of 'Europe' as a platform for national progress, prosperity and influence was also reflected in several newspaper articles written by leading politicians during the period that immediately preceded the Maastricht summit. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, defined the European Community as 'a gigantic machinery of economic progress' and 'the great supporting lever of all our international influence'.[5] It was only through Europe, he argued, that it was possible for Spain to carry out 'a serious policy towards the outside world', and this ideal situation was contrasted to the tragic errors of the Spanish past: 'we have to remember how often we have got ourselves into dead ends, missed opportunities, wasted chances, tribal disputes'. 'Europe' was therefore typically presented as the way forward for Spain, the outward-looking project which would ensure that the shameful tragedies and the humiliations of the past would be successfully avoided. In another article published during this period, Fernández Ordóñez wrote that at the Maastricht summit, Spain would be present 'to defend its future, which is tied to the future of Europe'.[6] From this perspective, there was no conceivable clash between national pride and the concept of 'belonging to Europe'; on the contrary, a 'European future' was identified with the most promising national future.

Similarly, one of Spain's European Commissioners, the Socialist Manuel Marín, argued that:

> Spain has a very clear option: to vigorously play the European card. A country of medium size and importance, with a level of development close but still inferior to the Community average, has an objective interest in consolidating the Community's mechanisms, instead of a simple intergovernmental cooperation which would only benefit the large countries... The worst thing that could happen to our country is to find itself isolated and marginal in a weak and disunited Community. Fortunately, our cultural vocation, our sense of history,

[5] *Diario-16*, 8 December 1991.
[6] *ABC*, 8 December 1991.

> and our short but positive experience as a member state of the EC clearly encourage us to support a united Europe without any reticence.[7]

Using the language of gambling, this politician thus suggested that if Spain wanted to *win* in the future, it should confidently play 'the European card'. This was the only way that a country 'of medium size and importance', as well as a relatively 'inferior' level of development, could strengthen its influence, prosperity, and prestige in the world. The alternative would be a return to the humiliating days of national weakness and humiliation, of being 'isolated and marginal'.

According to Marín, the Community as a whole had only one possible alternative at Maastricht: either it managed 'to consolidate its economic, monetary, and political integration, through a federal perspective', or it would have to resign itself to 'playing an insignificant role on an increasingly complex and competitive world stage'. Spain's other European Commissioner, Abel Matutes (a member of the conservative Popular Party), made exactly the same point in another article published during this period:

> The great dilemma which the European Community faces 'here and now' is the following: If at a time when the European Community increases its power of attraction and its authority over the rest of the world, and in which the Community of Nations is getting ready to renovate the institutions of the post-war period, Europe does or does not decide to transform itself into a great, global political power, as one would expect of a leading commercial and financial power.[8]

In fact, this image of Maastricht as a potentially great leap towards the creation of a 'European superpower', capable of competing equally with the United States and Japan, was a recurrent one in the media coverage of this event. For instance, on the day the summit was scheduled to begin, a report in *ABC* stated that the new treaty could potentially transform the ideal of 'the United States of Europe' into a reality, and give birth to 'a new rivalry: that of the ecu against the dollar, and of the Western European Union (WEU, the virtual military arm of the Community) against

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[7] *ABC*, 8 December 1991.
[8] *ABC*, 8 December 1991.

the Atlantic Alliance'.[9] Similarly, *Diario-16* published a photograph of the conference hall where the Maastricht summit would take place, with the headline 'All is ready for the birth of a united Europe' [reproduced on the following page] and a text which stated:

> In this conference hall, still empty yesterday, the leaders of the twelve countries of the European Community will try today and tomorrow to overcome their differences and agree upon a treaty, a common currency, and a common foreign policy, affirming their role as a global power, on a par with the United States and Japan. Europe aims to emerge at Maastricht as a new superpower which speaks with one voice.[10]

This idea was further illustrated with graphs which displayed the impressive economic muscle of 'Europe', symbolized by its flag, in comparison to the United States and Japan. On the same day, this newspaper also published an article by Luis Ignacio Sánchez, a Professor of International Law, entitled 'The United States of Europe?', which recalled the days when Europe used to be the political, economic, and military center of the world, and suggested that the Maastricht reunion could be a crucial step towards the recuperation of this lost global importance:

> A multitude of various factors, amongst which the two great and cruel world wars are particularly important, have reduced the importance of continental Europe to a group of countries that are large, medium, or small-sized powers, but which lack specific, decisive weight in the international context... The steps towards political, economic, and monetary union constitute, in the end, mere instruments towards one final goal: the birth of a new political entity with substantive influence in the sphere of international relations, capable of intervening in the great planetary decisions.[11]

The implicit message of these discourses was that through such a fusion of continental strength, Spain could become a part of this 'new European superpower' and benefit from its common pooling of prosperity and prestige. Only in this way, it was suggested, could the country gain a truly significant degree of influence and 'status honour' on the world stage.

Some voices, nevertheless, were extremely pessimistic about the capacities of Felipe González's Socialist government to lead the country to a respectable place in the European

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[9] *ABC*, 9 December 1991.
[10] *Diario-16*, 9 December 1991.
[11] *Diario-16*, 9 December 1991.

INTERNACIONAL

Los dirigentes de los doce países de la Comunidad Europea se reúnen hoy y mañana en la localidad holandesa de Maastricht en la que se considera la «cumbre» más importante de la historia. Los «doce» intentarán llegar a un acuerdo sobre la adopción de un tratado de unión que dote a la CE de una moneda común y de un esbozo de política exterior conjunta antes de acabar el siglo. Hay diferencias sobre la toma de decisiones en política exterior, la defensa común europea, la referencia al objetivo federalista de la construcción europea y la cohesión entre ricos y pobres.

Europa busca su unidad en Maastricht

Contactos de Felipe González antes del inicio de la «cumbre» para buscar apoyos

BERTA FERNANDEZ (FAXPRESS)
Enviada especial / MAASTRICHT

El pesimismo es el protagonista de la «cumbre» europea que comienza hoy, la más importante de las celebradas hasta ahora, pero el pesimismo no quiere decir que haya desánimo. Los expertos en política europea y en las negociaciones internas de la Comunidad Europea recuerdan que en la historia de ésta se han encontrado soluciones milagrosas en el último minuto, en el último segundo, que han salvado situaciones que parecían insalvables.

Pero la sensación generalizada es que no habrá consenso para el documento de Maastricht sobre Unión Política, y que en todo caso se tratará de «salvar la cara» poniendo la firma bajo un texto muy *light* que no recogerá los puntos concretos que tratan de defender los «doce». Por ejemplo, se cree que Felipe González no va a conseguir que se tenga en cuenta la cohesión social, que los países ricos paguen más que los pobres, y que deberá darse por satisfecho con la solución de compromiso que ya se ha acordado: que los fondos estructurales financien el cincuenta por ciento de los planes de desarrollo de las regiones menos favorecidas.

Felipe González, sin embargo, no da su brazo a torcer. Llegó a Maastricht antes de lo previsto, pues ha querido entrevistarse con varios de los «grandes» antes de que se iniciara formalmente el trabajo de la «cumbre», hoy lunes. González se reunió, por separado, con el presidente de la Comisión, Jacques Delors, que ha amenazado con renunciar si en Maastricht no se consigue el consenso necesario para poner *en* marcha la nueva Europa con su Unión Política y Monetaria; el primer ministro holandés Ruud Lubbers, anfitrión de Maastricht, y que es quien realiza más esfuerzos diplomáticos para conseguir el acuerdo que permita que Maastricht sea un éxito; y con Helmut Kohl, el presidente alemán que, por su propia personalidad, y porque representa a una Alemania unida, es ahora el peso pesado de la CE, el hombre de voz más fuerte y probablemente más cualificada, por su trayectoria política comunitaria y porque representa a un país que realiza un enorme esfuerzo interno de cohesión y solidaridad.

Y hoy, antes de que se inicien las sesiones de trabajo, González se verá con el primer ministro italiano Giulio Andreotti, buen amigo, y que fué quien dió hace años el más importante empujón final para que España pudiera salvar los últimos escollos de la adhesión.

En Maastricht deben aprobarse los tratados de Unión Política y Unión Económica y Monetaria por unanimidad, y no habrá esa unanimidad, según la delegación española, si no se tienen en cuenta los niveles de desarrollo de cada uno de los países miembros. La postura de González la respaldan Grecia y Portugal y la entienden alemanes, franceses e italianos, pero hay un trecho hasta conseguir la mayoría necesaria. Por otra parte existen discrepancias importantes entre los Doce respecto a la Unión Política, sobre todo desde el punto de vista de Política Exterior y de Seguridad y Defensa. España, Francia y Alemania quieren una defensa europea articulada a través de la UEO, mientras que Gran Bretaña, con el apoyo de Italia, Portugal y Holanda, pretenden potenciar la OTAN. Y existe aún un punto más de discordancia en el que no hay acercamiento previo: el federalismo. Ahí es John Major quien se opone con más vigor al texto del borrador que se ha presentado, y se teme que el *premier* británico, muy presionado pr su partido y por la opinión pública de su país, pueda llegar a esta ciudad con la misma disposición de ánimo, y de intransigencia, con que lo hacía su antecesora Margaret Thatcher en anteriores cumbres en las que demostró que le iba como un guante el apodo de «Dama de Hierro».

COMPARACION DE LA CE CON LOS OTROS BLOQUES ECONOMICOS

	CE	EE UU	JAPON
Población	340 millones	248 millones	124 millones
Superficie	2.362.000 km2	9.373.000 km2	372.000 km2
PNB (1989)	4.117 mil ecus	4.153 mil ecus	2.360 mil ecus
PNB per cápita (1989)	17.229 ecus	26.478 ecus	19.896 ecus
Desempleo (Sept. 91)*	7,3%	6,7%	2,2%
Inflación (Oct. 90 - Oct. 91)	6,6%	2,9%	2,5%

* Desestacionalizado

DIARIO 16/REUTER



PETER DEJONG / AP

Todo listo para que nazca la Europa unida

En esta sala de conferencias aún vacía ayer (izquierda), los líderes de los doce países de la Comunidad Europea tratarán hoy y mañana de limar sus diferencias y ponerse de acuerdo sobre un tratado, una moneda única y una política exterior común, afirmando su papel como potencia mundial, al lado de Estados Unidos y Japón (ver arriba). Europa pretende emerger de Maastricht como una nueva superpotencia que hable con una sola voz. Tras el derrumbamiento de la Unión Soviética, cuya defunción se certificó ayer, la Europa Unida deberá jugar un papel de contrapeso y colaboración con Estados Unidos.

LA SEMANA INTERNACIONAL / HACIA LA EUROPA RICA UNIDA

ENRIQUE CLEMENTE

Los «doce» celebran hoy y mañana la cita más importante de su historia, ya que deben decidir si Europa se compromete o no en el camino de constituir una unidad federal. El viejo sueño de una Europa unida con una moneda, una política exterior y un Ejército comunes está aún lejos, quizá se realice antes de que acabe el siglo, pero en Maastricht deben ponerse los medios para que sea posible. La pérdida de soberanía nacional, sin embargo, molesta a los británicos. Pero alemanes y franceses, máximos defensores de dar mayor peso a las instituciones comunitarias, consideran que se debe trasladar el evidente poder económico de esta Europa rica al plano político, para acrecentar su peso en el concierto internacional y para que el papel de comparsa de la CE en la guerra del Golfo no se repita. La cohesión entre países ricos y pobres que defiende España ha convertido a González en protagonista de la «cumbre». Hay diferencias, pero también voluntad de superarlas. Esta semana también habrá que estar atentos al diálogo árabe-israelí que comienza el martes en Washington y no perder de vista el progresivo deterioro de la situación en la URSS.

Diario-16, December 9 1991

arena. Another columnist of *ABC*, Lorenzo Contreras, suggested that although the Spanish Prime Minister liked to portray himself as 'a builder of the great united Europe', his position was that of 'a brick-layer' rather than 'an architect or a promoter'.[12] The reality, according to this writer, was that Spain's role in the process of European integration was *modestísimo*, and that it was 'arrogant to the point of stupidity' to demand 'a place in the Europe of high speed, after our economy has demonstrated serious insufficiencies in the race for productivity'. Yet by attacking González's Socialist government for its supposed incapacity to put the country 'in the Europe of high speed', this critique simply reiterated the same widespread desire: that Spain would become a leading, prestigious member of the European Community. From this perspective, if Spain's role in Europe still remained *modestísimo*, this was viewed as a major source of national shame.

Another important theme in the journalistic portrayal of the Maastricht summit was the representation of the European project as a moral quest for peace and a struggle against the evils of nationalism. For instance, in a special supplement on this event published by *El País*, illustrated with pictures of the celebrations which followed the Allied victory in World War II, the 'new Europe of Maastricht' was referred to as 'a historic landmark for a Europe which less than half a century ago was reemerging after the destruction caused by the Second World War, and which today is advancing in many fields towards its unity' [reproduced on the following page].[13] One of the commentators who wrote an article in this supplement wrote that the progress of European integration had not been 'an easy road', but that 'the amazing thing is that it has taken place in half a century, after 2000 years of wars, passions, rival nationalisms, hegemonic games, and, in this century, two horrific conflagrations'.[14] Similarly, the Secretary of State for the European Communities, Carlos Westendorp, stated in his own contribution to this special supplement on Maastricht that the challenge which had emerged out of the ashes of the Second World War was 'to end, if possible forever, the European divisions which had degenerated into

[12] *ABC*, 30 November 1991.
[13] *El País*, 5 December 1991.
[14] *El País*, 5 December 1991.

EL PAIS

AÑO V. NÚMERO 211 / JUEVES 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1991

Temas DE NUESTRA EPOCA

La cumbre de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Comunidad Europea que comenzará el próximo lunes en la ciudad holandesa de Maastricht puede señalar un punto de no retorno en el camino emprendido hacia la unidad económica y política de los Doce. Un amplio y complejo abanico de cuestiones que afectan a millones de ciudadanos —desde la moneda única hasta la producción, el consumo, la circulación de personas o la intervención con voz propia en grandes crisis internacionales— debe ser definido en la reunión, que representa un hito histórico para una Europa que hace menos de medio siglo resurgía de la destrucción de la II Guerra Mundial y hoy se encamina en muchos campos hacia su unidad.

La nueva Europa de Maastricht

La cumbre de los Doce afronta en la ciudad holandesa el reto de sellar una unidad económica y política que marcará la vida de 340 millones de ciudadanos de la CE



LOS AÑOS CUARENTA. En la parte superior, una colaboracionista paseada en las calles de Chartres (Francia, 1944); abajo, la liberación de París (1945). Ambas fotografías son de Robert Capa.

El País, December 5 1991

two fratricidal conflicts in the first half of the century'.[15] In a country such as Spain, which until relatively recently been governed by an old ally of Hitler and Mussolini, the project of European unity was thus portrayed once again at the time of Maastricht not only as an opportunity to gain political influence and economic prosperity, but also as a source of moral regeneration and ethical pride.

9.2 The run-up to Maastricht (II): Fighting for Spain's 'national interests' in the 'battle for cohesion'

At the same time, however, the period that preceded the Maastricht summit in Spain was also dominated by a pragmatic concern with what came to be known as 'the battle for cohesion'. This referred to the Spanish government's demand that the Maastricht Treaty had to guarantee the establishment of policies which would aid the development of the EC's poorer countries, so that they would be able to reach the convergence requirements of the future monetary union. It was argued, firstly, that each member state's contribution to the Community budget had to be based on their relative levels of prosperity – a demand that was frequently summed up in the press as 'those who have more should pay more'. This was a particularly important issue for Spain, since without a reform of the EC's system of funding, it was destined to become a net contributor of the budget in 1993. Given that the level of income per capita in Spain was still 22% below the European Community average, this was considered to be a totally unacceptable situation (Barbé 1999: 46-7). Secondly, the Spanish government demanded that it was necessary to set up a 'Cohesion Fund' to help finance projects for the development of transport infrastructures, education, scientific research, and healthcare in the least prosperous member states. These demands for the 'solidarity of the rich North with the poor South' were presented by the Spanish government as fundamental 'national interests' which had to be defended at all costs – including, if necessary, the threat of vetoing the entire Maastricht Treaty.

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[15] *El País*, 5 December 1991.

In the period that preceded the European summit, the press focused much of its attention on this sensitive economic issue. For instance, *Diario-16* devoted a full-page story to what it called *La Hora de la Cohesión* ('The Hour of Cohesion'), and *ABC* stated in one of its headlines that *Sin cohesión, Europa le va a costar muy cara a España* ('Without cohesion, Maastricht is going to cost Spain a lot') [reproduced on the following pages]. Furthermore, all the three main newspapers devoted widespread coverage of Felipe González's reunion with the Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, during which the Spanish Prime Minister attempted to gain the support of this leader – who at that time held the rotating presidency of the EC – in the 'battle for cohesion'. Lubbers, however, declared to the Spanish press that the requests for solidarity would probably not be accepted by the majority of the member states.[16] On the same day, the Spanish Secretary of State for the Economy, Pedro Pérez, proclaimed that the current draft of the Maastricht Treaty was 'unacceptable' to the government, and that Spain would reserve its right to veto the proposed document if this was necessary.[17]

A tense emotional climate was therefore created in Spain as the European summit approached, and it appeared that the demands for cohesion were being ignored by the leading member states of the EU. In the discourse of the press, it was therefore proclaimed that crucial 'national interests' were at stake in Maastricht, and that these could simply not be sacrificed on the altar of European unity. The following are some illustrations of this outlook from the main national newspapers:

> Spain and the other less developed countries should receive from the Community's finances a treatment which takes into account its current level of development. If Spain had to pay into the EC more than it receives from it, this would be absolutely unacceptable to public opinion, which would not understand the advantages of the system... Until now, the main Spanish proposals have not been taken seriously at the Community negotiating table. However, underlying these proposals there is a principle which is consubstantial with Spain's presence in the EC. These are not capricious demands which can easily be given up.[18]

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[16] *El País*, 21 November 1991.
[17] *El País*, 21 November 1991.
[18] *El País*, 17 November 1991.

La próxima reunión del Consejo Europeo en Maastricht (Holanda), donde habrán de firmarse los Tratados de Unión Política (UP) y de Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM), ya tiene un nombre para España: será «la cumbre de la cohesión». Sin embargo, las peticiones de igualdad económica y social que el Gobierno español hará en esta «cumbre» tienen pocas posibilidades de ser aceptadas en su totalidad. Incluso se cree que los países con el mismo desarrollo que España «aspiran a quedarse como están».

Maastricht: la hora de la cohesión

España propone la igualdad económica, aunque es poco probable que se acepte

JUDITH CRUZ
MADRID

El Gobierno de Madrid ha puesto durante los últimos meses toda la carne en el asador para que sus once socios comunitarios aprueben su posición en el tema de conseguir una igualación económica y social de los países más pobres de la CE con los más ricos.

La manera de hacerlo sería instaurando un sistema progresivo de ingresos, para que cada país cotice a la caja común comunitaria de acuerdo con su potencia económica real, y modificando las proporciones de cofinanciación en función de esa misma potencia, de forma que ningún Estado se vea obligado a incrementar su gasto público por el hecho de que haya fondos comunitarios disponibles para determinado proyecto.

Pero, además, España cree, como explica el secretario de Estado para la CE, Carlos Westendorp, que es una «necesidad que la cohesión figure como un objetivo del Tratado y no como una mera política» a seguir.

Es decir, para Madrid es necesario que a los países menos desarrollados de la Comunidad no les cueste dinero, que salga de sus presupuestos generales, su pertenencia a la misma y que eso quede reflejado como principio en un artículo del Tratado, no en una recomendación o declaración anexa al mismo.

En la defensa de esa necesidad, España contó o creyó contar con el apoyo de los que serían sus «aliados naturales» dentro de la CE: Grecia, Portugal e Irlanda, los países con los que comparte la etiqueta de «menos desarrollados».

Pero en la reunión ministerial de Noordwijk (Holanda), el Gobierno de Madrid —representado por Carlos Westendorp a causa de la enfermedad del titular de Exteriores, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez— se quedó prácticamente solo.

A Portugal le interesa, más que la cohesión, la modificación de los ingresos, estiman fuentes diplomáticas españolas.

«Pero es que Grecia e Irlanda están obteniendo ya mucha cohesión», entusiasmo por tal las contribuciones financieras de la CE.

En el caso del país heleno llegan al 5 por 100 de su Producto Interior Bruto (PIB), más mil millones de ecus (129.000 millones de pesetas) de ayuda a la balanza de pagos.

En el de la república irlandesa, «lo que tiene ya es importante», según Westendorp, pues supera a Grecia y recibe contribuciones comunitarias que llegan al 6 por 100 de su PIB.

Tanto Grecia como Irlanda y Portugal aspiran simplemente «a quedarse como están» en el tema de la cohesión, «que ya es mucho, y por eso no van a dar ninguna batalla al respecto, aunque les favorezca al final», opina un diplomático español.

En el extremo opuesto de España estará el Reino Unido, que «no quiere ni oír hablar» de nada que afecte al tema social, en el que mantienen que les ha ido muy bien su tradición «particularista» o «aislacionista», como la califican otros.

Pero no sólo en éste, sino también sopesando el conjunto de los otros temas clave de los Tratados de UP y UEM —poderes para el Parlamento Europeo, codecisión política, política exterior y de seguridad común, etcétera— se observa que España y el Reino Unido están cada uno en un extremo de la soga.

De todas formas, Westendorp opina que «se pueden encontrar vías de compromiso en casi todo, salvo en los temas sociales», en los que el Reino Unido va a mostrarse especialmente duro frente a toda negociación.

El problema, visto desde Madrid, es que, aunque Maastricht no sea la «última oportunidad» para la unidad, es que «después se va a complicar todo muchísimo», dice Westendorp al referirse, explícitamente, a la distribución de fondos comunitarios, a las solicitudes de ampliación de la CE que están muy próximas a ser admitidas —léase los casos de Suecia y Austria— y a las dificultades que van a plantear ya directa e indudablemente la resolución de las crisis en la ex URSS y en la Yugoslavia que se desmembra.

Los temas principales, junto con el de la cohesión, que han de quedar, supuestamente, resueltos en los Tratados que se firmarán en Maastricht son los poderes del Parlamento Europeo de Estrasburgo, la forma de adoptar decisiones en temas de política exterior y, sobre todo, de seguridad común.

El Parlamento Europeo, obviamente, quiere ver aumentado su poder decisorio en la Comunidad. Y por eso desde Estrasburgo, donde está su sede, se registran declaraciones cada vez más exigentes al respecto, como las del pasado miércoles, que hablaban de «chantaje institucional» y de «esquizofrenia organizada» refiriéndose a la mezcla prevista, en los proyectos holandeses de Tratados, de decisiones adoptadas por unanimidad y por mayoría cualificada.

Pero, puestos a hablar de esquizofrenias, ésta es total en lo referente al papel futuro de la CE en temas de defensa. Cinco países —Dinamarca, Holanda, Italia, Portugal y el Reino Unido— optan claramente por que la seguridad europea siga teniendo como pilar fundamental a la OTAN.

Otros cinco —Bélgica, España, Francia, Grecia y Luxemburgo— se han definido por el reforzamiento de llamado «pilar europeo», es decir, por que la Unión Europea Occidental asuma responsabilidades de defensa del continente.

Uno, Irlanda, se mantiene en su postura de «no sabe, no contesta», acogiéndose a su estatus de país neutral. Y el duodécimo, Alemania, mantiene una posición para unos ambigua, para otros confusa, al propugnarlo todo a la vez: mantenimiento del papel de la Alianza Atlántica, reforzamiento de la UEO y creación del embrión de «Ejército europeo» potenciando la brigada conjunta germano-francesa.

El presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, en La Moncloa.

LAS POSTURAS DE LOS DOCE

	R. UNIDO	FRANCIA	DINAMARCA	BELGICA	GRECIA	ITALIA	ESPAÑA	PORTUGAL	HOLANDA	IRLANDA	LUXEMBURGO	ALEMANIA
Más poderes para el Parlamento Europeo	Contra	(*)	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor
Nuevos poderes comunitarios para asuntos sociales	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	(*)	A favor	A favor	A favor
Votos de mayoría en Política Exterior	Contra	A favor	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	Contra	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor
Defensa: OTAN o CE	OTAN	CE	OTAN	CE	CE	OTAN	CE	OTAN	NEUTRAL	OTAN	CE	(*)
Supresión de visados para ciudadanos dentro de la CE	Contra	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor	A favor

(*) Ambiguo.

No es eso, señor Corcuera

ANTONIO HERCE

El ministro del Interior, José Luis Corcuera, explicó el viernes, a los «convencidos» representantes institucionales de su partido en Vizcaya, el proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana, su famosa ley Precedía al acto interno socialista una rueda de Prensa que el señor Corcuera confundió con un ¿debate?, quizá una ¿tertulia? o, quién sabe, con un ¿sermón?

Creyente en el texto que defiende, el alcalero ministro identificó a los perplejos periodistas con infieles. Pero, además, y en insolente apreciación, sospechosos algunos de pertenencia a Herri Batasuna o a su entorno. Pues mire, no. No es eso, señor Corcuera. Es algo tan elemental como acudir a una llamada, a una convocatoria de su partido en Vizcaya y preguntar y repreguntar, que es la única consigna de la que entiende un periodista.

Si usted desea un intercambio de opiniones —pretensión deducible de su cortesía reto y empazamiento a los presentes—, quedamos a tomar unos «chiquitos» en Portugalete o a comer en Aranda de Duero. Por ejemplo. Allí empezaría nuestro debate. Pero esa sería otra historia y en la que nos reunió a usted, al secretario general de los socialistas vizcaínos, **Redondo Terreros**, y a una veintena de periodistas, con el gobernador civil de Vizcaya, Daniel Vega, en calidad de amable observador para con las palabras de su jefe.

Es un juego simple establecido y con unas reglas igualmente simples, donde al interpelado le cabe siempre manifestarse con libertad. De su inteligente habilidad depende no irritarse ante cuestiones que le disgustan o, simplemente, no le agradan. Es una cuestión de buenos modos, en fondo y forma.

Yo acepto su fanática pasión por el proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana. Admita, por favor, que le pregunten los descreídos. Y no sólo de esa cuestión, sino de otros muchos asuntos que habitan en el inmueble de su tenebroso Ministerio. Desde esa falta de fe tendrá usted también, señor ministro, que soportarnos.

Piden la libertad de los insumisos ante la prisión de Alcalá

MADRID

Unas doscientas personas procedentes de Madrid, Valencia, Zaragoza y Navarra se manifestaron ayer frente a la prisión militar de Alcalá-Meco para pedir la libertad de los trece insumisos apresados en distintas cárceles españolas. (EFE)

Sin cohesión, Europa le va a costar muy cara a España

De no prosperar las demandas españolas, en 1993 seremos contribuyentes netos de la CE

Felipe González pedirá que pague más quien más tenga y cobren más los más pobres

Madrid. Isabel San Sebastián

Cohesión es la palabra clave. La aceptación por parte de los Doce de este término asbstracto para la mayoría de los españoles, con que el Gobierno denomina su concepto de justicia distributiva dentro de la Comunidad, va a resultar decisiva para el futuro desarrollo de España dentro de la CE y para el saldo positivo o negativo que obtengamos de nuestra condición de socios. Y es que, de no remediarse en Maastricht la actual situación, pudiera ser que a partir de 1993 el «europeísmo» de nuestro Gobierno y de nuestra sociedad en general comenzará a pesar de forma creciente y abrumadora en el bolsillo del españolito de a pié.

Si no hay cohesión, reconocen altos responsables de la Secretaría de Estado para la CE, España será el gran perdedor de ese proceso de integración europea al que se pretende dar el impulso definitivo en Maastricht. Si Felipe González no logra vencer las resistencias de los países ricos y la pasividad de los demás, para que se imponga el criterio de «solidaridad entre los Doce», nuestro país se hallará ante el dilema de pasar a la Historia como la nación que vetó la unidad europea o aceptar financiar, con sus contribuciones, el desarrollo de países como Francia o Gran Bretaña, en un momento en que la patronal, CEOE, presagia tiempos de profunda crisis para nuestra economía.



Pero ¿qué significa cohesión? Según el Gobierno, un principio general que debe inspirar todas las políticas económicas y sociales en el seno de la CE, con objeto de acercar a sus miembros, corregir diferencias y propiciar un desarrollo armónico tendente a reducir distancias.

Redistribuir la riqueza

En términos prácticos, supone reflejar a escala comunitaria la máxima tributaria según la cual paga más quien más tiene y recibe más quien más lo necesita. Es decir; en el capítulo de gastos, que se modifiquen los actuales sistemas de recaudación para que cada miembro contribuya en mayor o menor medida al presupuesto de la CE en función de su prosperidad relativa (renta por habitante). En el de gastos, que se cree un Fondo de Compensación Interestatal (embrión de un futuro fondo federal) que abandone la dimensión regional que impera actualmente en la Comunidad –donde paradójicamente pagan los Estados y cobran las regiones– y sirva de instrumento de redistribución de la riqueza entre los Doce.

¿Por qué «enturbiar» el ambiente previo a esa *reunión clave para el futuro europeo* con algo tan prosaico como el dinero? Porque en la actualidad nuestro país se encuentra en una incómoda situación intermedia (muy similar a la que a escala individual padecen las sufridas «clases medias», demasiado ricas para acogerse a las ayudas destinadas a los más pobres y demasiado pobres para beneficiarse de las ventajas que disfrutan los más ricos) que amenaza con convertirle de aquí a un año en contribuyente neto de la Comunidad; es decir, en país que paga más de lo que recibe.

Flagrante injusticia

Pese a las tajantes palabras de Felipe González ante la Cámara, donde recientemente negó esta posibilidad y aseguró que la Comunidad no permitiría que se diera tal caso de flagrante injusticia, lo cierto es que, de no corregirse los actuales mecanismos de recaudación y redistribución de los fondos comunitarios –calificados por el Gobierno de irracionales e injustos y tan obsoletos que sobre el papel sólo obligan a pagar a los 6 países fundadores de la CE– España podría perder muy pronto las ventajas financieras que le ha proporcionado hasta ahora su pertenencia a esta «sociedad», que en los últimos años ha arrojado un balance favorable en más de 600.0000 millones de pesetas.

Y ello, porque nuestro paulatino desarrollo, propiciado en buena medida por nuestra adhesión a la CE, nos ha situado a medio camino entre los países más ricos –beneficiarios de los fondos comunitarios estructurales y de investigación, que requieren al menos un 50 por 100 de financiación del país receptor y a los que a menudo no podemos acceder por falta de recursos para hacer frente a nuestra pare de la inversión– y los países más pobres –que, como Grecia o Irlanda, reciben el equivalente al 6 por 100 de su PIB en ayudas comunitarias (frente al 0,2 por 100 de España) o, como Portugal, aportan tan sólo el 0,8 por 100 del pesupuesto de la Comunidad (frente al 8 por 100 español)– y nos ha dejado prácticamente solos en nuestra demanda de cohesión, sin más apoyo que el de la Comisión Europea, tardío e incapaz, hasta ahora, de suscitar adhesiones de los restantes socios.

Ayudas dispersas

Ante este desafío, junto a las dos peticiones antes reseñadas, España solicitará en Maastricht que se flexibilicen los mecanismos de ayuda de la Comunidad de modo que los proyectos no deban ser financiados necesariamente en un 50 por 100 de su coste por el país receptor, sino que las tasas de cofinanciación puedan variar en función de los recursos de este último. Esta medida, que no implica un mayor desembolso para la CE sino eventualmente una reducción de los proyectos, podría, sin embargo, provocar tensiones con las comunidades autónomas, cada una de las cuales presenta puntualmente sus demandas particulares, que el Ejecutivo, hasta la fecha, procura trasladar «equitativamente» a Bruselas, con la consiguiente dispersión que ello genera.

Entre tanto, de no mediar soluciones en Maastricht, la situación tiende a agravarse puesto que el fuerte consumo interno y el elevado número de turistas que nos visitan incrementan cada año la suma que en concepto de IVA recaudamos para la CE, mientras regiones como Asturias o Valencia alcanzan el 75 por 100 de renta per cápita respecto a la media comunitaria, y pierden con ello el derecho a recibir ayudas con carácter prioritario.

Apuesta arriesgada

El Gobierno ha hecho hasta ahora una apuesta por la negociación discreta y se ha comprometido al mismo tiempo ante el Parlamento a no firmar documento alguno que vaya en contra de los intereses españoles. Pero si la mención a la cohesión queda excluída o reducida a una vaga declaración de intenciones en el Tratado sobre Unión Política y, como todo parece indicar, Felipe González renuncia al derecho de veto como instrumento máximo de presión, habrá que aplazar hasta el próximo debate presupuestario, previsto para 1992, la discusión puntual sobre aportaciones y retornos de las arcas comunitarias, y fiarse de la «buena voluntad» de nuestros interlocutores.

Unidad de acción

Porque para entonces, tras la firma del Tratado sobre la Unión Económica y Monetaria, España se habrá comprometido a ajustar su economía a la de los Doce, habrá reducido su margen de maniobra respecto al presupuesto nacional, al haberse impuesto un férreo control sobre el déficit y la inflación, habrá cedido soberanía en política monetaria y habrá coartado con ello decisivamente la capacidad del Gobierno de acometer sin el concurso de los Doce las tareas de ajuste y creación de infraestructuras que necesita nuestro país para equipararse a los miembros más desarrollados de la CE, tras haber abierto nuestras fronteras y nuestros mercados a sus empresas más competitivas.

> Amongst us, the emotions of romantic Europeanism have also given way to a cold calculation of the costs and benefits of political, economic, and monetary union. In the days before Maastricht, Parliament and Government have declared their firm conviction that Spain will not become a net contributor to the Community budget, in other words, the victim of an unjust and regressive fiscal treatment.[19]

> Cohesion is the key word. The acceptance by the Twelve of this abstract-sounding concept, which the government employs to designate its idea of distributive justice within the Community, is going to be decisive for the future development of Spain within the EC and for the positive or negative benefits we will obtain as partners in this enterprise. The fact is that, if the current situation is not remedied, from 1993 the 'Europeanism' of our government and of our society in general could begin to weigh increasingly and heavily on the pockets of the average Spaniard. If there is no cohesion... Spain will be the great loser of the process of European integration which it is hoped will receive its definitive impulse at Maastricht.[20]

> If Felipe González returned from Madrid on December 10, after the European Council of Maastricht, without having broken the inertia of the current financing system of the EC, which tends to tranform us into net contributors, eventhough Spain is a country well below the Community average, it would be plausible to speak of an important failure in the Europeanist adventure which began on 1 January 1986.[21]

Hence, if the government's demands for cohesion were not met, it was argued that Spain would become a 'victim' or a 'loser', that public opinion would find this 'totally unacceptable', and that the country's 'European adventure' would ultimately turn out to be a 'failure'. In this sense, it is clear that the traditional Euro-enthusiasm of Spanish political and media discourses was partly replaced during this period by a tough-minded concern with the defense of 'the national interest'.

At the same time, however, it should be noted that the 'battle for cohesion' was simultaneously depicted as something that was entirely consistent with Spain's moral commitment to 'European unity'. It was often proclaimed that Spain was not merely acting out of egoistic, narrow-minded self-interests, but defending policies that were absolutely vital for the construction of a unified 'common European home'. In this way, an attempt was repeatedly made in political and media discourses to legitimate the government's demands for cohesion on 'Europeanist' grounds, and to present them as a positive, morally honourable contribution of Spain to the process of European integration. Hence, although the Spanish Prime Minister and

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[19] *El País*, 7 December 1991.
[20] *ABC*, 8 December 1991.
[21] *Diario-16*, 30 November 1991.

his negotiating team warned that they were prepared to go as far as vetoing a treaty that did not respect their exigencies, this was depicted as an action worthy of 'good Europeans'. The point was not to obstruct the construction of European unity, but, on the contrary, to ensure that this objective would be successfully reached in a manner that avoided the creation of wide gaps between rich and poor countries.

For instance, in a speech he delivered in the Spanish Parliament a few days before the Maastricht summit took place, Felipe González declared that he was not willing to accept an 'insufficient agreement' which did not guarantee the establishment of cohesion policies. However, he also emphasized that these mechanisms of collective solidarity were absolutely vital to ensure the harmonious development of the European Community:

> We interpret the national interest in terms of cohesion, but I want to stress that social and economic cohesion is not the problem of Spain, but the problem of Community construction.[22]

The Spanish Prime Minister argued that a unified Europe could only become a reality if efficient instruments were created to ensure that the poorer countries could bridge the gap which separated them from the 'more prosperous and advanced' ones. On the day the negotiations began in Maastricht, he made this point once again:

> We cannot go towards the economic and monetary union if at the same time there do not exist the necessary means which will permit the least prosperous countries to diminish the differences which separate them from the more developed ones.[23]

Hence, in González's legitimating discourse, the concept of 'cohesion' was depicted as a general principle of solidarity that was necessary to create a European Union governed by a spirit of generosity and cooperation. In this sense, the Spanish demand was not merely a question of economic pragmatism and national self-interest. It was, according to the Prime Minister, a

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[22] Cited in *Diario-16*, 8 December 1991.
[23] Cited in *El País*, 10 December 1991.

valuable contribution of Spain to the construction of a truly united Europe, and therefore a source of national pride in the sphere of moral respectability.

The same position was also reflected in an interview published in *El País* with Carlos Westendorp, the Secretary of State for the European Communities. After declaring that 'without sufficient cohesion there will be no treaty', he linked this demand to Spain's defense of a European political union:

> Our attitude is a logical corollary of our integrationist position. You cannot conceive of a union if at the same time there is no cooperation. In truth, whoever opposes economic and social cohesion is opposing political union.[24]

This self-flattering portrayal of Spain's position as that of a noble-minded 'good European' was further elaborated by contrasting it to what were denigrated as the 'nationalistic' attitudes of Britain. As I showed in chapter 6, the British government was also threatening to veto the Maastricht treaty if its own demands were not satisfied, i.e. the elimination of federalism, as well as the right to opt out of the monetary union and the social chapter. However, Westendorp stressed that the Spanish position on Maastricht was exactly the opposite, and went on to ridicule Britain's old-fashioned 'anti-Europeanism':

> The United Kingdom has been an Empire until very recently. It is also an old nation, with one of the most efficient democratic systems in the entire Western world. All of this, united to their insular character and the Thatcher legacy, is what leads them to block the process [of European integration]. We should not forget that the British led EFTA and created the OECD with the the idea of weakening the Community. Afterwards, they applied the pragmatic maxim that 'if you can't beat them, join them'. Their attitude to the EC is that they do not get off the bus, but they put their foot on the brakes and on top of that, they criticise the way you drive.

By distancing the attitudes of Spain from those of Britain, Westendorp was therefore reaffirming that the Spanish defense of cohesion was fully consistent with the morally worthy project of constructing a supranational, European political union. In another statement cited in *ABC*, he

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[24] *El País*, 8 December 1991.

insisted that this issue was 'not a specifically Spanish problem', because it would determine whether or not 'the EC can function in the future as something harmonious'.[25]

One can see, therefore, how the Spanish government presented its firm demands on social and economic cohesion as a legitimate, positive contribution to the process of European integration. Spain was portrayed as the 'leader of the poor countries', the spokesman of the disadvantaged nations of the South who were justifiably demanding solidarity from the rich Northerners. This attitude was also widely reflected in the press. One commentator, for instance, wrote in *El País* that without effective policies of cohesion, the 'perverse effect' would be that 'the winnings of the North would be strictly equivalent to the symmetrical losses of the South'. If such regional inequalities were not corrected, 'the Europe of two velocities would increase even more the existing gap between the rich and poor countries of the Community'.[26] In *Diario-16*, another columnist warned that at Maastricht:

> Europe will continue to be a Europe of merchants if someone does not remedy it. It is very clear that the rich countries of the Community are not willing to allow the poor, even if they are partners, to approximate their levels of prosperity at their expense.[27]

According to this newspaper's editorial discourse, the purpose of cohesion was to establish effective mechanisms so that 'the Europe of the North will accede to remedy the backwardness of that of the South, so that the development of the "Twelve" will be accomplished harmoniously'.[28] Similarly, *ABC* defended the moral legitimacy of the Spanish government's demands as follows:

> Spain has a right to raise its demands without fear, because reason is on our side... Spain has indisputable moral reasons to demand general solidarity before it is obliged to bear the sacrifices imposed by the discipline of the projected Economic and Monetary Union... Spain does not simply intend to remedy the injustice it would suffer by becoming a net contributor of the future European Union, and it does intend, on the contrary, to establish

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[25] *ABC*, 28 November 1991.
[26] *El País*, 8 December 1991.
[27] *Diario-16*, 9 December 1991.
[28] *Diario-16*, 8 December 1991.

> in the future Treaty of European Political Union the principle of solidarity as the moral foundation of Europe.[29]

The Spanish government's struggle for cohesion was therefore depicted in these media discourses as a legitimate pursuit of national self-interests which was fully consistent with the moral goal of contributing to the harmonious unification of Europe.

The importance that was given to the issue of cohesion was also reflected in the attitude of the leading opposition party at that time, the PP (Popular Party), towards this issue. In an official document released to the press as the Maastricht summit approached, the PP declared its full support 'for European unity and the process of integration', but it made clear that:

> Both things cannot be carried out at any price, at the expense of the least developed countries of the Community, and above all, without a negotiation which will effectively defend the interests of Spaniards.[30]

The PP, furthermore, pressured Felipe González to clearly explain to the nation's citizens how he planned to achieve this crucial objective at Maastricht. The Prime Minister was heavily criticised by the opposition because he initially did not plan to present his negotiating position in the Spanish Parliament, unlike most other European leaders. For instance, the parliamentary spokesman of the PP, Rodrigo Rato, protested that: 'Felipe González is the only head of government who is going to go to Maastricht without explaining to public opinion, through Parliament, what he thinks of the texts that are going to be discussed in Holland'.[31] Similarly, the PP's spokeswoman for European Affairs, Isabel Tocino, declared that no other European leader was ignoring his own Parliament like González, and that this secretism was totally unacceptable on an issue as important for Spain's future as the Maastricht Treaty.[32] The same criticism was

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[29] *ABC*, 10 December 1991.
[30] *El País*, 19 November 1991.
[31] *Diario-16*, 23 November 1991.
[32] *ABC*, 23-11-91.

also made in the press. *El País*, for instance, contrasted the democratic procedures employed in Britain to the backwards attitude of the Spanish government:

> The methods utilized by the United Kingdom and Spain in the preparation of their negotiating positions in the European summit of Maastricht are radically different. In London, the issue is discussed in the House of Commons, under the scrutiny of public opinion, and Prime Minister Major ends up travelling to the Community reunion with the trust of Parliament. That gives his position in Maastricht considerable strength. In Madrid, on the contrary, Prime Minister González has just declined to negotiate with Parliament any terms of reference; in this way, when he returns from the summit, he will report on what he has achieved without having previously explained what he aimed to accomplish... The objetive of solidarity – which in very simple terms means that the rich help the poor –, not merely as a Community declaration, but as an articulated rule in the treaties of Maastricht, is an essential point. If it is not accomplished, and we know that it is difficult, Felipe González will have the escape route of not having broken any promises with Parliament. But the error is much older: confident of its own strength, the Government has failed to mobilize its public opinion and the other political forces on this front of Community solidarity.[33]

An editorial in *ABC* similarly attacked the Spanish leader's decision not to present his case in Parliament, in the manner which was customary in other member states of the EC:

> In all Community countries, with rare and counted exceptions, the governments have appeared before their parliaments in order to refine their respective national positions... At the moment, nobody, neither members of parliament nor citizens, knows in Spain what destiny awaits the our legitimate request of ensuring the establishment of Social and Economic Cohesion... The logical thing would have been that instead of forgetting the representatives of the people, González would have asked all of them to defend, even if it is lost beforehand, the legitimate Spanish request.[34]

These discursive media attacks illustrate how the issue of cohesion had become an emotionally charged concern in the Spanish public sphere as the Maastricht summit approached. At the same time, they also reflect the fact that in Spain, there was still a lingering self-image of political backwardness and inferiority, in comparison to the democratic practices of 'other Europeans'. The objective of these criticisms was to shame the Spanish Prime Minister for not abiding by the basic rules of the democratic game which were respected in the other member states of the EC.

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[33] *El País*, 25 November 1991.
[34] *ABC*, 24 November 1991.

Hence, when González ultimately bowed to this pressure and appeared in Parliament to explain his position before the Maastricht summit, this was applauded as a new, significant advance in Spain's 'Europeanization'. In other words, by adopting the parliamentary practices of the other EC member states, Spain had come closer to properly 'European' standards of democracy. As an editorial in *ABC* put it:

> Felipe González finally appeared yesterday before Parliament, compelled by the pressure of the political parties and the press, to take part in a debate before the Maastricht summit. It seems just to consider that the change in the Prime Minister has largely been motivated by the Popular Party's demands that Spain should adopt the parliamentary habits that are practised in other European countries. In this sense, yesterday's proceedings can be considered an important advance in the progress of institutional relations.[35]

One can therefore observe in such discourses a continuing symbolic depiction of 'other Europeans' as the admired political models which should be emulated in order to fully overcome the remaining shameful traces of Francoism.

When the parliamentary debate on Maastricht ultimately took place, Felipe González promised that he would not come back with a treaty that was 'contrary to the interests of Spain', and that he would 'fight this battle to the end' [see report on the following page].[36] At the same time, however, he insisted that the success of Spain in the struggle for cohesion was something which would be necessary 'for the proper functioning of the Community in the future' and that he would go to Maastricht with the spirit of 'constructing Europe'. The imagery of a 'battle' that had to be 'won' against foreign rivals was also invoked by the spokeswoman of the PP on European Affairs, Isabel Tocino, who expressed her hope that Felipe González would return from Maastricht after achieving *una pica en Mastrique* – in other words, a proud 'victory' like the one Philip II had won for Spain on the very same territory in the sixteenth century, by successfully defending the country's 'national interests'.

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[35] *ABC*, 29 November 1991.
[36] *Diario-16*, *ABC* and *El País*, 29 November 1991.

ESPAÑA

Felipe González aseguró ayer en el Congreso que el Gobierno negociará duramente sus posiciones sobre los Tratados de Unión Política (UP) y de Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM), que han de ser aprobados en el Consejo Europeo de Maastricht (Holanda) los próximos 9 y 10 de diciembre, para que sean satisfactorios. Si no lo son, España puede abstenerse en la votación, impidiendo así su aprobación puesto que los acuerdos en las «cumbres» de la CE se toman por unanimidad. El dictamen parlamentario fue aprobado, al final, por consenso salvo en el tema de la cohesión.

JUAN CARLOS TRIVIÑO

El presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, en su escaño del banco azul, ayer durante la celebración del debate en la Cámara Baja.

González asegura que negociará con dureza en Maastricht y no descarta un veto del Tratado

El Gobierno consigue el respaldo matizado de la oposición en el Congreso

VIDAL COY
MADRID

El presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, dijo, durante su comparecencia de ayer ante la Cámara Baja para debatir el dictamen de la Comisión Mixta Congreso-Senado sobre la propuesta española en Maastricht, que el posible acuerdo que se alcance en Holanda «tiene que ser satisfactorio desde el punto de vista de nuestra concepción de Europa y de los intereses nacionales que defendemos».

Si eso no es así, «no hablaré nunca de veto, pero si llega el momento de no votar una resolución, no la votaré», declaró González. Esa actitud, si se produce, equivaldría en la práctica a un veto por el requisito de unanimidad para que cualquier acuerdo sea adoptado en una «cumbre» comunitaria.

El documento de la Comisión Mixta que fija la postura española ante la «cumbre» fue finalmente aprobado por la totalidad de grupos parlamentarios, tras el debate, salvo la parte referida a la cohesión económica y social —caballo de batalla en la sesión de ayer entre PP y PSOE— en la que el Grupo conservador se abstuvo tras solicitar su portavoz, Rodrigo Rato, la votación separada de las enmiendas.

El presidente del PP, José María Aznar, insistió en su intervención en que en la propuesta holandesa de cara a Maastricht —hecha en tanto que presidente de turno de la CE— «no han sido recogidas ni las posiciones ni los intereses de España», por lo que «no es aceptable».

González reiteró la decisión de su Gobierno de dar la batalla de la cohesión «hasta el final». «Nos gustaría darla acompañados», dijo refiriéndose a la soledad de España en la defensa a ultranza de que quede reflejado en el Tratado la necesidad de una política de cohesión económica, «pero no nos da ningún empacho hacerlo solos», añadió.

Y reiteró que «si no llegamos a un acuerdo satisfactorio, no aceptaremos el Tratado. Pero como eso no se puede definir en un quantum», precisó, «el riesgo es evaluar el grado de satisfacción que nos parezca suficiente» en Maastricht.

González enumeró como los tres objetivos de España en el próximo Consejo Europeo los de conseguir «mayor democratización» de la CE, «mayor eficacia» y «mayor solidaridad».

El primero correspondería a profundizar el grado de codecisión del Parlamento europeo, a la creación del Comité de Regiones y a la ampliación del concepto de ciudadanía europea.

El segundo se conseguirá, según González, con el otorgamiento de nuevas competencias a la CE en materias económicas, culturales y sociales. «La mayoría cualificada como forma de decisión se va a ir convirtiendo en la regla».

La solidaridad será mayor si se acepta la propuesta de cohesión económica y social. «Aspiramos a un Tratado que introduzca la progresividad en política de gasto y que haya un fondo nuevo, se llame como se llame», dijo González.

Felipe, el deseado

Con expresiones y exclamaciones de fingida sorpresa acogieron ayer los diputados de los grupos de oposición la entrada del presidente del Gobierno en el hemiciclo del Congreso para participar en el debate sobre la propuesta española en Maastricht. Luego, en el uso del turno de palabra, varios de los oradores, empezando por el presidente del Partido Popular, José María Aznar, se congratularon irónicamente de la presencia del jefe del Ejecutivo en el foro parlamentario donde, para ellos, se hace demasiado caro de ver.

Aznar, como dirigente del principal grupo de oposición, fue el más claro al respecto: «Deseo que este tipo de comparecencia se convierta en *norma*». Su compañera Isabel Tocino fue más allá en la ironía: «Felicito al presidente del Gobierno que, en cumplimiento de sus funciones, ha accedido a venir» al Congreso, dijo la diputada popular.

El clarín del patriotismo

ISMAEL FUENTE

TRAS dudas y zozobras, tras jugar con el «tempo» comunitario y ganar todo el tiempo posible, Felipe González tocó el clarín del patriotismo y, a su sonido, formaron uno tras otro —algunos, como el PP, con reservas— hasta dar al presidente todas las armas posibles para volver a Flandes, no en nombre del colonialismo, sino en el de la cohesión económica y social.

Los populares de José María Aznar, que habían mantenido su texto alternativo, tuvieron cintura política para variar el sentido de su voto a última hora y no caer en tentaciones propias de los tiempos de Manuel Fraga y del referéndum de la OTAN de 1986, de defender una postura anti-natura solamente por dar una bofetada «gratis» al Gobierno y a su presidente.

Seguramente, ganas no le quedaron, porque ayer se tuvo la demostración palmaria de que el jefe del Ejecutivo acude al Parlamento cuando quiere y cuando le conviene. Acude para pedir, cuando lo necesita. Y no para dar, aunque sea únicamente explicaciones. Pero, mientras se lo consienta la oposición, bueno le será, supongo. Y González está lo suficientemente resabiado como para saber cuándo no se le puede negar el apoyo.

Así que el presidente se puso —ante el Parlamento— la venda antes que la herida y, como si se tratase de reivindicar Gibraltar o de defender Ceuta y Melilla, prometió negociar con firmeza «hasta donde se pueda». Pero aún con el respaldo del Congreso, recitará utilizar el mecanismo comunitario del veto, cuya efectividad ya está más que puesta en entredicho.

Porque Felipe González se juega una parte de su prestigio personal si regresa «derrotado» de Maastricht. El ciudadano de a pie, que es la mayoría del voto, se preguntará con alguna lógica, aunque la política no se base precisamente en la lógica: ¿Todos estos años de vendernos Europa, incluso por encima de carreteras, hospitales, escuelas, seguridad ciudadana, etc, no han servido para que, a la hora de la verdad, se nos haga el caso que nos merecemos?

The so-called 'battle for cohesion' therefore became a symbolic rallying cry in the Spanish public sphere for what was seen as a legitimate defense of the nation's interests in the European arena. The outcome of this crucial struggle was presented as the key issue that would determine whether Maastricht could be considered a national 'victory' or 'defeat'. Without cohesion, it was feared that Spain would not be able to 'catch up' with the more prosperous European countries, and hence that the old Europeanist dreams of the past could turn out to be an illusion. As one columnist put it in *Diario-16*:

> If [Felipe González] returns defeated, and this cannot be discarded, how will he explain to the country's citizens that Europe has slammed the door in his face?... If he returns from Maastricht without the key of economic and social cohesion, many are likely to ask: So, what was all that for?[37]

It is interesting to note that, in any case, the vigorous defense of 'national interests' was clearly perceived in some minds as the most effective way of boosting Spain's collective dignity and pride in the European arena. For instance, another journalist suggested in *Diario-16* that by fighting for the establishment of social and economic cohesion, the Spanish Prime Minister could show that he was a truly respected 'European' leader:

> At Maastricht, González needs to demonstrate that he is a leader with European stature and prestige. He needs to demonstrate that when he goes abroad he defends the interests of us all... That social cohesion deserves to be fought for with cape and sword, and that he does not accept watered down documents.[38]

If, in the past, the achievement of 'European stature and prestige' had been identified with Spain's successful democratization, it was now increasingly linked to building up the nation's weight and reputation within the European Community. From this perspective, Prime Minister González was pressured by the press to show his mettle as a tough negotiator who could make his voice heard in the European arena, and push forward Spain's just demands for social cohesion. A cartoon in *Diario-16* encapsulated this image of the Spanish Prime Minister as a

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[37] *Diario-16*, 9 December 1991.
[38] *Diario-16*, 10 December 1991.

courageous, virile defender of 'the nation', by portraying him as a courageous *picador*, preparing to confront 'European bulls' such as Kohl and Mitterrand in the *corrida* of Maastricht, by proclaiming with confident bravura: *Me van a oir!* ('This time they're really going to hear me!') [reproduced on the following page].

9.3 The aftermath of Maastricht: A 'giant leap towards European unity' and a victory for 'the poor South'

When the Maastricht summit ultimately took place, the discourse which emerged in the Spanish public sphere was dominated by two fundamental messages: firstly, that a crucial, 'historic' step had been taken in the construction of a unified, European 'superpower'; and secondly, that Spain had managed to *win* the 'battle for cohesion', by convincing its partners of the crucial importance of establishing mechanisms of 'European solidarity' between the rich North and the poor South. For both of these reasons, the Maastricht agreement was widely depicted as a source of great national satisfaction and pride. As a member of the new 'European Union', Spain could look ahead to becoming part of the future economic powerhouse which would be created with the birth of a common currency in 1999. At the same time, the two main demands of the Spanish government concerning the issue of cohesion had largely been satisifed. On the one hand, a legally binding protocol was signed by the Twelve in which it was agreed that the relative prosperity of each member state should be taken into account in order to determine their respective contributions to the Community budget. On the other, a new Cohesion Fund was established to aid the development of environmental policies and transport infrastructures (though not education, research, and healthcare, which had also been demanded by the Spanish government), in the so-called 'poor four' of the EU: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.

Diario-16, December 9 1991

This was more than enough to allow Felipe González to triumphantly present the outcome of the Maastricht summit as a 'victory for Spain', which had been based on the 'impecable and implacable logic' of 'our arguments for cohesion'.[39] In the discursive media performance he delivered at a press conference after the summit concluded [see the report of *El País* on the following page], the Spanish Prime Minister declared that the European Community had taken 'the most transcendental step since its birth', and that the most important thing now would be for Spain to achieve the economic requirements necessary to belong to the future common currency. In his view, Spain was 'not in a position of grave risk', since it already found itself among the seven leading countries who had the greatest possibilities of reaching this cherished objective. The socialist leader thereby suggested that Spain had an excellent chance of catching the so-called 'train of European history' this time, and that it would not find itself again in the shameful position of a humiliated outsider.

This tone of proud national triumphalism was widely echoed in the press. *El País*, for instance, celebrated the great economic and political potential of the new 'European Union', as well as the triumph of Spain in the 'battle for cohesion'. In its front page report on the day after the summit ended [reproduced on the following page], this top-selling newspaper proclaimed:

> The European Union, the most important reform since the creation of the EC, was born in the early hours of yesterday at Maastricht. The British veto forced a sacrifice of social policy, but the Twelve approved a treaty on political and monetary union which will allow them to speak with one voice in the international arena, work towards the objective of a common defense, and have at their disposal, from 1999, a common currency, which will strengthen their economic weight. *Spain was the country which emerged victorious*, because it managed to impose the principle of solidarity so that the poor countries of the Community will pay less and receive more money from the EC.[40]

Maastricht was thus presented as a cause for national celebration, because it signified a crucial step in the *strengthening* of Europe's weight, as well as a Spanish *victory* in the struggle for solidarity. Spain had shown its capacity to make its voice heard at the European negotiating table

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[39] *El País*, 12 December 1991. All other citations in this paragraph are from this newspaper.
[40] *El País*, 12 December 1991, my italics.

EL PAIS

EDICIÓN DE MADRID — DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE DE LA MAÑANA — JUEVES 12 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1991

Redacción, Administración y Talleres: Miguel Yuste, 40 / 28037 Madrid / Of. (91) 337 82 00 / Precio: 80 pesetas / Año XVI. Número 5.346

Felipe González se muestra "razonablemente satisfecho" de lo logrado en Maastricht

Moneda única y voz común en el exterior definen el nacimiento de la Unión Europea

F. MONTEIRA, ENVIADO ESPECIAL, Maastricht

La Unión Europea, la reforma más importante desde la creación de la CE, nació en la madrugada de ayer en Maastricht. El veto británico obligó a sacrificar la política social, pero los Doce aprobaron un tratado de unión política y monetaria que les permitirá hablar con una sola voz en la escena internacional, plantearse como objetivo una defensa común y disponer, a partir de 1999, de una moneda única, que reforzará su peso económico. España fue el país que salió victorioso, porque logró imponer el principio de solidaridad para que los países pobres de la Comunidad paguen menos y reciban más dinero de la CE.

Felipe González se mostró "razonablemente satisfecho" con el resultado de la cumbre. Maastricht, una pequeña ciudad holandesa de sólo 120.000 habitantes, que sufrió varios sitios en guerras europeas del pasado, ha pasado a convertirse ahora en la cuna de la Unión Europea.

La unión monetaria significa la construcción de una economía federal para los Doce. En la unión política, el acuerdo quedó bajo mínimos, pero la política exterior y de seguridad común, así como las nuevas competencias de la Comunidad Europea, constituyen un primer paso para una profundización ya emplazada para 1996.

"Lo más importante, la irreversibilidad del proceso, está garantizada", destacó el canciller alemán, Helmut Kohl.

La reacción de la Comisión y del Parlamento Europeo, los dos grandes críticos de la merma de ambiciones de los Doce, demuestra que la integración europea es el triunfo de lo posible. Para el presidente de la Comisión Europea, Jacques Delors, el Tratado "es globalmente favorable".

Enrique Barón, presidente de la Eurocámara, considera que "se trata de un paso importante, aunque no es lo que queríamos nosotros". Los eurodiputados celebrarán hoy un primer debate en Estrasburgo sobre el contenido del Tratado de la Unión Europea y, aunque lloverán las críticas, el dictamen no será de rechazo. La propuesta de la comisión interinstitucional se pronuncia por el sí al acuerdo de Maastricht, aunque la votación definitiva se celebrará en febrero.

La propia Confederación Europea de Sindicatos (CES) emitió ayer un comunicado en el que "se felicita que 11 países hayan superado una batalla fundamental para el futuro de Europa".

Paradójicamente, la política social, el último vestigio de una Europa dividida por culpa del veto del primer ministro británico, John Major, en lugar de a los conservadores arrinconará a los laboristas. Major mantuvo como una cosa suya negativa a influir en el Tratado la más mínima mención a los derechos de los trabajadores, y los otros 11 países no fueron capaces de convencerle. O no había política social o no había Tratado de Maastricht.

Finalmente, los 11 dieron su brazo a torcer. La política social no es más que un simple protocolo en el que todos, menos el Reino Unido, se comprometen a desarrollar la Carta Social aprobada en 1989, cuyo campo de acción es muy reducido.

La posición británica de dar menos poderes a la Comunidad tuvo éxito relativo en varios puntos del Tratado, pero fue completo al conseguir que los 11 se vean obligados a llevar a cabo su política social fuera del marco legal de la CE.

Pasa a la página 3
Más información en las páginas 4 a 6
Editorial en la página 8

El primer ministro británico, John Major (derecha), brinda con el secretario del Foreign Office, Douglas Hurd (centro), tras la cumbre de Maastricht. A la izquierda, el canciller del Exchequer, Norman Lamont.

Francia detiene a 21 activistas de ETA en una gran operación contra Pakito

Al menos 21 activistas y colaboradores de ETA, la mayoría de ellos franceses, fueron arrestados ayer por la policía del país vecino en una amplia operación desarrollada en Burdeos, Poitiers, Angers y Biarritz, que había sido montada para detener al jefe de la banda, Francisco Mujica Garmendia, *Pakito*. Entre los arrestados está José Luis Eciolaza Goñi, *Bonbonito*, que figura en el organigrama de la cúpula militar de ETA y está acusado por la policía española de haber intervenido en 15 asesinatos. También fue detenida Izaskun Rekalde, esposa del dirigente etarra Santiago Arrospide Sarasola, *Santi Potros*. Este es la tercera vez que el número uno de ETA escapa a una operación similar.

Página 11

SUMARIO

Acuerdo entre Gorbachov y Yeltsin tras sus encuentros con mandos del Ejército soviético

El presidente de la Federación Rusa, Boris Yeltsin, consiguió ayer, tras un encuentro con mandos del Ejército soviético, que Mijaíl Gorbachov suavizara su inicial oposición a la Comunidad de Estados Independientes (CEI), forjada en Minsk entre las repúblicas de Rusia, Ucrania y Bielorrusia. La entrevista de Yeltsin con responsables de las Fuerzas Armadas seguía a la que el martes sostuvo Gorbachov. Un portavoz del Ministerio de Defensa señaló que los compromisos adquiridos con ambos dirigentes en torno a la estabilidad de la situación del país son considerables.

Andrei Grachov, portavoz de Mijaíl Gorbachov, aseguró ayer que el líder soviético no se está planteando una lucha por el poder. "El problema no es si se sigue en el puesto de presidente de la Unión Soviética, sino lograr que la transición a una nueva formación de Estado soberano e independiente se haga de una manera democrática y civilizada", dijo Grachov.

Página 2

Desconvocada la huelga de repartidores de prensa en la Comunidad de Madrid

Madrid recupera hoy la normalidad en la distribución de prensa, ya que al filo de las nueve y media de la noche de ayer los editores y las empresas distribuidoras llegaron al acuerdo de reanudar las negociaciones para un convenio colectivo en la Comunidad autónoma madrileña. Este hecho ha permitido la desconvocatoria de la huelga que mantenían los repartidores desde el pasado lunes.

Los representantes de la patronal se comprometieron a no adoptar sanciones contra los siete detenidos durante la madrugada anterior por utilizar medios violentos. Todos ellos fueron puestos en libertad antes de suscribirse este acuerdo.

Durante la jornada de ayer, tres periódicos, EL PAIS, *Diario 16* y *Cinco Días* lograron distribuir sus ediciones de Madrid.

Página 16

El País, December 12 1991

CUMBRE DE MAASTRICHT



El presidente del Ejecutivo español analiza en Maastricht los resultados de la cumbre

El Gobierno presentará este mes al Congreso un plan de convergencia económica

González cree que España será capaz de aprobar en 1999 la reválida de la moneda única

IGNACIO CEMBRERO, Maastricht

El presidente del Gobierno, Felipe González, abandonó ayer por la mañana la ciudad sede de la cumbre europea dispuesto a preparar a España para que pase con éxito el examen de *reválida* que le permitirá estar en el vanguardia de Estados de la Comunidad Europea que, como tarde, contará a partir de primero de enero de 1999 con una moneda única, el ecu (unidad de cuenta europea). Antes de finales de año el ministro de Economía, Carlos Solchaga, presentará ante el Congreso de los Diputados el plan de convergencia económica que, reconoció González, supondrá un inevitable esfuerzo de ajuste económico.

"España no está en situación de grave riesgo" de quedarse descolgada en la última fase de la unión monetaria, recalcó González, en una larga conferencia de prensa que dio en la madrugada de ayer al término del Consejo Europeo de Maastricht, donde se quedó a dormir en la noche del martes al miércoles. González informará al Congreso a principios de la próxima semana.

"Hoy en día España está ya entre los siete países que tienen mayor grado de convergencia", recalcó el jefe del Ejecutivo. "Será, por tanto, muy difícil, casi inconcebible", añadió, que no esté en ese mismo grupo en 1996 cuando se haga un primer intento, por mayoría cualificada, para determinar quienes disfrutarán de la moneda común.

González hizo además una valoración global de la cumbre, al asegurar que "la CE no ha dado desde su fundación un paso más importante que éste, a pesar de que el resultado final refleja contradicciones". La alusión al apaño hecho entre 11 Estados para permitir al Reino Unido mantenerse al margen de la política social era evidente y "no significa que el Reino Unido haya sido el perdedor de la reunión".

Para que los indicadores económicos de España arrojen entonces resultados similares a los de los socios de la CE con una economía más saneada, los Doce líderes comunitarios reunidos en Maastricht dieron, en gran medida, satisfacción a la principal reivindicación española, la cohesión o solidaridad financiera de los Estados más prósperos de la CE con los menos desarrollados.

González evitó, sin embargo, echar las campanas al vuelo. Reconoció que a los españoles "nos han salido razonablemente bien las cosas, pero no me gustaría exagerar". "España tendrá que hacer un esfuerzo de disciplina y de convergencia, porque nuestros problemas no se van a resolver sólo por solidaridad o cohesión".

Achacó el presidente "la victoria en la batalla" de la cohesión a "la lógica implícita en el planteamiento español que ha sido impecable e inatacable", hasta el punto de acabar por convencer a Helmut Kohl, el canciller de una Alemania que es el principal contribuyente a las arcas comunitarias, y de hacer ceder al primer ministro británico, John Major, el más reacio a cualquier avance en el proceso político. "Hemos sido exigentes y españoles", la creación de un nuevo instrumento que se beneficiarán España, Irlanda, Portugal y Grecia, y el compromiso de tener en cuenta el principio de relativa de cada Estado a la hora de fijar su contribución a las arcas comunitarias.

En un mañana de cuentas, Irlanda había hecho una primera concesión a las tesis españolas incluyendo en el mandato del nuevo fondo, aunque reservara su uso al apoyo en los países más pobres a las políticas de medio ambiente y la construcción de infraestructuras de transporte. España intentó en vano que el fondo, que nacerá como tarde dentro de un año, pudiese servir para acometer infraestructuras sanitarias y de educación.

Para poder acceder al nuevo fondo, los Estados miembros deberán tener una renta *per cápita* al menos inferior en un 10% a la media comunitaria —la de España lo es en un 22%— y desarrollar planes de convergencia económica, con vistas a poder ingresar en la tercera fase de la unión económica y monetaria.

La segunda concesión holandesa se concretó por la tarde cuando el primer ministro, Ruud Lubbers, propuso que la declaración que sugería hasta entonces añadir al tratado se convirtiese en un protocolo, fórmula última que tiene valor jurídico vinculante.

Los Doce se comprometen en la declaración a "tener más en cuenta la creatividad contributiva de los distintos Estados miembros en el sistema de recursos propios, así como a estudiar medidas para corregir, para los Estados miembros menos prósperos, elementos regresivos que existen en el sistema actual de recursos propios".

Una vez sentados los principios de solidaridad, le queda a España otra batalla por librar: lograr que se plasmen en las perspectivas financieras de la CE para el próximo quinquenio, que deberán ser aprobadas por unanimidad en una cumbre extraordinaria, la próxima primavera, la esta definitiva batalla, España la cuenta con un aliado de peso: la Comisión Europea.

Los logros de la delegación española en Maastricht no significan que España no corra aún el riesgo de ser contraviniente neto a la CE en 1992.

Aznar: "Ahora habrá que leerse la letra pequeña"

EL PAÍS, Madrid

Los partidos españoles se mostraron ayer "moderadamente satisfechos" por los resultados de Maastricht. En el análisis de la reunión, los principales grupos coincidieron en calificar como "importante, pero algo tímido" el paso dado hacia la unidad política, económica y social de la Comunidad Europea.

"No es para echar las campanas al vuelo". Esta frase, de Iñaki Anasagasti, portavoz del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, resume el sentimiento de los grupos parlamentarios. Aún así, dentro de esta tibia acogida, hay grados.

El ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Juan Manuel Eguiagaray, calificó los resultados de "gran victoria para España", y el diputado socialista Jesús Caldera extrajo esa impresión. Enfrente, José María Aznar, presidente del Partido Popular, no ocultó su reticencia al manifestar que "España sólo ha salvado los muebles, y ahora habrá que leerse la letra pequeña".

El eurodiputado de la lista de Ursula Antoni Gutiérrez se mostró "cautelosamente decepcionado" y afirmó que Maastricht no ha respondido a las expectativas de unión política". El Centro Democrático y Social lamentó "el escaso avance para sentar el déficit democrático de la CE y la tardanza del paso dado en la creación de la defensa común europea".

La cumbre vista por sus protagonistas

Felipe González. "La Comunidad ha dado el salto más trascendente" desde su nacimiento aunque en el nuevo tratado "hay bastante desorden y numerosos elementos contradictorios" y al capítulo social se le ha dado un tratamiento "injusto" que se nota "como una carencia". "Nos han salido razonablemente bien las cosas, pero no me gustaría exagerar. España tendrá que hacer un esfuerzo de disciplina y de convergencia, porque nuestros problemas no se van a resolver sólo por solidaridad o cohesión, sino con nuestro trabajo".

François Mitterrand. "Todos los puntos que Francia quería obtener se han obtenido. Decidimos una Unión Monetaria Europea en torno a una moneda única y quedamos una fecha fija para su entrada en vigor. Nuestras expectativas se han visto colmadas". Destacó "el serio avance en materia de seguridad europea, una cuestión de importancia esencial cuando la nueva Europa puede enfrentarse a un nuevo tipo de conflictos".

John Major. "Es un buen día para el Reino Unido y un buen día para Europa. Juego, set y partido para el Reino Unido. Estoy muy satisfecho. Es un avance significativo hacia la cooperación comunitaria. Con este acuerdo el Reino Unido tiene el derecho esencial de sumarse a la iniciativa de la moneda única, si así lo desea y cuando quiera". Respecto a la Carta Social, "nuestro país posee una historia diferente y una estructura legal distinta, y en los últimos doce años hemos hecho muchos esfuerzos para conseguir que nuestras leyes laborales se adecuen a los mejores parámetros existentes. Lo que no podíamos aceptar es una ampliación de las competencias en las relaciones entre empresarios y trabajadores".

Gianni de Michelis. "Es una victoria para Europa y la integración europea". El componente social puede ser interpretado "como una botella medio vacía o medio llena. Para nosotros, la botella está más que llena. Una nueva Europa nacerá en 1993".

Ruud Lubbers. "Este tratado se considerará importante. Hemos demostrado que la voluntad de trabajar juntos en Europa crece cada día. Será criticado desde hoy en el Parlamento Europeo y en otros foros, "pero no es fácil modificarlo".

Wilfried Martens. Los Doce "han logrado un resultado concreto" en Maastricht aunque "tenía otras esperanzas sobre la unión política de Europa".

Helmut Kohl. "El compromiso es un avance significativo. John Major presentó resistencia para defender las posiciones británicas, pero lo ha hecho muy bien".

Constantin Mitsotakis. El ingreso de Grecia en la UEO en 1992, "es un triunfo de la política exterior griega. Nuestras fronteras serán en lo sucesivo las fronteras defensivas de la Europa unida".

El País, 12 December 1991

and to *impose* a vision of Europe which protected its national interests. This same attitude was also reflected in an editorial entitled *Europe advances*, in which *El País* stated that after the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the Maastricht Treaty could be considered 'the second success of contemporary Europe'.[41] By the end of the century, it would create an entity that would have much more than 'a mere vocation'. It would have common economic, political, and legal institutions 'at the service of a European citizenry'. Another article published in this newspaper, significantly entitled *Un competidor peligroso para EEUU* ('A dangerous competitor for the USA'), emphasized once again the tremendous power potential of a united Europe:

> The European Union which has just been born in Maastricht marks the definitive consolidation of Europe as an economic and political superpower. In other words, as a serious competitor of the mighty powers which emanate from the two shores of the Pacific.[42]

The author of this article, who was the correspondent of *El País* in Washington, compared the Maastricht summit to the historic reunion which took place in Maryland on 15 November 1977, when the representatives of the thirteen original North American colonies met with the objective of creating 'a great and united nation'. That meeting had turned out to be 'the embryo of the most powerful country on the earth', in the same way that the Maastricht summit could potentially become the crucial step towards a 'United States of Europe'. Hence, this journalist suggested that the Americans, 'accustomed to a century of clear global predominance', were beginning to worry about 'the emergence of a new economic and political power' in Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe was 'reclaiming its own path', and the Maastricht summit was, for the United States, 'a clear message that the days of North American presence on the European continent are coming to an end.'

This same image of Maastricht as a crucial advance towards the construction of a 'European superpower', as well as a Spanish victory in the struggle for cohesion, was also clearly reflected

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[41] *El País*, 12 December 1991.
[42] *El País*, 13 December 1991.

in the coverage of *ABC*. In its front page headline on the day after the summit concluded, this newspaper proclaimed that Europe had taken 'A GIANT LEAP TOWARDS UNION' [reproduced on the following page].[43] The agreements reached could be considered 'a first step on the road towards the "Europe of one voice", capable of situating itself on an equal commercial and political plane with the United States and Japan.' It was also stressed, however, that Maastricht had consecrated 'the Europe of two velocities', since in 1999 only those countries who fulfilled the required contitions of economic convergence would be able to join the common European currency. Hence, the crucial question now was 'whether our country will be prepared to be in the leading group' of the monetary union.

At the same time, this newspaper also celebrated in huge bold print that at Maastricht, 'Spain *won* the battle for social cohesion' [reproduced on the following page]. In this way, Europe had been reminded that 'the South also exists', and that for the project of European integration to succeed, it was vital to close the gap between the rich and the poor countries. The Spanish 'victory' in the 'battle for cohesion' was thus depicted as an extremely valuable contribution to the project of European unification. It was not merely a question of 'demanding money for Spain, Greece, or Portugal at a given moment', but of defending 'the establishment of a general principle for the redistribution of wealth' which would ultimately become vital for the progressive assimilation of the impoverished countries of Eastern Europe in the EU. In an editorial entitled 'The Success of Felipe González', the Spanish Prime Minister was therefore congratulated for maintaining 'a difficult balance between the energetic defense of Spain's legitimate interests and the obligation of serving the European cause.' His 'good tact' had led him to reject the temptation of vetoing the Maastricht Treaty, which would have been 'a false demagogic success', while at the same time he had avoided 'a servile capitulation to European egoism'. In this way, he had obtained 'an acceptable formula for our interests without losing the European perspective.' The cohesion victory was thus depicted as a success not only because it

[43] *ABC*, 11 December 1991.

ABC
MADRID



EUROPA DA UN PASO DE GIGANTE HACIA LA UNIÓN

Los jefes de Estado o de Gobierno de las doce naciones de la CE llegaron ayer a un acuerdo sobre la Unión Económica y Monetaria, después de que la Delegación española consiguiera imponer sus exigencias sobre la cohesión política y social y Gran Bretaña aceptara una cláusula de «exención» por la que podrá decidir abandonar en un futuro la UEM. Los máximos dirigentes comunitarios acordaron también a última hora de la noche desbloquear la «postura intransigente» de Gran Bretaña sobre política social en la Comunidad. Por un protocolo adicional los «once» quedan con las manos libres para avanzar en la Europa Social tan lejos como deseen, mientras el Reino Unido obtiene satisfacción a sus demandas, ya que el Tratado de Unión Europea no ampliará sus actuales competencias. Vienen a nuestra portada John Major y Felipe González, protagonistas de la histórica cumbre. (Editorial e información en páginas interiores)

ABC, December 11 1991

CUMBRE DE MAASTRICHT

España ganó la batalla de la cohesión social

El compromiso para la redistribución de riqueza entre países pobres y ricos será vinculante

González: «Las cosas han salido razonablemente bien, aunque quedan algunas incertidumbres»

Maastricht. Luis Ayllón, enviado especial

España consiguió ayer que la CE aceptara sus pretensiones en materia de cohesión económica y social, que ha sido su principal caballo de batalla en la «cumbre» comunitaria. Felipe González afirmó al término de la reunión, esta madrugada, que en su opinión, «las cosas han salido razonablemente bien, aunque con algún elemento de incertidumbre», en referencia a la solución adoptada en política social. España tuvo que convencer al resto de los socios comunitarios, y sobre todo a Alemania, de la necesidad de adoptar compromisos vinculantes para que los españoles no nos convirtamos en poco tiempo en contribuyentes netos de la CE.

En la cuestión de la cohesión, la Presidencia holandesa introdujo un párrafo, en el Artículo 130.d, según el cual, el Consejo Europeo se compromete a implantar antes del 31 de diciembre de 1993 un Fondo de Cohesión para financiar proyectos en el campo del medio ambiente y de las grandes redes transeuropeas de transporte.

Sólo un punto

Sin embargo, sólo este punto aparecía incluido en el Tratado. Para el resto de las peticiones españolas, lo que la Presidencia ofrecía era una declaración anexa sobre cohesión económica y social, cuyo contenido lo consideraba Madrid como satisfactorio, pero que no aceptaba porque una declaración no tiene carácter vinculante y podía fácilmente quedar en agua de borrajas.

«Todo estaría resuelto si en lugar de una declaración fuera un protocolo, porque eso ya formaría parte del Tratado y comprometería a todos los países miembros», dijo por la mañana una fuente autorizada española.

A lo largo de la jornada, las posiciones de los países más reacios a introducir medidas que les obligarían a aumentar su contribución a las arcas comunitarias fueron reblandeciéndolas. Según González «en realidad nadie se opuso a la cohesión social, aunque a muchos no les guste tener que aceptar lo que es de una lógica implacable»

Protocolo del Tratado

Después del almuerzo, los negociadores españoles pudieron respirar tranquilos, porque lo que era una simple declaración pasó a ser un protocolo del tratado algo con un carácter jurídico vinculante.

En cualquier caso, España, que había temido que el paso de la declaración al protocolo fuera acompañada de una rebaja en la oferta de la Presidencia, vio finalmente recogidas sus pretensiones, tanto en cuanto a que la cohesión económica y social quede en el Tratado como un objetivo de la Unión Europea y algo que debe estar presente en las políticas que emprenda la Comunidad, como en lo que se refiere a los gastos y a los ingresos, capítulo este último que era el que presentaba más problemas.

Capítulo de gastos

En el capítulo de gastos, los españoles pedían un Fondo de Convergencia y han conseguido un Fondo que lleva el nombre de cohesión, pero cuyo objetivo es el mismo, y que se aplicará sobre todo a medio ambiente y a las grandes redes del transporte, que son los campos en los que España tendría que hacer un mayor esfuerzo inversor para situarse a la altura que exige la Comunidad.

Además del artículo citado, dentro del tratado, en el Protocolo anexo se dice textualmente: «El Fondo de Cohesión que deberá ser creado antes del 31 de diciembre de 1993 aportará contribuciones financieras comunitarias a proyectos en los ámbitos del medio ambiente y de las redes de infraestructura del transporte en los Estados miembros que tengan un Producto Interior Bruto per cápita inferior al 90 por 100 de la media comunitaria de los que tengan programas de convergencia económica».

Ingresos

La otra demanda española en cuanto a los gastos trataba de aumentar la tasa de cofinanciación comunitaria. En el texto al que todos han dado su visto bueno se establece la disposición del Consejo Europeo a «modular los niveles de participación de la Comunidad en el contexto de programas y proyectos de los Fondos Estructurales, al objeto de prevenir incrementos excesivos en los gastos presupuestarios en los Estados miembros menos prósperos».

Finalmente, en el capítulo de ingresos, el hueso más duro de roer, los Doce «declaran su intención de tener más en cuenta la capacidad contributiva de los distintos Estados miembros en el sistema de recursos propios, así como de estudiar medios con el fin de corregir, para los Estados miembros menos prósperos, elementos regresivos que existen en el sistema actual de recursos propios».

El quinto recurso

Es decir, que se tenga en cuenta el principio de prosperidad relativa con un carácter progresivo para que paguen más los más ricos y no sólo, como sucede ahora, los que más consumen, entre ellos España, al estar el sistema de aportación en función del IVA. España ha ganado la batalla de Maastricht pero la guerra continúa y una nueva contienda se abrirá el próximo año cuando se aborden las perspectivas financieras para el período 1993-97, y se pueda aplicar lo que se ha dado en llamar «el quinto recurso» para aumentar la contribución de los países más prósperos.

Una pica en Mastrique

Maastricht. L. A., e.e.

Felipe González ha tenido que proveerse de sus mejores armas y vestidos de guerra para salir vencedor de este nuevo asalto a Maastricht, como lo hiciera Alejandro Farnesio en nombre de su hermanastro Felipe II.

En vísperas del Consejo Europeo, la contienda no se presentaba nada clara, a pesar de que había conseguido que la Presidencia holandesa comprendiera su obstinación en que el Tratado consagrara la cohesión económica y social. No contaba González con la inestimable ayuda de uno de sus más fieles lugartenientes, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, mordiéndose sin duda las uñas por no poder estar presente en una batalla tan decisiva, a cuya preparación tanto ha contribuido. En su lugar, Carlos Westendorp, el secretario de Estado para las Comunidades Europeas, puso en juego toda su experiencia comunitaria para apoyar las gestiones políticas del presidente del Gobierno ya en la localidad holandesa.

Claves para ese proceso fueron las escaramuzas nocturnas del domingo con Jacques Delors, Ruud Lubbers y Helmut Kohl. Delors, el presidente de la Comisión, aseguraba estar del lado español. El presidente del Consejo, Lubbers, se comprometía a presentar nuevas propuestas para tratar de satisfacer a España. Kohl, por fin, que habrá de rascarse más que nadie el bolsillo a causa de la cohesión, no podía negarle a Felipe González sus peticiones, recordando las veces que contó con las huestes españolas en diferentes campos de batalla.

Cuando se desencadenó la guerra, las incursiones en los pasillos y la guerra psicológica en las mesas de los almuerzos y cenas, permitieron a González ir acabando con las resistencias que aún quedaban en Kohl o, incluso, en Major. Mitterrand no era, al parecer un problema. No hablaba cuando se suscitaba el asunto de la cohesión, lo que González interpretaba como algo positivo, sabedor también de que los franceses no iban a descargar su artillería contra el Ejército español. González sacrificó algunas de sus piezas de ataque, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la petición de unanimidad para decidir cuestiones de medio ambiente y cooperación, y, al final, el estandarte de la cohesión atravesó las murallas de Maastricht.

Será difícil que Jordi Solé Tura o Ludolfo Paramio escriban una comedia como Lope de Vega hizo con el primer asalto de Mastrique, pero, sin duda, González podrá contar entre sus trofeos de guerra este protocolo por el que tanto ha batallado.

ABC, December 11 1991

safeguarded Spain's economic interests, but also because it did so without in any way neglecting the values and ideals of European unity. Spaniards were thus encouraged to feel proud of the way their country's leaders were both protecting national well-being, as well as making important, positive contributions to the project of European integration. The political cartoonist of *ABC* thus portrayed a proud, cigar-smoking González as one of the three 'protagonists' of the Maastricht summit, aside from Major and Kohl, as a result of his *Victoria en la cohesión* (Victory in cohesion).

Similarly, in the discourse of *Diario-16*, the 'birth of a new Europe', as well as the Spanish triumph in the 'battle for cohesion', was also celebrated as a gratifying boost for the collective self-love of the nation [reproduced on the following page]. In its editorial on the day after the summit ended, this newspaper stated that 'the city of Maastricht will be inscribed in history as the passing of the Rubicon of the new Europe'.[44] Even if the new treaty could not exactly be considered 'the dream of the European founding fathers', largely due to 'the intransigence of the British', the common currency projected for 1999 and the European central bank, were 'important steps' on the road to unity, and the agreement reached maintained 'the hope of continuing to fill the gaps of Maastricht' in the future. The denigrating depiction of Britain as a pathetically stubborn, 'bad European' was also evident in a cartoon in which an 'ecu' was tossed in the air by Jacques Delors at the Maastricht summit. While the leaders of the eleven member states that had signed up for the common currency shouted 'Heads!', John Major, all alone in the opt-out corner, passionately shouted 'Tails!' [reproduced on the following page].[45] At the same time, on the emotionally charged issue of cohesion, the editorial discourse of this newspaper suggested that Spaniards 'should congratulate themselves' for the morally worthy inclusion of a legally binding protocol which would ensure 'the solidarity of the richest with the poorest'. The

[44] *Diario-16*, 12 December 1991.
[45] *Diario-16*, 13 December 1991.

Los Protagonistas

Lucha titánica

El primer ministro británico John Major ha mantenido a lo largo de la cumbre una lucha titánica para defender sus posturas «aislacionistas» frente al resto de los países comunitarios. Con la Dama de Hierro y sus partidarios «euroescépticos» velando armas en Gran Bretaña por si fuera necesario salir en defensa de la soberanía nacional, Major acudía a Maastricht con un apoyo muy condicionado dentro de su propio partido y con un margen de maniobra muy estrecho ante posibles concesiones. De ahí que la postura británica haya sido uno de los principales escollos en las negociaciones de los países comunitarios en la ciudad holandesa.

Victoria en la cohesión

El presidente del Gobierno español, Felipe González, obtiene de esta cumbre de Maastricht un triunfo y un resultado satisfactorio, después de un duro forcejeo con sus contendientes comunitarios que incluyó el amago de veto. Una primera aproximación de la Presidencia holandesa para incluir el tema de la cohesión social en una declaración anexa al Tratado, fue rechazado por González. Posteriormente la inclusión en el Tratado de un protocolo, pero vinculante, colmó las aspiraciones españolas. Con ello la cuestión del equilibrio económico en cuanto a contribuciones entre países ricos y pobres obtuvo el pleno consenso comunitario.

El poder en la sombra

El canciller Helmut Kohl ha sido y es el auténtico peso pesado en la sombra de la unión europea. Su potencial económico le da una fuerza que el propio Gobierno de Bonn no quiere ejercer de forma «descarada» ante los temores que suscita el recuerdo de una Gran Alemania. En cualquier caso, su postura ha sido casi determinante para los avances y decisiones salidos de Maastricht. Para el futuro que se abre para Europa, no hay duda de que la locomotora alemana está destinada a desempeñar un papel crucial, a pesar del lastre que en un primer momento está suponiendo la unificación y el hacerse cargo política y económicamente de la antigua RDA.

ABC, December 11 1991

INTERNACIONAL

España consiguió ayer en la «cumbre» de Maastricht que su propuesta de cohesión económica y social, un mecanismo que facilite el equilibrio entre los países más ricos de la CE y los más pobres, figurara en un Protocolo que tiene carácter vinculante. La delegación española manifestó su satisfacción por este logro en una reunión que parecía avanzar lentamente hacia la Unión Europea, pero bajo la estructura de «once países más uno» ante la cantidad de cláusulas de excepción que se estaban introduciendo para conseguir que Gran Bretaña acepte varios puntos.

España gana la batalla de la cohesión

González logra que el equilibrio entre países ricos y pobres figure en un Protocolo vinculante

VIDAL COY
Enviado especial / MAASTRICHT

Los doce países miembros de la Comunidad Europea aceptaron ayer las exigencias españolas de que la cohesión económica y social figure en un Protocolo, que tiene carácter vinculante.

Esta decisión se consideraba en la «cumbre» de la CE un indudable éxito para Felipe González ya que la redistribución de la riqueza en el interior de la Comunidad era una de las principales dificultades que los «doce» tenían que resolver en Maastricht.

La aceptación de que la cohesión económica figurara en un Protocolo vinculante y no en una declaración anexa, como propuso Holanda por la mañana, fue adoptada en la reunión de los primeros ministros con los titulares de Economía y Finanzas.

«España está satisfecha», declaró un exultante Miguel Gil, portavoz oficial de la delegación española en rueda de prensa. No era para menos. Para España, esta decisión era poner la guinda al pastel desde un punto de vista particular: los otros once socios aceptaban en el Protocolo prácticamente todo, o al menos lo más importante, de las proposiciones que Madrid había traído a Maastricht.

El apoyo del canciller alemán, Helmut Kohl, para conseguir ese objetivo ha sido determinante. El portavoz español reconocía, nada más comunicar la conversión de la declaración anexa en Protocolo, que la actitud de Kohl «ha respondido a la que tuvo en la primera entrevista con Felipe González» en Maastricht, el pasado domingo.

Tras esa reunión, la actitud de Kohl fue calificada de «receptiva» e incluso «solidaria». «También hay que decir», añadió el portavoz español por la tarde «que el primer ministro británico ha colaborado» en la consecución de este Protocolo vinculante.

Fue la primera vez, desde que comenzó la «cumbre», que desde la delegación española se mostraba un cierto agradecimiento hacia la británica.

El primer ministro británico, John Major, también dio muestras de un cierto talante negociador al aceptar un «acuerdo político» sobre la unión económica y monetaria (UEM) ya que levantó el último obstáculo al aceptar que Gran Bretaña sea objeto de un régimen de excepción específico.

Carlos Westendorp y Felipe González, fotografiados al inicio de la segunda jornada de la «cumbre» comunitaria en Maastricht.

Gran Bretaña, que es el único país que se opone a la introducción de una moneda única europea como muy tarde en 1999, hubiera deseado que el acuerdo hubiera establecido una cláusula general de excepción, pero al final se ha conformado con ser objeto de un régimen específico de excepción.

Con esta situación, la Comunidad Europea parecía avanzar hacia el objetivo final de la Unión Europea, pero bajo la estructura de once más uno, es decir once países unidos en todos los aspectos y uno, Gran Bretaña, que gozará de numerosas excepciones.

Pero en lo que no se había logrado ningún avance, al menos hasta la hora del cierre de esta edición, era en el tema de la política social comunitaria —condiciones de trabajo, seguridad social etc— donde la postura del Reino Unido era inflexible.

Las discusiones sobre este tema alcanzaron un grado de virulencia que casi hacen aflorar los insultos en las salas donde los portavoces informaban por separado de las negociaciones.

Jean Musitelli, portavoz del presidente francés François Mitterrand, dijo sin tapujos que Lamers estaba bloqueando la negociación sobre la unidad de la política social, a pesar de que el último texto de la presidencia de turno holandesa limitaba esta cohesión social al trabajo manual y poco más, sin referirse en absoluto a los temas conflictivos como el de la financiación y estructuración de la seguridad social.

Musitelli llegó a calificar de «cerrazón» la actitud de Major y amenazó con un veto francés si no cambiaba de opinión. Según la opinión de los franceses, este escollo estaba bloqueando todo el proceso y podía dar al traste con el resultado final.

La presidencia holandesa ofreció otra cláusula de excepción, «opt-out» en la jerga comunitaria, que fue considerada inaceptable por el resto, «porque pone en entredicho todo el proyecto que se está llevando a cabo», señaló el portavoz español. El mismo de que «es mejor un buen acuerdo a once que uno malo a doce», repetido en las última semana, recobró ayer su actualidad.

En busca de la cohesión perdida

España ha conseguido introducir en los acuerdos de Maastricht el «principio» de la cohesión económica y social, con el compromiso añadido de instrumentar «medidas apropiadas» destinadas a favorecerla.

Por cohesión, según la propuesta, cabe interpretar la aplicación de unos mecanismos concretos que faciliten el equilibrio económico y social entre los países más ricos de la CE y los más pobres, de forma que las diferencias entre unos y otros sean cada vez menores.

En el origen de la propuesta puede que se encuentre el convencimiento de que, de mantenerse la actual política de fondos estructurales de la CE (el FEOGA y el FEDER), España podía llegar a una situación de contribuyente neto a la Comunidad; o lo que es lo mismo, que pagaría más de lo que recibe, contribuyendo así teóricamente al desarrollo de países miembros de mayor nivel de renta.

La propuesta española consta de dos puntos básicos. En primer lugar, del lado de los ingresos. Cada país debería aportar en el futuro bajo el principio de la «prosperidad relativa»: a mayor nivel de renta, más aportación según una fórmula progresiva.

En segundo lugar, del lado de los gastos. Se modificaría la estructura de financiación de los fondos estructurales, abandonando el principio del 50%. Además, se crearía un Fondo de Cohesión, destinado a acelerar la convergencia de los datos económicos.

Diario-16, December 11 1991



Diario-16, December 12 1991

Spanish Prime Minister had been rewarded for his 'impassioned Europeanism' by the other member states, and Spain had successfully taken 'a load off its back'.[46]

Nevertheless, in spite of the overwhelming predominance of this discursive triumphalism, some voices attempted to channel national sentiments against Felipe González and his government, by suggesting that the supposed 'victory' in the 'battle of cohesion' was nothing but a blatant piece of false propaganda. For instance, Federico Jiménez Losantos, a conservative columnist of *ABC*, defined the declaration on cohesion as 'words and nothing more than words, without specifying how much and in what way, in other words, everything' and went on to suggest that:

> We are told by the instruments of official intoxication that we are a great political power: Felipe González has supposedly achieved the miraculous feat of making Socialist Spain the great political force of the united Europe, in spite of being economically little, militarily nothing, diplomatically hardly anything, and culturally a folkloric memory. The worst thing is not that they fool us, but that they do it with our own money.[47]

Yet once again, it is important to note that this discursive attack continued to reflect the same recurrent aspiration of recovering prestige and national pride in the European arena. By attempting to pour scorn on the Spanish leader for supposedly keeping Spain at humiliating, shameful levels of economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural 'nothingness', this journalist was suggesting that the widespread desire to reach a respectable European status would never be properly satisfied under the leadership of the Socialists.

In fact, this strategy of discursive hostility was predictably adopted by the conservative Leader of the Opposition, José María Aznar, who was not willing to allow the Socialist leader an easy victory over Maastricht. In a statement published in the press the day after the summit ended, Aznar suggested that in reality, *España sólo ha salvado los muebles* (literally, 'Spain has only saved the furniture'), an expression meaning that the country had just barely managed to

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[46] *Diario-16*, 12 December 1991.
[47] *ABC*, 12 December 1991.

save its bare necessitities, but could hardly consider Maastricht a national victory and hence a source of collective pride.[48] Similarly, during the parliamentary debate that took place to assess the results of Maastricht, the leader of the PP declared that the Prime Minister had not really achieved 'guarantees for the development of policies of solidarity' within the European Community.[49] Furthermore, he mocked González's negotiating position at Maastricht by stating that 'we would prefer not to feel like supplicants', and that 'the real problem of Spain' was that its income per capita remained 25% below the European Community average. Aznar thus suggested that as a result of the Socialist's government's incompetence in financial affairs, Spain had still not liberated itself from the shameful stigma of economic inferiority and backwardness. For this reason, it remained country which had no choice but to place itself in the humiliating role of a beggar, pleading for a few crumbs of charity from the prosperous rich countries of Europe. In this way, the conservative Leader of the Opposition attempted to symbolically associate the policies of the Socialist government with a lingering sense of national inferiority and shame, a feeling that to be a Spaniard was still rather embarrassing in the face of the much more 'prosperous', 'advanced', and 'developed' *Europa de la primera velocidad* ('first-speed Europe').

Indeed, the parliamentary debate that took place in the *Cortes* of Madrid after the Maastricht summit can largely be seen as a symbolico-emotive struggle in which both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition attempted to depict themselves as the men who could best lead the country to a proud and prestigious status in the new European Union, by joining the leading group of countries that would launch the single European currency. Hence, Felipe González proclaimed that 'the construction of Europe' had become 'an irreversible process', and that Spain was contributing to it 'in a constructive and active manner'.[50] The results of the Maastricht summit were 'very satisfactory for Spain', since the new treaty has established 'the instruments

[48] *El País*, 12 December 1991.
[49] *El País*, 18 December 1991.
[50] *El País*, 18 December 1991.

which are necessary for the solidarity of the countries which belong to the European Community'. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that for Spain 'the challenge of the future' would be to reach the convergence requirements which would make it possible to be at the vanguard of the countries which would belong to the future European currency. This was a great aspiration 'not only for the government, but for the whole of Spanish society.' The Leader of the Opposition, however, doubted that Spain would be able to achieve this widely cherished goal, because the government had 'wasted its time since our entry into the EC'. In his view, although the Maastricht Treaty was a satisfactory step forward for the construction of European unity, it was far from clear whether Spain would be able to reach the necessary requirements for the Monetary Union under the 'disgraceful' leadership of the Socialists. This emotionally charged political debate therefore illustrates that there was a fundamental consensus in the Spanish public sphere on the importance of placing Spain in the leading group of countries that would inaugurate the European common currency, instead of 'falling behind' like in the past. For this very reason, the leaders of the country's two main parties clashed over who could best satisfy this desire for 'European' prosperity and prestige.

9.4 Conclusion: Proud to be making 'European history'

In Spain, the dominant discourses which emerged at the time of the Maastricht summit reflected a clear symbolic and emotional continuity with the triumphalism that surrounded the succesful 'entry into Europe' after the country's successful transition to democracy. There was much talk of a 'historic summit' and a 'historic treaty' in which Spain was now a respected, active participant. In other words, 'European history' was being made at Maastricht, but now, fortunately, Spain was contributing to the making of this history. It was no longer 'on the sidelines' or 'in the periphery', but at the center stage of 'Europe'. Spaniards, in short, were no longer humiliated *outsiders*, but proudly *established* members of what promised to become 'the great European superpower' of the future, on a par with the two other economic giants on the

world stage, the United States and Japan. Being a part of this 'Europe', furthermore, signified overcoming the horrific tragedies caused by the kind of xenophobic nationalism of which *el Generalísimo*, along with Hitler and Mussolini, had been a notorious exponent, and therefore contributing to the definitive consolidation of a 'European peace'. As one author has put it, 'the ghost of Franco was finally exorcised at Maastricht and with it, all questions of Spanish moral worth and national expiation' (Arango 1995: 257-8). The concept of a 'modern, democratic, and European Spain', a respected partner in the project of European unification, therefore remained a fundamental, practically uncontested source of national pride in the political, economic, and moral spheres. From this perspective, the national we-feelings of Spaniards were still harmoniously fused with the concept of being 'European'.

Indeed, even the so-called 'battle for cohesion', on which much of the media's attention became focused at the time of the Maastricht summit, was also framed within this symbolico-emotive outlook. In the first place, it was argued that only with the aid of 'cohesion policies' could Spain continue to 'catch up' with the 'more developed Europeans' and aspire to reach the convergence requirements of the future common currency. In other words, only through 'cohesion' could the ideal of 'Europe' as the road to Spanish modernization fully become a reality. Furthermore, although the achievement of 'cohesion' was viewed as a fundamental 'national interest' which had to be defended at all costs, it was simultaneously depicted as a valuable, morally worthy contribution to the harmonious development of the European Union. In the discourse employed both by the country's leading politicians, as well as by much of the press, the idea of Spain as 'leader of the poor South' became a new we-image that was employed to describe the country's special role in the process European integration. The idea was that Spain, as the spokesman of the least prosperous countries in Europe, had to convince the 'bigger' and 'more advanced powers' of the need for solidarity between 'the North' and 'the South'. This was a flattering self-depiction, since the concept of being a 'leader of the South' implied that the country was assuming important responsibilities within the European arena. Even if, in comparison to Germany, France, or Britain, Spain was seen as a relatively powerless member

state, at the very least it could be portrayed as 'leader' of the Portuguese, the Greek, and the Irish (in other words, from this perspective, there were still some 'others' who could be viewed as even weaker and more backwards than 'ourselves'). By vigorously defending 'the welfare of the poor' against 'the egoism of the rich', it was suggested that Spain, represented by its Prime Minister, could show its weight as a country that was prepared to go as far as vetoing the entire Maastricht Treaty in the name of 'European solidarity'. In this way, Spain would further increase its 'European stature and prestige' by standing up for its legitimate national interests, without losing sight of the wider ethical goals of European unity.

Hence, the ultimate results of the Maastricht summit released a new surge of discursive Euro-enthusiasm in the Spanish public sphere, with much talk of a 'future European superpower' that would be a platform for national prosperity and prestige, as well as of a proud Spanish 'victory' in the 'battle for cohesion'. Spain, it was proclaimed, had effectively *imposed* its demands for solidarity on the more prosperous member states, and in this way had shown its weight as an influential player in the European arena. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the target date which was set for the future common currency was symbolically framed as a new 'challenge' that had to be faced by all Spaniards if they wanted to stay on 'the high speed train' of European modernity. The past aspiration to 'enter Europe', in order to overcome the shameful stigma of Francoism, was therefore replaced at this stage by the collective aspiration of maintaining national self-esteem by not 'falling behind' ever again within the new European Union. Hence, the objective of gaining a place amongst the leading countries that would join the common European currency clearly became a crucial issue of national 'status honour' in the discourse of the country's leading politicians. It was a fundamental goal that necessarily had to be reached in order to maintain the country's hard-won 'European prestige', and to avoid the collective shame of becoming humiliated outsiders once again.

IV. Conclusion

"The difficulties in the way of European union will remain inaccessible to analysis, particularly scientific analysis, as long as the we-ideal and the we-identity in individual feeling and behaviour is misunderstood."

Norbert Elias

10. National pride in the emergent European 'patrie'

I began this thesis by citing Ernest Renan's prophetic claims about a future Europe in which nations would ultimately 'come to an end' and be 'replaced' by a 'European confederation'. Fifteen years later, Emile Durkheim similarly observed in a public debate on pacifism and patriotism that 'over and above the *patrie* there is yet another which is in the process of being formed, and which envelops our national *patrie*. This is the European *patrie*' (1973 [1907]: 101). Today, the very existence of the European Union demonstrates that to a considerable extent, a European *patrie* has indeed been born since the days of Renan and Durkheim, even if admittedly it remains a rather immature creature which is still clearly 'in the process of being formed'. The evidence of this thesis, however, demonstrates that the undeniable progress which has been made towards the goal of European unification during the course of the past century has in no way eliminated the ideals and sentiments of nationhood. On the contrary, as the cases of Britain and Spain clearly show, national we-images and we-feelings should rather be seen as the fundamental factors which have conditioned the emergence of different symbolic representations and affective meanings of 'Europe' in the member states of the EU. Indeed, although 'nationalism' and 'Europeanism' are typically seen as rival, conflicting ideologies, what one can actually observe in different countries is a more or less harmonious interplay of national sentiments with the idea of belonging to 'Europe' and contributing to the project of 'European unity'. In this sense, it is evident that the emergence of the European Union has in no way eroded or suppressed the collective emotions of national self-love or 'status honour'. Rather, the concept of becoming 'European' has been portrayed more or less favourably in the public sphere of each member state, depending on its perceived impact on the pride-shame balance of different national communities.

The striking contrast between Britain and Spain makes this particularly clear, because it illustrates how national we-feelings can produce two very different outcomes: a largely lukewarm, reluctant, insecure attitude to 'Europe' in Britain, and a generally enthusiastic, eager,

self-confident 'Europeanism' in the Spanish case. My analysis of these two case-studies suggests that this can be linked to the relative compatibility or incompatibility of 'Europe' with the maintenance of national self-esteem. In the British case, the idea of 'belonging to Europe' has largely clashed with national pride, and therefore a greater emotional resistance has arisen. In the Spanish case, however, the objective of 'becoming European' has strongly appealed to the national 'face', and hence this idea has been embraced with relatively little opposition. One could say that Spain's particular historical trajectory made it possible to frame EC/EU membership within a triumphalist narrative of national progress and self-improvement, while in the British case, a very different background of collective memory made it rather difficult to perceive 'entering Europe' in an emotionally appealing way. In both countries, I have shown how political leaders appealed to national we-feelings in order to build up support for EC/EU membership, but while in Britain this process turned out to be a highly contested, difficult, unresolved struggle which met much resistance, in Spain it was embraced with very little opposition. As I have argued, this can be linked to the fact that while in Britain, the European road became associated with a loss of status-ranking in the world's hierarchic ladder of international prestige, in Spain exactly the opposite was true.

Using Norbert Elias's terms, one could say that Britain's we-image as an established 'world power' made 'going into Europe' seem like a humiliating loss of 'group charisma', while Spain's we-image as a denigrated outsider during the Franco dictatorship made it seem like a gratifying liberation from 'group disgrace'. As I noted in my introductory chapter, Elias pointed out that national pride can become a painful 'sore spot' in people's personality structure, particularly in countries 'which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the pyramid of states' (1996: 17). In fact, he specifically referred to Britain as a vivid empirical illustration of this phenomenon in the latter half of the twentieth century:

> Up till now in the course of human history, it is a proven fact that the members of states and other social units which have lost their claim to a position of highest rank in the elimination struggles of their day often require a long time, even centuries, to come to terms with this changed situation and the consequent lowering of their self-esteem. And

> perhaps they never manage it. Britain in the recent past is a moving example of the difficulties a great power of the first rank has had in adjusting to its sinking to being a second- or third-class power.(1996: 4)

From this perspective, one can understand why in the British context, 'going into Europe' appeared to be a rather meagre subtitute for the 'greatness' of the past – a kind of consolation prize which may have been necessary to maintain as much political and economic strength as possible in a situation of decline, but which in many minds could hardly compare with the glory days of 'Rule Britannia'. It was thus a relatively weak source of national pride, if not a source of national shame. This collective historical experience has been perfectly encapsulated by the British writer Hugo Young:

> For Britain... the entry into Europe was a defeat: a fate she had resisted, a necessity reluctantly accepted, the last resort of a once great power, never for one moment a climactic or triumphant engagement with the construction of Europe. This has been integral to the national psyche, perhaps only half articulated since 1973.(1998: 2-3)

Hence, for over fifty years, as this author puts it, Britain 'struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid' (1998: 1).

In Spain, on the contrary, gaining acceptance into 'Europe' could be widely experienced as a great leap from a lower to a higher position in what Elias called the world's 'pyramid of states' – as the grand victory of 'democracy' over 'authoritarianism', 'modernity' over 'backwardness', and hence of 'Europeanization' over so-called 'Africanism'. It was thus a potent source of national pride, and in no way a source of national shame. Borrowing Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, one could say that for Spaniards, the acquisition of a 'European' status became a self-flattering sign of political, economic, and moral 'distinction' on the world stage, in a way which could hardly have been the case in Britain. This process has been eloquently summarized by the Spanish sociologist Víctor Pérez-Díaz:

> I belong to a generation of Spaniards who first assumed professional and political responsibilities in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in the belief that the institutional framework of Francoism was both inimical to us and an impediment to solving Spain's problems in a spirit of freedom, justice, and creativity. We believed then that, for all its limitations and internal tensions, and with all the reservations that our own youthful

> maximalism advised, western Europe and the western world as a whole provided us with keys to a better understanding of our situation and a better future for our country... Usually, the dreams of one generation are fulfilled only in the lifetime of the next, if at all. Therefore, it has been our great privilege as a generation not only to have harboured visions of change but to have been witnesses to, and protagonists in, the changes we desired, to the extent that institutions which were a fundamental part of European life a few decades ago have come to be an accepted part of Spanish life as well... In fact this European reference, and the construction of a European identity for Spain, has been one of the crucial mechanisms at work throughout the entire process of transition to and consolidation of democracy.(1993:1-2, 5)

In short, echoing Ortega y Gasset, one could say that the 'backward' Spain of Francoism was the problem, and the Europe of 'modernity' and 'democracy' became the solution.

If we apply the title of Alan Milward's famous book *The European Rescue of the Nation-state* to the emotional dimension of nationhood, it could therefore be argued that in the case of Spain, 'Europe' effectively rescued the national pride of Spaniards, by welcoming them into the bosom of the EC after the shameful stigma of Francoism had been thrown off during the quasi-mythical period of *la transición*. In the British case, however, although it is clear that discursive attempts were made by figures such as Macmillan, Wilson, and Heath to portray 'Europe' as a kind of supporting platform which could successfully rescue the national pride of a declining Britain, it seems evident that these symbolic efforts were largely unsuccessful.

In the remainder of this final chapter, I shall firstly review how this historically conditioned, symbolic and emotional contrast between Britain and Spain has been reflected during the three critical time-periods I have analyzed in each of these two case-studies. Secondly, on the basis of these empirical results, I shall outline what I consider to be the main theoretical and methodological implications of my findings, and also offer some suggestions for further research in this field. Finally, I shall end the thesis with some concluding reflections on the future of national we-feelings within the developing European *patrie*.

10.1 'Europe' as a symbol of national decline versus 'Europe' as a symbol of national resurgence: comparing and contrasting the cases of Britain and Spain

In order to make the comparative exposition of Britain and Spain as clear as possible to the reader, I have divided this section into three further sub-sections, each of which presents a summary of the different time-periods that I have analyzed in my two case-studies.

(i) Attempts to 'enter Europe': adapting to the loss of 'world power' versus suffering the exclusion of a 'backwards dictatorship'

In Britain, I have shown how the initial decisions to apply for EEC membership, both under Macmillan in 1961 and under Wilson in 1967, took place in a context of national decline which involved having to recognize a painful reality of diminished status. At the end of the Second World War, the initial dominant stance in Britain towards the project of European integration had been that of a warm but detached supporter. As one of the world's so-called 'Big Three', with a place at the 'Top Table' of international diplomacy, Britain was portrayed as a 'world power' with global aspirations and responsibilities. From this perspective, the idea of constructing a European federation was viewed as something which may have been entirely appropriate for the devastated continental countries, but not for a Britain which could still allow itself much greater aspirations, due to its 'special relationship' with the United States and the leadership of its Empire/Commonwealth. However, over the course of time it became clear that Britain could no longer be considered a significant player in the 'world power' league, which became a prestigious privilege reserved exclusively to the two undisputed global giants, the USA and the USSR, and hence the dominant national we-image of British global preeminence increasingly began to lose its plausibility.

From the British perspective, the turn towards 'Europe' was therefore symbolically linked with a weakening of national power and status. When other, more prestigious alternatives had

failed, British leaders turned to the EEC as the only conceivable option which remained in order to avoid the possibility of further political and economic decline. In this sense, the decision to apply for EEC membership inevitably seemed to imply a loss of 'face' or 'group charisma', since it signified the definitive collapse of Britain's initially greater ambitions on the world stage. Of course, in their discursive efforts to legitimate the EEC application, and to build up popular support for this decision, I have shown how both Macmillan and Wilson did their utmost to depict this decision as an emotionally appealing option for the national pride-shame balance, by invoking visions of a new 'greatness' for Britain which would supposedly be achieved through its participation in the project of European integration. However, the impassioned discursive controversies which surrounded the EEC applications in the British public sphere demonstrate that the need to 'go into Europe' inevitably provoked a sense of national failure and defeatism in many minds. This was undoubtedly best illustrated by the cries of 'Shame!' which were yelled in the House of Commons when Macmillan first announced the decision to apply for EEC membership, as well as by Hugh Gaitskell's ominous warning that entering the Common Market would imply 'the end of one thousand years of history' and the reduction of Britain's status to 'a Texas or a California in the United States of Europe'. Given Britain's particular historical trajectory of recent 'Great Power' status, applying for the EEC was inevitably perceived more as a pragmatic necessity provoked by adverse circumstances, rather than as cherished aspiration.

In Spain, by contrast, a very different set of historical circumstances ultimately tranformed the goal of 'entering Europe' into a widespread hope for national resurgence and improvement, after centuries of decadence and internal strife. As I have shown, the ideal of 'European modernization' was one which Spanish intellectuals such as Joaquín Costa and José Ortega y Gasset had already put forward in the aftermath of the humiliating 1898 'disaster', when Spain definitively lost the last remnants of its *Imperio*. However, the authoritarian forces of General Franco which ultimately emerged victorious in the Spanish Civil War rejected the outlook of all such modernizing 'Europeanizers', and put forward the alternative vision of a 'Christian Europe'

that had to be defended by a resurrected *España nacional-Católica* against the grave dangers of liberalism and communism.

The initial Spanish application for EEC membership took place in the context of the Franco regime's desperate attempts to improve its international image and strengthen its legitimacy by portraying Spain as a respected member of the 'Western family of nations'. After the unexpected Allied victory in the Second World War, Franco's collaboration with the defeated totalitarian powers initially led to a harsh period of international ostracism and economic penury. Spain was excluded from the United Nations, as well as from the Marshall plan for post-war recovery. Nevertheless, after this difficult period, Franco ultimately found a renewed source of wealth, prestige, and legitimacy through its Cold War Alliance with the United States in 1953. The regime's official discourse now constructed a we-image of Spain as 'the sentinel of Occident', an honourable partner in the Western world's struggle against Soviet Communism. Within this symbolic framework, the Francoist state applied for membership of the EEC in 1962, proclaiming Spain's 'European vocation' and its aspiration to take part in the great collective project of the Common Market. However, the authoritarian nature of the regime made this a futile pretension, and Spain's accession into the EEC was therefore never allowed as long as *el Generalísimo* held the reins of power.

Hence, although the regime's own propaganda had depicted the idea of 'entering Europe' as an important collective aspiration, the most it ever accomplished was a commercial trade agreement with the EEC in 1970. Full membership, however, always remained out of the question, and Spain therefore remained a denigrated outsider in this sphere of the international stage throughout Franco's lifelong rule. For this very reason, however, as the legitimacy of the dictatorship eroded over the years, 'Europeanization' gradually became a fundamental component of the national project defended and promoted by Spaniards who opposed the regime and demanded political change. From their perspective, Spain desperately needed to overcome its humiliating *atraso*, or backwardness, and to recover respectability in the world through a

process of modernisation and democratisation. As I have shown, the Francoist press branded these rebels as 'filthy conspirators' who wanted to stab *la patria* in the back, and made it extremely difficult to make their voices heard. However, over the course of time, Spain's exclusion from the EEC became an emotionally charged symbol of the country's pariah status on the international stage, and the idea of 'going into Europe' increasingly became identified with the objective of recovering national self-respect by overcoming the shameful stigma of Francoism. Hence, unlike in the British context, the particular historical trajectory of Spaniards eventually transformed the goal of entering the EEC into a widely shared hope for status-promotion.

(ii) 'Going into Europe': reluctantly accepting a diminished national status versus triumphantly celebrating the nation's passage to 'modernity' and 'democracy'

At the time of the UK's successful 'entry into Europe' in 1973, I have shown how Edward Heath's Conservative government launched a massive discursive campaign to link the goal of 'going into Europe' with a revival of national pride in a post-imperial Britain. The Prime Minister repeatedly attempted to depict the prospect of EEC membership as a new source of potential British 'greatness', by proclaiming that it would contribute in a fundamental way to a resurgence of the country's economic prosperity, political influence, and moral prestige at this difficult juncture of the country's history. It is clear, however, that in the particular British context of national we-images and we-feelings, the necessity of 'going into Europe' inevitably continued to involve a painful recognition of reduced power and status. As Heath himself put it in his ritualized media performance to the nation, when he attempted to legitimate his government's reasons for taking the country into the EEC by offering 'premiums of national vanity' to his audience, the British people had to 'look at the facts' and realize that 'today we don't occupy the place in the world we once did'. 'Europe' was thus portrayed in Heath's patriotic discourse as the best, most realistic hope for a *diminished* Britain, and in this sense it

necessarily involved having to give up the older national we-image of global grandeur. Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister's discursive attempts to transform 'Europe' into a new source of national pride were rather unsuccessful.

In the first place, as I have shown, Heath was challenged by the Labour leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson, who accused the British leader of failing to protect the 'national interest' in the negotiations with the EEC, and of displaying a shameful, defeatist attitude by suggesting that Britain had 'no future' outside the Common Market. At the same time, the Prime Minister's attempts to depict 'Europe' as a new source of national pride were challenged within his own party by Enoch Powell and his supporters, who depicted the entry into the EEC as a humiliating surrender of Britain's historic status and its sovereignty. Within this atmosphere of passionate contestation, opinion polls suggested that the British public remained largely unenthusiastic about 'going into Europe' when membership became official. As the front-page headline of *The Guardian* put it, 'WE'RE IN – BUT WITHOUT THE FIREWORKS!'

Nevertheless, when the British people were granted the opportunity to vote on the issue of EEC membership in 1975, they supported a 'Yes to Europe' by a ratio of two to one. This demonstrates that to a considerable extent, the British population now accepted that the EEC represented the best conceivable future for 'the nation'. Indeed, as I have shown, the referendum was preceded by a massive propaganda campaign which depicted EEC membership as the most sensible and effective strategy for maintaining as much British prosperity and prestige as possible in a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, given the particular historical background of British 'greatness', it seems evident that for the most part, the 'Yes to Europe' was primarily motivated not so much by a passionate enthusiasm for EEC membership, but rather by a resigned acceptance that, as the 'pro-marketeers' frequently proclaimed in their legitimating discourse, there was now 'no alternative' for a weakened, diminished Britain.

In Spain, on the contrary, the ultimate 'entry into Europe' in 1986 could be triumphantly celebrated as the historic culmination of the country's successful passage to 'modernity' and 'democracy'. As I have shown, throughout the delicate period of the transition, the objective of getting accepted into the EEC was directly linked in the dominant political and media discourses to the success of the democratization process which was launched in the aftermath of General Franco's death. King Juan Carlos I, who had been initially stigmatized amongst the circles of the anti-Francoist opposition because he was the dictator's appointed successor, soon demonstrated his commitment to Spain's democratization, and invoked 'Europe' as the objective which he wished his country to reach. It was in this way that the new monarch managed to find widespread legitimacy amongst a population that was now overwhelmingly demanding political change. Similarly, in the discourse of the first democratically elected government, led by UCD's Adolfo Suárez, the objective of entering the European Community was portrayed not only as a way of improving Spain's prosperity and strengthening its political influence in the world, but also as a way of demonstrating the country's commitment to the values of democratic pluralism and the defense of human rights. In this way, 'Europe' was depicted as a fundamental source of national pride in the economic, political, and moral spheres of global status-ranking. Furthermore, the military *coup d'etat* which took place in 1981 dramatically revealed the continuing fragility of the new democratic structures, and further strengthened the belief in Spain's need to secure its political freedoms through membership of the EEC.

After the defeat of the UCD in the general elections of 1982, the victorious socialists of Felipe González continued to maintain the symbolic identification of 'Europeanization' with 'modernization' and 'democratization'. Entering the EEC still remained the great unfulfilled aspiration of the young Spanish democracy, and the ideal of 'catching up with Europe' was frequently invoked in the dominant discourses of the Spanish public sphere. Hence, in 1985, the accession of Spain into the EEC was depicted as the successful culmination of *la transición*, as the definitive *rite de passage* in which 'the nation' acquired a 'modern' and 'democratic' status.

This event, therefore, was celebrated with a spectacular signature ceremony in which *el pueblo español* was venerated for its achievement of all the great aspirations which had been symbolically constructed by a new elite of political leaders after Franco's death. As the front-page headline of *Diario-16* proclaimed, 'DEMOCRACY INTEGRATED SPAIN IN EUROPE'. Hence, in contrast to Britain, entering the EEC could be perceived as a major promotion of Spain's status in the global hierarchy of international prestige, and therefore as a greast boost of national self-esteem.

(iii) The Maastricht summit: Avoiding 'the conveyor belt to federalism' versus contributing to the unity of Europe 'with dignity and prestige'

At the time of the Maastricht summit, I have shown how in Britain, 'Europe' continued to be a source of passionate discursive conflicts between those who viewed the country's full participation in the process of European integration as the best possible strategy to maintain national prosperity and influence, and those who viewed this prospect as a humiliating, defeatist surrender of national sovereignty and status. If in the 1960's and 1970's, the debate had been about whether or not Britain should 'go into Europe', in the late 1980's and 1990's it became a discursive struggle over how the nation should deal with the growing tide of supranationalism in the European Community. At the end of the treaty negotiations, Prime Minister John Major and his supporters in the media utilized a discourse of victory and national pride to celebrate the fact that the word 'federal' had been eliminated from the treaty, and that Britain had successfully acquired the right to opt out of the single currency and the social chapter. In this way, it was proclaimed that the British leader had protected 'the nation' from the shameful reduction of self-governing powers which would be implied by what Margaret Thatcher ominously called 'the conveyor belt to federalism'. This was presented as a way of remaining 'in Europe' in order to maintain a respectable level of prosperity and influence in the world, without accepting the humiliating reduction of 'the nation' to the status of a 'region' in a future European superstate.

From the perspective of Thatcher and her supporters, accepting the disappearance of the pound would be to completely lose faith in the capacity of 'the British lion' to maintain its strength in the world on its own.

In contrast to this, however, the Labour opposition and its supporters in the press employed a language of defeat and national shame in their portrayal of the Maastricht summit, by proclaiming that the opt-outs achieved by Major from the single currency and the social chapter would leave Britain isolated in 'the second division of Europe'. As a result of this, according to Labour's discourse, the nation's future economic prosperity was gravely endangered, and the fundamental rights of workers would fail to be respected, placing Britain in the humiliating position of Europe's 'sweat shop' for American and Japanese companies.

This discursive battle shows that in the British context, 'Europe' remained a highly polemic issue characterized by emotional ambivalence and contestation. The very fact that the rejection of the 'f-word' and the opts-outs from the Maastricht treaty could be presented as a great 'victory' in the British public sphere clearly reflected a continuing strong clash between national we-feelings and the process of European integration. Even if there was a strong consensus on the necessity of remaining a part of the EU, as epitomised by Major's widely applauded pledge to place Britain 'at the heart of Europe', there was also a strong emotional resistance to what was viewed as an unacceptable reduction of the nation's independent status on the world stage, through the replacement of the pound by a single European currency and the further 'surrender' of parliamentary powers to 'foreign' European authorities.

In Spain, by contrast, the dominant discourses which emerged at the time of the Maastricht Treaty continued to reflect a largely triumphalistic attitude towards the country's participation in the project of European integration. The fact that Spain was no longer a 'backwards', humiliated outsider, but rather a respected, active member of the newly baptised 'European Union' was presented as a crucial factor for the maintenance of the nation's prosperity and influence in the international arena, and hence as a fundamental source of national pride. The signing of the

Maastricht Treaty was viewed as a great step forward on the road towards the unification of Europe, and it was proclaimed that fortunately, Spain was no longer excluded from this 'historic', ethically prestigious process. Rather, as the emotionally charged discourse of King Juan Carlos I put it, the country could celebrate the fact that it was now contributing to the cherished objective of European integration 'with dignity and prestige'. In contrast to the decades of international opprobrium that had been suffered under Franco, Spain could now look forward to becoming a member of what was defined as a future 'European superpower'.

Unlike in Britain, the importance of participating in the future common currency was in no way a controversial issue in the Spanish public sphere. On the contrary, this objective was depicted as a fundamental 'challenge' that had to be faced by the whole nation in order to remain in the center the 'European galaxy', and to avoid the shameful isolation of the past. It was within this symbolico-emotive outlook that the Spanish demands in the so-called 'battle for cohesion' were framed: only if the 'rich Northerners' committed themselves to policies of solidarity with the 'poor South' would Spain be able to catch up with the 'more developed Europeans' and to reach the convergence requirements of the single currency. In other words, it was only by achieving the demands for 'cohesion' that the ideal of Spain's 'European modernization' could fully become a reality. This was therefore portrayed as a fundamental 'national interest' that had to be defended at all costs, including, if necessary, the threat of vetoing the entire Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, however, it was stressed that by standing up for 'cohesion' and avoiding the creation of wide gaps between the more and less prosperous member states, Spain was doing a great service to the harmonious unification of Europe. In this way, when the final agreement was reached, the dominant political and media discourses constructed a self-flattering we-image of Spain as a respected, tough player in the European arena that could stand up for its legitimate 'national interests', while fully respecting the morally worthy goals of European unity. Furthermore, given that the need to reach the requirements of the common currency was widely viewed as a fundamental national aspiration, the leaders of two leading parties portrayed

themselves as the men who could best lead the nation to this cherished goal, in order to avoid the possibility of 'falling behind' in Europe and returning to the shameful days of Spanish 'backwardness'.

The same symbolic and emotional contrast with the UK was thus reflected once again at the time of Maastricht: while in Britain the debate was characterised by passionate warnings, fears and tensions concerning the potential threats arising from 'Europe' to the maintenance of the nation's independent status and self-respect in the world, in Spain it continued to illustrate a general enthusiasm for the country's participation in the European project, and an ongoing aspiration to continue building up national prosperity and prestige through the platform provided by EU membership, for the benefit of the collective pride-shame balance.[1]

10.2 Final summary of empirical findings, theoretical and methodological implications of these results, and suggestions for further research

This thesis, therefore, has shown how the particular historical trajectories, and hence the collective emotional experiences, of the two countries I have studied allowed a relatively harmonious fusion of national pride with the notion of belonging to 'Europe' in the Spanish case, and an uneasy, ambivalent, contested relation between national self-love and the European Union in the British case. In fact, as I shall now briefly illustrate, these same tendencies can still be observed today, within the public spheres of these two member states of the EU.

It is unoubtedly noteworthy, for instance, that the British have voluntarily kept themselves out of the euro currency union, and that the whole 'Europe question' remains a highly controversial

[1] According to a Eurobarometer survey which was carried out amongst 1.000 individuals over the age of 18 in each member state of the European Union at the time of the Maastricht summit, in Britain 57% of those polled thought that their country's membership of the EU was 'a good thing', while 15% thought it was 'bad', while in Spain 73% were in favour of their country's EU membership, while 7% were against it. Figures cited in *Diario-16*, 18 December 1991.

issue of debate in this country's political arena.[2] On the one hand, the current Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has clearly been attempting to channel national we-feelings in favour of 'Europe', by defending what he calls an 'enlightened form of patriotism' – a project through which the British people will derive prosperity, prestige, and collective pride from their country's full-hearted commitment to the ideals of European integration.[3] For instance, at a widely publicised speech on EU enlargement, which he delivered in Warsaw on 6 October 2000, Blair declared that 'for Britain, being at the centre of Europe is an indispensable part of its influence, strength, and power in the world.'[4] Similarly, on 13 November 2000, at his annual foreign policy speech in the City of London, the Labour leader stated that:

> If we want to stand up for Britain then we have to be in Europe, active, constructive, involved all the time... It is patriotism, it is national self-interest, to argue for Britain's full engagement as a leading partner in Europe. It is a betrayal of our nation and of our future constantly to obstruct every fresh opportunity for cooperation in Europe.[5]

At the same time, however, the leading figures of the Conservative Party have continuously been challenging Blair's symbolic identification of 'Europe' with the maintenance of British national pride, by adopting an increasingly hostile attitude to what they view as the dangerously supranational character of the European project, and the growing threat it represents for one of the most emotionally charged symbols of Britain's distinctive, historic 'greatness': the pound.

Following in the footsteps of the 'Iron Lady', the current Tory leader, William Hague, has therefore seized every possible opportunity to portray the Labour government's position on Europe as a defeatist, unpalatable, humiliating source of national shame, by accusing Blair and

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[2] According to a report in *The Guardian* which was published on 25 July 2000, public support for the EU has plunged to its lowest level in 20 years, with just a quarter of the British population convinced that it is 'a good thing'. This poll showed that Britain is currently the most Eurosceptic country in the whole of the EU. According to another survey published in the same newspaper on 8 November 2000, as many as 71% of Britons would vote No in a referendum on whether or not Britain should joing the euro currency.

[3] *The Guardian*, 14 October 2000.

[4] *The Guardian*, 7 October 2000.

[5] *The Guardian*, 14 November 2000.

his collaborators of 'using every trick in the spin doctor's book to try and pretend that they are not willing participants in the creation of a European superstate'.[6] In fact, during the Conservative Party Conference of 1999, Hague even went as far as comparing the current British Prime Minister to Napoleon Bonaparte, because of his purported attempt 'to submerge Britain in a single European superstate', and due to the fact that he 'obviously wants to abolish the pound'. Furthermore, at the end of this impassioned address, the Conservative leader tried to ignite the national sentiments of his audience against the Labour government's humiliating 'sell-out to Europe' with the following words: 'If you believe that our country is unique in the world but is in danger of losing its identity... if you believe in an independent Britain. Then come with me, and I will give you back your country.'[7]

One week later, however, Prime Minister Blair reiterated his 'patriotic cause' in favour of 'Europe', when he officially inaugurated the cross-party 'Britain in Europe' campaign which has been created to defend the UK's future entry into the euro currency in an upcoming referendum on this highly controversial issue:

> Once in each generation, the case for Britain in Europe needs to be remade, from first principles. The time for this generation is now... And we make this case, not because we are pro-Europe – though I believe in the ideal of European partnership. We make it because *we are pro-Britain.* To be part of Europe is *in the British national interest.* So far from submerging our identity as a nation in some Eurosceptic parody of a Federal super-state, we believe that by being part of Europe, *we advance our own self-interest as the British nation.* This is *a patriotic cause...* The Britain of the 21st Century should surely be the Britain I grew up in: not narrow-minded, chauvinistic or isolationist; but a country open in its attitudes, engaged in the outside world, adventurous in taking on the future's challenges, and having the confidence to know that working with others is a sign of strength, not weakness... *The real denial of our history* would be to retreat into isolation from the continent of Europe of which we are part and whose history we have so intimately shaped.[8]

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[6] *The Guardian*, 14 November 2000.
[7] *The Guardian*, 8 October 1999.
[8] *The Guardian*, 15 October 1999.

Only few hours later, the Conservative leader immediately responded to Blair, by launching a discursive counter-attack against the supposedly 'patriotic' European project defended by the Prime Minister and his fellow 'Britain in Europe' campaigners, by promising that he would lead a 'full-blooded battle of the pound' amongst the towns and villages of Britain. In his view, this was an absolutely crucial, historic fight which would decide 'what kind of land we give our children' and 'the fate our nation and of its soul'.[9]

The fact that Tony Blair has recently won the last general elections in June 2001 by a very wide margin suggests that his pro-European brand of 'enlightened patriotism' has appealed to the British people more than the staunch defense of 'British independence' offered by his Conservative rival in order to 'save the pound'. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen whether Blair will ultimately be able to capitalize on this electoral victory by persuading the majority of the British people about the virtues of joining the euro currency, when he decides to hold the promised referendum on this highly contested, emotionally charged issue.

In Spain, by contrast, the country's successful entry into the euro currency in May 1998 has been completely unquestioned in the public sphere, and the idea that 'Europe' is something 'good for the nation' remains a rather obvious, taken-for-granted aspect of national life. Hence, as one would expect, this accomplishment has been enthusiastically celebrated in political and media discourses as a demonstration of the fact that the country has definitively achieved *niveles altos de bienestar* ('high levels of well-being'), by entering *la primera velocidad de la Unión Europea* ('the first speed of the European Union') and catching *el tren de la historia* ('the train of history').[10] As José María Aznar, the current conservative Prime Minister, wrote in an article

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[9] *The Guardian*, 15 October 1999, my italics. The fact that Tony Blair has won the last general elections by a wide margin suggests that his brand of pro-European 'enlightened patriotism' is more appealing to the British people more than the staunch defense of 'British independence' offered by his Conservative rival. However, it remains to be seen whether Blair will be able to capitalize on his victory, by persuading the British people to join the Euro currency, when he decides to hold the referendum on the single currency which he has promised.

[10] These were the words employed by the Spanish leader José María Aznar at the end of the European Council meeting in which Spain's entry into the euro was officially announced in May 1998. It is also noteworthy that in the

entitled *La Hora de Europa, La Hora de España* ('The Hour of Europe, the Hour of Spain'), which was published just one month before he won the last general elections by an overwhelming absolute majority:

> Only three years ago, there were many in our country who were resigned to finding themselves permanently in the second division, and who did not believe that Spain would be able to make the effort of incorporating herself to the rest of the great European nations. I never listened to those voices: I always believed in the capacity of democratic Spain to rise up by its own merits to the position to which her history entitles her. Today the euro has become a reality. And Spain has regained its place, its weight, and if I may be allowed a term with an Orteguian eco, its level within this great European project.[11]

Even more significantly, on 20 November 2000, the 25th anniversary of Franco's death, an editorial in the national newspaper *El Mundo*, which has become the country's second leading daily, proclaimed that:

> A quarter of a century later, there are reasons to feel proud... The bloody conflict of 1936 is today a page of history, the constitutional monarchy has obtained the consensus of the immense majority of Spaniards, Spain has found its identity in Europe, the economy has modernized, and most importantly, the mentality its citizens has changed profoundly. The Pyrenées have ceased to be a spiritual and topographical barrier.[12]

Finally, it is also worth mentioning a speech recently delivered by the celebrated Spanish writer, Francisco Umbral, when he received the *Premio Cervantes* (Cervantes Prize), the most prestigious literary award in Spain, in an emotive ceremony presided by King Juan Carlos I. After proclaiming that the figure of Don Quixote 'is a metaphor of Spain', Umbral declared:

> Spain invents passions to survive itself.... The passion of America, the passion of Empire, *the passion of Europe*, the passion of the world move Spain and place us at the head of the century of centuries.[13]

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preceding months, between April and May 1998, 72% of Spaniards were in favour of their country's acceptance into 'Euroland' (Barbé 1999: 169-70).

[11] *El Mundo*, 5 February 2000.

[12] *El Mundo*, 20 November 2000.

[13] *El País*, 24 April 2001.

To a great extent, therefore, the historically conditioned relationship between British and Spanish we-feelings of collective pride, and the affective meanings of 'Europe' which have emerged in each of these two countries, can still clearly be perceived in the present day.

During the course of the past few years, this symbolico-emotive contrast has also been vividly reflected in the diverse collective representations of the European flag which have emerged in Britain and Spain. In the latter case, this totemic European icon has remained a prestige-symbol which is frequently seen waving from official buildings, and is even employed as an advertising hook by leading companies. In the British case, however, this seems rather inconceivable, since 'Europe' hardly has the same widespread emotional appeal amongst the general public, and hence cannot possibly be considered an effective symbolic tactic for the purposes of commercial marketing. This was made patently clear, for instance, on May 9 1996 (otherwise known as 'Europe Day'), when the British *Daily Express* tabloid published an 'alternative flag' which it asked its readers to paste on the windows of their homes, as a sign of 'patriotic protest against Euro-rot' [reproduced on the following page]. This image depicted Saint George, one of the classic symbolic representations of British nationhood, tearing down the twelve-starred European flag with his mighty sword, in order to uncover a shiny Union Jack which lay in the background.[14] By contrast, only a few months later, in December of the same year, Spain's *El Mundo* published a massive two-page advertisement in which Caja de Madrid, one of the most important banks in this country, utilised the European flag to promote the fact that it was supposedly more 'modern' and 'advanced' than any of its competitors [reproduced on the following page]. 'The common project of Europe,' its advertising rhetoric proclaimed,

[14] This British hostility to European symbols was also illustrated in a series of recent reports on the web page of the BBC, which showed how leading members of the Conservative Party have mounted a campaign to promote the use of national symbols on passports, driving licenses, and car number plates, in opposition to what they see as the Labour government's attempt to 'erase all traces of Britishness' and 'force us into a Europe or regions by stealth' (See 'MPs demonstrate passport patriotism' [July 7 1988] and 'Tories flag up national identity' [22 April 2001], http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk_politics/).

DAILY EXPRESS

FRIDAY MAY 3, 1996 WEATHER: SHOWERS 35p ★



THE FLAG TO FLY ON EUROPE DAY

Your chance to make a patriotic protest against Euro-Rot on May 9 See Page 60

CUT OUT YOUR EURO-ROT FLAG

The European Commission wants us to fly the 12-star EU flag to mark Europe Day next Thursday. The Daily Express suggests the flag we print below is more appropriate. Cut it out and paste it in your window.



Daily Express, May 9 1996



El Mundo, December 26 1996

'compels us to work harder. To win, day by day, the trust of our customers.' Hence, such diametrically opposed depictions of the European flag encapsulate the diverse affective meanings of 'Europe' which have emerged over the course of time in the British and Spanish contexts of collective memory and sentiment.

These empirical findings, however, are not the only contribution which I wish to make with this thesis. As I stated in my introductory chapter, on a more general level, I also hope to have illustrated the fruitfulness of the innovative theoretical approach to the study of national identities which was pioneered by Norbert Elias, and has more recently been developed in the 'sociology of emotions' proposed by Thomas Scheff. Such an approach, which I have proposed to call Elias's *sociohistorical psychology of national pride*, focuses on the we-images of relative superiority or inferiority, as well as on the we-feelings of 'group charisma' and 'group disgrace', or collective pride and shame, which are experienced by individuals as members of rival national communities, embroiled in ongoing competitive struggles for power and status. As I argued in the introduction, this is *partly a distinctively modern phenomenon*, which has developed during the course of a long-term sociohistorical process of state-formation and nation-building. As networks of human contact and interdependence have expanded, people's emotional identification with each other has spread throughout increasingly wider territorial spaces, with societies growing in scale from small-scale tribes to industrialized nation-states, and today, as well, to the globally interconnected, planetary community of humankind as a whole. However, national we-images and we-feelings should also be seen as *contemporary variations of a universal anthropological theme*: the general tendency of human 'survival units' to bond together symbolically and emotionally through collective ideals and sentiments about themselves, which are always formed in contrast and opposition to other human communities on the same level of integration (cities vis-à-vis other cities, regions vis-à-vis other regions, nations vis-à-vis other nations, and so on). Furthermore, following the leading exponents of the multidisciplinary research programme I have referred to as 'political symbolism and ritual', these

collective self-concepts and self-feelings must necessarily be studied as *conflicting paradigms of national greatness*. In other words, from this perspective, national ideals and sentiments can be seen the key symbolic weapons that are employed in the ongoing discursive duels of the rival political groups which struggle for power and authority in the public spheres of contemporary nation-state societies.

At the same time, the crucial methodological point which I hope this thesis has managed to convey is that the collective emotions of nationhood *have a history*, and hence that in order to study them effectively, the sociologist must necessarily delve into a country's past and analyze its vicissitudes on the world stage – in other words, the triumphs and defeats which have been collectively experienced *over the course of time* in the various 'games of international honour' which nations constantly play with each other, such as those of political power, economic prosperity, moral respectability, cultural prestige, and so on. In this way, as Elias proposed in his illuminating study of German nationhood, one must firstly carry out a kind of sociohistorical psycho-analysis of a national community's developed (and developing) 'pride-shame balance' of collective self-esteem. Only within such a historically informed frame of reference can one carry out a properly sociological 'discourse analysis' of the symbolic forms which predominate in any given national context. Therefore, another essential lesson which I hope my thesis has successfully communicated is that the diverse 'symbolic universes' (Cassirer 1944) in which human beings live, and hence the 'contexts of controversy' (Billig 1991) in which their rival ideological paradigms clash, evidently never emerge in a sociocultural vaccuum. Rather, they are always fundamentally conditioned and constrained by the particular historical trajectories (and therefore the collective memories) of the particular society in question.

From this theoretical and methodological perspective, my comparative-historical research on Britain and Spain has shown that the development of the European Union has hardly eliminated the we-images and we-feelings of people's collective, national 'face'. On the contrary, the very notion of 'being European' has itself become a kind of ranking-measure in the symbolic status-

evaluations which are continuously made in the political and media discourses of each member state of the EU. Indeed, the evidence of this thesis suggests that the fundamental issue in the discursive battles which have taken place within the context of the nationally bounded, media-transmitted political arena of each member state of the EU has always been: What does 'Europe' mean for 'us' (the national 'we')? What does 'becoming European' respresent for 'our' interests, 'our' reputation, 'our' honour, 'our self-respect'? Following the largely forgotten insights which Max Weber bequeathed to us in *Politics as a Vocation*, one could say that since the end of the Second World War, 'Europe' has actually become one of the key symbolic weapons which national politicians currently employ in the member states of the EU to 'canvass votes' and 'win over potential followers', by offering them 'premiums of (national) vanity' through the prospect of 'European prosperity and prestige' (or, on the contrary, to attack one's political opponents by identifying membership in the future 'Europe superstate' with national shame, disgrace, and dishonour).

In an essay written in 1987, Elias suggested that a clash was gradually beginning to emerge in the European context between national we-feelings and the project of constructing a supranational political union. He argued that the old nation-states of Europe could no longer fulfil their classic security functions separately, given the competitive pressure toward the creation of increasingly larger survival units, such as the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the goal of creating a European federation was restrained by what he called a 'drag effect', an emotional resistance which blocked the shift of people's affective loyalties towards a higher level of social integration. Elias stressed that this phenomenon could only be understood by taking into account the deeply ingrained, collective we-feelings of national habitus:

> If resistance to integration at a higher level is presented as primarily a problem of thought. an intellectual problem, it can never be properly understood... It would make rational sense, and possibly bring benefits if the European nation-states combined into the United States of Europe, but in most cases the difficulty lies in the fact that the intellectual awareness of the logic of integration meets the resistance of *emotive ideas* which give the integration the character of ruin... The integration unit on the continental level may be understood to be a practical necessity, but *unlike the older national units it is not associated with strong we-feelings*.(1991a: 225-6, my italics)

Today, in the 'brave new Europe' of the euro currency, people's sentimental affections for their old nation-states may seem completely 'absurd', 'archaic', and even 'immoral' from an 'enlightened', 'Europeanist', or 'cosmopolitan' perspective. Nevertheless, Elias emphasised that the predominant tendencies of national habitus cannot simply be changed overnight by a 'rational' act of will, since 'these things cannot simply be changed like clothes' (1991a: 224-5). For this reason, he strongly emphasised that 'the difficulties in the way of European Union will remain inaccessible to analysis, particularly scientific analysis, as long as... the we-ideal and we-identity in individual feeling and behaviour is misunderstood' (Elias 1991a: 221).

To a great extent, Elias's sociological diagnosis was undoubtedly accurate, and can still be applied to the Europe of the early twenty-first century. As I noted in my introductory chapter, the collective passions ignited by international sporting contests repeatedly demonstrate that the affections people display towards their nation-states are much stronger in comparison to their feelings towards the relatively boring, mundane, 'Eurocratic' world of Brussels.[15] One could therefore say, echoing Durkheim, that 'the nation' is still a *sacred* object of collective emotional devotion, while the European Union largely remains bogged down in the *profane* world of economic statistics, manufacturing regulations, and agricultural quotas. Furthermore, in all the member states of the EU, the affective dispositions of people's national habitus can still make it extremely difficult for them to accept the political authority of 'European' power-holders and decision-makers whom they find it very difficult to trust, given that they are not 'one of us' (the national 'we'). For this reason, in spite of the 'Euro-enthusiasm' which has generally

[15] At a conference which took place at the University of Metz in September 2000, on 'Norbert Elias and Social Anthropology', Eric Dunning pointed out to me that there is actually one exception to this point with which I was not myself acquainted: the Ryder's Cup golf tournament, in which 'America' is pitted against 'Europe' every two years, and the fans of each respective team enthusiastically wave either the stars-and-stripes flags of the USA, or the twelve-starred blue and gold flag of the EU. However, golf is largely an elite, minority sport which evidently cannot compete with the much greater bursts of mass national sentiment which explode every four years with the World Cup of football or the Olympic Games.

characterized Spain, it is nevertheless rather difficult to imagine that most contemporary Spaniards would accept the authority of a Briton or a Frenchman as a fully empowered 'President of Europe'. At the same time, judging from the 'Europhobia' which continues to characterize the British tabloid press, it seems even less likely that the majority of Britons would accept the authority of a Spaniard or a German at the head of a 'European government'.

As Weber pointed out when he famously outlined what he called the 'ideal types of authority', in the messy reality of the modern social world, the legitimacy of political institutions is never exclusively based on a 'legal-rational' type of order, but also on some degree of custom and tradition:

> In the case of 'legal authority', it is never purely legal. The belief in legality comes to be established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional. Violation of the tradition may be fatal to it. (1978 [1918-20])

Today, following this Weberian insight, one could therefore say that the European Union largely lacks the crucial dimension of *traditional* authority with which the governments of its nation-states have become endowed over the course of a long-term historical process.[16] Most of those people who have recently been baptised as 'European citizens', in other words, are completely accustomed to being governed by political leaders with whom they share the same nationality, and who speak to 'us' in 'our (national) language'. Although rivers of ink have flowed with regard to the so-called 'democratic deficit' in the European Union, rarely does one hear it stated openly and explicitly that a fundamental obstacle to the resolution of this problem is the fact that even if the peoples of Europe were granted the opportunity to vote in an utterly 'transparent' and 'democratic' manner for a fully empowered European Commission, Parliament, and President,

[16] This has been explored by Helen Wallace in a paper entitled 'Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC' (1993), and in other contributions to García (ed., 1993). More recently, various authors have also examined this important problem from different angles in an interesting collection of essays edited by Banchoff and Smith (1999).

many of them would still reject the utterly unpalatable prospect of being governed by 'bloody foreigners'.

Nevertheless, as my comparative analysis of Britain and Spain has demonstrated, it is clearly a mistake to classify national we-images and we-feelings as obstacles which, always and necessarily, stand in the way of European unification. In reality, and to a considerable extent, the ideals and sentiments of nationhood have also played a fundamental role in building up the legitimacy and popularity of EC/EU membership amongst different populations. Hence, although Elias was undoubtedly right about the existence of a 'drag effect' which has slown down, and indeed continues to block, the process of European integration, it is also evident that this phenomenon should not be viewed as a uniformly homogeneous trend which is identical in all national contexts. Instead, what one can observe is that some nations, such as Britain, seem to have a much greater tendency to 'drag' along reluctantly in this project of supranational bonding, while others, such as Spain, seem to be much more willing to push this process forward with enthusiasm. The evidence of my research suggests that these divergent symbolic and emotional tendencies can be explained by analyzing the historically conditioned, collectively shared 'pride-shame balance' which has developed, and is developing, within each member state of the European Union.

Future sociological and anthropological studies could undoubtedly continue to investigate this important phenomenon in other countries and historical periods, by employing the theoretical and methodological framework I have employed in this thesis. It would undoubtedly be worthwhile, for instance, to explore the relation between national pride and the affective meanings of 'Europe' which has emerged in the cases of Germany and Italy, given their own 'shameful past' as the countries in which Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini became worshipped national 'totems'; in France, with its own attempts to recover global grandeur after the humiliations it suffered during World War II, and to continue its universal 'civilizing mission' in the world, by leading the construction of *l'Europe*; in Greece and Portugal, with their own

particular we-images of humiliating economic, political, and cultural 'backwardness'; in Ireland, where 'Europe' has been widely perceived as a way to build up national strength and self-confidence *vis-à-vis* Britain, through the status-boost provided by the platform of EU membership; in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they attempt to recover influence, prosperity, and respectability on the world stage, by being accepted into the EU, and so on. At the same time, although I have not focused on the discourse of sub-state minority nationalisms in this thesis, one could also investigate the way in which such movements, in areas like the Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales, have viewed the European Union as an opportunity to boost their own collective 'status honour', by liberating themselves from what they perceive as the humiliating, oppressive boots of Madrid or London, and hence by recovering an independent prestige-ranking in the world as separate 'nations in Europe'. This is still a largely unexplored field of sociological and anthropological research which in my view could be fruitfully explored through the theoretical focus on the historically developed, collective emotions of national 'face' that I have employed in this thesis.

For the time being, with the sincere hope that my own work may inspire further investigations into the pride-shame balance of other national collectivities, I shall tentatively conclude this thesis with some final reflections on the future of the European Union.

10.3 Towards a European pride-shame balance?

In my introductory chapter, I cited a passage from *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* in which Emile Durkheim suggested that 'as long as there are states, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more warranted' (1992 [1950]: 75). Today, as this thesis has demonstrated, Europe's nation-states are clearly still alive and well, and hence so is the national pride of their respective populations. At the same time, however, following this Durkheimian line of reasoning, one can expect that if a 'European super-state' truly emerges in the coming decades,

then a European 'we-layer' of collective self-esteem is also likely to arise, and will undoubtedly grow if this process of supranational integration continues to develop successfully. Indeed, to some extent, one can already observe the early birth pangs of a kind of 'European pride-shame balance', especially with regard to the creation of the 'euro' currency. For instance, all those 'European citizens' whose national economies have joined the 'European' monetary union are beginning to read in their daily newspapers, and to listen in the evening news broadcasts on television, the latests reports on 'how the euro is doing' in comparison to the dollar or the yen, and hence how much more (or less) prosperous *we* (as 'Europeans') are likely to be in comparison to *them* (the Americans or the Japanese). Hence, in the competitive field of economic prosperity, the members of so-called 'Euro-land' are now beginning to play this particular 'game of international honour' not as Germans, Italians, Spaniards, or Frenchmen, but rather as 'Europeans'.

In fact, the emergence of a 'European pride-shame balance' is also observable in other arenas of collective status-ranking. For instance, in the everyday evaluations which people routinely make in the sphere of cultural prestige, it is not infrequent – at least in relatively educated circles – to hear self-flattering remarks which seem to reflect the emergence of a 'European group charisma' with regard to the supposedly 'much higher quality' and the 'profound intellectual depth' of 'European cinema', in comparison to what is typically denigrated as 'Hollywood rubbish'. The same undoubtedly applies to the frequent boasts which one hears about the 'exquisite cuisine of Europe', in contrast and opposition to 'American fast food trash'. Even more significantly, in the always potentially dangerous, competitive arena of political power and military muscle, one can also begin to perceive the timid emergence of a 'European' collective self-esteem, as claims increasingly begin to be made in public discourses about how the creation of a common 'European' foreign policy, and perhaps even of a future 'European' army, will finally make Europe 'fully independent' from the humiliating subordination to 'the Americans' which *we* (as 'Europeans') have suffered since the tragedy of World War II fell upon *us*.

This kind of 'European patriotism' was clearly illustrated, for example, in the emotive rhetoric with which Jacques Delors described what he called 'militant Europeanism', during a speech he delivered at the College of Europe in October 1989, when he was still the President of the European Commission. This address was delivered in the very same place and almost exactly one year after Margaret Thatcher's notorious Bruges speech. Delors's choice of time and place was in no way a coincidence. On the contrary, his aim was evidently to strike back with discursive blows against the British Prime Minister, in response to the accusations she had made about the European Commission's alleged attempts 'to suppress nationhood'.[17] As I showed previously in my chaper on Britain and Maastricht, according to Thatcher this was totally absurd and highly dangerous, since, as she put it, 'our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German'. For this reason, the British leader proclaimed that it would be 'folly' to try to force Europe's culturally diverse nations into an artificial 'identikit European personality' – the suffocating ideological straitjacket which was supposedly being fabricated by Delors and his army of sinister 'Brussels bureaucrats'.

In opposition to Thatcher's scaremongering tactics, however, Delors stated that the European federalism which he defended was 'a way of reconciling what for many appears to be irreconcilable: the emergence of a united Europe and loyalty to one's homeland' (1994 [1989]: 52). Indeed, he explicitly declared that 'nobody is being asked to renounce legitimate patriotism', and went on to explain that:

> I want not only to unite people, as Jean Monnet did, but also to bring nations together. As the Community develops, as our governments emphasize the need for a people's Europe, is it heresy to hope that all Europeans could feel that they belong to a Community which they see as a second homeland? If this view is rejected, European integration will founder and the specter of nationalism will return to haunt us, because the Community will have failed to win the hearts and minds of the people, the first requirement for the success of any human venture.(1994 [1989]: 61)

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[17] *The Times*, 21 September 1988. Thatcher's speech is also reprinted in Nelsen and Stubb (eds., 1994).

In today's globalized world of 'superpowers', Delors argued, it was completely obvious that Europe's nations could have very little 'influence' or 'clout' on their own. However, by fusing together their immense natural, industrial, and human resources through the project of European integration, the President of the European Commission assured that things could be very different in the future. Hence, after listing an impressive catalogue of all the economic and political successes which the European Community had achieved for its member states since the Treaty of Rome had been signed in 1957, Delors triumphantly proclaimed that 'Europe' was 'once again a force to be reckoned with' (1994 [1989]: 55). In many ways, Delors's speech was reminiscent of the famous address which Winston Churchill delivered half a century earlier, at the Congress of Europe in The Hague:

> We must proclaim the mission and design of a United Europe whose moral conception will win the respect and gratitude of mankind, and whose physical strength will be such that none will dare molest her tranquil sway... I hope to see a Europe where men and women of every country will think of being European as of belonging to their native land, and wherever they go in this wide domain will truly feel 'Here I am at home.' (cited in Davies 1997: 1066).

Today, it seems evident that the collective ideals and sentiments of this 'European patriotism' are still relatively weak, and largely limited to the elite circle of the EU's own officials, as well as of the cosmopolitan-minded 'jet-set' of European businessmen, journalists, artists, scientists, and intellectuals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the timid emergence of a European 'we-feeling' of 'group charisma' has actually been viewed by some authors not as something to celebrate enthusiastically, but rather as a cause for considerable ethical concern. Pierre Bourdieu, for one, has recently warned that 'we will certainly not have gained much if Eurocentrism is substituted for the wounded nationalisms of the old imperial nations' (1998b: 9). Similarly, the British anthropologist Cris Shore (2000), has ominously warned about the potential dangers of a future 'Euro-nationalism' which could lead, and perhaps is already leading, to new racist and xenophobic categorizations of 'we (white) Europeans' against 'threatening barbarians' such as 'Islamic fundamentalists', 'uncivilized Africans', and so on.

Such fears are certainly not unfounded, as is illustrated by the reemergence of extremist right-wing parties and neo-Nazi groups, who sometimes invoke the purity of a 'European culture' or of a 'Christian Europe' which is to be defended from contamination by the 'non-European Other'.[18] In this sense, it is absolutely clear that a 'European' form of collective narcissism could potentially be just as dangerous as the collective narcissism of nations has been in the past, and this is undoubtedly something which social scientists should be keeping an eye on in the years to come.

However, in the midst of all the self-doubting scepticism, cynical pessimism and dreary defeatism which has been one of the fundamental characteristics of our so-called 'post-modern' condition, perhaps we may derive some optimism from the second half of the passage I cited earlier from Durkheim's lectures on the 'civic morals' of patriotism. It was there that the great founder of French sociology suggested that societies could conceivably derive their collective pride not from being 'the greatest or the wealthiest', but from 'being the most just' and 'possessing the best moral constitution' (1992 [1950]: 75). In an earlier section of this same lecture, Durkheim also stated that what he called 'world patriotism' was gradually beginning to emerge:

> No matter how devoted men may be to their native land, they all to-day are aware that beyond the forces of national life there are others, in a higher region and not so transitory, for they are unrelated to conditions peculiar to any given political group and are not bound up to its fortunes. There is something more universal and more enduring. It is true to say that those aims that are most general and the most unchanging are also the most sublime. As we advance in evolution, we see the ideals men pursue breaking free of the local or ethnic conditions obtaining in a certain region of the world or a certain human group, and rising above all that is particular and so approaching the universal. We might say that the moral forces come to have a hierarchic order according to their degree of generality or diffusion.(1992 [1950]: 72-3).

[18] This problem has recently been explored in detail by the social psychologist Anna Tryandafyllidou (2000).

Nevertheless, as I noted in the introduction, he observed that this emotional allegiance to humankind as a whole still clashed with people's affiliations to their national states.

Durkheim also noted that some politicians and intellectuals of his day had already begun to propose the creation of a European federation to resolve the ethical tensions between nationalism and cosmpolitanism. However, he warned that this European polity would still merely include one limited portion of humanity, and hence that it would inevitably continue to conflict with the values of 'world patriotism':

> A confederation of European states... is advanced, but vainly, as a half-way course to achieving societies on a bigger scale than those we know to-day. This greater federation, again, would be like an individual State, having its own identity and its own interests and features. It would not be humanity.(1992 [1950]: 74).

Hence, for Durkheim, the only conceivable solution to this moral problem was for 'patriotism' to become 'a fragment of world patriotism' – in other words, for nation-states and all sub-sections of humanity to channel their energies towards the achievement of 'human ideals' (1992 [1950]: 75). In his book on the sociology of education, he made exactly the same point:

> The problem of whether humanity ought to be subordinate to the state, cosmopolitism to nationalism, is... one of those that arouses the greatest controversy today... The only way of resolving this difficulty, which troubles public thinking, is to seek the realization of the human ideal through the most highly developed groups that we know... that is to say throught the efforts of specific nations. To eliminate all such contradictions, thus satisfying the requirements of our moral consciousness, it suffices that the state commit itself as its main goal not to expanding, in a material sense, to the detriment of its neighbors, not to gaining greater strength than they; but to the goal of realizing among its own people the general interests of humanity... From this point of view, all rivalry between different countries disappears and, consequently, all contradiction between cosmpopolitanism and patriotism.(1961 [1925]: 75-7)

Hence, Durkheim concluded that although, 'so far as we can now see, there will always be a plurality of states', the nation-states of the world could conceivably collaborate together 'to realize the goals of mankind' though what he called 'pacific' rather than 'aggressive' forms of patriotism (1961 [1925]: 77-8]).

Indeed, in the concluding chapter of his very first book, *The Division of Labour in Society*, Durkheim had already foreseen that 'among European peoples there is a tendency to form, by spontaneous movement, a European society which has, at present, some idea of itself and the beginning of organization' (1964 [1893]: 405). Furthermore, anticipating his later arguments on the ethical clash between 'patriotism' and 'world patriotism', he proposed a sociological hypothesis on the nature of human egotism, in which he suggested how people's instinctively selfish tendencies could conceivably be constrained at both individual and collective levels:

> Men have long dreamt of finally realizing in fact the ideal of human fraternity. People pray for a state where war will no longer be the law of international relations, where relations between societies will be pacifically regulated, as those between individuals already are, where all men will collaborate in the same work and live the same life... But they can be satisfied only if all men form one society, subject to the same laws. For just as private conflicts con be regulated only by the action of the society in which the individuals live, so intersocial conflicts can be regulated only by a society which comprises in scope all others. *The only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power of the group; and the only power which can serve to moderate the egotism of groups is that of some other group which embraces them.*(1964 [1893]: 405, my italics).

In other words, the only way to constrain *individual* selfishness and narcissism is by making people think and feel that they are part of a larger group to which they should be loyal; and the only way to constrain *collective* selfishness and narcissism is by making the members of a group think and feel that they are part of an even larger group which they should respect.

From this illuminating Durkheimian perspective, we could perhaps imagine a future world in which the egotism of Europe's nation-states would be effectively constrained by a wider allegiance to their European *patrie*, and the egotism of the European Union would simultaneously be constrained by a wider planetary affiliation to what Edgar Morin (1999) has recently called *terre patrie* ('homeland earth').[19] In short, it can conceivably be possible to make

[19] In relation to Europe, Morin has similarly promoted the vision of an outward-looking European Union that would pursue what he calls 'planetary anthropolitics' in his book *Penser L'Europe* (Paris, Gallimard, 1987), of which I have read the Spanish edition *Pensar Europa* (Barcelona, Gedisa, 1988).

national sentiments compatible both with the unification of Europe, as well as with Durkheim's ideal of 'world patriotism', as long as the maintenance of peaceful relations and solidarity with all peoples becomes a fundamental source of national and European pride, while the violation of these principles becomes a potent source of national and European shame.

To some extent, one can already observe that in recent times, a European pride-shame balance or 'group charisma' has also been emerging in the sphere of moral respectability, which is typically framed in contrast and opposition to the 'yanks' across the ocean. For instance, it is not infrequent these days to hear denunciations voiced by EU authorities, as well as by European intellectuals, concerning the American government's 'barbarous' maintenance of the death penalty, its 'scandalous' attitude to the selling of guns amongst the general public, and the 'shameless' way in which it has decided to ignore international treaties that have been established to protect the global habitat which all the world's peoples share.[20] As Elias pointed out (1991a: 232), over the course of history, humanity as a whole has clearly become one interdependent survival unit, given the overwhelming destructive capacity of modern weaponry, as well as the environmental dangers which threaten the sustainability of life on earth. In this sense, it is absolutely vital for the future of humankind as a whole to develop we-images and we-feelings about itself – in other words, for *us*, as human beings, to become conscious of ourselves as an interdependent global community, and to develop a sense of collective self-esteem about how *we* are trying to build a better world for ourselves, as well as for the future generations that will populate the earth after we end our own individual life-journeys.

At a time when the original ethical objectives of European integration seem to have been largely abandoned or forgotten, and money appears to have taken over as the fundamental *raison*

[20] For instance, the current President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, recently published an article in the Spanish newspaper *El Mundo* (5 April 2001), in which he criticised the American government, headed by George W. Bush, for deciding to reject the international Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of gas emissions which are provoking the phenomenon of global warming. The European Union, Prodi stated, will respect these agreements, with or without the support of the United States, because it considers them to be crucial for the future of humanity.

d' être of the EU, there is undoubtedly a need to revitalize the ideal of 'Europe', by making it a morally worthwhile collective project. When Jean Monnet originally outlined his conception of European integration in an article he wrote back in the early 1960's, what he had in mind was precisely the construction of an outward-looking, globally responsible community:

> One impression predominates in my mind above all others. It is this: unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe and consequently in the world. People, more often outside the European Community than within, are tempted to see the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the overtones of power this implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-century power philosophy gave rise. The natural attitude of a European Community based on the exercise by nations of common responsibilities will be to make these nations also aware of their responsibilities, as a Community, to the world.(1994 [1962]: 24)[21]

When we read these words, perhaps the instinctive response of our detached, scientific habitus is to ridicule 'the lofty and utopian rhetoric of a politician'. Nevertheless, we should also continuously remind ourselves of 'the truth' which Max Weber believed had been confirmed by 'all historical experience': the fact that 'man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible' (1946a [1919]: 128).

[21] The original text was published in the *Journal of Common Market Studies* (1962), Vol.1, No. 1, pp. 203-11.

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